Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda's emir, Osama bin Laden, once sent a Portuguese convert to Islam to Rome with orders to kill an exiled king. The target was Mohammed Zahir Shah of Afghanistan. Bin Laden wanted to stop him from returning home and possibly heading a new government. On the 4th of November 1991, the man, Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, entered the king's villa posing as a journalist. He stabbed the king several times in the neck. A tin of cigarillos in the king's breast pocket deflected the blade, and the king recovered in hospital. General Abdul Wali, a former commander of the Royal Afghan Army, caught the attacker, who then served ten years in an Italian jail.
That failed plot belongs to the story of a pan-Islamist militant organization led by Sunni Islamist jihadists. They describe themselves as a vanguard that will spark a global Islamist revolution and unite the Muslim world under one caliphate. The United Nations and more than two dozen countries have designated al-Qaeda a terrorist organization. Yet basic questions about it remain unsettled. Where did its name come from? Was it ever a tightly run organization, or a loose idea that American prosecutors gave a shape? Who paid for it? And what was left once its early leaders were gone?
The word al-Qaeda comes from the Arabic noun al-qāʿidah, meaning "the foundation" or "the base." The opening al- is simply the Arabic word for "the." Two of the Arabic consonants have no match in English, so spellings and pronunciations vary. Al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida and el-Qaida all appear in print.
As a doctrine, the idea came first. In an April 1988 issue of Al-Jihad magazine, the Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam used it for a committed vanguard of Muslims who would wage armed jihad around the world. Azzam cited the early Muslim conquests of the 7th century and the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen of the 1980s as proof that his call could succeed. He wrote that it was time to think about a state that would be "a solid base for the distribution of the (Islamic) creed."
Bin Laden offered a humbler origin in 2001. He said the name was established "by mere chance." In his telling, the late Abu Ebeida El-Banashiri built training camps for mujahideen fighting what bin Laden called Russia's terrorism, and the camp was called al-Qaeda. "The name stayed," he said.
Two documents seized from the Sarajevo office of the Benevolence International Foundation complicate that story. Both record minutes of meetings held to set up a new military group, and both use the term al-Qaeda. Some argue they prove a group by that name was established in August 1988, rather than a camp nickname being adopted.
Robin Cook, a former British Foreign Secretary, offered a third reading. He argued the word should be translated as "the database." To him it meant the computer file of thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with CIA help to defeat the Soviets.
In April 2002 the group took the name Qa'idat Al-Jihad, meaning "the base of Jihad." Diaa Rashwan said this apparently followed a merger. The overseas branch of Egypt's Al-Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, had joined the groups bin Laden brought under his control after returning to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. That merger put Egyptian veterans beside bin Laden's own followers, a mix whose intellectual debts ran back to an Egyptian writer of the 1950s.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb preached that the Islamic world was no longer truly Muslim. Because sharia law was missing, he argued, Muslim societies had slid back into jahiliyyah, the ignorance that came before Islam. His cure was a vanguard of righteous Muslims who would build "true Islamic states," impose sharia and strip out non-Muslim influence. He pictured them separating from the wider society first. Then they would wage armed jihad against tyrannical regimes, as the early Muslims did in the Islamic State of Medina under Muhammad.
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a close college friend of bin Laden, remembered the two trying to learn what Islam says about how people eat, marry and talk. "We read Sayyid Qutb," he said. "He was the one who most affected our generation." Qutb's influence reached Zawahiri through family. Zawahiri's uncle and maternal patriarch, Mafouz Azzam, was Qutb's student, protégé, personal lawyer and an executor of his estate.
The movement grew in the years after the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 and during the Afghan Jihad of 1979-89. Its supporters also looked back to the 19th century, to Syed Ahmad Barelvi, an Indian Muslim revivalist who died in 1831. He had led a jihad against British India from the frontier regions of Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Pakistani journalist Husain Haqqani calls his revival of jihad the prototype for later militant movements in South and Central Asia.
The organization itself took shape in a series of meetings in Peshawar during 1988. Those present included Azzam, bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and other veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. They built on the networks of Maktab Al-Khidamat and chose the word "vanguard" for the job.
The founding charter, titled "Al-Qaeda's Structure and Bylaws," set four general goals. They were to promote jihad awareness in the Islamic world, to train and equip cadres through instruction and real combat, to support the jihad movement as far as possible, and to coordinate jihad movements into one unified international effort. Its policies rejected any negotiation with secular and national parties, whom it called tyrants and promised to oppose as constant enemies. They also demanded economic independence and called secrecy "the main ingredient of our work."
