Appeasement
In the early 1930s, a deep psychological scar from World War I shaped British foreign policy. The trauma of the Great War between 1914 and 1918 left a generation determined to avoid another conflict at any cost. Public opinion strongly favored disarmament and peace over military confrontation. A Peace Ballot in 1935 saw eleven million people pledge support for reducing armaments through international agreement. This mood made concessions to aggressive powers seem like a necessary step toward stability. Many believed that the Treaty of Versailles had been too harsh on Germany and needed correction. National grievances should be addressed peacefully rather than through force. The League of Nations was established after the war with hopes of preventing future aggression. Its failure became evident when Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931 without facing real consequences. The United States refused to recognize Japan's conquest but took no direct action. This inactivity encouraged European aggressors who planned similar acts of defiance. Disarmament conferences starting in 1932-34 failed to stop rearmament drives. Hitler walked out of these talks signaling a new diplomacy outside the League framework. Britain began seeking economic ties with Germany through agreements like the Anglo-German Payments Agreement of 1934. These efforts aimed to stabilize relations while avoiding war. The goal was to integrate Germany as an equal partner in European affairs. Only then would lasting peace be attained according to this thinking.
The Abyssinian crisis of October 1935 tested British resolve against Italian aggression. Emperor Haile Selassie appealed personally to the League assembly in Geneva for help. Italy launched an attack on Ethiopia claiming border disputes at Walwal where about 150 Abyssinians and 50 Italians died. The League declared Italy the aggressor but imposed incomplete sanctions excluding coal and oil. Fear that full sanctions might provoke war prevented stronger measures. British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval secretly agreed to concede two thirds of Abyssinia to Italy. When the press leaked their discussions, public outcry forced both men to resign. This scandal discredited collective security and traditional diplomacy resumed its place in international affairs. Mussolini found himself drawn into Hitler's arms by the indignant British public. In May 1936, undeterred by sanctions, Italy captured Addis Ababa and proclaimed Victor Emmanuel III as Emperor of Ethiopia. The League abandoned sanctions in July marking a major failure of international cooperation. The Rhineland remilitarization on the 7th of March 1936 further demonstrated Germany's growing confidence. Hitler sent the Wehrmacht into this demilitarized zone gambling Britain would not intervene. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin claimed Britain lacked forces to back France according to intelligence that overestimated German strength. Public opinion in Britain thought Germans were merely walking into their own backyard. Hugh Dalton of the Labour Party said neither people nor party would support military or economic sanctions. The Spanish Civil War beginning in 1936 showed how non-intervention policies favored fascist powers. Britain adopted benevolent neutrality avoiding favoring either side hoping for future advantage regardless of outcome.
Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden on the 15th of September 1938 to negotiate directly with Hitler about Czechoslovakia. He now demanded absorption of Sudeten lands into Germany rather than just autonomy. Chamberlain became convinced refusal would lead to war and agreed to Hitler's demands. Britain and France told Czech President Edvard Beneš to hand over territory with German majority. On the 22nd of September Chamberlain flew to Bad Godesberg for his second meeting with Hitler. Hitler responded that cession was not enough and Czechoslovakia must be broken up completely. Later that day Hitler resiled saying he would accept cession by the 1st of October. On the 24th of September Germany issued the Godesberg Memorandum demanding cession by the 28th of September or war. The Czech government rejected these demands while France ordered mobilization and Britain moved the Royal Navy. Mussolini persuaded Hitler to put the dispute to a four-power conference held in Munich on the 29th of September 1938. Hitler, Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier and Mussolini met without Czechoslovakia or Soviet Union participation. They agreed Germany would occupy the Sudetenland but an international commission would consider other disputed areas. At Chamberlain's request Hitler signed an agreement for peace between United Kingdom and Germany. Before leaving Munich Chamberlain promised peace for our time upon returning to Britain. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a telegram calling him good man and later said he was not upset over final result. The Versailles Treaty legacy had created Czechoslovakia with border areas having majority-German population known as Sudetenland. In April 1938 Sudeten German Party led by Konrad Henlein threatened direct action bringing Sudeten Germans within Reich frontiers. An international crisis ensued when France and Britain advised Czech acceptance of autonomy. Lord Runciman mediated in Prague persuading Czech government to grant autonomy. Germany escalated dispute with press carrying stories of alleged atrocities against Sudeten Germans. Hitler ordered 750,000 troops to Czech border creating atmosphere of growing conflict.
