Fumimaro Konoe

• 1. Aristocratic Origins And Early Education

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  Fumimaro Konoe was born in Tokyo on the 12th of October 1891 to a prominent aristocratic family. His lineage traced back to the ancient Fujiwara clan, making him the head of one of the Five Regent Houses. This status placed his family at the pinnacle of Japan's noble hierarchy during the Meiji period. While the average height of Japanese people at that time stood around 160 centimeters, Konoe towered over them at more than 180 centimeters. He attended Taimei Elementary School before moving to Gakushuin, an institution designed specifically for children of the nobility. Uncharacteristically for someone from such a high-ranking background, he chose to study at the First Higher School instead of staying at Gakushuin. Upon graduating in 1912, he proceeded to study philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University alongside former peers from Gakushuin. Konoe subsequently transferred to the law department of Kyoto Imperial University where he studied under Marxist economist Hajime Kawakami. Under Kawakami's influence, Konoe became interested in socialism and wrote a translation of Oscar Wilde's The Soul of Man Under Socialism. After graduation, Fumimaro turned to Saionji Kinmochi for advice about starting a political career. He worked briefly in the home ministry before accompanying his mentor to Versailles as part of the Japanese peace delegation.

• 2. Rise To Power And First Premiership

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  In 1916 while still at university, Fumimaro took his father's seat in the House of Peers. This upper house of the Imperial Diet allowed him to enter politics directly through inheritance rather than election. After returning from Europe, he was aggressively recruited by the kenkyukai faction led by Yamagata Aritomo. In September 1922, he joined this conservative, militaristic group that generally opposed democratic reform. The opposing seiyukai party eventually gained support and Hara Takashi became prime minister in 1918. Konoe believed the House of Peers should stay neutral in factional party politics lest their privileges be restricted. By 1923, the seiyukai had split into two factions and could no longer control the government. During the premiership of Kato Komei, Konoe supported universal male suffrage to forestall serious curtailment of noble privileges. He left the kenkyukai in November 1927 after it became clear they were too radical. Konoe assumed the vice presidency of the House of Peers in 1931. Political parties lost control of the cabinet in 1932, leading to alliances between political elites and military factions. Konoe ascended to the presidency of the House of Peers in 1933 and spent the next few years mediating between elite political factions. Despite his tutelage under the liberal-leaning Saionji Kinmochi, he seemed to have a contradictory attraction to fascism which angered and alarmed the ageing mentor. At a costume party before Saionji's daughter was married in 1937, he dressed as Adolf Hitler. In June 1937, Konoe became Prime Minister on the recommendation of his mentor.

• 3. Escalation Of The Sino-Japanese War

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  One month after assuming office, Japanese troops clashed with Chinese troops near Beijing in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. A consensus emerged among Japanese military leadership that the nation was not ready for war with China, yet a truce made on the 11th of July broke by the 20th of July. Konoe's government sent more divisions to China causing full-scale war to erupt. In November 1937, Konoe instituted a new system of joint conference between civil government and military called liaison conferences. This arrangement resulted in an imbalance favoring the military since each member had equal say in policymaking. Prior to the capture of Nanjing, Chang Kai-shek attempted to negotiate through the German ambassador but Konoe rejected the overture. After taking Nanjing, the Imperial Japanese Army favored taking up a German offer of mediation to end the war. Konoe opposed immediate peace negotiations and instead chose to escalate the war by suggesting deliberately humiliating terms. He knew Chiang Kai-shek would never accept these terms in order to win total victory over China. In January 1938, Konoe issued a statement declaring Kuomintang aggression had not ceased despite its defeat. Six days later he gave a speech where he blamed China for the continued conflict. When asked for clarifications, Konoe said he meant more than just non-recognition of Chiang's regime but rejection and eradication of it. Due to trade imbalances Japan lost large amounts of gold reserves by late 1937. Konoe believed a new economic system geared toward exploitation of northern China's resources was the only way to stop this deterioration. In April 1938, Konoe and the military pushed a State General Mobilization Law through the Diet which declared a state of emergency. The law allowed central government control over all manpower and material while rationing raw materials into the Japanese market. Japanese victories continued at Xuzhou, Hankow, Canton, Wuchang, and Hanyang yet Chinese resistance nonetheless continued. Konoe resigned in January 1939 leaving the war that he had a large part in making to be finished by someone else.