The long-term aim was a supra-national caliphate headed by an elected caliph descended from the Ahl Al-Bayt, the family of Muhammad. The nearer aims were expelling American troops from the Arabian Peninsula and toppling governments allied with the United States. The model of government was the Rashidun Caliphate. Elections to choose rulers through Shura leadership councils were acceptable. Parliaments where Muslim and non-Muslim legislators write laws of their own choosing were not.
In the second edition of his book Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, Zawahiri demanded a caliphate founded on "the sovereignty of sharia and not on the whims of the majority." He added that the ummah would choose its rulers and bring them to account if they deviated.
Five named committees sat beneath bin Laden, alongside a shura council of senior members. The Military Committee trained operatives, acquired weapons and planned attacks. The Money and Business Committee handled finance. The Law Committee reviewed sharia and judged whether a course of action conformed to it. The Islamic Study and Fatwah Committee issued religious edicts, including a 1998 edict telling Muslims to kill Americans. The Media Committee ran a newspaper called Nashrat al Akhbar, meaning "Newscast," which no longer exists. In 2005 the group formed As-Sahab, a production house for its video and audio.
Its stated philosophy centralized decisions but decentralized execution. Top leaders set the ideology and strategy and kept their messages simple. Mid-level groups had autonomy, though they had to consult top management before large attacks and assassinations. After the war on terror began, the leadership grew isolated, and the organization split into several regional al-Qaeda groups. Nasser Al-Bahri, who guarded bin Laden for four years before 9/11, described a formal administrative structure and a vast arsenal in his memoir.
The first members were mostly Egyptians and Saudis, with some Yemenis and Kuwaitis. Later came North Africans, Jordanians, Palestinians and Iraqis. In the decade after 9/11, non-Arabs joined too, among them Pakistanis, Afghans, Turks, Kurds and European converts to Islam. One estimate holds that 62 percent of members have a university education.
Counts of the membership vary enormously. Documents captured in the 2011 raid on bin Laden's compound put the core membership in 2002 at 170. A 2006 estimate found several thousand commanders in 40 countries, while a later belief held that no more than 200-300 active commanders remained. At the other extreme, one account counts about 20 functioning cells and 70,000 insurgents across sixty nations in 2001. The same account puts those under al-Qaeda's command and allied militias at roughly 250,000 by 2018.
A 2004 documentary, The Power of Nightmares, went further. It argued that al-Qaeda was so loosely linked that it consisted only of bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. It pointed to the small number of convicted members, despite many arrests on terrorism charges, as a reason to doubt that a widespread entity matching the description existed.
The author Adam Curtis argued separately that a formal al-Qaeda is primarily an American invention. In his account, the name reached the public at the 2001 trial of bin Laden and four men accused of the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa. To charge bin Laden in absentia under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Justice Department had to show he led a criminal organization. Curtis wrote that bin Laden and Zawahiri had become the focus of "a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants," and that there was no organization. Bin Laden himself told an interviewer in 2001 that the West wrongly portrays "an 'organization' with a specific name."
The name and structure came from the testimony of Jamal Al-Fadl, who said he was a founding member and a former employee of bin Laden. Several sources question his reliability, citing a history of dishonesty and a plea bargain after he was convicted of conspiring to attack US military establishments. His own defense attorney, Sam Schmidt, said he believed Al-Fadl lied about a unified image of the organization. "It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists," Schmidt said.
Many Western analysts do not believe the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by al-Qaeda's leaders, though bin Laden held considerable ideological influence. Bruce Hoffman disagreed. He saw a cohesive network strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas.
In March 2002, Bosnian police raided the Sarajevo office of the Benevolence International Foundation and seized a list of sponsors. It carried twenty-five names, twenty of them very wealthy Saudi and Gulf financiers, including bankers, businessmen and former ministers. Bin Laden's own name appeared seven times among the beneficiaries. Jamal Al-Fadl vouched for the list's authenticity and gave it the name "Golden Chain." At the top, the US Department of Justice's translation shows a line from the Quran: "And spend in the cause of God."
The raid also turned up a computer file titled "Tarekh Osama," or "Osama History." It held photographs of al-Qaeda's early days, along with letters and documents, some in bin Laden's handwriting. Bin Laden's confidant Enaam Arnaout, who headed the Sarajevo office, had been entrusted with the material and considered the office the safest place for it. Investigators found a clear link between Arnaout and bin Laden, and charges followed.
Even the list's age is disputed. Some accounts say it dates from 1988, while the US counter-terrorism advisor Richard A. Clarke says 1989. The American government presented it in the criminal case United States v. Arnaout, filed in 2003. It has never released the full document, so the complete roster of names is a matter of conjecture.
