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— CH. 1 · STRATEGIC ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES —

Guadalcanal campaign

~10 min read · Ch. 1 of 7
7 sections
  • On the 7th of December 1941, Japanese forces attacked the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack killed almost 2,500 people and crippled much of the U.S. battleship fleet. This event precipitated formal declarations of war between the two nations the next day. The initial goals of the Japanese leadership were to neutralize the U.S. Navy and seize territories rich in natural resources. They aimed to establish strategic military bases with which to defend Japan's empire in the Pacific Ocean and Asia. Initially, Japanese forces captured the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, Wake Island, Gilbert Islands, New Britain and Guam.

    The Allies chose the Solomon Islands as their first target for a major offensive in summer 1942. Guadalcanal was added to the plan when it was discovered that the Japanese were constructing an airbase there. Allied concern grew when, in early July, the Imperial Japanese Navy began constructing a large airfield at Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal. From such a base, Japanese long-range bombers could threaten the sea lines of communication from the west coast of the Americas to the populous east coast of Australia. By August, the Japanese had about 900 naval troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, and 2,800 personnel on Guadalcanal. These bases were meant to protect Japan's major naval base at Rabaul and threaten Allied supply lines.

    The Allied plan to invade the southern Solomons was conceived by U.S. Admiral Ernest King. He proposed the offensive in order to deny the use of the islands to the Japanese as bases from which the supply routes between the United States and Australia could be threatened. With U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's tacit consent, King also advocated for an invasion of Guadalcanal. The operation was under the command of Robert L. Ghormley, reporting to Chester W. Nimitz. The campaign followed successful Allied defensive actions at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway in May and June 1942.

  • Bad weather allowed the Allied expeditionary force to arrive unseen by the Japanese on the night of the 6th of August and morning of the 7th of August. This event is occasionally referred to as the Midnight Raid on Guadalcanal. A Japanese patrol aircraft from Tulagi had searched the general area that the Allied invasion fleet was moving through but was unable to spot the Allied fleet due to severe storms and heavy clouds. The landing force split into two groups, with one group assaulting Guadalcanal and the other Tulagi, Florida, and other nearby islands.

    At 09:10 on the 7th of August, Vandegrift and 11,000 U.S. Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point. Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered scant Japanese resistance and secured the airfield by 16:00 on the 8th of August. The Japanese naval construction units and combat troops, under the command of Captain Kanae Monzen, had panicked after coming under naval bombardment and aerial bombing. They abandoned the airfield and fled about west to the Matanikau River and Point Cruz area. Japanese troops left behind food, supplies, intact construction equipment and vehicles, and 13 dead at the airfield and surrounding area.

    Over four days of intense effort, the supplies were moved from the landing beaches to dispersed dumps within the defensive perimeter. Work began on the airfield immediately, mainly using captured Japanese equipment. On the 12th of August the airfield was named Henderson Field after Lofton R. Henderson, a Marine aviator who was killed during the Battle of Midway. By the 18th of August the airfield was ready for operation. At this time there were exactly 10,819 Marines on Guadalcanal. Five days' worth of food had been landed from the transports, which gave the Marines a total of 14 days' supply of food.

  • As the transports continued to unload on the night of 8, the 9th of August, two groups of screening Allied cruisers and destroyers were surprised and defeated by a Japanese force of seven cruisers and one destroyer from the 8th Fleet based at Rabaul and Kavieng. This force was commanded by Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. The 8th fleet had been sighted at least five times over the course of the previous days, but a combination of misidentification of ships and the Allied leadership's dismissal of Japanese night fighting capability contributed to an air of complacence among the Allied surface fleet.

    In the course of this action four allied cruisers were sunk and one was heavily damaged with no Japanese ships lost. The transport fleet was left exposed to further attack. As a result, during the Battle of Savo Island on the night of the 9th of August, Mikawa's force was able to surprise and sink one Australian and three American cruisers. The Japanese suffered only moderate damage to one cruiser. Despite this success, Mikawa was unaware that Fletcher was preparing to withdraw with the U.S. aircraft carriers. He immediately retired to Rabaul without attempting to attack the now defenseless Allied transport ships.

