North African campaign

On the 11th of June 1940, a small British unit crossed the border from Egypt into Libya and captured Fort Capuzzo, igniting a conflict that would rage across the sands of North Africa for nearly three years. This initial raid marked the beginning of the Western Desert campaign, a brutal struggle that would see the British Commonwealth forces, including Indian and Rhodesian troops, face off against the Italian Tenth Army. The Italian leader Benito Mussolini had declared war on France and the United Kingdom on the 10th of June 1940, explicitly stating that Italy did not intend to drag other peoples bordering her into the conflict, yet his forces quickly moved to reinforce positions in Cyrenaica. By the 8th of September, despite lacking transport and suffering from low training levels among officers, the Italians were ordered to invade Egypt, advancing to Maktila before halting due to supply problems. Marshal Graziani ordered his men to dig in around Sidi Barrani, establishing fortified camps that would become the target of a limited five-day attack known as Operation Compass. The British Commonwealth force, totaling 36,000 men, attacked the forward elements of the 10-division-strong Italian army on the 9th of December, leading to the capture of Bardia and Tobruk and the destruction of the Italian Tenth Army. Over ten weeks, Allied forces destroyed the Italian Tenth Army and reached El Agheila, taking 130,000 prisoners of war in the process. Mussolini requested help from his German allies, and the German Afrika Korps was dispatched to North Africa in February 1941 under the command of Erwin Rommel to reinforce the Italians and prevent an Axis defeat.

Rommel's Counterstroke

Although Erwin Rommel had been ordered to simply hold the line, an armoured reconnaissance soon became a full-fledged offensive from El Agheila in March 1941, forcing Allied forces back and capturing leading general officers. The Australian 9th Infantry Division fell back to the fortress port of Tobruk, and the remaining British and Commonwealth forces withdrew a further 500 miles to the Libyan, Egyptian border. Rommel garrisoned positions at Sollum and the Halfaya Pass, reinforcing the battle-group and ordering it onto the defensive. Though isolated on land, Tobruk's garrison continued to receive supplies and replacements delivered by the Royal Navy at night, creating a persistent supply problem for Rommel's forward units. The Allies launched a small-scale counter-attack called Operation Brevity with some initial success, but they could not hold the advance positions. They followed Brevity up with a much larger-scale offensive, Operation Battleaxe, intended to relieve the siege at Tobruk, but this operation also failed. Following the failure of Operation Battleaxe, Archibald Wavell was relieved of command and replaced by Claude Auchinleck. The Western Desert Force was reinforced with a second corps, XXX Corps, forming the Eighth Army, which included forces from the British Army, the Australian Army, the Indian Army, the New Zealand Army, the South African Army, and the Sudan Defence Force. A brigade of Free French under Marie-Pierre Koenig also joined the formation. The new formation launched a new offensive, Operation Crusader, in November 1941. After a see-saw battle, the 70th Division garrisoning Tobruk was relieved and the Axis forces were forced to fall back. By January 1942, the front line was again at El Agheila. After receiving supplies and reinforcements from Tripoli, the Axis attacked again, defeating the Allies in the Battle of Gazala in June and capturing Tobruk. The Axis forces drove the Eighth Army back over the Egyptian border, but their advance was stopped in July only 60 miles from Alexandria in the First Battle of El Alamein.

When did the North African campaign begin?

The North African campaign began on the 11th of June 1940 when a small British unit crossed the border from Egypt into Libya and captured Fort Capuzzo. This initial raid marked the start of the Western Desert campaign which would rage across the sands of North Africa for nearly three years.

Who commanded the German Afrika Korps in the North African campaign?

The German Afrika Korps was dispatched to North Africa in February 1941 under the command of Erwin Rommel to reinforce the Italians and prevent an Axis defeat. Rommel led the forces from El Agheila in March 1941 and later returned to Germany for health reasons in 1943.

When did the North African campaign end?

The North African campaign ended on the 13th of May 1943 when the Axis forces surrendered yielding over 275,000 prisoners of war. The last Axis force to surrender in North Africa was the 1st Italian Army of General Messe.

How did the Allies break Axis codes in the North African campaign?

The Allies' Ultra programme read much enciphered German message traffic especially that encrypted with the Enigma machine to aid in cutting the Axis supply line to Tunisia. The British also instituted improved call signal procedures and created a fake signals network after the 621st Signals Battalion was overrun during the Battle of Gazala.

What was the result of Operation Torch in the North African campaign?