The list was one piece of a wider system. In the 1990s, money came partly from bin Laden's personal wealth, the heroin trade, and donors in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Al-Qaeda usually did not pay out funds for individual attacks and very rarely used wire transfers. The Sarajevo documents showed it widely exploited charities, including the International Islamic Relief Organization and the Muslim World League. Zawahiri's brother worked for the first in Albania and recruited for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda's leader openly named the second as one of three charities it relied on.
Much of the money moved through the hawala banking system. Around 1,000 hawaladars operate in Pakistan alone, outside regulated banks. US-led efforts against terrorist financing were most successful in the year right after September 11. The 9/11 Commission Report estimated that al-Qaeda needed $30 million a year to operate. The money committee also procured false passports, paid members and oversaw profit-driven businesses.
US authorities have also accused individuals of financing the group. In 2013 the US Treasury designated Abd Al-Rahman Al-Nuaimi, a Qatari citizen who founded the Swiss-based non-governmental organization Alkarama, as a terrorist. It said he had facilitated significant financial support to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and he was accused of overseeing a $2 million monthly transfer. A diplomatic cable leaked in 2009 put the wider concern bluntly: "terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern."
In 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait, bin Laden offered Saudi Arabia the help of his mujahideen. The Saudi government rebuffed him and turned to the United States instead. The arrival of American troops on the Arabian Peninsula pushed bin Laden to declare jihad on both the US and the Saudi rulers, whom he denounced as murtadd, or apostates. From 1992 al-Qaeda based its headquarters in Sudan, until it was expelled in 1996. It then moved to Afghanistan under the Taliban. In 1996 and 1998, bin Laden issued two fatwas demanding that US troops leave Saudi Arabia.
On the 29th of December 1992, two bombs went off in Aden, Yemen, at the Movenpick Hotel and in the parking lot of the Goldmohur Hotel. The aim was to kill American soldiers on their way to Somalia for the famine relief effort called Operation Restore Hope. No soldiers were staying there. An Australian tourist and a Yemeni hotel worker died, and seven others, mostly Yemeni, were badly hurt. Inside al-Qaeda the bombing counted as a victory that frightened the Americans away. In the United States it was barely noticed.
In 1996, bin Laden personally engineered a plot against President Bill Clinton, who was in Manila for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. Intelligence agents intercepted a message before the motorcade left and alerted the Secret Service. Agents later found a bomb planted under a bridge.
On the 7th of August 1998, bombs struck the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and killed 224 people, including 12 Americans. The United States answered with Operation Infinite Reach, firing cruise missiles at al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. The strikes devastated a base in Khost, but the network's capacity was unharmed. Plots timed for the millennium followed, masterminded by Abu Zubaydah. They included a bombing of Los Angeles International Airport by Ahmed Ressam and attacks on Christian holy sites in Jordan. On the 12th of October 2000, militants in Yemen struck the destroyer USS Cole in a suicide attack, killing 17 sailors. Encouraged by the success of so brazen an attack, the command core began preparing to hit the United States itself.
The September 11 attacks killed 2,996 people. They included 2,507 civilians, 343 firefighters, 72 law enforcement officers and 55 military personnel, plus al-Qaeda's 19 hijackers. Two airliners were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and a third into the Pentagon. A fourth, possibly aimed at the US Capitol or the White House, crashed in a field in Stonycreek Township near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers revolted. It was the deadliest foreign attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941, and the deadliest terrorist attack in history.
Evidence points to suicide squads led by the military commander Mohamed Atta. He was an Egyptian studying in Germany when he was trained, and the Hamburg cell around him was prized for its language skills and knowledge of Western culture. Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Hambali were the key planners. In his 2002 "Letter to the American people," bin Laden asked, "Why are we fighting and opposing you?" He answered: "Because you attacked us and continue to attack us." He also claimed the targets were America's "icons of military and economic power." Yet he planned the strike for the morning, when most people in the buildings were present, which maximized casualties.
Evidence later suggested that the original targets may have been nuclear power stations on the US East Coast. Al-Qaeda changed them out of fear that such an attack "might get out of hand."
Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, was offered a chance to surrender bin Laden and his top associates. The Taliban countered that they would hand bin Laden to a neutral country for trial if the US supplied evidence of his role. President George W. Bush replied: "We know he's guilty. Turn him over." British Prime Minister Tony Blair warned the regime: "Surrender bin Laden, or surrender power."
The first forces inserted into Afghanistan were paramilitary officers from the CIA's Special Activities Division. The United States and its allies then invaded and, together with the Afghan Northern Alliance, removed the Taliban government. Training camps were destroyed. After being driven from Tora Bora, many al-Qaeda fighters tried to regroup in the rugged Gardez region. By early 2002 the group had taken a serious blow to its operational capacity, though a significant Taliban insurgency remained.
