Houthis

• 1. Introduction

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  On the 31st of October, during the Gaza war, the Houthis launched ballistic missiles from Yemen toward Israel. Israel's Arrow missile defense system shot them down, and Israeli officials claimed it was the first combat ever to take place in space.

  The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, are a Zaydi revivalist and Shia Islamist political and military organization. They emerged from Yemen in the 1990s. Today they are a central player in Yemen's civil war, and some countries designate them a terrorist organization.

  How did a movement that began with summer camps for students end up firing missiles at another country? What do the Houthis actually believe, and who supplies their weapons? And what do the Yemenis who live under their rule think of them?

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• 2. Roots and Insurgency

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  In 1992, in Saada Governorate, a group called the Believing Youth was founded. Sources credit either Mohammed al-Houthi or his brother Hussein al-Houthi with starting it. The group ran school clubs and summer camps meant to promote a Zaydi revival. By 1994-95, between 15,000 and 20,000 students had attended those camps. The lessons included lectures by Mohammed Hussein Fadhlallah, a Lebanese Shia scholar, and by Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah.

  Ahmed Addaghashi, a professor at Sanaa University, describes the early movement as moderate. In his telling, it preached tolerance and held a broad-minded view of all Yemeni peoples. Adam Baron of the European Council on Foreign Relations stresses something else. He describes the formation of the Houthi organisations as a reaction to foreign intervention. The grievances were fear of Saudi-influenced ideologies, the former government's alliance with the United States, corruption, and the marginalisation of much of Saada.

  Outsiders coined the name Houthis from the surname of an early leader, Hussein al-Houthi. The al-Houthi family and the movement are not the same thing, although the family supplies much of the leadership.

  In 2003, influenced by Hezbollah, the movement adopted an official slogan against the United States, Israel, and the Jews. One analyst argues that Hussein al-Houthi helped radicalise some Zaydis after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He had no official tie to the Believing Youth. Young people linked to the group chanted the slogans in the Al Saleh Mosque in Sanaa after Friday prayers. The chanting drew the authorities' attention, and their fear was captured in one line: "The security authorities thought that if today the Houthis chanted 'Death to America', tomorrow they could be chanting 'Death to the president of Yemen."

  In 2004, 800 supporters of the Believing Youth were arrested in Sanaa. President Ali Abdullah Saleh then invited Hussein al-Houthi to a meeting in the capital, and Hussein declined. On the 18th of June, Saleh sent government forces to arrest him. Hussein answered by launching an insurgency against the central government. The Yemeni military killed him in Saada on the 10th of September. His brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi has mostly led the movement since.

  The third Saada war, from November 2005 to February 2006, was increasingly fought along tribal feuds. That distorted the socio-economic, religious, and ideological aims Hussein al-Houthi had set. The intermittent fighting ended with a ceasefire agreement in 2010. The Yemeni army and air force had been used to suppress the rebellion in the north, and the Saudis joined those campaigns. The Houthis won against both Saleh and the Saudi army. The Brookings Institution says this particularly humiliated the Saudis, who had spent tens of billions of dollars on their military.

  In 2005, the movement had between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters. By 2009 estimates ranged from 2,000 to 10,000. In 2010 the Yemen Post claimed more than 100,000 fighters. Houthi expert Ahmed Al-Bahri put the total that year at 100,000-120,000 followers, counting both armed fighters and unarmed loyalists.

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• 3. March on Sanaa

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  The Houthis joined the 2011 Yemeni Revolution and the National Dialogue Conference that followed. They then rejected the November 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council deal. Their stated reason was that it split Yemen into poor and wealthy regions. They also pointed to the assassination of their representative at the conference.

  By the 9th of November 2011, the Houthis were said to control two governorates, Saada and Al Jawf. They were close to taking a third, Hajjah, which would let them attack Sanaa directly. By May 2012 they reportedly controlled most of all three. They had also gained access to the Red Sea and begun building barricades north of Sanaa.