Operation Torch started on the 8th of November 1942 and finished on the 16th of November 1942 to secure victory in North Africa while allowing American armed forces to engage against Nazi Germany. The landings met no practical opposition in Algiers and the city was captured on the first day along with the entire Vichy African command.

The Turning Point

Of great significance, on the 29th of June 1942, reports of British military operations in North Africa sent to Washington by the US military attaché in Cairo, Bonner Fellers, no longer used the compromised Black Code, which the Axis forces had been reading, so the Axis could no longer learn of British strengths, positions, losses, reinforcements, supply, situation, plans, and morale as they had since 1940. General Auchinleck, although he had checked Rommel's advance at the First Battle of El Alamein, was replaced by General Harold Alexander. Lieutenant-General William Gott was promoted from XIII Corps commander to command of the entire Eighth Army, but he was killed when his aircraft was intercepted and shot down over Egypt. He was replaced by Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery. At the end of June, Axis forces made a second attempt to break through the Allied defences at El Alamein at Alam Halfa, but were unsuccessful. After a lengthy period of build-up and training, the Eighth Army launched a major offensive, decisively defeating the Italian-German army in the Second Battle of El Alamein in late October 1942, driving Axis forces west and capturing Tripoli in mid-January 1943. By February, the Eighth Army was facing the Italian-German Panzer Army near the Mareth Line and came under command of Alexander's 18th Army Group for the concluding phase of the war in North Africa. The intelligence war played a crucial role, as the Allies' Ultra programme read much enciphered German message traffic, especially that encrypted with the Enigma machine. The primary benefit of Ultra intercepts to the effort in North Africa was to aid in cutting the Axis supply line to Tunisia. It is estimated that 40% to 60% of Axis supply shipping was located and destroyed due to decrypted information, although this claim is strongly disputed by some historians who argue that intelligence provided by Ultra had little impact in stopping Italian convoys reaching North Africa. Of the 2.67 million tons of materiel, fuel, and munitions shipped to Africa, 2.24 million tons managed to arrive despite the best efforts of Ultra and the British Navy to prevent it.

Operation Torch Lands

Operation Torch in November 1942 was a compromise operation that met the British objective of securing victory in North Africa while allowing American armed forces the opportunity to engage in the fight against Nazi Germany on a limited scale. Senior US commanders were strongly opposed to proposed landings in North-West Africa, with General George Marshall and Admiral Ernest King declining to approve the plan on the 30th of July 1942. Marshall and other US generals advocated the invasion of northern Europe later that year, which the British rejected. After Prime Minister Winston Churchill pressed for a landing in French North Africa in 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a direct order that Operation Torch was to have precedence over other operations and was to take place at the earliest possible date, one of only two direct orders he gave to military commanders during the war. The landings started on the 8th of November and finished on the 16th of November. In an attempt to pincer German and Italian forces, Allied forces landed in Vichy-held French North Africa under the assumption that there would be little to no resistance. Nevertheless, Vichy French forces put up a strong and bloody resistance to the Allies in Oran and Morocco, but not in Algiers, where a coup d'état by the French resistance on the 8th of November succeeded in neutralizing the French XIX Corps before the landing and arresting the Vichy commanders. Consequently, the landings met no practical opposition in Algiers, and the city was captured on the first day along with the entire Vichy African command. After three days of talks and threats, Generals Mark Clark and Dwight Eisenhower compelled Vichy Admiral François Darlan and General Alphonse Juin to order the cessation on the 10th and the 11th of November of armed resistance from Vichy forces in Oran and Morocco, promising to make Darlan the head of a Free French administration. During Operation Torch, Americans fought Vichy French and German navy vessels in the Naval Battle of Casablanca, which ended in an American victory. The Allied landings prompted the Axis occupation of Vichy France, including an attempt to capture the French fleet at Toulon, which did them little good, as the main portion of the fleet was scuttled to prevent their use by the Axis. The Vichy Army in North Africa joined the Allies.