The US State Department released a videotape of bin Laden speaking with a small group of associates in Afghanistan. A couple of people questioned its authenticity, but it implicated him and al-Qaeda in the attacks. In September 2004, the 9/11 Commission concluded that al-Qaeda operatives had conceived and carried them out. A month later, bin Laden appeared in a videotape released through Al Jazeera. He said he was inspired by Israeli attacks on high-rises in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and wanted to "punish the oppressor in kind."
By the end of 2004, the US government said it had captured and interrogated two-thirds of the most senior al-Qaeda figures of 2001. Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin Al-Shibh and Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri fell in 2002, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in 2003, and Saif al Islam el Masry in 2004. Mohammed Atef and several others were killed.
In 2003, a US-led coalition invaded Iraq and overthrew the Ba'athist regime, which it falsely accused of ties with al-Qaeda. The following year, al-Qaeda launched an Iraqi regional branch. Its forces were embedded in Jama'at Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, commanded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and specialized in suicide operations. Between 30% and 42% of suicide bombings in the early years were claimed by al-Zarqawi's group. After 2006 the branch morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq, which carried out numerous sectarian attacks on Shias. It later seceded from al-Qaeda and became ISIL.
Elsewhere, a series of bombings in Istanbul in 2003 killed 57 people and injured 700. Some of the 74 people charged had met bin Laden, and they asked for al-Qaeda's blessing and help without pledging allegiance. In 2009, three Londoners were convicted of plotting to detonate bombs disguised as soft drinks on seven airplanes bound for Canada and the US. The MI5 investigation took more than a year and over two hundred officers. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab members declared allegiance to bin Laden in a 2009 video, but this was an "unrequited courtship" that al-Qaeda largely ignored.
After pursuing him for almost a decade, the US military killed bin Laden in Pakistan on the 2nd of May 2011. Al-Qaeda vowed to avenge his killing.
In 2005, the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi published extracts from a document by Saif Al-Adel titled "Al-Qaeda's Strategy to the Year 2020." Abdel Bari Atwan summarized it as five stages. The first was to provoke the United States and the West into invading a Muslim country by staging a massive attack on US soil. The second was to incite local resistance to the occupiers. The third was to spread the conflict to neighboring countries and draw the US into a long war of attrition. The fourth was to turn al-Qaeda into an ideology that could be loosely franchised, inciting attacks until the US and its allies withdrew. The Madrid train bombings of 2004 had that effect, while the London bombings of the 7th of July 2005 did not. The fifth was the collapse of the US economy by 2020, global instability, and a worldwide jihad leading to a Wahhabi caliphate.
Atwan called the plan unrealistic. Still, he wrote, "it is sobering to consider that this virtually describes the downfall of the Soviet Union." Fouad Hussein, a Jordanian journalist who spent time in prison with al-Zarqawi, described seven phases along similar lines. The first, "The Awakening," ran from 2001 to 2003. The second, "Opening Eyes," ran from 2003 to 2006 and made Iraq the center of operations. The last, "Definitive Victory," was projected for 2020. More recently, Charles Lister and Katherine Zimmerman have described a new model that seeks to "socialize communities" and build a territorial base with local support.
After 9/11, the group published a tract titled "A Statement from Qaidat Al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington." The critics Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner said it provides "ample theological justification for killing civilians in almost any imaginable situation." Yet the organization has since officially renounced attacks on civilian targets of its enemies. In his 2023 book Free Reading of 33 Strategies of War, Saif Al-Adel urged fighters to prioritize police forces, soldiers and state assets. He asked: "If we target the general public, how can we expect their people to accept our call to Islam?"
Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy, became emir after his death, replacing Saif Al-Adel, who had served as interim commander. Killings thinned the ranks below him. Atiyah Abd Al-Rahman, alleged to be second in command, died on the 22nd of August 2011. Abu Yahya Al-Libi was killed in Pakistan on the 4th of June 2012. Nasir Al-Wuhayshi, who also led al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, died in a US airstrike in Yemen in June 2015. Abu Khayr Al-Masri was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in February 2017. Abu Muhammad Al-Masri, who was involved in the 1998 embassy bombings, was killed in Iran in November 2020 by Israeli agents.
Zawahiri himself was killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan on the 31st of July 2022. By then al-Qaeda's direct affiliates were Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in the Indian subcontinent and in the Islamic Maghreb, along with Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Al-Shabaab. Jemaah Islamiyah dissolved in 2024, and Hurras al-Din dissolved in 2025.