  On the 13th of July 2014, the government raised fuel prices. Houthi leaders answered with massive rallies in Sanaa and demanded that President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi's government resign over corruption. In late 2014 the Houthis repaired their relationship with Saleh, and with his help they took control of the capital. By September 2014 they held parts of Sanaa, including government buildings and a radio station. Al-Qaeda strongly challenged their control as it spread to the rest of Sanaa and to towns such as Rada'.

  On the 20th of January 2015, Houthi fighters seized the presidential palace. Hadi was inside during the takeover but was not harmed. On the 6th of February the movement took control of the government. It dissolved parliament and declared its Revolutionary Committee the acting authority.

  On the 20th of March, suicide attacks hit the al-Badr and al-Hashoosh mosques during midday prayers, and the Islamic State quickly claimed responsibility. The blasts killed 142 Houthi worshippers and wounded more than 351. It was the deadliest terrorist attack in Yemen's history.

  Seven days later, on the 27th of March 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched an airstrike in Yemen. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan took part. The United States helped plan airstrikes and provided logistical and intelligence support. The Battle of Aden ran from the 25th of March to the 22nd of July. The US Navy joined a Saudi-led naval blockade of Houthi-controlled territory, which humanitarian organizations call the main cause of famine in Yemen.

  A report in Esquire magazine in September 2015 called the Houthis, once outliers, among the most stable and organised movements in Yemen. Many formerly powerful parties had become disorganised and lost public favour. The newly branded Ansar Allah name grew more attractive as a result.

  The alliance with Saleh broke down in late 2017. Armed clashes began in Sanaa on the 28th of November. On the 2nd of December, Saleh declared the split in a televised statement. He called on his supporters to take back the country and said he was open to talks with the Saudi-led coalition. On the 4th of December 2017, Houthi fighters assaulted his house in Sanaa, and Saleh was killed the same day. The Houthis lost significant support among Sunni tribes after killing him.

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• 4. Ideas and Faith

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  Zaydis make up about 25% of Yemen's population, and Sunnis make up the other 75%. Zaydi-led governments ruled Yemen for a thousand years, until 1962. The Houthi movement centers its beliefs on this branch of Islam, a sect found almost only in Yemen. Yet the Houthis reject the portrayal of themselves as a faction interested only in Zaydi issues.

  Bernard Haykel, an American historian, sees two central tenets. The first is the "Quranic Way", the belief that the Quran allows no interpretation and holds everything needed to improve Muslim society. The second is the absolute, divine right of the Ahl al-Bayt, the Prophet's descendants, to rule. That second belief is attributed to Jaroudism, a fundamentalist offshoot of Zaydism.

  The Houthis have not publicly called for restoring the old Zaydi imamate, and Hussein al-Houthi did not either. Most Yemenis think poorly of the old imamate. Hussein instead proposed a "Guiding Eminence" (alam al-huda), a descendant of the Prophet who would act as a "universal leader for the world". He never defined the powers of this role or how its holder would be chosen.

  Hussein al-Houthi's teachings were gathered after his death in a book titled Malazim, meaning Fascicles. The Houthis treat it as more important than older Zaydi theological traditions. That has led to repeated disputes with established Zaydi religious leaders. The book reflects many influences, including Khomeinism and revolutionary Sunni movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Hussein believed the last exemplary Zaydi scholar was Al-Hadi ila'l-Haqq Yahya, and that later imams had deviated. The Quranic Way also rejects tafsir, or Quranic interpretation, as derivative and divisive.

  Salafism is the other great force in this story. The Houthis say they fight its alleged expansion. Before their rise, state-supported Salafis had harassed Zaydis and destroyed Zaydi sites, most notably cemeteries. After taking power in 2014, the Houthis "crushed" the Salafi community in Saada Governorate and mostly eliminated al-Qaeda from areas they hold. They view al-Qaeda as "Salafi jihadists" and therefore as "mortal enemies". Between 2014 and 2019 the Houthi leadership also signed multiple co-existence agreements with the Salafi community.