• 4. Totalitarian Reforms And Axis Alliances

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  Dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Mitsumasa Yonai led the Japanese Army to demand Konoe's return. On the 23rd of June, Konoe resigned his position as Chairman of the Privy Council before being appointed prime minister again on the 16th of July 1940. Konoe did set out to end the war in China but deemed political parties too liberal and divisive thereby aiding pro-war factions in the military. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was created in 1940 under Second Konoe Cabinet as a wartime mobilization organization. It formed an alliance with local meiboka political bosses since their cooperation was required to mobilize the rural population. Konoe's government pressured political parties to dissolve into the IRAA though he resisted calls to form a political party akin to the Nazi party. He worried that becoming head of a political party would be beneath the dignity of a nobleman. Instead he worked to promote the IRAA as the sole political order. Even before Konoe had been recalled, the army had already planned an invasion of French Indochina. This invasion would secure needed resources to wage war with China while cutting off western supply of Kuomintang armies. Foreign minister Yosuke Matsuoka signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on the 27th of September 1940 over objections from some advisors including former Japanese ambassador Kikujiro Ishii. In a press conference on the 4th of October, Konoe said the U.S. should not misunderstand intentions of tripartite powers. He stated if the U.S. did not end provocative actions there would be no option left but war. In November 1940 Japan signed a Sino-Japanese treaty with Wang Jingwei who headed a rival Kuomintang government in Nanjing. Konoe's Government did not relinquish all held territory to Jinwei's government undercutting its authority. The British reopened the Burma Road in December 1940 and lent £10 million to Chiang's Kuomintang.

• 5. Diplomatic Failures And Path To Pearl Harbor

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  In February 1941 Konoe chose Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura as Japanese ambassador to the U.S. On the 18th of April 1941 word arrived from Nomura of a diplomatic breakthrough involving a draft understanding between US and Japan. The outline included American recognition of Manchukuo and normalization of trade relations. When Matsuoka returned to Tokyo he voiced opposition believing it would betray Nazi allies. After arguing that Japan should let Germany see this draft he left citing exhaustion while Konoe retreated claiming fever. Matsuoka changed the U.S. draft into a counteroffer gutting most concessions before sending it to Washington. On Sunday the 22nd of June 1941 Hitler broke the Molotov, Ribbentrop pact by invading the Soviet Union. Cordell Hull delivered another amendment rejecting Japanese rights to control Manchukuo or military expansion in Pacific. Konoe was forced to apologize to Emperor Hirohito assuring him Japan was not about to go to war with Soviet Union. Beginning on the 10th of July, Konoe held liaison conferences discussing response to Hull's latest amendment. It was decided reply would not be given until Japanese takeover of southern Indochina was complete. On the 22nd of July French government allowed Japanese army to occupy all of French Indochina after being threatened with military action. Two days later U.S. cut off negotiations and froze Japanese assets. Navy chief of staff Osami Nagano informed Emperor Hirohito that oil stockpiles would be completely depleted in two years. On the 6th of August Konoe's government announced it would only pull out of Indochina when war in China concluded. On the 8th of August Konoe requested through Nomura a meeting with Roosevelt suggesting they could meet in Juneau Alaska. On the 5th of September Konoe met emperor with chiefs of staff General Hajime Sugiyama and Admiral Osami Nagano informing him cabinet decision to commit to war if diplomatic breakthrough failed.

• 6. Resignation And Post-War Accountability

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  On the 6th of September the Emperor approved cabinet decision at imperial conference after receiving assurance from chiefs of staff that diplomacy remained primary emphasis. That same evening Konoe arranged dinner in secrecy with U.S. ambassador Joseph Grew. He told Grew he was prepared to travel to meet Roosevelt on moment's notice. The day after imperial conference Konoe arranged meeting between Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni and army minister Tojo attempting to bring war hawk in line. Tojo replied that if western encirclement were accepted Japan would cease to exist. On the 10th of September Nomura met Hull who stated latest offer was non-starter requiring concessions regarding China before summit. At liaison conference of the 25th of September Tojo and militarists pressed cabinet to commit to actual deadline for war of the 15th of October. After this meeting Konoe told lord keeper Kōichi Kido he was going to resign but Kido talked him out of it. Konoe secluded himself in villa at Kamakura until the 2nd of October leaving foreign minister Toyoda to take charge negotiations. On the 14th of October one day before deadline Konoe and Tojo met where Konoe attempted to impress need to stand down from war. Tojo ruled troop withdrawal as out of question declaring hundreds of thousands troops being moved south as they spoke. That same evening Tojo sent Teiichi Suzuki to Konoe urging resignation stating if he resigned Tojo would endorse prince Higashikuni. Next day on the 15th of October Konoe's friend Hotsumi Ozaki exposed and arrested as Soviet spy. Konoe resigned on the 16th of October 1941 recommending Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni as successor. Two days later Hirohito appointed war minister Hideki Tojo as next prime minister. Six weeks later Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. On the 29th of November 1941 Konoe voiced objection to war during luncheon with Emperor. Upon hearing attack on Pearl Harbor Konoe said what on earth feeling miserable defeat coming lasting only 2 or 3 months. On the 14th of February 1945 Konoe wrote report titled The Konoe Memorial calling for surrender to prevent communist revolution. After beginning Allied occupation Konoe served in cabinet of Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni first post-war government. He came under suspicion of war crimes after refusing to collaborate with U.S. Army officer Bonner Fellers in Operation Blacklist. Night before leaving to Sugamo prison on the 15th of December 1945 his son Michitaka searched room for weapons and poison. Just before dawn Michitaka awakened by mother's excited voice finding father stretched out looking calm beside empty brownish bottle. Fumimaro had died by suicide taking potassium cyanide.