A 2023 United Nations report concluded that de facto leadership had passed to Saif Al-Adel, a former Egyptian army officer operating from Iran. He had been a military instructor in al-Qaeda camps in the 1990s and was known for his role in the Battle of Mogadishu. The report said al-Qaeda could not officially declare his leadership, citing the "political sensitivities" of the Afghan government in acknowledging Zawahiri's death. It also cited "theological and operational" challenges posed by his location in Iran.
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Common questions
What does the name Al-Qaeda mean?
Al-Qaeda is a transliteration of the Arabic noun al-qāʿidah, which means "the foundation" or "the base." The opening al- is the Arabic definite article "the." The name is also spelled al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida or el-Qaida.
When and where was Al-Qaeda founded?
Al-Qaeda was founded in a series of meetings held in Peshawar during 1988. Attendees included Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Mohammed Atef and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, all veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War.
Who led Al-Qaeda after Osama bin Laden was killed?
Ayman al-Zawahiri became emir after the US military killed bin Laden in Pakistan on the 2nd of May 2011. Zawahiri was killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan on the 31st of July 2022. A 2023 United Nations report concluded that de facto leadership had passed to Saif Al-Adel, operating from Iran.
What attacks were carried out by Al-Qaeda?
Al-Qaeda bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on the 7th of August 1998, killing 224 people. It attacked the USS Cole on the 12th of October 2000, killing 17 sailors. The September 11 attacks in 2001 killed 2,996 people.
How was Al-Qaeda funded?
In the 1990s, Al-Qaeda's funding came partly from bin Laden's personal wealth, the heroin trade and donations from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. It also exploited charities and moved money through the hawala banking system. The 9/11 Commission Report estimated it needed $30 million per year.
Is Al-Qaeda a single organization or a loose network?
The question is disputed. Bruce Hoffman saw a cohesive network strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas. Adam Curtis and the documentary The Power of Nightmares argued that it was a loose association of militants rather than a formal organization. Many Western analysts say the global jihadist movement is not driven at every level by al-Qaeda's leaders.
What are the main Al-Qaeda affiliates today?
Al-Qaeda's direct affiliates are Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Al-Shabaab. Jemaah Islamiyah dissolved in 2024, and Hurras al-Din dissolved in 2025.
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- 106Hoffman (2002)Hoffman — 2002
- 107NewsThe Killing of Ayman al-Zawahri: What We KnowCora Engelbrecht et al. — August 2, 2022
- 108NewsMilitant in Iran identified as al-Qaeda's probable new chief in U.N. reportAndrew Jeong
- 109NewsUnited Nations report identifies new al Qaeda leader with $10 million bountyFebruary 15, 2023
- 110Al Qaeda
- 111BookCasebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009Paul, Chuck J. Tompkins, Crossett et al. — United States Army Special Operations Command — 2012
- 112Al-Bahri, Nasser, Guarding bin Laden: My Life in al-Qaeda. p. 185. Thin Man Press. London.
- 114WMD Terrorism and Usama bin LadenKimberly McCloud — James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies — March 7, 2001
- 115NewsWitness: Bin Laden planned attack on U.S. embassy in Saudi ArabiaCNN — February 13, 2001
- 117The Terrorists-Are-Dumb Theory: Don't mistake these guys for criminal mastermindsTimothy Noah — February 25, 2009
- 118BookThe Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went GlobalFawaz A Gerges — Cambridge University Press — 2005
- 120Today's jihadists: educated, wealthy and bent on killing?Canada.com — July 3, 2007
- 121Al-Qaeda's ResurrectionMarch 6, 2018
- 123NewsA Nation Challenged: The Money; Terror Money Hard to Block, Officials FindKurt Eichenwald — December 10, 2001
- 128NewsList of Early al Qaeda Donors Points to Saudi Elite, CharitiesGlenn R. Simpson — March 19, 2003
- 129Emerson, Steve (2006). Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US. Prometheus Books. p. 382.
