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— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

Japanese militarism

~10 min read · Ch. 1 of 7
7 sections
  • Japanese militarism was an ideology that held the military's strength to be the measure of a nation's strength, and it shaped the Empire of Japan from the age of conscription through the fires of the Second World War. At its height, the belief was simple and absolute: the nation existed to strengthen the military, and the military existed to expand the nation. Kimono linings and children's undergarments bore printed images of soldiers, bombers, and tanks. The doctrine touched everything, from constitutional law to the fabric worn closest to the skin.

    How did a country that had been closed to the outside world for centuries come to build one of the most aggressive military machines the modern era had seen? Who pushed back, at great personal cost? And what finally broke the ideology's grip on an entire society? Those are the questions this documentary will answer.

  • Yamagata Aritomo introduced universal military conscription in 1873, and the model he drew on was not French or British but Prussian. Prussia's recent transformation from an agricultural backwater into a leading industrial and military power had made a deep impression on him and many of his contemporaries. He embraced Prussian political ideas that favored military expansion abroad and authoritarian rule at home, and crucially, ideas that treated civilian control of the military as an obstacle rather than a safeguard.

    In 1885, Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke sent a military advisor named Major Jakob Meckel to Japan at Japan's own request, following German victory in the Franco-Prussian War. Meckel worked directly with future prime ministers General Katsura Taro and General Yamagata Aritomo, and with army strategist General Kawakami Soroku. His list of practical reforms was substantial: he reorganized the army's command structure into divisions and regiments to increase mobility, connected major army bases by railway, established artillery and engineering regiments as independent commands, and revised the conscription system to abolish nearly all exemptions.

    Meckel stayed only until 1888, but his intellectual imprint lasted far longer. He introduced Clausewitz's military theories and the Prussian concept of war games, training roughly sixty of Japan's highest-ranking officers. He also reinforced a constitutional principle already embedded in Articles XI-XIII of the Meiji Constitution: that loyalty to the Emperor was the officer's supreme obligation, not loyalty to any civilian government. A bust of Meckel was placed in front of the Army Staff College in 1909 and stood there until 1945.

    The proclamation of the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors in 1882 had already given that loyalty doctrine a formal home. Thousands of conscripts from across Japanese society were now being trained not merely in tactics but in the belief that unquestioning obedience to the Emperor was the foundation of the Japanese state. The early Meiji government had framed this project as defensive, a response to the threat of western imperialism, but the architecture they built would prove easier to turn outward than anyone publicly acknowledged.

  • In 1878, the Imperial Japanese Army established its General Staff office on the German model. This was not a department reporting to a minister but a body equal to, and eventually superior to, the Ministry of War. The Imperial Japanese Navy soon created its own equivalent. Both offices reported directly to the Emperor, bypassing the cabinet and the Prime Minister entirely.

    The practical consequences of this arrangement were far-reaching. Because the Chiefs of the General Staff were not cabinet ministers, they owed the Prime Minister nothing. And because the law required the posts of Army Minister and Navy Minister to be filled by active-duty officers nominated by their respective services, the military held a veto over the formation of any government. If either service refused to nominate a minister, the prime minister could not fill his cabinet, and a cabinet that could not be filled could not govern.

    This veto was used sparingly but its shadow fell everywhere. In 1937, the Army deployed it to block a general, Kazushige Ugaki, from becoming prime minister. The threat alone, however, shaped every negotiation between civilian leaders and military commanders. Politicians knew that pressing the military too hard on any issue could bring the government down.

    What made the arrangement doubly unstable was that the military was not a unified force. It was fractured by internal factions, and those factions competed for power through means that went well beyond institutional maneuvering. Assassinations, coup attempts, and the suppression of rivals within the officer corps were recurring features of Japanese political life through the 1930s. Even Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime prime minister, struggled to control portions of his own military.

  • Great Power status in the nineteenth century was understood to require a resource-rich colonial empire, and Japan's home islands were poor in the raw materials that modern industrial warfare demanded. Iron, oil, and coal had to be largely imported. Taiwan, secured in 1895, and Korea, absorbed in 1910, were primarily agricultural possessions. They did not solve the resource problem.

