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— CH. 1 · ORIGINS OF ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT —

Kantokuen

~8 min read · Ch. 1 of 7
7 sections
  • In 1904, the Russo-Japanese War ended with Japan defeating Russia and securing influence in East Asia. This conflict planted deep seeds of hostility toward Moscow that would grow for decades. Following the Russian Civil War, Japanese forces deployed approximately 70,000 troops into Siberia between 1918 and 1922 to support White movement factions against Bolsheviks. They occupied key points like Vladivostok east of Lake Baikal. After international withdrawal, the Imperial Japanese Army maintained contingency plans viewing the Soviet Union as a traditional enemy. These early strategies were defensive, envisioning a Red Army invasion into Chinese territory countered by a Japanese counterattack from Korea. The decisive battlefield was planned to be southern Manchuria. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, Japanese and Soviet troops faced each other along thousands of kilometers of border. To protect their puppet state of Manchukuo, the IJA adopted a policy of halting any Soviet advance and fighting the greater part of the war in Siberia. This marked an epoch-making change in strategic thought from defense to offense. Plans progressively increased in scope from small-scale operations to gigantic multistage campaigns aiming to seize virtually the entire Soviet Far East up to Lake Baikal.

  • In 1938 and 1939, the Operations Bureau of the Japanese Army General Staff and the Kwantung Army cooperated on related contingencies under Operational Plan No. 8 or Hachi-Go. Both variants designated Concepts A and B examined all-out war with the Soviet Union beginning in 1943. Against expected 60 Soviet divisions, the IJA would commit up to 50 of its own delivered incrementally from China and Home Islands. Concept A closely mimicked the 1937 war plan calling for attacks across eastern and northern borders while maintaining defensive stance in west. The more ambitious Concept B examined striking into vast steppe between Great Khingan Mountains and Lake Baikal hoping to quickly cut Trans-Siberian Railway. Such movement would isolate whole region from European Russia and doom remaining defenders to defeat in detail. Scope was enormous with two sides engaged over front nearly 5,000 kilometers long. Japan's final objectives reached deep into Soviet territory. In terms of distances, Concept B would have dwarfed even Operation Barbarossa, German invasion of Soviet Union in June 1941. Despite impressive theory, harsh realities prevented implementation near future. Railway network in Manchuria had not been sufficiently expanded to support far-reaching offensive. Supplies on hand were seriously below required levels. Ongoing war in China precluded concentration of planned 50 divisions without fatally weakening Japanese effort there. Imperial General Headquarters concluded that sustaining drive out to Lake Baikal required fleet of some 200,000 motor vehicles. This number exceeded twice as many as entire Japanese Army ever had at given time. Popular support for Concept B finally dissipated after 1939 Battle of Khalkhin Gol demonstrated extensive challenges of sustaining even small force so far away from nearest railheads.

  • In late 1941, Adolf Hitler reportedly lamented regrettable lack of Japanese entry into war against Soviet Russia alongside Germany. From Japanese perspective, however, Germany attitude toward cooperation against Soviets from 1939 to 1941 was one of ambivalence even duplicity. After Japanese defeat at Khalkhin Gol, sudden unveiling of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact met with shock and anger where it seen as direct violation Anti-Comintern Pact betrayal common interests. Consequently April 1941 Japan felt free arrange own Neutrality Pact with Soviets as tension with West particularly United States began mount over occupation Vichy French Indochina previous year. Amid barrage Allied economic sanctions throughout 1940 and 1941 growing threat war south sense tranquility north diverted attention long-planned campaign Siberia. Shift welcomed by Imperial Japanese Navy which traditionally favored policy Nanshin-ron southward expansion maintaining deterrent against Soviet Union opposed Hokushin-ron northward expansion favored Imperial Japanese Army. Hence great shock consternation Japanese government met news Operation Barbarossa Hitler invasion Soviet Union June 1941. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe mortified second betrayal considered abandoning Tripartite Pact. Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka immediately argued jettison Neutrality Pact launch attack coordination Germany. Matsuoka views supported Kwantung Army powerful elements IJA General Staff particularly Major General Shin'ichi Tanaka Chief Operations Bureau eager quick decision. Hardliners push war Soviet Union conflicted existing flexible response policy referred Junbi Jin Taisei Preparatory Formation Setup. Under concept intervention event Soviet-German war entertained only if events took favorable turn Japan. Although Junbi Jin doctrine officially articulated June ultimately withstand renewed pressures Go North faction define strategic thinking throughout 1941.