- 132Ban Ki-Moon shakes hands with alleged al Qaeda emirJune 23, 2015
- 133Terrorist paymaster targeted by BritainOctober 18, 2014
- 136Osama bin Laden Biography, al-Qaeda, Terrorist Attacks, Death, & FactsJanuary 1, 2024
- 140Analysis: Qatar still negligent on terror finance – The Long War JournalAugust 19, 2015
- 141See United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, a/k/a "Abu Mahmoud", a/k/a "Abu Mahmoud al Suri", a/k/a "Abu Mahmoud al Hamawi", a/k/a "Abdel Samia", U.S. v. Arnaout, No. 02 CR 892, 231 F.Supp.2 d 7
- 142Wall Street Journal, 3/18/2003
- 144Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Coconspirator Statements" in the case of USA v. Arnaout, USDC, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division) filed on January 29, 20
- 145JournalAl-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious TerrorismMark Sedgwick — 2004
- 146BookThe Secret History of Al QaedaAbdel Bari Atwan — University of California Press — 2006
- 147Al-Qaeda's Strategy Until 2020May 5, 2005
- 148NewsThe Future of Terrorism: What al-Qaida Really WantsYassin Musharbash — August 12, 2005
- 149NewsWhat has happened to al-Qaeda?BBC News — April 5, 2016
- 150JournalThe Global State of al-Qa`ida 24 Years After 9/11Colin Clarke et al. — September 2025
- 151JournalAl-Qaeda's Evolution: Future Course and Key Implications for Peace and SecurityFarhan Zahid — May 2026
- 152BookMaster Narratives of Islamist ExtremismJeffry, H. L., and Steven R. Halverson, Goodall, Jr., R. Corman — Palgrave Macmillan — 2011
- 153BookMilestones (Ma'alim fi'l-tareeq)Sayyid Qutb et al. — Maktabah Book Sellers and Publishers — 2006
- 154How Did Sayyid Qutb Influence Osama bin Laden?Gemsofislamism.tripod.com
- 155Wright (2006) p. 36Wright — 2006
- 156Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-FascismDale C. Eilmeier — Spring 2007
- 157BookJihad: The Trail of Political IslamGilles Kepel — Harvard University Press — 2002
- 158JournalThe Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi GroupsHussain Haqqani — 2005
- 159BookTerrorism & Political Islam: Origins, Ideologies, and Methods; a Counter Terrorism Textbook; 2nd EditionErich Marquardt et al. — Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences — 2008
- 161JournalAl Qaeda's Challenge: The Jihadists' War With Islamist DemocratsWilliam McCants — September 2011
- 162Abdel Bari Atwan. The Secret History of Al Qaeda, p. 233. University of California Press, 2006.
- 163BookIslam and PoliticsPeter Mandaville — Routledge — 2014
- 164JournalKilling in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11Quintan Wiktorowicz et al. — Summer 2003
- 165NewsA book by al-Qaeda's new leader reveals shifting strategiesHaid Haid — September 26, 2023
- 166BookThe Rise and Fall of Osama bin LadenPeter Bergen — Simon & Schuster — 2021
- 167Bin Laden 'tried to kill king'April 14, 2002
- 168NewsOsama bin Laden came within minutes of killing Bill ClintonTom Leonard — December 25, 2009
- 170Hamid Miir 'Osama claims he has nukes: If U.S. uses N-arms it will get the same response' "Dawn: the Internet Edition" November 10, 2001
- 171NewsAl-Qaida leaders say nuclear power stations were original targetsGiles Tremlett — September 9, 2002
- 172NewsAl Qaeda Scaled Back 10-Plane PlotJune 17, 2004
- 173US Jets Pound Targets Around KabulOctober 15, 2001
- 174NewsBlair to Taliban: Surrender bin Laden or surrender powerCanadian Broadcasting Corporation — October 3, 2001
- 175U.S. Releases Videotape of Osama Bin LadenDecember 13, 2001
- 176NewsUS urged to detail origin of tapeMorris, Steven — December 15, 2001
- 178National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United StatesSeptember 20, 2004
- 179Full transcript of bin Ladin's speechAl Jazeera — November 1, 2004
- 180NewsInside the interrogation of a 9/11 mastermindScott Shane — June 22, 2008
- 181NewsLawyers: Scan suggests alleged 9/11 plotter suffered head injury in CIA custodyCarol Rosenberg — April 30, 2018
- 182Al-Qaida – A Multiform IdeaPaul Rogers — Oxford Research Group — August 8, 2013
- 183NewsIslamic rebels gain strength in the SaharaYaroslav Trofimov — August 15, 2009
- 184Al Shabaab's Rise in the al Qaeda NetworkAdam Kahan — 2011-08-09
- 187NewsAl Qaeda backs Libyan protesters, condemns GaddafiFebruary 24, 2011
- 188Libya: al-Qaeda backs protestersFebruary 24, 2011
- 189NewsLibya: revolutionaries turn on each other as fears grow for law and orderNick Meo — October 31, 2011
- 190NewsLibyans storm Ansar Al-Shariah compound in backlash after attack on US ConsulateFox News — September 21, 2012
- 191NewsSources: 3 al Qaeda operatives took part in Benghazi attackPaul Cruickshank et al. — CNN — May 4, 2013
- 192NewsU.S. forces raid terror targets in Libya, SomaliaCNN — October 6, 2013