    For six weeks, from early August to the end of September, the U.S. Navy largely avoided the waters off Tulagi and Guadalcanal. Transport Division 12 consisted of six obsolete World War I-era destroyers converted to high-speed transports. These ships landed the first Marines onto Tulagi and later on Guadalcanal. They conducted special operations missions with Marine Raiders and provided covering fire for the Marines on Guadalcanal. On the 30th of August, one of these ships was bombed by Japanese high-altitude horizontal bombers and sank with the loss of 51 men.

  • On the 7th of September, Kawaguchi issued his attack plan to rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield. Kawaguchi's plan called for forces under his command, split into three divisions, to approach the Lunga perimeter inland. Oka's forces would attack the perimeter from the west, while Ichiki's Second Echelon, renamed the Kuma Battalion, would attack from the east. The main attack would be conducted from the jungle south of the Lunga perimeter by Kawaguchi's Center Body, numbering 3,000 men in three battalions.

    By the 7th of September, most of Kawaguchi's troops had departed Taivu to begin marching towards Lunga Point along the coastline. About 250 Japanese troops remained behind to guard the brigade's supply base at Taivu. Meanwhile, native scouts under the direction of Martin Clemens brought reports to the U.S. Marines of Japanese troops at Taivu near the village of Tasimboko. Edson subsequently planned a raid on the Japanese troop concentration at Taivu. On the 8th of September, after being dropped off near Taivu by boat, Edson's men captured Tasimboko and forced the Japanese defenders to retreat into the jungle.

    On the night of the 12th of September, Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion attacked the Raiders between the Lunga River and ridge. The next night Kawaguchi faced Edson's 840 Raiders with 3,000 troops of his brigade. The Japanese began their attack just after nightfall. Two companies from Kawaguchi's 2nd Battalion charged up the southern edge of the ridge and pushed Edson's troops back to Hill 123. Throughout the night the Marines turned back wave after wave of frontal Japanese infantry attacks. Several of these devolved into hand-to-hand combat. The weight of these repeated assaults eventually pressed the Marines back to within a quarter mile of the airfield.

  • Throughout August, small numbers of American aircraft and their crews continued to arrive at Guadalcanal. By the end of August, 64 planes of various types were stationed at Henderson Field. Air battles between the Allied aircraft at Henderson and Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul continued almost daily. Between the 26th of August and the 5th of September, the U.S. lost about 15 aircraft to the Japanese's approximately 19. More than half of the U.S. aircrews shot down were rescued; most of the Japanese aircrews were not.

    The eight-hour round-trip flight from Rabaul to Guadalcanal seriously hampered Japanese efforts to establish air superiority over Henderson Field. Throughout the campaign, Rabaul-based Japanese aircrew had to fly almost 600 miles before combat with Allied pilots operating in the immediate area of Henderson Field. The Japanese navy did not systematically rotate their veteran pilots out of combat zones. This steadily exhausted and depleted Japanese air power in the region. From a strategic standpoint, the overall quality of Japanese aviation in the Solomons deteriorated as worn-out veteran pilots were replaced by inexperienced aircrew with minimal combat experience.

    Australian coastwatchers on Bougainville and New Georgia islands were often able to provide Allied forces on Guadalcanal with advance notice of approaching Japanese air strikes. This allowed the U.S. fighters time to take off and position themselves to attack the Japanese aircraft as they approached. The Japanese air forces were slowly losing a war of attrition in the skies above Guadalcanal. Later United States Admiral of the Fleet, William F. Halsey, paid tribute to Australian Coastwatchers: The Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the South Pacific.