  • Operatively speaking Kantokuen essentially identical War Plan 1940 but abbreviated force structure 20 to 30 divisions versus 43 divisions presumably banking Soviet inability reinforce Far East light conflict against Germany. Level commitment enormous far single greatest mobilization history Japanese Army. To facilitate operation tremendous number combat logistical assets dispatched Manchuria top existing structure. Particular railways north east expanded accommodate increased burden carried offensive war. Port facilities military housing hospitals augmented. Like previous concepts drawn aftermath Nomonhan Incident Kantokuen began massive initial blow Ussuri Front against Primorye followed another attack North Blagoveshchensk Kuibyshevka. Under umbrella organization First Area Army Japanese Third Twentieth Armies supported 19th Division Korea Army penetrated border south Lake Khanka overcome main Soviet defensive lines threaten Vladivostok. Simultaneously Fifth Army struck just south Iman Dalnerechensk complete isolation Maritime Province sever Trans-Siberian Railway block reinforcements arriving north. Northern Manchuria Fourth Army at first hold Amur River line transitioned offensive against Blagoveshchensk. Meanwhile two reinforced divisions outside Kantokuen force structure started operations Northern Sakhalin landward seaward sides aim wiping out defenders pincer movement. Other second-stage objectives included capture Khabarovsk Komsomolsk Skovorodino Sovetskaya Gavan Nikolayevsk. Amphibious operations Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky other parts Kamchatka Peninsula contemplated. Allocation forces never firmly agreed underwent several revisions planning stage. Two variants drawn the 8th of July 1941 close agreement regarding forces deployed Eastern Ussuri Front 13 to 14 divisions strength allocated Fourth Army varied 1 to 5 divisions consensus offensive against Blagoveshchensk launched simultaneously Primorye.

  • Soviet Union asserted military planning against Japan during 1930s early 1940s defensive nature intended primarily preserve control Russian Far East communist Mongolia. Means end completely passive. Even German invasion well into 1942 Stavka advocated all-out defense border zone heavy counterattacks along front objective preventing IJA seizing Soviet territory throwing back Manchuria. Although aggressive language used Boris Shaposhnikov 1938 concerning decisive action northern Manchuria after 45 days moderated simply destroying first echelon invaders creating situation stability. Red Army never totally gave limited offensive goals. Japanese assessed lack traversable terrain between Manchurian border Pacific Ocean combined vulnerability Trans-Siberian Railway Amur Primorye regions compelled take stance despite investing considerable resources fortify area defensive warfare. Primary Red Army forces stationed Soviet Far East 1941 Far Eastern Trans-Baikal Fronts under command Generals Iosif Apanasenko Mikhail Kovalyov respectively. Trans-Baikal Front nine divisions including two armored mechanized brigade fortified region tasked defending area west Oldoy River near Skovorodino. Far Eastern Front 23 divisions including three armored four brigades excluding antiaircraft 11 fortified regions responsible area east including crucial seaport Vladivostok. Two fronts together accounted some 650,000 men 5,400 tanks 3,000 aircraft 57,000 motor vehicles 15,000 artillery pieces 95,000 horses. Distribution manpower equipment prewar FER followed specific breakdown. By 1942 Vladivostok Defense Sector also had some 150 artillery pieces 75 mm to 356 mm caliber organized into 50 batteries. Most numerous 130 mm B-13 made up 20 batteries 90 guns.

