Hamas

• 1. Introduction

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  Hamas is an acronym, and the Arabic word it happens to spell means zeal, strength or bravery. The letters stand for Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, which means Islamic Resistance Movement. The group's own 1988 covenant pointed out the match with the everyday word ḥamās. Today the name belongs to a Sunni Islamist Palestinian nationalist organisation with a military wing called the al-Qassam Brigades. It has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007. Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and the European Union are among the governments that have designated it a terrorist organisation. Even so, motions at the United Nations in 2018 and 2023 to condemn it as one failed to reach the required two-thirds majority. How does a charity network grow into a government and an army? Who pays for it, and who commands it? What does it say it wants, and do its words agree with each other from one decade to the next? And how did a single day in 2023 reshape everything that followed?

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• 2. Charity Before Politics

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  In 1973 a Palestinian Islamic scholar named Ahmed Yassin founded a charity called Mujama al-Islamiya, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That charity is the seed from which Hamas later grew. The Brotherhood had been active in Gaza since the 1950s, gaining influence through mosques and a web of charitable and social organisations. After Israel occupied Gaza in 1967, the Gaza Brotherhood refused to join the boycott of Israel that other Palestinian factions observed.

  In December 1987, soon after the First Intifada broke out against the Israeli occupation, the Brotherhood adopted a more nationalist and activist line under the name Hamas. According to the account, Israel at first gave the new movement quiet support. The aim was a counterweight to the secular Palestine Liberation Organization, and a way to prevent an independent Palestinian state. In its earliest days Hamas functioned mainly as a social and religious charity centre. By the spring of 1989, however, its members were armed and at war with Israel's army, as the Intifada turned gradually more riotous and violent.

  Charity nonetheless remained the foundation. In the 1990s some 85% of the Hamas budget went to social services. Hamas copied the model of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, where helping the community is a religious duty and also a form of resistance. Mosques sat at the centre. Funded by waqf endowments and zakat donations, they ran nurseries, schools, orphanages, soup kitchens, women's activities, libraries and even sporting clubs.

  By the year 2000, Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40% of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. By 2005 it and other Islamic charities were supporting 120,000 people in Gaza with monthly payments. Part of the appeal was a gap left by the PLO administration. It had failed to meet demand for jobs and services, and was widely viewed as corrupt. The rival Palestinian Islamic Jihad has no comparable welfare network and relies on spectacular attacks to recruit.

  The aid was not spread evenly. In 2007, funding from Iran let Hamas pay monthly stipends of 100 dollars to 100,000 workers, at a cost of 60 million dollars. A comparable sum went to 3,000 fishermen left idle by Israeli limits on fishing, and grants totalling 45 million dollars went to detainees and their families. Analyst Matthew Levitt argues that grants follow a cost-benefit logic, with people linked to militant activity receiving more. Families of activists killed or wounded in operations got a one-time grant of 500-5,000 dollars plus 100 dollars a month. The accounting was flexible enough that money could move between charitable and military uses. Until 2007 these programmes reached the West Bank, but after a PLO crackdown they continue only in the Gaza Strip.

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• 3. Following the Money

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  By 2011 the Hamas budget stood at 70 million US dollars, and 85% of it came from foreign rather than Palestinian sources. A list seized in 2004 named only two Israeli-Palestinian donors. The rest were bodies in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Italy and France. Much of the money was directed at what Hamas calls its charitable work, though investments backing its ideology also mattered.

  Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget in the early 2000s. In 2004, under US pressure, it cracked down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers, and by 2006 the flow had shrunk drastically. After Hamas won the 2006 election, Iran and Syria stepped in to fill the gap. Saudi Arabia chose to direct more help to the Palestinian National Authority, the election loser, once the European Union suspended its aid.

  Iran had supplied about 10% of Hamas funding in the 1980s. By the late 2000s it provided 22 million dollars, over a quarter of the budget. Iran preferred to pay operative groups directly rather than charities, and it required video proof of attacks. Much of its money travelled through Hezbollah. Tension over Syria's Assad then changed the arrangement. Iran restricted its funding to the military wing, which dropped from 150 million dollars in 2012 to 60 million the following year. A further fall came in 2015, when Hamas criticised Iran's role in the Yemeni Civil War.

  In 2017 the Palestinian Authority imposed sanctions on Gaza, including cutting off salaries to its employees there. The Israeli government then allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be channelled through Israel to Hamas, replacing the stopped transfers. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended the arrangement: "Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes."

