Western Desert campaign
In the summer of 1940, a scorpion stung an Italian soldier near Sidi Omar. That small creature lived in the Western Desert, which stretched about 500 miles from Marsa Matruh to Gazala along the only paved road. Bedouin nomads knew how to navigate by sun and star, but the Maletti Group got lost leaving Sidi Omar and had to be found by aircraft. Days were miserably hot while nights turned very cold. A sirocco wind blew clouds of fine sand that reduced visibility to a few metres and coated eyes, lungs, machinery, food, and equipment. Motor vehicles needed special oil filters because the barren terrain meant supplies for military operations had to be transported from outside. German engines tended to overheat, and the life of their tanks' engines fell from 2,000 miles to 800 miles. This problem was made worse by the lack of standard spare parts for the German and Italian motor types.
Benito Mussolini ordered an invasion of Egypt on the 7th of August 1940, intending to occupy Egypt and establish a land connection with Italian East Africa. The Libyan divisions lacked the transport necessary to operate with the Maletti Group, which had one medium, two mixed, and four light tank battalions on the escarpment. On the 9th of September, the Maletti Group got lost en route to Sidi Omar, so Rodolfo Graziani cancelled a flanking move and concentrated on the coast road. Five divisions and the Maletti Group advanced, but the 5th Army stood by to support the advance with about 300 serviceable aircraft. By evening, the 2nd Libyan Division, 63rd Infantry Division Cirene, and the Maletti Group pushed past British harassing parties and converged on Halfaya Pass. An Italian force of fifty tanks attempted a flanking move, so the British rearguard retired east of Sidi Barrani. Graziani halted the advance, and the Italians dug in around Sidi Barrani and Sofafi, about 50 miles west of the British defences at Marsa Matruh.
In December 1940, Operation Compass began when Selby Force advanced from Matruh to isolate Maktila early on the 9th of December. The 4th Indian Division and the 7th Royal Tank Regiment attacked Nibeiwa at dawn and overran the camp. A counter-attack from Tummar East was repulsed, and the camp fell the next day. On the 10th of December, the British cut the coast road, and the 7th Armoured Division mopped up around Buq Buq. Late on the 14th of December, the 11th Hussars cut the Via Balbia between Tobruk and Bardia. From 9 to the 11th of December, the British took 38,289 prisoners, 237 guns, 73 tanks, and about 1,000 vehicles for 624 casualties. At dawn on the 21st of January, Australian infantry broke into Tobruk and made a path for 18 British I tanks. The Australians pressed on and captured half of the Tobruk defences by nightfall. They took 25,000 prisoners, 208 guns, and 87 tanks, for a loss of 355 Australian and 45 British troops.
Adolf Hitler responded to the Italian disaster with Directive 22 on the 11th of January, ordering Operation Sunflower, the deployment of a new Afrika Korps to Libya as a barrier detachment. General Erwin Rommel led the Axis force that raided and quickly defeated the British at El Agheila on the 24th of March and at Marsa el Brega on the 31st of March. By the 15th of April, they had pushed the British back to the border at Sollum and besieged Tobruk. The new commander of XIII Corps, Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, O'Connor, and Major-General Michael Gambier-Parry were captured. Several Axis attempts to seize Tobruk failed, and the front line settled on the Egyptian border. In early 1941, after the big British victory in Cyrenaica, the military position was soon reversed. The best-equipped units in XIII Corps went to Greece as part of Operation Lustre in the Battle of Greece.
Axis supplies from Europe to Libya were moved by road, and after Operation Compass, only Tripoli remained as an entry point with a maximum capacity of four troopships or five cargo ships at once. A German motorised division needed 100 tons of supplies a day, and moving its supplies 500 miles required 1,170 lorry-loads. With seven Axis divisions, air force, and naval units, 10,000 tons of supplies were needed per month. Lack of transportation in Libya left German supplies in Tripoli, and the Italians had only 7,000 lorries for deliveries to their 225,000 men. Deliveries averaged 30,000 tons a month from July to October, but the consumption of 30 to 50 percent of fuel deliveries by road transport and truck non-serviceability of 35 percent reduced deliveries to the front. In November, a five-ship convoy was sunk during Operation Crusader, and ground attacks on road convoys stopped journeys in daylight.
When the Eighth Army offensive began on the 23rd of October, the Panzer Army Africa had 48,000 troops, including 9,000 front-line troops. There were 560 tanks, 400 of which were Italian, and 500 guns. The Eighth Army had 230,000 troops, another 1,000 repair, and 1,000 guns. Allied troops were well fed and in good health, whereas Axis troops were undernourished and susceptible to illness. The Panzer Army Africa had only 100 gallons of fuel per vehicle. By the 27th of October, it was down to 100 tanks, and by the 2nd of November, it had expended most of its ammunition and had only 50 and 100 tanks left. On the 4th of November, the Eighth Army broke through Axis defences, and Rommel ordered the retreat to begin. Tobruk was retaken by the Eighth Army on the 13th of November, and the Axis retreat continued; Benghazi fell on the 20th of November.
In 1977, Martin van Creveld wrote that Rommel claimed if supplies sent to Tunisia in late 1942 and early 1943 had been sent earlier, the Axis would have won the Desert War. Van Creveld disagreed, noting that only the German occupation of southern France after Operation Torch made French merchant ships available for dispatch. The extra distance from Bizerta to the Egyptian border negated the benefit of using a larger port. Axis supply had always been determined by the small size of ports in Libya, a constraint that could not be overcome. Attacks on Axis shipping compounded chronic supply difficulties. With the German army bogged down in the USSR, there was never sufficient road transport available for the Panzer Army Africa or the Italian forces. Warfare in the desert has been described as a quarter-master's nightmare given the conditions of desert warfare and supply difficulties.
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Common questions
When did the Western Desert campaign begin and what were the initial conditions?
The Western Desert campaign began in the summer of 1940 with extreme environmental challenges including scorpion stings, heat, cold nights, and sirocco winds that reduced visibility to a few metres. The Maletti Group got lost leaving Sidi Omar because Bedouin nomads knew how to navigate by sun and star but Italian forces lacked this knowledge.
What specific dates marked the start of Operation Compass and the capture of Tobruk?
Operation Compass began on the 9th of December 1940 when Selby Force advanced from Matruh to isolate Maktila. Australian infantry broke into Tobruk at dawn on the 21st of January 1941 and captured half of the defences by nightfall before retaking it completely on the 13th of November 1941.
How many prisoners and vehicles did the British capture during the first phase of Operation Compass?
From the 9th to the 11th of December 1940, the British took 38,289 prisoners, 237 guns, 73 tanks, and about 1,000 vehicles for only 624 casualties. Later operations resulted in another 25,000 prisoners, 208 guns, and 87 tanks with losses of 355 Australian and 45 British troops.
Why did Axis supply lines fail despite having motorised divisions in Libya?
Axis supplies failed because a German motorised division needed 100 tons of supplies a day while moving them 500 miles required 1,170 lorry-loads. The Italians had only 7,000 lorries for deliveries to their 225,000 men and truck non-serviceability of 35 percent reduced actual deliveries to the front significantly.
What dates defined the timeline of Rommel's counter-offensive against the Eighth Army?
Adolf Hitler issued Directive 22 on the 11th of January 1941 ordering Operation Sunflower which led to raids at El Agheila on the 24th of March and Marsa el Brega on the 31st of March. By the 15th of April 1941 they had pushed the British back to the border at Sollum and besieged Tobruk before the Eighth Army offensive began on the 23rd of October 1942.