  The relationship with Sunnis is mixed. Researcher Ahmed Nagi says themes such as Muslim unity, prophetic lineages, and opposition to corruption let the Houthis mobilize people in predominantly Shafi'i areas. Yet the group has closed Sunni mosques and mostly placed Zaydis in leadership roles. Many Zaydis oppose the Houthis too. They see them as Iranian proxies, and Haykel calls their approach a "highly politicised, revolutionary, and intentionally simplistic, even primitivist interpretation" of Zaydism.

  On the political side, former Houthi spokesperson Hassan al-Homran said: "Ansar Allah supports the establishment of a civil state in Yemen." Insider Hussein al-Bukhari said the Houthis do not want a cleric-led government on the Iranian model. His reason was that Shafi followers outnumber Zaydis. After the 2014 takeover the movement stayed committed to republicanism and kept celebrating republican holidays. In 2018 the Houthi leadership proposed a non-partisan transitional government of technocrats.

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• 5. Missiles and Ships

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  In 2017, the United Nations reported that about 70% of the Yemeni military's weapons were likely lost. Between 2004 and 2010 the Houthis often looted government weapons stores. Weak control left behind Scud and OTR-21 Tochka missiles from the 1994 Yemeni civil war.

  Late in 2015, the Houthis announced local production of the short-range Qaher-1 ballistic missile on Al-Masirah TV. In March 2015 the Saudi-led coalition had claimed it destroyed most Houthi missile capability, but attacks persisted. By mid-2016, with technological help from Iran, the Houthis began work on new variants. In September they introduced the Burkan-1, a Scud variant with longer range. The next month came the Burkan-2H, which had a separating warhead. These weapons let the Houthis strike deep into Saudi Arabia, including the capital, Riyadh. By June 2019, the Saudi-led coalition said the Houthis had launched 226 ballistic missiles.

  In February 2017, the Houthis revealed their drone program. From mid-2018 into 2019, long-range ballistic missile attacks became less frequent, while drones and artillery grew more common. Drones served for reconnaissance and for attacks on both military and civilian targets. The Qasef drone, which carries up to 30 kg of explosives, had been used in over a dozen attacks since 2016. The Sammad-2, Sammad-3, and Qasif-2K suicide drones were unveiled in 2019. Drone attacks peaked in 2021, and many targeted Saudi Arabia.

  On the 14th of September 2019, the Abqaiq-Khurais attack hit Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia. The Houthis claimed responsibility, while the United States asserted that Iran was behind it. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said: "Yemeni people are exercising their legitimate right of defence... the attacks were a reciprocal response to aggression against Yemen for years."

  In June 2024, the Houthis unveiled the Palestine-2 missile, which closely resembled the Iranian Fattah-1 and Kheibar Shekan missiles. The Houthis called it locally made, and defense analysts rejected that claim. In September it was fired at Israel and landed in an open area near Ben Gurion Airport. It traveled 2,000 km in 11 minutes. The Houthis claimed a two-stage solid fuel design, a range of 2,150 km, and a top speed of Mach 16. Israel and the United States denied that it was hypersonic.

  Al-Dailami and Al Hudaydah are two key air bases the Houthis hold, and they partly control the Yemeni Air Force. Their air force consists of a single Northrop F-5 fighter jet seized from the government. A Soviet-era Mikoyan MiG-29 flew over Sanaa during a military parade in 2023. They also operate Mil Mi-17 helicopters seized during the civil war.

  The fight for Aden in 2015 largely destroyed the Yemeni Navy, including all its missile-carrying vessels. Air attacks by the Saudi-led intervention later that year destroyed most surviving patrol craft and helicopters. The Houthis were left with anti-ship missiles stored ashore, no launchers, and a handful of small patrol ships. Early anti-ship attacks were limited to rocket-propelled grenades fired at vessels close to shore.