    Japanese military planners looked at Manchuria's iron and coal, Indochina's rubber, and China's broader resource base as the answer. This vision, however, put the military in conflict with Japan's own zaibatsu, the large financial and industrial corporations whose executives often preferred trade to conquest as the route to raw materials. That tension played out in domestic politics throughout the interwar period.

    The army's view gained urgency when the Great Depression collapsed world trade beginning in 1929 and western nations raised trade barriers. The sense of encirclement, already present in the Meiji-era phrase fukoku kyohei, "rich nation, strong army," sharpened into something more aggressive. Patriotic education reinforced the concept of hakko ichiu, described as a divine mission to unify Asia under Japanese rule. The ideological and the economic arguments for expansion were becoming indistinguishable from each other.

    By 1940, this logic had carried Japan to French Indochina, which it occupied in the wake of the fall of Paris to German forces. The United States responded by freezing Japanese assets and cutting off the sale of war materials. The US fleet, previously stationed in California, was moved to Pearl Harbor. What had begun as a competition for colonial resources was now a direct confrontation with the world's largest economy.

  • In June 1928, officers of the Kwantung Army, acting without authorization, assassinated warlord Zhang Zuolin, a former Japanese ally, in hopes of sparking a general conflict in Manchuria. The gamble failed, but the officers faced no punishment. That outcome was noted.

    The Manchurian Incident of September 1931 followed the same template and succeeded. Kwantung Army conspirators blew up a section of the South Manchurian Railway track near Mukden, blamed Chinese saboteurs, and used the incident as the pretext for a full military takeover of Manchuria. The civilian government in Tokyo had no power to stop it. The Kwantung Army's actions drew popular support rather than condemnation.

    One month later in Tokyo, the Imperial Colors Incident saw military figures attempt to establish a military dictatorship. They failed, but the perpetrators were not punished and the news was suppressed. In January 1932, Japanese forces attacked Shanghai in what became a three-month undeclared war. In May of that year, a group of junior naval officers and army cadets assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. The assassins were tried and sentenced to fifteen years in prison, but they were widely seen as patriots rather than criminals.

    The February 26 Incident of 1936 was the most dramatic of these episodes. The Army's elite First Infantry Division staged an attempted coup. It was put down by other military units and its leaders were executed after secret trials. Yet even after this episode, Japan's civilian leadership chose accommodation over confrontation. Defense budgets rose, naval construction accelerated, Japan announced it would no longer honor disarmament treaties, and patriotic indoctrination intensified. War with China began formally on the 7th of July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a clash near Beijing that escalated into the full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War within days.

  • Hara Takashi became prime minister in 1918 on the rallying cry "Militarism is dead." He was a commoner and a liberal thinker in the Rikken Seiyukai party. Three years later he was assassinated.

    Kijuro Shidehara pursued a non-interventionist policy toward China through the 1920s, working to stabilize Japan's relations with Britain and the United States. The phrase "Shidehara diplomacy" came to describe Japan's liberal foreign policy of that decade. Military interests attacked it as a sign of weakness, and Shidehara was eventually driven from influence.

    Baron Takuma Dan, director of Mitsui Bank, was known for his opposition to overseas intervention and his pro-American views. He was murdered on the 5th of March 1932, in what became known as the League of Blood Incident. Professor Minobe Tatsukichi of Tokyo Imperial University argued in 1935 that the Emperor was part of Japan's constitutional structure rather than a sacred authority above it. Bureaucrats had largely accepted this interpretation for years, but the increasingly militant climate turned it into grounds for attacks in the House of Peers and forced his resignation.

    Saito Takao, a graduate of Yale University and member of the Rikken Minseito party, stood before the Diet on the 2nd of February 1940 and sharply questioned the justification for Japan's war in China. He was expelled from the Diet on the 7th of March 1940. His speech also prompted Fumimaro Konoe to establish the League of Diet Members Believing the Objectives of the Holy War.