- 193Last words of a terrorist | The ObserverSeptember 30, 2001
- 196NewsGang is brought to justice by most complex operation since the warDuncan Gardham — September 8, 2009
- 197NewsComplex operation brings gang to justiceDuncan Gardham — September 16, 2009
- 198NewsPolice watched the plot unfold, then pouncedCahal Milmo — September 8, 2009
- 199UK court convicts 3 of plot to blow up airlinersSeptember 7, 2009
- 200NewsUK | Airline plot: Al-Qaeda connectionDaniel Sandford — BBC News — September 7, 2009
- 201NewsRussia accuses al-Qaida of 'forest jihad' in EuropeMiriam Elder — October 3, 2012
- 202JournalA Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in YemenShelagh Weir — Middle East Research and Information Project — July–September 1997
- 204Riedel (2008) p. 101Riedel — 2008
- 205NewsAl-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and TargetsMurad Batal Al-Shishani — November 17, 2005
- 206NewsHow the US let al-Qaida get its hands on an Iraqi weapons factoryDominic Streatfeild — January 7, 2011
- 207NewsCSI Urges Obama to Protect Iraq's Endangered Christian CommunityNovember 1, 2010
- 211NewsTurkey and Saudi Arabia alarm the West by backing Islamist extremists the Americans had bombed in SyriaKim Sengupta — May 12, 2015
- 214Freedom in the World 2008 – Kashmir PakistanUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees — United Nations High Commission for Refugees — July 2, 2008
- 216Osama men plan to target Delhi: Kathmandu receives threatNovember 10, 2001
- 229Army of Madinah in KashmirNine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation
- 232Al Qaeda Strikes BackBruce Riedel
- 238Lashkar-e-Taiba threat revived after Chicago arrestNovember 20, 2009
- 241US drones killed two terrorist leaders in PakSeptember 17, 2009
- 245US charges Ilyas Kashmiri in Danish newspaper plotJanuary 15, 2010
- 248Al Qaeda could provoke new India-Pakistan war: GatesJanuary 20, 2010
- 249Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of CyberplanningTimothy Thomas — February 14, 2007
- 252Bin Laden Identifies Saudi Arabia as the Enemy of Mujahideen UnityScheuer, Michael — Jamestown Foundation — January 2008
- 253NewsBriton Used Internet As His Bully PulpitCraig Whitlock — August 8, 2005
- 254Babar Ahmad Indicted on Terrorism ChargesUnited States Attorney's Office District of Connecticut — October 6, 2004
- 255NewsBritish cyber-jihadist Babar Ahmad jailed in USBBC News
- 256NewsQaeda Plot Leak Has Undermined U.S. IntelligenceEric Schmitt et al. — September 29, 2013
- 257NewsAl Qaeda linked to rogue aviation networkTim Gaynor — January 13, 2010
- 258NewsReport: Saudi-UAE coalition 'cut deals' with al-Qaeda in YemenAl Jazeera — August 6, 2018
- 259NewsUS allies, Al Qaeda battle rebels in YemenFox News — August 7, 2018
- 260NewsAllies cut deals with al Qaeda in Yemen to serve larger fight with IranAugust 6, 2018
- 261NewsBreivik Studied al-Qaeda AttacksKarl Ritter — April 20, 2012
- 262NewsNorway: Militant Studied Al QaedaApril 20, 2012
- 263Will Obama End the War on Terror?Daniel Klaidman — December 17, 2012
- 264Bergen, Cruickshank (2008)Bergen, Cruickshank — 2008
- 265Libya releases scores of prisonersEnglish.aljazeera.net — April 9, 2008
- 266Taking Stock of the War on TerrorRealclearpolitics.com — May 22, 2008
- 267NewsDecember 18, 2007 Poll: Most Saudis oppose al QaedaCNN — December 18, 2007
- 268Wright (2008)Wright — 2008
- 273Listing of Terrorist OrganisationsAustralian Government
- 277O Brasil e o terrorismo internacionalAlfredo Sirkis — June 2011
- 281Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European ParliamentCommission of the European Communities — October 20, 2004
- 282La France face au terrorismeSecrétariat général de la défense nationale (France)
- 283The Hindu : Centre bans Al-QaedaHinduonnet.com — April 9, 2002
- 285NewsIran Wants to Talk With U.S.; Just Not About NukesJohn Moody — Fox News — June 12, 2007
- 286Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005Department of Justice Ireland
- 287Summary of indictments against Al-Qaeda terrorists in SamariaIsrael Ministry of Foreign Affairs — March 21, 2006
- 289B. Terrorist Attacks in the United States and the Fight Against TerrorismDiplomatic Bluebook — 2002
- 290Fight against terrorism and extremism in KazakhstanMfa.gov.kz
- 293Al QaedaNATO Library — 2005
- 295Annual Report 2004General Intelligence and Security Service
- 296New Zealand's designated terrorist individuals and organisationsNew Zealand Government
- 297List of banned organisations in PakistanOctober 24, 2012
- 298NewsAbus, al-Qaeda Tagged in Wednesday Night Zamboanga BombingOctober 4, 2002
- 301NewsSeoul confirms release of two Korean hostages in AfghanistanKorean Foreign Ministry — August 14, 2007