  • Throughout the last week of September and the first week of October, Tokyo Express runs continually delivered troops from the Japanese 2nd Infantry Division to Guadalcanal. The Japanese Navy promised to support the IJA's planned offensive by delivering necessary troops, equipment, and supplies to the island. They also stepped up air attacks on Henderson Field and sent warships to bombard the airfield. In the meantime, Millard F. Harmon convinced Ghormley that U.S. Marine forces on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive.

    On the 8th of October, the 2,837 men of the 164th Infantry Regiment from the Americal Division boarded ships at New Caledonia for the trip to Guadalcanal with a projected arrival date of the 13th of October. To protect the transports carrying the 164th to Guadalcanal, Ghormley ordered Task Force 64, consisting of four cruisers and five destroyers under U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept any Japanese ships that approached Guadalcanal. Mikawa's 8th Fleet staff scheduled a substantial Express run for the night of the 11th of October. Two seaplane tenders and six destroyers were ordered to put 728 soldiers ashore on Guadalcanal.

    Just before midnight, Scott's warships detected Gotō's force on radar near the entrance to the strait between Savo Island and Guadalcanal. Scott's force was in a position to cross the T on Gotō's unsuspecting formation. Opening fire, Scott's warships sank a cruiser and a destroyer, heavily damaged another cruiser, mortally wounded Gotō, and forced the rest of Gotō's warships to abandon their bombardment mission and retreat. During the exchange of gunfire, one of Scott's destroyers was sunk, and one cruiser and another destroyer were heavily damaged.

  • Despite the heavy damage from the battleship bombardment on the 14th of October, Henderson personnel were able to restore one of the runways to operational condition within a few hours. Seventeen SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers and 20 F4F Wildcats at Espiritu Santo were quickly flown to Henderson. U.S. Army and Marine transport aircraft shuttled aviation gasoline from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal. The Japanese convoy reached Tassafaronga Point at midnight on the 14th of October and began unloading. Throughout the day of the 15th of October, a string of CAF aircraft from Henderson bombed and strafed the unloading convoy, destroying three of the cargo ships.

    In December, the Japanese decided to abandon Guadalcanal to focus on the defense of the other Solomon Islands. They evacuated their last forces by the 9th of February 1943. The campaign followed the successful Allied defensive actions at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway in May and June 1942. Along with the battles at Milne Bay and Buna, Gona on New Guinea, the Guadalcanal campaign marked the Allies' transition from defensive operations to offensive ones.

    The campaign effectively allowed them to seize the strategic initiative in the Pacific theater from the Japanese. The campaign was followed by other major Allied offensives in the Pacific, most notably: the Solomon Islands campaign, New Guinea campaign, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign, the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign, the Philippines campaign of 1944 to 1945, and the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign prior to the surrender of Japan in August 1945.

Common questions

When did the Guadalcanal campaign begin and end?

The Guadalcanal campaign began on the 7th of August 1942 when U.S. Marines landed on the island and ended in December 1943 when Japanese forces evacuated their last troops by the 9th of February 1943.

Who commanded the Allied invasion force during the Guadalcanal campaign?

U.S. Admiral Ernest King conceived the plan for the Guadalcanal campaign while Robert L. Ghormley held operational command under Chester W. Nimitz with Vandegrift leading the Marine landing force.

Why was the airfield at Lunga Point important to the Guadalcanal campaign?

The airfield at Lunga Point became critical because it allowed Allied aircraft to establish Henderson Field which protected sea lines of communication between the United States and Australia from Japanese long-range bombers.

What happened during the Battle of Savo Island in the Guadalcanal campaign?

During the Battle of Savo Island on the night of the 9th of August four allied cruisers were sunk and one was heavily damaged by a Japanese force commanded by Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa without any Japanese ships lost.

How did Australian coastwatchers contribute to the success of the Guadalcanal campaign?

Australian coastwatchers on Bougainville and New Georgia islands provided advance notice of approaching Japanese air strikes which allowed U.S. fighters time to take off and position themselves to attack the Japanese aircraft as they approached.