French invasion of Russia

• 1. Introduction

  ›

  The French invasion of Russia began on the 24th of June 1812, the day Napoleon's Grande Armée crossed the Neman River into Russian territory. Within six months, roughly a million soldiers and civilians were dead. The army that crossed that river was the largest ever assembled in European history to that point. How did a force of nearly half a million men, meticulously supplied and led by the most celebrated general of his age, collapse so completely? And what does that collapse reveal about the limits of military power itself? Those are the questions this documentary will try to answer.

  5209887

• 2. Why Napoleon Invaded

  ›

  Tsar Alexander I had been Napoleon's ally, bound by the Treaty of Tilsit signed along the Neman River in 1807. That agreement drew Russia into the Continental System, a blockade designed to strangle British trade. But the arrangement cost Russia dearly. On the 31st of December 1810, Alexander broke away from the blockade entirely, cutting off Napoleon's primary foreign policy weapon against Britain.

  For Napoleon, the rupture was intolerable. He had spent years reshaping Europe through a string of wars: the War of the Third Coalition, which dissolved the Holy Roman Empire; the War of the Fourth Coalition; and the War of the Fifth Coalition. Each victory had tightened his grip. Losing Russia as a trading partner in the blockade undid a crucial pillar of that grip.

  Napoleon framed the coming war publicly as the "Second Polish War," invoking the cause of Polish independence to rally support from Polish nationalists. He told his soldiers that Russia had broken sacred vows made at Tilsit and that their destiny would be fulfilled. In a proclamation at Vilkaviškis Manor on the 21st to the 22nd of June 1812, he declared: "Soldiers, the second Polish war is begun." Behind that rhetoric, though, his stated goal of resurrecting the Polish state held no real weight for him. The real objective was forcing Russia back into the Continental System.

  152116205

• 3. The Machinery of Supply

  ›

  Twenty train battalions with 7,848 vehicles were mobilized before the invasion even began, with a forty-day supply load as their goal. Napoleon's logistical preparation for 1812 was the most elaborate of his career. Magazines were packed across Poland and East Prussia. The city of Danzig alone contained enough provisions to feed 400,000 men for fifty days. At Breslau, Płock, and Wyszogród, grain depots produced 60,000 biscuits a day at Thorn. Fifty thousand cattle were collected to follow the army. Magdeburg stored 100 heavy guns and 462 cannons alongside two million paper cartridges and 300,000 pounds of gunpowder.

  Yet the plan began unraveling almost immediately. The dense road networks of Germany and France that the French army was accustomed to had no equivalent in Lithuania or Russia. Standard heavy wagons designed for paved German roads could not navigate the sparse dirt tracks through birch forest and marshland. On the 29th of June 1812, a violent thunderstorm turned roads into deep mire. Historian Richard K. Riehn recorded that wagons sank to their hubs, horses dropped from exhaustion, and soldiers lost their boots in the mud. Then the sun baked those ruts into hardened ridges that broke wagon wheels and snapped horses' legs.

  The supply wagons simply could not keep pace with the forced marches Napoleon demanded. The foremost columns received whatever provisions could be moved forward; the formations behind them starved. Colonel Pion documented troops pillaging even allied territory because no food was reaching them. By the time Napoleon reached Vilna, he had left more than 5,000 dead horses in his wake and been forced to abandon up to 100 guns and 500 artillery wagons. The Vilna magazine, which held rations for 100,000 men for forty days as well as 27,000 muskets and 30,000 pairs of shoes, stood as the furthest forward depot. Beyond it, the army was on its own.

  9824228757

• 4. Disease Before the Battles

  ›

  Several days after crossing the Neman, soldiers began developing high fevers and a red rash. Typhus had arrived. Before any major engagement was fought, the main body of Napoleon's Grande Armée had shrunk by a third in the first eight weeks of the campaign. A Lieutenant Mertens of Ney's III Corps recorded in his diary the oppressive heat followed by cold nights, dead horses, swamp-like bivouacs, dysentery, and fever raging through the ranks, with hundreds filling a field hospital improvised for the purpose.

  Diarrhea, diphtheria, and dysentery spread through soldiers who drank from contaminated rivers and ponds and ate spoiled food because clean supplies could not reach them in time. Jakob Walter, a German soldier with the army, described the exhausting experience of foraging in villages emptied by Russia's scorched-earth tactics, where peasants had hidden their stores and Russian partisans watched from a distance. In the first two weeks of July alone, the Grande Armée lost 100,000 men to sickness and desertion. Starvation, historian accounts confirm, prompted wholesale surrenders even before the frost arrived. Armand de Caulaincourt recorded soldiers swarming over horses that had slipped and fallen, cutting them apart before the animals had even died. By the end of August, before the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon had lost roughly half of the fighting strength with which he crossed the Neman.