  Hamas also administers Gaza's waqf properties, endowments covering over 10% of the real estate in Gaza. They include 2,000 acres of farmland held in religious trusts, plus shops, rentable apartments and public buildings. An investment portfolio worth 0.5-1 billion dollars, with assets in Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates, has been attributed to it. Hamas denies this. Allegations also include cigarette and drug smuggling, copyright infringement and credit card fraud. The US, Israel and the European Union have shut down charities such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. In 2024, financial activity in Gaza ran through money changers to bypass international financial authorities. The European Council added six people and three businesses to its sanctions list, including front companies in Spain and Sudan.

  The 2013 Egyptian coup deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi and left Hamas in a financial straitjacket. Its effort to hand responsibility for Gaza's public works back to the Palestinian National Authority has not succeeded.

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• 4. Command and Brigades

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  Hamas inherited a three-part design from its predecessor, with social services, religious training and military operations all under a Shura Council. Traditionally it also described four functions: a charitable wing called dawah, a military division, a security service known as Jehaz Aman, and a media branch. The Majlis al-Shura draws on the Quranic idea of consultation, which Hamas leaders say provides democracy within an Islamic framework. As Israeli pressure grew, it was renamed the General Consultative Council. It elects the 15-member Political Bureau, which makes the decisions. Seats go to representatives from Gaza, the West Bank, exile and Israeli prisons.

  Khaled Mashal led a Kuwaiti group of Palestinian exiles, while Mousa Abu Marzook directed a Gaza group from exile, first in Damascus and then in Egypt. Mashal's group began to receive extensive Gulf funding after he broke with Yasser Arafat, who had sided with Saddam Hussein in the invasion of Kuwait. Mashal insisted that Iraq withdraw. The Political Bureau stayed in Damascus until January 2012, when Hamas's support for the Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad pushed the office to Qatar. On the 6th of May 2017 the Shura Council chose Ismail Haniyeh to replace Mashal as leader.

  The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades are the military wing. Israel estimates a core of several hundred members who receive military-style training, including in Iran and in Syria before its civil war. Estimates of the backup force range from 10,000-17,000 operatives to 15,000-40,000. Recruit training lasts two years, and fighters are grouped in cells of four or five that feed into companies and battalions. Its official rules limit operations to inside Palestine, against Israeli soldiers and armed settlers, and call for avoiding civilian targets and Westerners. Yet the same account records that Hamas conducted suicide bombings in the 1990s and early 2000s and has launched rockets at Israeli cities.

  By 2007 the Brigades had lost some 800 operatives in conflicts with Israeli forces. Targeted assassinations repeatedly struck the leadership. Emad Akel was killed on the 24th of November 1993, and Yahya Ayyash on the 5th of January 1996. Salah Shehade followed on the 23rd of July 2002, Ibrahim al-Makadmeh on the 8th of March 2003, and Ismail Abu Shanab on the 21st of August 2003. Founder Ahmed Yassin was killed on the 22nd of March 2004, and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi on the 17th of April 2004. After al-Rantisi's death, political direction of the militant wing diminished and field commanders gained wider freedom. Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill liken the relationship to that between Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army, and its exact nature remains hotly debated.

  Inside Gaza, the General Security Service, formally part of the political party, works like a government body. Under the direct oversight of Yahya Sinwar, it keeps files on journalists and critics through a network of informants. Before the latest war it reportedly had a monthly budget of 120,000 dollars and 856 personnel, including more than 160 paid to spread propaganda and attack opponents online.

  Civilian administration has its own lesser-known moments. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a crisis team headed by Hamas police officer Faiq Al-Mabhouh explained restrictions through video announcements on Al-Aqsa TV and social media. Gaza favoured partial measures such as weekend lockdowns and curfews over total lockdowns. When mosques were open, the Health Ministry replaced the preachers with doctors who gave health seminars.

  Al-Aqsa TV is the Hamas channel, and the Anti-Defamation League says it promotes terrorist activity and incites hatred of Jews and Israelis. Hamas calls it an independent institution that often does not express the views of the government or the movement. The station went on air in Gaza on the 9th of January 2006, less than three weeks before the legislative elections that would transform Hamas's standing.

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• 5. Ballots and Blockade

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  Hosam al-Taweel, a Palestinian Christian, won one of the six seats reserved for Christians in the 2006 legislative election, with the highest vote of the six. He ran as an independent on the Hamas Change and Reform list, and Israeli media were surprised by the team. The wider result in January 2006 was a Hamas majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council, defeating the ruling Fatah party. Hamas had campaigned on a promise of corruption-free government and on resistance to the occupation. Conflicts between the two parties followed, and they could not resolve them.

