Second Battle of El Alamein

• 1. The Desert Stalemate

  ›

  On the 23rd of October 1942, a calm and clear evening under the bright sky of a full moon marked the start of a thirteen-day battle near the Egyptian railway halt of El Alamein. Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery opened his offensive against Axis forces that had advanced into Egypt after their success at the Battle of Gazala in June 1942. The Axis advance threatened British control of the Suez Canal, the Middle East, and its vital oil resources. General Claude Auchinleck had withdrawn the Eighth Army to within thirty miles of Alexandria where the Qattara Depression lay south of El Alamein on the coast. This depression was impassable and meant any attack had to be frontal. Axis attacks in the First Battle of El Alamein from July 1st to 27th had been defeated. Eighth Army counter-attacks in July also failed as Axis forces dug in and regrouped. Auchinleck called off the attacks at the end of July to rebuild the army. In early August, Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke visited Cairo and replaced Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command with General Harold Alexander. Lieutenant-General William Gott was made commander of the Eighth Army but was killed when his transport aircraft was shot down by Luftwaffe fighters. Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was flown from Britain to replace him.

• 2. Camouflage And Intelligence

  ›

  Before the battle the Commonwealth forces practiced deceptions in Operation Bertram to confuse the Axis command regarding where and when the battle would occur. In September they dumped waste materials like discarded packing cases under camouflage nets in the northern sector making them appear to be ammunition or ration dumps. The Axis naturally noticed these but since no offensive action immediately followed and the dumps did not change in appearance they were subsequently ignored. This allowed the Eighth Army to build up supplies in the forward area unnoticed by the Axis by replacing the rubbish with ammunition petrol and rations at night. A dummy pipeline was built hopefully leading the Axis to believe the attack would occur much later than it did and much further south. Dummy tanks consisting of plywood frames placed over jeeps were built and deployed in the south. In a reverse feint the tanks destined for battle in the north were disguised as supply trucks by placing removable plywood superstructures over them. Ultra intelligence exposed the Axis order of battle its supply position and intentions. By the 25th of October Panzerarmee Afrika was down to three days' supply of fuel only two days of which were east of Tobruk. Harry Hinsley the official historian of British intelligence wrote in 1981 that the Panzer Army did not possess the operational freedom of movement that was absolutely essential.

• 3. The Break-In Phase

  ›

  At 21:40 Egyptian Summer Time on the 23rd of October Operation Lightfoot began with a 1,000-gun barrage. The fire plan had been arranged so that the first rounds from the 882 guns from field and medium batteries landed along the front at the same time. After twenty minutes of general bombardment the guns switched to precision targets in support of the advancing infantry. The shelling plan continued for five and a half hours by the end of which each gun had fired about 600 rounds totaling approximately 529,000 shells. At 22:00 four infantry divisions of XXX Corps began to move. The objective was to establish a bridgehead before dawn at the imaginary line in the desert where the strongest enemy defences were situated on the far side of the second mine belt. Once the infantry reached the first minefields the mine sweepers including Reconnaissance Corps troops and sappers moved in to create a passage for the armoured divisions of X Corps. Progress was slower than planned but at 02:00 the first of the 500 tanks crawled forward. By 04:00 lead tanks were in the minefields where they stirred up so much dust that there was no visibility at all traffic jams developed and tanks bogged down. Only about half of the infantry attained their objectives and none of the tanks broke through.