- 302Radical Islamist Movements in the Middle EastMinistry for Foreign Affairs Sweden — March–June 2006
- 304Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, page 8
- 306مجلس الوزراء يعتمد قائمة التنظيمات الإرهابية. – WAMNovember 17, 2014
- 307Terrorism Act 2000July 20, 2000
- 309Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)United States Department of State
- 313BookThe Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A Study in Islamic Political ThoughtAndrea Mura — Routledge — 2015
- 314BookGuarding bin Laden: My Life in Al-QaedaNasser Al-Bahri — Thin Man Press — 2013
- 315BookTalking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (un)making of TerroristsScott Atran — Ecco Press — 2010
- 317BookAfter Bin Laden: Al-Qaeda, The Next GenerationAbdel Bari Atwan — Saqi Books (London)/ New Press (New York) — 2012
- 318JournalGoing to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist FinancingMark Basile — May 2004
- 319BookThe Age of Sacred TerrorDaniel Benjamin et al. — Random House — 2002
- 320BookHoly War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin LadenPeter Bergen — Free Press — 2001
- 321BookThe Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's LeaderPeter Bergen — Free Press — 2006
- 322MagazineThe Unraveling: The jihadist revolt against bin LadenPeter Bergen et al. — June 11, 2008
- 323BookThe Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and al-QaedaPeter Bergen — Free Press — 2011
- 324BookMessages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin LadenOsama Bin Laden — Verso — 2005
- 325Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliate OrganizationsDaniel Byman — Report of the Brookings Institution — 2012
- 326BookCounterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular WarRobert M. Cassidy — Praeger Security International — 2006
- 327BookGhost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001Steve Coll — Penguin Books — 2005
- 328BookIslamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle EastCambridge University Press — 2012
- 329BookUnholy War: Terror in the Name of IslamJohn L. Esposito — Oxford University Press — 2002
- 330BookNew Religions: Emerging Faiths and Religious Cultures in the Modern WorldABC-CLIO — 2021
- 331BookInside Al QaedaRohan Gunaratna — C. Hurst & Co. — 2002
- 332JournalMartyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and BiographiesMohammed M. Hafez — March 2007
- 333BookThe New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counter-StrategiesBruce Hoffman — Eastern Universities Press — 2002
- 334BookThe Dual Nature of Islamic FundamentalismJohannes J.G. Jansen — Cornell University Press — 1997
- 335JournalThe Merger of Al-Shabab and Qa'idat al-JihadNelly Lahoud — 2012
- 336MagazineA Traitor's TaleJohanna McGeary — February 19, 2001
- 337BookModern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror NetworksLoretta Napoleoni — Pluto Press — 2003
- 338BookMilestonesSayyid Qutb — Kazi Publications — 2003
- 339BookTaliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central AsiaAhmed Rashid — Yale University Press — 2002
- 340BookThe New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden and the Future of TerrorismSimon Reeve — Northeastern University Press — 1999
- 341BookThe Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and FutureBruce Riedel — Brookings Institution Press — 2008
- 342BookUnderstanding Terror NetworksMarc Sageman — University of Pennsylvania Press — 2004
- 343JournalAl Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-NarrativesAlex Schmid — 2014
- 344JournalExposing and Exploiting Weaknesses in the Merger of al-Qaeda and al-ShabaabMatthew J. Thomas — 2013
- 345BookFaith at War: A Journey On the Frontlines of Islam, From Baghdad to TimbuktuYaroslav Trofimov — Picador — 2006
- 346BookHow Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New WarWilliam F. Wechsler — PublicAffairs — 2001
- 347BookThe Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11Lawrence Wright — Knopf — 2006
- 348MagazineThe Rebellion WithinLawrence Wright — June 2, 2008
- 349JournalReview: Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror NetworksMohammed Akacem — August 2005
- 350JournalDeciphering Islamism and TerrorismJeffrey M. Bale — October 2006
- 351JournalThe Terrorism, Ideology, and Transformations of Al-QaedaR Shaffer — 2015
- 352Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. PolicyK. Allen Kronstadt et al. — US Congressional Research Service — November 2008
- 353Global Al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future ChallengesSubcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives — July 18, 2013
- 354Progress Report on the Global War on TerrorismUnited States Department of State — September 2003
- 355State 2003