    Kano Jigoro, creator of Judo and a central figure in Japan's modern educational system, was reportedly a firm opponent of militarism. He secured a promise from the Emperor that his Judo school, the Kodokan, would not be converted into a military training center. Tokugawa Iesato, President of the House of Peers from 1903 to 1933, went on a world tour in late 1933 and into 1934 to strengthen Japan's relationships with the United States and Europe. While in the United States, he delivered a radio address to the American public and met personally with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to encourage a united front against rising global militarism. It was only after Tokugawa's death in 1940 that Japanese militants succeeded in bringing Japan into the Axis.

  • The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941 brought the United States into the war, and with it a confrontation that Japan's military had structured the entire state to avoid ever losing. The early years of the Pacific War produced stunning territorial gains, organized into what was called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, framed as an integrated political and economic bloc to resist Western domination.

    The reversal came quickly. Japan was defeated at Midway in June 1942. The Guadalcanal campaign ended in Japanese defeat in February 1943. By July 1944, the loss of Saipan forced Tojo to resign. U.S. bombers began firebombing major Japanese cities in 1945. Atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima on the 6th of August and on Nagasaki on the 9th of August. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on the 8th of August and invaded Manchuria the following day. On the 15th of August, Hirohito broadcast Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. The formal surrender ceremony took place in Tokyo Bay on the 2nd of September 1945.

    After the surrender, many former military leaders were tried for war crimes before the Tokyo tribunal. Japan's government and educational system were restructured under American occupation. Pacifism was written into the postwar Constitution of Japan as one of its central tenets, a direct and deliberate reversal of everything the militarist ideology had stood for. The occupation lasted until the 28th of April 1952, when the Treaty of San Francisco took effect. The institution that had once been able to bring down any civilian government, veto any prime minister, and launch unauthorized wars on the Asian continent now had no constitutional existence at all.

Common questions

What was Japanese militarism and when did it dominate Japan?

Japanese militarism was the ideology that military strength was equal to national strength and that the military should dominate Japan's political and social life. It was most prominent from the introduction of universal conscription in 1873 until Japan's defeat in World War II in 1945.

Who was Major Jakob Meckel and what was his role in Japanese militarism?

Major Jakob Meckel was a Prussian military advisor sent to Japan from 1885 to 1888 at Japan's own request. He reorganized Japan's army into divisions and regiments, connected military bases by railway, trained roughly sixty of Japan's highest-ranking officers, and introduced Clausewitz's theories along with the Prussian concept of war games.

How did the Japanese military control the civilian government?

Japanese law required the posts of Army Minister and Navy Minister to be filled by active-duty officers nominated by their respective services. Because a prime minister could not form a cabinet without these posts filled, both the Army and Navy held an effective veto over any civilian government and could bring it down by withdrawing their minister.

What was the Manchurian Incident of 1931?

The Manchurian Incident of September 1931 was a staged provocation in which Kwantung Army conspirators blew up a section of South Manchurian Railway track near Mukden, blamed Chinese saboteurs, and used the event as a pretext to invade and seize all of Manchuria. The civilian government in Tokyo was powerless to stop it.

Who were the main opponents of Japanese militarism?

Notable opponents included Prime Minister Hara Takashi, who was assassinated in 1921; diplomat Kijuro Shidehara, whose non-interventionist policy was attacked by military interests; Baron Takuma Dan, director of Mitsui Bank, murdered on the 5th of March 1932; and Tokugawa Iesato, who met with President Roosevelt in 1933-1934 to encourage resistance to rising militarism.

How did Japanese militarism end after World War II?

Japanese militarism was discredited by Japan's military defeat and the American occupation that followed. Former military leaders were tried for war crimes before the Tokyo tribunal, and pacifism was written into Japan's postwar constitution as a central tenet. The occupation lasted until the 28th of April 1952.

All sources

9 references cited across the entry

  1. 1webThe Meiji Restoration Era, 1868-1889Japan Society — 2021-06-11
  2. 6bookEmbracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War IIJohn W. Dower — W. W. Norton & Company — 1999
  3. 7journalJapanese Responses To the Defeat in World War IiKitahara Michio — 1984-06-01
  4. 8bookJapanese war criminals: the politics of justice after the Second World WarSandra Wilson — Columbia University Press — 2017
  5. 9bookThe Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal: Law, History, and JurisprudenceDavid Cohen — Cambridge University Press — 2018