• 4. The Death Of Stumme

  ›

  The morning of Saturday the 24th of October brought disaster for the German headquarters as Axis forces were stunned by the British attack and their messages became confused and hysterical. One Italian unit communicated to Germans that it had been wiped out by drunken negroes with tanks. The reports that Georg Stumme received that morning showed attacks had been on a broad front but such penetration as had occurred should be containable by local units. He went forward to see for himself suffering a heart attack and dying. Temporary command was given to Major-General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma. Hitler had already decided Rommel should leave his sanatorium and return to North Africa. Pending complete clearance of paths through the minefields Allied armour was held at the Oxalic Line. In the 51st Highland Division sector Seaforth Highlanders supported by tanks of the 2nd Armoured Brigade attacked and captured the Stirling position. Artillery and the Desert Air Force made over 1,000 sorties bombarding Axis positions all day to aid the crumbling of Axis forces. By 16:00 there was little progress beyond the Oxalic Line. At dusk with the sun at their backs Axis tanks from the 15th Panzer Division and Littorio Division advanced from the Kidney feature often wrongly called a ridge as it was actually a depression to engage the 1st Armoured Division.

• 5. The Tank Hammering

  ›

  Phase four Operation Supercharge began at 01:00 on the 2nd of November with the objective of destroying enemy armour forcing them to fight in the open reducing Axis stock of petrol attacking and occupying enemy supply routes causing disintegration of the enemy army. The intensity and destruction in Supercharge were greater than anything witnessed so far during this battle. The initial thrust was carried out by the 2nd New Zealand Division which had lost 1,405 men in just three days at El Ruweisat Ridge in July. Along with the 5th New Zealand Infantry Brigade and 28th Maori Infantry Battalion the division was to have placed under its command the 151st Durham Brigade from the 50th Northumbrian Infantry Division. Two assault brigades each supported by a regiment of tanks advanced and cleared a path through mines. Once they reached objectives distant 9th Armoured Brigade would pass through supported by heavy artillery barrage breaking open a gap in Axis defences. At 06:15 thirty minutes before dawn three regiments of the brigade advanced towards the gun line behind a creeping barrage. German and Italian anti-tank guns mostly Pak38 and Italian 47 mm guns along with 24 formidable 88 mm flak guns opened fire on advancing tanks silhouetted by rising sun.

• 6. The Great Retreat

  ›

  On the 2nd of November Rommel signalled Hitler that he could not hold the position and at 13:30 on the 3rd of November received a reply. Rommel thought the order similar to one given at same time by Benito Mussolini through the Italian High Command. Rommel ordered Italian X and XXI Corps and 90th Light Division to hold while Panzer Army Africa withdrew approximately west during night of the 3rd of November. The Italian XX Corps and Ariete Division conformed to their position and Rommel replied to Hitler confirming his determination to hold battlefield. Desert Air Force continued bombing and in its biggest day of battle flew 1,208 sorties dropping tons of bombs. On night of 3/the 4th of November Montgomery ordered three infantry brigades in reserve to advance on Rahman track as prelude to armoured break-out. By late morning on the 4th of November Rommel realized situation was desperate and telegraphed Hitler for permission to fall back on Fuka. As further British blows fell Thoma was captured and reports came from Ariete and Trento divisions that they were encircled. At 17:30 unable to wait any longer for reply from Hitler Rommel gave orders to retreat.

• 7. Casualties And Legacy

  ›

  In 2005 Niall Barr wrote that casualties were an estimate because of chaos of Axis retreat. British figures based on Ultra intercepts gave German casualties as 1,100 killed 3,900 wounded and 7,900 prisoners. Italian losses were 1,200 killed 1,600 wounded and 20,000 prisoners. According to Italian official history Axis losses during battle were 4,000 to 5,000 killed or missing 7,000 to 8,000 wounded and 17,000 prisoners. During retreat losses rose to 9,000 killed or missing 15,000 wounded and 35,000 prisoners. Total Axis casualties included 25,000 men killed or wounded including 5,920 Italians and 30,000 prisoners. About half tanks had been lost and most remainder knocked out next day by 7th Armoured Division. Eighth Army had 13,500 casualties including 4,000 killed 11,000 wounded and 1,500 missing. Churchill spoke at Lord Mayor's Banquet at Mansion House on the 10th of November 1942 making famous claim that before Alamein we never had victory after Alamein we never had defeat.