  On the 1st of October 2016, a single C-801/C-802 missile fired from a shore battery hit the UAE Navy's HSV-2 Swift catamaran. The ship stayed afloat, but the damage was so severe that it had to be decommissioned. The US Navy then sent two destroyers and an amphibious transport dock to the area. Those vessels were attacked with anti-ship missiles three times without success.

  The Houthis converted 10-meter patrol craft, donated by the UAE to the Yemeni Coast Guard in the early 2010s, into water-borne explosive devices. They probably had help from Iranian engineers. In 2017 one of them attacked the Saudi frigate Al Madinah. Three more designs followed: the Tawfan-1, Tawfan-2, and Tawfan-3. The Houthis also produced 15 types of naval mines, which are increasingly deployed in the Red Sea but have not yet damaged naval vessels. About 30 coast-watcher stations were set up, and disguised "spy dhows" were built. Remote-controlled drone boats such as the Shark-33 began as old coast guard patrol boats. The Houthis have also trained combat divers on the Zuqar and Bawardi islands.

  A 2022 Houthi parade displayed the 120 km-range Noor and 200 km-range Qader anti-ship missiles. It also showed the 300 km-range Khalij Fars anti-ship ballistic missile. Iran delivered these weapons, arguably the most significant escalation in its support.

  On the 17th of January 2022, missile and drone attacks on UAE industrial targets set fuel trucks on fire and killed three foreign workers. It was the first specific attack the Houthis admitted and the first to cause deaths. A Saudi-led response included a the 21st of January air strike on a detention centre that killed at least 70 people.

  The Houthis say their Red Sea ship attacks show solidarity with Palestinians and aim to ease humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. To end them, they demanded a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to Israel's blockade. In January 2024, the United States and United Kingdom struck multiple Houthi targets in Yemen. The US also designated the Houthis a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. In mid-March 2025, the US launched a military campaign against Yemen, and the Houthis said women and children were killed.

  In February 2026, the Houthis announced they had resumed attacks on ships in response to US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran. On the 28th of March 2026, during the 2026 Iran war, a Houthi missile was launched toward Beersheba in southern Israel after their leader gave a speech. Hours later they confirmed launching a second missile.

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• 6. Backers and Doubts

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  Iran's Quds Force has smuggled weapons to the Houthis since 2009, mainly in dhows and small fishing boats. By 2015 it was smuggling missile components too. Hezbollah's Unit 3800, established in 2003, has given the Houthis training and strategic assistance. In December 2017, after examining debris from the Burkan-2H, the United Nations concluded that Iran had supplied the missile.

  In 2013, an Iranian vessel was seized carrying Katyusha rockets, heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, RPG-7s, and Iranian-made night vision goggles. It also held artillery systems that track targets 40 km away. In April 2016, the US Navy intercepted a large Iranian shipment of thousands of AK-47 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and 0.50-caliber machine guns. The Pentagon described it as likely headed to Yemen.

  In March 2017, Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran's Quds Force, met with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps about a newly accelerated effort to empower the Houthis. He was quoted as saying: "At this meeting, they agreed to increase the amount of help, through training, arms and financial support." In August 2018, Iran's Fars News Agency quoted IRGC commander Nasser Shabani: "We (IRGC) told Yemenis Houthi rebels to strike two Saudi oil tankers, and they did it." The IRGC called the quote a "Western lie" and said Shabani was retired. He had served 37 years, and no report of his retirement existed.

  In 2019, Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei announced his "spiritual" support for the movement. He did so in a personal meeting in Tehran with Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdul Salam. In 2024, Reuters reported that IRGC and Hezbollah commanders were on the ground in Yemen, overseeing Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.