The Tunisian Squeeze

Following the Operation Torch landings from early November 1942, the Germans and Italians initiated a buildup of troops in Tunisia to fill the vacuum left by Vichy troops which had withdrawn. During this period of weakness, the Allies decided against a rapid advance into Tunisia while they wrestled with the Vichy authorities. Many of the Allied soldiers were tied up in garrison duties because of the uncertain status and intentions of the Vichy forces. By mid-November, the Allies were able to advance into Tunisia, but only in single division strength. By early December, the Eastern Task Force, which had been redesignated as the British First Army under Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson, was composed of the British 78th Infantry Division, British 6th Armoured Division, 1st Parachute Brigade, No. 6 Commando and elements of US 1st Armored Division. But by this time, one German and five Italian divisions had been shipped from Europe and the remoteness of Allied airfields from the front line gave the Axis clear air superiority over the battlefield. The Allies were halted and pushed back having advanced eastwards to within 30 miles of Tunis. In early December, the Allies were met with the reality that they would not be successful in capturing the key cities of Tunis and Bizerta. The air campaigns by the Axis forces proved to be a difficult challenge for the British forces. However, the Allies were left with the advantage of having secured the island of Malta, enabling the Allies to carry out future aerial operations. Additionally, on land, allied British and American forces were able to hold onto their possessions. On the 4th of December 1942, the Allied Force Headquarters in North Africa reported that military operations were ongoing in the Tebourba area. The Axis powers attempted a second counter-attack in the neighborhood of Tebourba, following their failed attempt on the 1st of December. The attack was successfully repulsed by the Allied powers, and the enemy sustained significant damage to their weaponry. During the winter, there followed a period of stalemate during which time both sides continued to build up their forces. By the new year, the British First Army had one British, one US and one French Corps. In the second half of February, in eastern Tunisia, the Axis had some successes against the mainly inexperienced French and US troops, most notably in routing the US II Corps commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredendall at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. By the beginning of March, the British Eighth Army, advancing westward along the North African coast, had reached the Tunisian border. Rommel and von Arnim found themselves in an Allied two army pincer. They were outflanked, outmanned and outgunned. Rommel went back to Germany for health reasons and was substituted by the Italian general Messe. The British Eighth Army bypassed the Axis defence on the Mareth Line in late March after harsh fighting and First Army in central Tunisia launched their main offensive in mid-April to squeeze the Axis forces until their resistance in Africa collapsed. The Axis forces surrendered on the 13th of May 1943 yielding over 275,000 prisoners of war. The last Axis force to surrender in North Africa was the 1st Italian Army of General Messe.

The Shadow War

The Axis had considerable success in intelligence gathering through radio communication intercepts and monitoring unit radio traffic. The most important success came through intercepting the reports of Fellers, the US military attaché in Egypt, known to the Germans as die gute Quelle or the good source. He transmitted his reports back to Washington using the Black Code of the US State Department. However, in September 1941, the Italians had stolen a code book containing the Black Code, photographed it and returned it to the US embassy in Rome. The Italians shared parts of their intercepts with their German allies. In addition the Chiffrierabteilung, the German military cipher branch, were soon able to break the code. Fellers' reports were very detailed and played a significant role in informing the Germans of allied strength and intentions between January and June 1942. In addition, the Italian Servizio Informazioni Segrete or SIS code-breakers were able to successfully intercept much radio encrypted signals intelligence from British aircraft traffic as well as first-class ciphers from British vessels and land bases, providing Supermarina with timely warnings of Allied intentions in the Mediterranean. The Afrika Korps had the intelligence services of the 621st Signals Battalion mobile monitoring element which arrived in North Africa in late April 1941, commanded by Hauptmann Alfred Seeböhm. The 621st Signals Battalion monitored radio communications among British units. Unfortunately for the Allies, the British not only failed to change their codes with any frequency, they were also prone to poor radio discipline in combat. Their officers made frequent open, uncoded transmissions to their commands, allowing the Germans to more easily identify British units and deployments. The situation changed after a counterattack during the Battle of Gazala resulted in the 621st Signals Battalion being overrun and destroyed, and a number of their documents captured, alerting British intelligence to the problem. The British responded by instituting an improved call signal procedure, introducing radiotelephonic codes, imposing rigid wireless silence on reserve formations, padding out real messages with dummy traffic, tightening up on their radio discipline in combat and creating an entire fake signals network in the southern sector. The Allies' Ultra programme read much enciphered German message traffic, especially that encrypted with the Enigma machine. The primary benefit of Ultra intercepts to the effort in North Africa was to aid in cutting the Axis supply line to Tunisia. It is estimated that 40% to 60% of Axis supply shipping was located and destroyed due to decrypted information, although this claim is strongly disputed by some historians. Heavy losses of German paratroopers during the Battle of Crete, made possible by Ultra warnings of the drop times and locations, meant that Hitler hesitated in attacking Malta, which aided the British in gaining control of the Mediterranean, as did the losses of the Italian Navy at the Battle of Cape Matapan.