Winston Churchill stood out among Conservatives who refused to vote for Munich settlement. He warned week before Munich that partitioning Czechoslovakia under pressure amounted to complete surrender of Western Democracies to Nazi threat. Such collapse brought peace or security neither to UK nor France. Churchill and few other Conservatives attacked by local constituency parties after voting against agreement. Only MP advocating war was Conservative Duff Cooper who resigned from government to protest agreement. Labour Party opposed fascist dictators on principle but until late 1930s also opposed rearmament. Pacifist leader George Lansbury resigned after party resolution favoring sanctions against Italy which he opposed. Clement Attlee replaced him initially opposing rearmament by advocating abolition of national armaments. Ernest Bevin and Hugh Dalton persuaded party in 1937 to support rearmament and oppose appeasement. British communists following Joseph Stalin's line argued appeasement had been pro-fascist policy. Communist MP Willie Gallacher said many prominent Conservative representatives would welcome Hitler if believed only alternative to Socialism establishment. Public opinion shifted gradually beginning mid-decade despite early strong opposition to war. At Oxford Union Society debate in 1933 undergraduates passed motion saying they would not fight for King and country. Baldwin told House Commons in 1933 unable pursue rearmament because of strong pacifist sentiment. Eleven million responded to League Peace Ballot pledging support reduction of armaments by international agreement. Same survey found 58.7% favored collective military sanctions against aggressors. Public reaction to Hoare-Laval Pact with Mussolini extremely unfavorable even left wing peace-balloters began signing International Brigades fighting Franco. By height Spanish conflict 1937 majority young pacifists modified views accepting war legitimate response aggression fascism.
German correspondent Norman Ebbutt charged persistent reports about Nazi militarism suppressed by editor Geoffrey Dawson at The Times. Historians Richard Cockett, William Shirer and Frank McDonough confirmed claim results October 1938 Gallup poll showing 86% public believed Hitler lying future territorial ambitions censored News Chronicle last minute publisher loyal Chamberlain. For few journalists asking challenging questions primarily foreign press members Chamberlain froze intimidated them. When asked press conferences about Hitler abuse Jews other minority groups went denounce reports Jewish-Communist propaganda. Chamberlain direct manipulation BBC sustained egregious example Lord Halifax told radio producers not offend Hitler Mussolini complied censoring anti-fascist commentary Labour Popular Front MPs. BBC also suppressed fact 15,000 people protested prime minister Trafalgar Square returned Munich 1938 ten thousand more welcomed him 10 Downing Street. Radio producers continued censor news persecution Jews broke out war Chamberlain still hoped quick armistice didn't want inflame atmosphere. Journalist Sheila Grant Duff's Penguin Special Europe Czechs published distributed every MP day Chamberlain returned Munich. Her book spirited defence Czech nation detailed criticism British policy confronted need war necessary influential widely read. Although argued against peace almost price took personal tone unlike Guilty Men two years later. As Richard Cockett noted Chamberlain successfully demonstrated government democracy influence control press remarkable degree danger this Chamberlain preferred forget exercised influence increasingly mistook pliant press real public opinion truth matter controlling press merely ensuring unable reflect public opinion.