  In June 2007 Hamas defeated Fatah in a series of violent clashes known as the Battle of Gaza. It has governed the territory separately from the Palestinian National Authority ever since, while being ousted from government positions in the West Bank. Israel significantly intensified its movement restrictions and imposed a complete blockade, and Egypt began its own blockade at that time. Pacts in Cairo in May 2011 and Doha in February 2012 promised unity governments, yet the Doha interim government did not materialize.

  A six-month ceasefire between Hamas and Israel began on the 19th of June 2008. Hamas declared it finished on the 18th of December amid mutual accusations of breaches. In late December 2008 Israel attacked Gaza, withdrawing its forces in mid-January 2009. Further wars followed in 2012-2014 and 2021, with substantial casualties. Hamas has been criticised for human rights violations in the territory it rules.

  In Gaza, the government's Islamic Endowment Ministry sent Virtue Committee members to warn citizens about immodest dress, card playing and dating. No law imposes such standards, and the education ministry reversed one effort to impose Islamic dress on students. One legislator said: "What you are seeing are incidents, not policy." In 2013, however, UNRWA cancelled its annual marathon in Gaza after Hamas prohibited women from taking part.

  In 2005 a Hamas-led municipality in Qalqiliya banned an outdoor music-and-dance performance as haram, and ordered that music no longer be played at the town zoo. The Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish warned: "There are Taliban-type elements in our society, and this is a very dangerous sign."

  Advisers Ahmed Yousef and Ghazi Hamad held up Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the model Hamas wanted to follow. Yousef said the Taliban were opposed to everything, including education and women's rights. Yezid Sayigh of King's College London doubted how influential this view was, noting that both men were dismissed as advisers in October 2007, though both later received other prominent posts. Khaled al-Hroub of the anti-Hamas daily Al Ayyam said the reality on the ground was a replica of the Taliban model. Two founding documents, issued 29 years apart, frame the larger argument over what Hamas truly seeks.

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• 6. Two Charters

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  On the 18th of August 1988 the first Hamas charter was signed. A single person wrote it, an old guard Muslim Brotherhood member in Gaza who was isolated from the outside world. It was published without the usual consultation, a flaw Hamas leaders later regretted. It defined Hamas as a chapter of the Brotherhood and sought an Islamic state throughout Palestine. It compared Israeli attacks on civilians to those of Nazi Germany, and it was widely described as antisemitic.

  Article 6 of the charter promised to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine. It added that under the wing of Islam, "followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety." Yet the charter rejected a two-state solution, saying the conflict could not be resolved "except through jihad." Many scholars note that the Likud party platform also sought full control of the land and likewise denounced a two-state solution.

  On the 1st of May 2017, after much internal discussion, Mashal and the Political Bureau published "A Document of General Principles and Policies." This 2017 charter is much shorter. It accepts a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel, and it argues that armed resistance to occupation is supported by international law. It removed the antisemitic language and said the struggle was with Zionists, not Jews. Hamas leaders said it did not replace the 1988 text.

  Critics disagree on how deep the change goes. J. S. Spoerl, writing in 2020, judged the document hardly a serious repudiation of antisemitism, since it describes Zionism as the enemy of all Muslims. Scholar Joas Wagemakers argues the 2017 text clearly omits every antisemitic element and takes a nationalist viewpoint. Leïla Seurat and Tareq Baconi stress that it limits the primacy of armed struggle and adds peaceful forms of resistance.

  Hamas leaders gave their own explanation: "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past." Mashal said the new document reflected "our position for now." Some analysts believe the old charter was never formally revoked so as not to alienate members who might join rival Islamist factions. Hamas describes the changes as adaptation within a specific context rather than abandonment of principle. In 2020, Ismail Haniyeh named "Palestine from the sea to the river" as one of the principles of Hamas.

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• 7. The Truce Question

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  In 1999 the Hamas leadership sent a memorandum to European diplomats proposing a long-term ceasefire with Israel. In return it asked for withdrawal of troops and settlements from the West Bank and Gaza, release of all Palestinian prisoners, and Palestinian self-determination. The movement called this a hudna. Ahmed Yassin offered a ten-year version in exchange for a state in the West Bank and Gaza. He said it could be renewed for 30, 40 or even 100 years, but would never signal recognition of Israel.