  • IJA designs against Soviet Union did not exist vacuum. Even buildup Kantokuen underway war China diplomatic standoff United States allies continued drag on putting Japanese strategic planners difficult position. Mid-July 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka continued insistence immediate war Soviet Union ended dismissal replacement Admiral Teijiro Tono dealt blow Strike North faction. Further damaging anti-Soviet cause General Hideki Tojo Emperor Hirohito both supported reinforcement Manchuria called AGS neither ready commit hostilities. Hirohito particularly continued express worry volatility Kwantung Army negative image special maneuvers created abroad. Concerns unfounded since late October 1941 Brigadier General Sherman Miles US Military Intelligence Division apprehensive rapid increase Japanese strength Manchuria recommended US provide direct military aid Soviet Chinese Armies effort check Axis expansion keep Soviet Union war Germany. Japanese increasingly faced time crunch longer decision invade postponed less time available before winter brought operations halt. Later versions Kantokuen phrased terms overrunning Primorye 21 days versus 6 to 8 weeks originally envisioned even 35 days AGS crash schedule. For part although Soviet transfers equipment east west considerable manpower levels remained high nothing like 50 percent reductions IJA planners optimistically hoped. Nevertheless objections General Shunroku Hata opposed weakening China Expeditionary Army sake Manchuria incoming Korea Army commander Seishiro Itagaki Chief Staff Hajime Sugiyama still persuaded Hirohito reaffirm support buildup audience the 1st of August.

  • Events already begun overtake them. Response Japanese occupation key points southern French Indochina the 24th of July US President Franklin Roosevelt citing unlimited national emergency issued executive order freezing Japan's US assets controlling trade monetary transactions involving Japanese interests. When Great Britain Dutch government-exile followed America example all trade effectively blocked between Japan three nations. Even more calamitous the 1st of August same day Sugiyama appeared Emperor United States further sanctioned Japan enacting total oil embargo. American exports accounted 80% Japan's oil supply most rest came Dutch East Indies which also refused sell. Japanese war machine virtually cut off. Oil embargo proved final nail coffin Kantokuen. Scarcely week later the 9th of August 1941 Army General Staff finally bowed War Ministry plans seizure resource rich countries Southeast Asia given top priority. Grounded sheer opportunism IJA cherished adventure Siberia never compete grim realities national survival. Agreement Kantokuen buildup halted only 16 divisions stand guard provocation facilitate diplomacy Stalin government take advantage sudden collapse opportunity presented itself. All reinforcements Manchuria totaled 463,000 men 210,000 horses 23,000 vehicles bringing totals there 763,000 253,000 29,000 respectively. Korea Army expanded further 55,000 men 16,000 horses 650 vehicles. Throughout Northeast Asia total number IJA personnel stationed territories periphery Soviet Russia numbered more than 1 million.

Common questions

What was the Kantokuen plan and when was it developed?

Kantokuen was a planned World War II Japanese military campaign designed to seize virtually the entire Soviet Far East up to Lake Baikal. The operational plans were progressively increased in scope from small-scale operations to gigantic multistage campaigns between 1938 and 1941.

Who commanded the Imperial Japanese Army forces for the Kantokuen operation?

The Kwantung Army and the Operations Bureau of the Japanese Army General Staff cooperated on related contingencies under Operational Plan No. 8 or Hachi-Go. Major General Shin'ichi Tanaka served as Chief of the Operations Bureau and pushed for quick decisions regarding the northern expansion strategy.

Why did Japan cancel the Kantokuen invasion of Siberia?

Japan cancelled the Kantokuen invasion because the United States enacted a total oil embargo on the 1st of August 1941 which cut off 80% of Japan's oil supply. This economic sanction proved the final nail in the coffin of the operation and forced the Army General Staff to prioritize seizure of resource-rich countries in Southeast Asia instead.

What were the specific objectives of Concept B within the Kantokuen plan?

Concept B examined striking into the vast steppe between Great Khingan Mountains and Lake Baikal hoping to quickly cut the Trans-Siberian Railway. Such movement would isolate the whole region from European Russia and doom remaining defenders to defeat in detail.

How many divisions were planned for deployment in the Kantokuen offensive?

Kantokuen plans called for committing up to 50 divisions delivered incrementally from China and Home Islands against expected 60 Soviet divisions. The final buildup halted with only 16 divisions standing guard while all reinforcements totaled 463,000 men by the time operations ceased.