  Other voices dispute how much Iran controls. In April 2015, National Security Council spokesperson Bernadette Meehan said: "It remains our assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over the Houthis in Yemen." Joost Hiltermann points out that the Houthis flatly rejected Iran's demand not to take Sanaa in 2015. He adds that US and UK support for the Saudi-led coalition exceeds Iran's help to the Houthis by many factors.

  Thomas Juneau writes that Iran's support has grown since 2014 but remains too limited to shift the balance of power. The Quincy Institute argues that Tehran's influence has been "greatly exaggerated" by Saudi Arabia, its coalition partners, and their lobbyists in Washington. Academics Marieke Brandt and Charles Schmitz say the proxy label began as a political narrative of Saleh, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The Houthis themselves have criticized Iran's state religion, Twelver Shi'ism. A December 2009 cable from Sanaa recorded that US analysts believed the Houthis got weapons from the Yemeni black market and corrupt Republican Guard members.

  In August 2018, Reuters reported that a confidential United Nations investigation found North Korea was trying to sell weapons to the Houthis. In August 2019, South Korean intelligence traced Scud missiles used against Saudi Arabia back to North Korea. In January 2024, Yonhap News Agency reported weapons shipped via Iran, based on Hangul writing found on missiles fired toward Israel.

  In July 2024, Newsweek noted that the Houthis possessed Russian-made P-800 Oniks missiles, probably transferred via Syria and Iran. The Wall Street Journal reported that Russia considered arming the Houthis with advanced anti-ship missiles but did not follow through after pushback from the US and Saudi Arabia. In August 2024, Middle East Eye, citing a US official, reported Russian GRU personnel in Houthi-controlled Yemen. In October, the Wall Street Journal reported that Russia was supplying geospatial intelligence to target Western ships.

  Two China-based companies were sanctioned by America in 2024 for supplying materials used to build missiles and drones. Yemeni border customs seized 800 Chinese-made drone propellers bound for the Houthis. According to the Wall Street Journal, the Houthis sent a group from Saada to Beijing to study Mandarin and manage drone and missile guidance supplies. The United States Department of State says the Chinese company Chang Guang Satellite Technology Corporation provided intelligence to help target US warships.

  A 2024 United Nations report called the Houthi relationship with Al-Shabaab "transactional or opportunistic, and not ideological". A 2025 report said it was deepening. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis had fought before but have kept a ceasefire since 2022. Under it they cooperate in attacks on the Yemeni government and in security and intelligence.

  In January 2021, the United States designated the Houthis a terrorist organization, raising fears of an aid shortage in Yemen. The stance was reversed a month later after Joe Biden became president. In January 2024, the US and UK sanctioned key Houthi figures, including the defense minister. Those sanctions came on top of existing ones against 11 Houthi individuals and 2 entities. On the 28th of April 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned three shipping companies for delivering oil products through the Houthi-controlled port of Ras Isa. On the 8th of April 2026, Costa Rica designated the Houthis a terrorist organization.

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• 7. Propaganda and Rule

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  The Houthis are said to have "a huge and well-oiled propaganda machine". Lebanese Hezbollah gave technical support to build what has been called "a formidable media arm". The televised speeches of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi are modeled after those of Hassan Nasrallah. After the peaceful youth uprising of 2011, the group launched its official TV channel, Almasirah. It also operates up to 25 print and electronic newspapers.

  The zawamil are among the most versatile forms of Houthi media. This genre of tribal oral poetry is rooted in Yemeni tradition. Singers such as Issa al-Laith perform it, and it spreads on YouTube, Twitter and Telegram. The Spectator calls it the most successful part of Houthi propaganda. It stresses the movement's claimed virtues of piety, bravery and poverty against the wealth and hypocrisy of its adversaries.

  Radio is another tool. The Houthis often seize stations and confiscate equipment from outlets that ignore their broadcast rules. In 2019, a Yemeni radio station aligned with the group raised 73.5 million Yemeni rials, about $132,000, for Hezbollah.

