Battle of Alam el Halfa
The Axis supply position was precarious because the main supply ports of Benghazi and Tobruk were 1,000 miles and 650 miles from the front respectively. Tripoli, located 900 miles away, was almost redundant due to its distance from the front line. At Alamein, an attack by the Axis would have to pass between the coast and the Qattara Depression about 30 miles to the south. This depression was impassable for tanks, forcing all movement into a narrow corridor. From mid-August there was a big increase in Axis losses at sea, notably from a reinforced Mediterranean submarine force. By the end of August, the Axis had been reinforced by troops flown from Crete but were short of supplies, notably ammunition and petrol. Rommel demanded 4,800 tons of fuel and 2,000 tons of ammunition before attacking at the end of the month. By the 29th of August, over 50 per cent of the supply ships from Italy had been sunk and only 1,000 tons of fuel had arrived at Tobruk.
Montgomery knew of Axis intentions through Ultra signals intercepts and left a gap in the southern sector of the front. He knew that Rommel planned to attack there. The bulk of the British armour and artillery was dug in around Alam el Halfa Ridge, 6 miles behind the front. Unlike in previous engagements, Montgomery ordered that the tanks were to be used as anti-tank guns, remaining in their defensive positions on the ridge. On the 13th of August, command of the Eighth Army passed to Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery. After visiting the front, Montgomery ordered that the contingency plans be destroyed and emphasised his intention to hold the ground around Alamein at all costs. The attackers would meet the main defensive positions when they swung north and approached the Alam el Halfa ridge. The 7th Motor Brigade Group and 4th Light Armoured Brigade (7th Armoured Division) would cover the minefields but withdraw when necessary. This gap would be mined and wired to encourage Rommel to take the bait and attack there.
The attack started on the night of the 30th of August, taking advantage of a full moon. From the start, things went wrong for Rommel; the DAF spotted the Axis vehicle concentrations and unleashed several air attacks on them. Fairey Albacores of the Fleet Air Arm dropped flares to illuminate targets for Wellington medium bombers and for the artillery. The minefields that were thought to be thin turned out to be deep. The British units covering the minefields were the two brigades of the 7th Armoured Division (7th Motor and 4th Armoured), whose orders were to inflict maximum casualties before retiring. They included General Walther Nehring, the Afrika Korps commander, wounded in an air raid and General Georg von Bismarck, commander of the 21st Panzer Division, killed by a mine explosion. Despite these difficulties, Rommel's forces were through the minefields by midday the next day and had wheeled left and were drawn up ready to make the main attack originally scheduled for 06:00.
At 13:00, the 15th Panzer Division set off, followed an hour later by the 21st Panzer Division. The British units holding the ridge were the 22nd Armoured Brigade with 92 Grants and 74 light tanks, supported by anti-tank units with six-pounder guns. The Axis forces had approximately 200 gun-armed tanks in the two Panzer divisions and 243 in the two Italian armoured divisions. The German tanks had long-barrelled 75 mm guns that could penetrate 70 mm of armour at 500 meters. When the Germans came into range, they were exposed to the fire of the brigade and their tanks were hard hit. An attempt to outflank the British was thwarted by anti-tank guns and with night beginning to fall and fuel running short because of the delays and heavy consumption over the bad 'going', General Gustav von Vaerst ordered the Panzers to pull back. During this engagement, the Germans lost 22 tanks and the British 21.
The night of the 31st of August/the 1st of September brought no respite for the Axis forces, as the Albacore and Wellington bomber combinations returned to the attack, concentrating on the Axis supply lines. This added to Rommel's supply difficulties as Allied action had sunk over 50 per cent of the 4,800 tons of petrol promised to him by Mussolini. On the 1st of September the 21st Panzer Division was inactive (probably because of a lack of fuel) and operations were limited to an attack by the 15th Panzer Division toward the eastern flank of the 22nd Armoured Brigade. The attack started at dawn but was quickly stopped by a flank attack from the 8th Armoured Brigade. Air raids continued throughout the day and night and on the morning of the 2nd of September, realising his offensive had failed and that staying in the salient would only add to his losses, Rommel decided to withdraw. In the air the DAF flew 167 bomber and 501 fighter sorties.
Operation Beresford began at 22:30 on the 3rd of September. The 5th New Zealand Brigade on the left inflicted many casualties on the Italian defenders and defeated Axis counter-attacks the next morning. The Axis defenders were alerted by diversionary raids by the 6th New Zealand Brigade (Brigadier George Clifton) on the right flank of the 132nd Infantry Brigade which was an hour late arriving on their start line. The attack was a costly failure; the Valentine tanks of the 46th RTR got lost in the dark and ran onto a minefield where twelve were knocked out. The 90th Light Division inflicted 697 casualties on the 132nd Infantry Brigade and 275 casualties on the New Zealanders. Robertson was wounded and Clifton was captured by a patrol of the X Battalion of the Italian 185th Infantry Division 'Folgore'. The vigorous Axis defence suggested to Freyberg that another attack was unlikely to succeed and advised that the troops should be withdrawn from their very exposed positions and the operation called off.
By the 5th of September, the Axis units were back almost on their starting positions and the battle was over. Montgomery did not exploit his defensive victory, preferring to continue the methodical build up of strength for his autumn offensive, the Second Battle of El Alamein. There has been criticism of Montgomery's leadership during the battle, especially his decision to avoid losses, which prevented the British tank formations from trying to finish off the Afrika Korps when it was strung out between the minefields and Alam Halfa. Friedrich von Mellenthin in Panzer Battles painted a dramatic picture of Panzer divisions, paralysed by lack of fuel, under constant bombardment and awaiting a British onslaught. Rommel complained to Kesselring, 'The swine isn't attacking!' Montgomery kept his forces intact and the Eighth Army accumulated supplies for the offensive in October that came to be known as the Second Battle of El Alamein.
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Common questions
When did the Battle of Alam el Halfa take place?
The battle took place from the 13th of August to the 5th of September 1942. The main attack started on the night of the 30th of August and concluded by the 5th of September when Axis units returned to their starting positions.
Who commanded the British forces during the Battle of Alam el Halfa?
Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery assumed command of the Eighth Army on the 13th of August 1942. He ordered tanks to be used as anti-tank guns in defensive positions on the ridge and decided not to exploit his victory immediately.
Why was the terrain at Alamein critical for the Battle of Alam el Halfa?
The Qattara Depression located 30 miles south of the front line was impassable for tanks, forcing all movement into a narrow corridor between the coast and the depression. This geography allowed the British to concentrate their defenses along the Alam el Halfa Ridge.
What were the supply conditions for Rommel before the Battle of Alam el Halfa?
Axis supply lines were precarious because Benghazi and Tobruk were 1,000 miles and 650 miles from the front respectively. By the end of August over 50 per cent of supply ships from Italy had been sunk leaving Rommel short of fuel and ammunition.
How many tanks did the Axis lose during the engagement on the 1st of September?
During the engagement on the 1st of September the Germans lost 22 tanks while the British lost 21. The Axis forces had approximately 200 gun-armed tanks in the two Panzer divisions and 243 in the two Italian armoured divisions.