  106112492

• 5. Moscow and the Waiting Game

  ›

  On the 7th of September 1812, the Battle of Borodino brought together more than 250,000 troops and caused at least 70,000 casualties, making it the bloodiest single day of the Napoleonic Wars. The Grande Armée attacked the Imperial Russian Army near the village of Borodino, west of Mozhaysk, captured the main positions, but failed to destroy the Russian army. About a third of Napoleon's soldiers were killed or wounded. Crucially, Napoleon withheld the Imperial Guard entirely, losing the one chance to deliver a decisive blow.

  On the 14th of September 1812, Napoleon entered Moscow with roughly 100,000 men, only to find the city deserted. Military governor Fyodor Rostopchin had ordered it set ablaze. Within forty-eight hours, three quarters of the city had burned to ashes. A French foot soldier recalled marching toward the city and seeing great clouds of fire, red smoke, and glittering gilded crosses of church towers billowing skyward.

  Napoleon then waited five weeks for a peace proposal that never came. Tsar Alexander refused to respond. On the 5th of October, Napoleon sent French ambassador Jacques Lauriston to meet Kutuzov, hoping to open negotiations. Kutuzov agreed to meet but transmitted no offer. Meanwhile, Kutuzov had repositioned his army at Tarutino, controlling roads from Obninsk toward Kaluga and Medyn, where surrounding hills and the Nara River gave him protection and access to supply routes from the fertile southern provinces. He refused to attack. He was content for Napoleon to remain in Moscow as long as possible, rebuilding his own strength while the French army deteriorated inside a burned city.

  907076598

• 6. The Retreat

  ›

  On the 19th of October 1812, Napoleon finally ordered the retreat. His forces still numbered around 108,000 men, but his cavalry had been nearly destroyed. Commanders were redirecting cavalrymen into infantry units because so few horses remained.

  Napoleon attempted to swing south and west along a different route, hoping to reach untouched, prosperous regions and avoid the devastated road his army had already stripped bare heading east. The Battle of Maloyaroslavets ended that plan. Kutuzov's forces blocked the southern route, compelling Napoleon to retrace the same Smolensk road his army had already exhausted. Cossack bands under Matvei Platov, Vasily Orlov-Denisov, and Denis Davydov struck at isolated foraging units throughout the march. The absence of fodder killed nearly all the remaining horses, which in turn meant abandoning still more cannons and wagons.

  Winter arrived on the 6th of November with a blizzard. The army was still wearing summer clothing. The horses had not been fitted with the caulkin shoes that would have allowed them to walk on iced roads. Armand de Caulaincourt described soldiers overcome by the cold dropping to the ground along the road, begging passersby to leave them alone rather than help, because the drowsiness brought on by hypothermia was irresistible. When the night-time temperature dropped to minus 35 degrees Celsius, a division of 15,000 soldiers under Loison lost 12,000 men within three days without fighting a single battle.

  At the Berezina River crossing, two Russian armies descended on the Grande Armée's remnants. Captain Jean-François Dumonceau of the 2nd Lancers Regiment of the Imperial Guard described cannon fire tearing gaps in the crowd surging at the bridges, a bridge collapsing under the press of bodies, and people throwing themselves into the ice-choked river. By the time Napoleon crossed the Berezina, he commanded around 49,000 troops alongside 40,000 stragglers of no military use. On the 5th of December, he abandoned the army at Smorgonie and returned to Paris by sled.

  9248879196

• 7. The Reckoning

  ›

  Napoleon's initial force entering Russia exceeded 450,000 men, over 150,000 horses, approximately 25,000 wagons, and nearly 1,400 artillery pieces. Richard K. Riehn's figures suggest 685,000 men marched into Russia in 1812, with around 31,000 soldiers eventually marching out in any recognizable military formation and perhaps another 35,000 stragglers. Minard's famous infographic, which plotted the army's size against its route and the temperatures recorded on the return march, showed 422,000 crossing the Neman with Napoleon and only 10,000 crossing back.

  Half of the dead perished from disease rather than combat. Russian losses were nearly as large, with the Russian field army reduced to 40,000 effectives by the time it reached the Neman. The campaign shattered Napoleon's reputation for invincibility. The catastrophic loss of cavalry in particular would weaken him in every subsequent campaign.

  Historian Riehn summarized the structural failure plainly: Napoleon's military machine was built for short, violent campaigns, and the infrastructure of horse-drawn transport and dirt roads could not support what 1812 demanded. Modern military analysts have noted that the scale of operations Napoleon attempted in 1812 and 1813 required railroads and telegraph networks that had not yet been invented. Within weeks of the army's collapse, Austria and Prussia switched sides to join Russia and Britain, triggering the War of the Sixth Coalition. The invasion's failure did not merely end a campaign; it began the dismantling of the French Empire itself.

  958998875