  On the 13th of January 2014, a gathering at the main sports stadium in Sanaa marked the birth of Mohammed. Men filled the open-air stadium, guided by safety officials in bright vests and matching hats. Women filled the adjacent indoor stadium, led in by security women in purple sashes. At least five thousand women attended, ten times as many as at a similar event on the 24th of January 2013.

  The movement says it defends women's rights to vote and hold public office. It fields a women's security force and a Girl Scouts wing. Some feminists have fled from government-held areas into Houthi territory, where radical jihadists are at least less empowered. Yet it has also been reported that the Houthis harass women and restrict their movement and expression.

  Their attitude to the arts is inconsistent. They have let radio stations keep broadcasting music they see as too Western, but they have also banned certain songs. In one widely reported case, police said a wedding could have music if loudspeakers did not broadcast it. The main wedding singer was arrested when guests did not comply. Journalist Robert F. Worth wrote that "many secular-minded Yemenis seem unsure whether to view the Houthis as oppressors or potential allies."

  A leaked 2009 US Embassy cable reported that the Houthis had set up courts and prisons in areas they control. They impose their own laws, demand protection money, and order executions. Yet Ahmad al-Haj of the AP argued that the Houthis were winning hearts and minds. They provided security in areas long neglected by the government and limited the arbitrary power of influential sheikhs. The Civic Democratic Foundation says they help settle tribal conflicts and reduce revenge killings. Because high-ranking officials often cannot check the powers of regional officers, the treatment of civilians depends on the area.

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• 8. Rights and Reckoning

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  The Panel of Experts on Yemen, established under Security Council resolution 2140, says the Houthis have carried out a wide range of human rights violations. These include violations of international humanitarian law and abuse of women and children. Children as young as 13 have been arrested on charges such as "indecent acts". Minors share cells with adult prisoners.

  Human Rights Watch says the Houthis intensified their recruitment of children in 2015. UNICEF has said that children make up up to a third of all fighters in Yemen, with the Houthis and other armed groups. Human Rights Watch has also accused Houthi forces of using landmines in Taizz, Yemen's third-largest city, causing many civilian casualties. It documented 16 cases in which Houthi authorities held people unlawfully, in large part to extort money from relatives or to swap them for prisoners.

  A United Nations Human Rights Council report covering July 2019 to June 2020 described the recruitment of boys as young as seven. It also described the recruitment of 34 girls aged 13-17 as spies, recruiters, guards, medics, and members of a female fighting force. Women in Houthi-controlled areas have been blocked from traveling without a male guardian, even for essential healthcare. Anadolu Agency reported that Yemen-based rights groups documented 1,181 violations against women by the Houthis from 2017 to 2020.

  The United Nations World Food Programme has accused the Houthis of diverting food aid and removing food lorries from distribution areas. Rations were sold on the open market or given to people not entitled to them. Spokesman Herve Verhoosel said continued blocking of biometric registration was undermining a process that would let the agency verify that food reaches people "on the brink of famine". The agency warned it might have to suspend aid in phases.

  On the 9th of February 2024, Amnesty International reported that two Houthi-run courts had sentenced 48 individuals to death, flogging, or prison over same-sex conduct charges in the past month. Human Rights Watch says Houthi militias have beaten and tortured detained migrants and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa.

  Yemen's rural Jewish community had about 50 remaining members. The Houthis have been accused of expelling or restricting them, which Houthi officials deny. Spokesman Fadl Abu Taleb said: "Our problems are with Zionism and the occupation of Palestine, but Jews here have nothing to fear." Houthi authorities have also been accused of detaining and torturing Baháʼí Faith members on espionage and apostasy charges, which are punishable by death.

  A 2024 survey by the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies asked Yemenis for their views of the movement. In Houthi-controlled areas, only 8% had a positive view, compared with 3% in both government-controlled and contested areas. Negative views were held by 20%, 34%, and 39% in those areas respectively.

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