  Ahmed Yousef explained that a hudna is more than a ceasefire, because it "obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences." Under Islamic law, the account says, a hudna is binding and the Qur'an prohibits breaking it. One Hamas official compared an indefinite truce without recognition to the Irish Republican Army's willingness to accept a permanent armistice without recognizing British sovereignty over Northern Ireland.

  On the 6th of June 2006, Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh wrote to US President George W. Bush through Jerome Segal of the University of Maryland. He said: "We are so concerned about stability and security in the area that we don't mind having a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders and offering a truce for many years." A similar message went to Israel's leaders, and Haniyeh reportedly proposed a fifty-year armistice. Neither Washington nor Israel replied. Segal suggested that such a state and truce could count as de facto recognition of Israel.

  In April 2008, former US President Jimmy Carter met Khaled Mashal. Mashal said Hamas would accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders if Palestinians approved it by referendum, and would accept Israel's right to live as a neighbour. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert refused even to meet Carter in Jerusalem. Haniyeh repeated the offer in November 2008 to 11 European members of parliament, adding the condition that Israel recognize Palestinian national rights.

  Mousa Abu Marzook described Israel in 2011 as "amr waqi," a fait accompli, which he called de facto recognition without recognizing it as a state. Scholars read the 2006 Prisoners' Document and the 2007 Mecca agreement as implicit recognition, since accepting a state limited to the 1967 borders acknowledges an entity on the other side. Tareq Baconi adds a lesson from history. The 1993 Oslo Accords had the PLO recognize Israel on 78% of historic Palestine, yet it could not win recognition of Palestine on the other 22%. Hamas, he argues, therefore keeps recognition as a bargaining chip.

  Sceptics read the same facts differently. Political scientist Abusada of Al Azhar University wrote in 2008 that Hamas talks of a hudna, not peace, and believes it will eventually be strong enough to liberate all historic Palestine. Leïla Seurat reports that the leaders consider a traditional peace treaty tantamount to surrender, and see a truce as a way to wait for the regional balance to shift. Journalist Zaki Chehab called the post-2006 concessions window-dressing.

  In April 2024, Khalil al-Hayya, deputy chairman of the Political Bureau, told the Associated Press that Hamas would accept a truce of five years or more. It would lay down its weapons and become a political party if an independent state arose on the pre-1967 borders. The Associated Press called this a significant concession, but presumed Israel would not even consider it after the attack of 2023.

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• 8. After the Attack

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  On the 7th of October 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian militants attacked Israel, killing nearly 1,200 Israelis, about two thirds of them civilians. Approximately 250 civilians and soldiers were taken hostage and brought into the Gaza Strip, with the aim of securing a swap for Palestinian prisoners. Hamas said the attack answered the continuing occupation, the blockade of Gaza, settlement expansion, alleged threats to the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the plight of Palestinians. There are also reports of sexual violence by Hamas militants, which Hamas has denied.

  Israel responded by invading the Gaza Strip. A peer-reviewed study in The Lancet reported over 70,000 Palestinians killed, 59.1% of them women, children and the elderly. Statements from Hamas leaders pulled in different directions. On the 24th of October, Ghazi Hamad said Israel "has no place on our land." On the 1st of November, Haniyeh said Hamas would be ready for political negotiations toward a two-state solution if a ceasefire, humanitarian corridors and aid came first.

  On the 31st of July 2024, Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran after attending the inauguration of Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian. In August 2024 Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, was elected chairman to replace him. Hamas officials said his popularity across the Arab and Islamic worlds after the attack, and his links with Iran, explained the choice. On the 16th of October 2024, Israeli troops killed Sinwar during a routine patrol and a chance encounter in southern Rafah.

  In January 2025 the Wall Street Journal, citing Israeli sources, reported that Sinwar's younger brother Mohammed Sinwar, known as Shadow, was leading Hamas. It named Izz al-Din Haddad of the Brigades as the other most senior commander in Gaza. A ceasefire took effect on the 19th of January 2025. The same month Hamas confirmed that its military chief Mohammed Deif had been killed by Israel in July 2024. On the 18th of March 2025, according to the account, Israel broke the ceasefire and shelling continued.

  The killings continued through 2025. Ismail Barhoum of the political bureau died in an Israeli attack on Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis in March. Israel said in April that it had killed Yahya Fathi Abd al-Qader Abu Shaar, head of the weapons smuggling network. Unconfirmed reports in May said Mohammed Sinwar had been killed, and in June the Israeli military said DNA checks had identified his body. In August 2025, the armed wing's spokesman Abu Obaida was killed in an Israeli aerial attack, the latest senior name in this record.

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