John F. Kennedy wrote 1940 Harvard College thesis Why England Slept arguing appeasement necessary because UK France unprepared world war. In 1961 view appeasement avoidable error cowardice set head A.J.P. Taylor book Origins Second World War. Taylor argued Hitler did not have blueprint war behaved much German leader might Appeasement active policy not passive allowing Hitler consolidate policy implemented men confronted real problems doing best circumstances time. Taylor said appeasement ought seen rational response unpredictable leader diplomatically politically appropriate time. His view shared Paul Kennedy says choices facing politicians times each course brought share disadvantages crisis British global position such last resort insoluble sense no good proper solution. Martin Gilbert expressed similar view old appeasement mood hope Victorian optimism Burkean belief societies evolved bad good progress only better new appeasement mood fear Hobbesian insistence swallowing bad preserve remnant good pessimistic belief Nazism there stay horrible accepted way life Britain ought deal. Arguments Taylor Origins Second World War sometimes described revisionist rejected many historians time reviews book Britain United States generally critical Nevertheless praised some insights showing appeasement popular policy continuity British foreign policy after 1933 shattered common view appeasers small degenerate clique mysteriously hijacked British government sometime 1930s carried policies face massive public resistance. Also portraying leaders 1930s real people attempting deal real problems made first strides explaining actions appeasers rather merely condemning them. Early 1990s new theory counter-revisionist emerged historians argued appeasement probably only choice British government 1930s poorly implemented carried late enforced strongly enough constrain Hitler.
Harry S Truman explained decision enter Korean War 1950 citing opposition appeasement justification firm armed action international relations. Anthony Eden confronted Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser Suez Crisis 1956 using same reasoning. John F. Kennedy quarantine Cuba 1962 Lyndon Johnson resistance communism Indochina 1960s Ronald Reagan air strike Libya 1986 Donald Trump drone strike assassination Qasem Soleimani 2020 all referenced lessons Munich. Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote letter Churchill after Viet Minh won Battle Dien Bien Phu 1954 saying nations learned something from tragedy desperate peril marked beginning many years stark tragedy. Lyndon Johnson defended Vietnam War everything knew history told got Vietnam let Ho Chi Minh run streets Saigon doing exactly Chamberlain did World War II giving big fat reward aggression. Curtis LeMay Air Force Chief Staff compared Kennedy hesitance air strike Soviet nuclear missiles Cuba to appeasement jabs father Joseph P. Kennedy Sr supported appeasement Ambassador United Kingdom later supported negotiated surrender Germany May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis Battle Britain. Margaret Thatcher invoked example Churchill Falklands War 1982 rapped sharply table American Secretary State Alexander Haig urged compromise Argentines pointedly this table Neville Chamberlain sat 1938 spoke Czechs faraway people know little. Spectre appeasement raised discussions Yugoslav wars 1990s George W Bush Tony Blair cited Churchill warnings German rearmament justify action run-up 2003 Iraq War. Obama administration officials John Kerry Chuck Hagel claimed failure US intervene Syrian Civil War Ghouta chemical attack act appeasement Bashar al-Assad. George W Bush cautioned false comfort appeasement dealing Iran Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad May 2008 opponents Barack Obama Joint Comprehensive Plan Action act appeasement Iran Mike Pompeo stated first Trump administration foreign policy trying correct Obama administration's appeasement Iran.
Up Next
Continue Browsing
Common questions
What was the main goal of British appeasement policy in the early 1930s?
The main goal of British appeasement policy was to integrate Germany as an equal partner in European affairs and attain lasting peace through concessions. This approach aimed to stabilize relations while avoiding war by addressing national grievances peacefully rather than through force.
When did Italy capture Addis Ababa during the Abyssinian crisis?
Italy captured Addis Ababa in May 1936 after undeterred sanctions failed to stop its aggression. The League abandoned sanctions in July marking a major failure of international cooperation following this conquest.
Who negotiated directly with Hitler about Czechoslovakia on the 15th of September 1938?
Neville Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden on the 15th of September 1938 to negotiate directly with Hitler about Czechoslovakia. He agreed to Hitler's demands for the absorption of Sudeten lands into Germany rather than just autonomy.
Which historian argued that appeasement was a rational response to unpredictable leadership in 1961?
A.J.P. Taylor argued in his 1961 book Origins Second World War that appeasement was a rational response to an unpredictable leader. His view suggested the policy allowed Hitler to consolidate power diplomatically and politically at an appropriate time.
What event caused British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval to resign?
Sir Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval resigned when the press leaked their secret agreement to concede two thirds of Abyssinia to Italy. This scandal discredited collective security and forced both men from office due to public outcry.