Neville Chamberlain

Arthur Neville Chamberlain was born on the 18th of March 1869 at a house called Southbourne in the Edgbaston district of Birmingham, the only son of Joseph Chamberlain and Florence Kenrick. He was a man who would eventually be remembered for the phrase peace for our time, yet his life began in the shadow of a father who was a towering figure in British politics and a half-brother, Austen Chamberlain, who would also become a statesman of note. Chamberlain was educated at home by his elder sister Beatrice and later at Rugby School, but he showed little interest in academic pursuits, preferring the practical world of business. His father, seeking to recoup diminished family fortunes, sent him to establish a sisal plantation on Andros Island in the Bahamas, a venture that lasted six years and ended in failure, costing the family £50,000. Upon his return to England, Chamberlain entered business, purchasing Hoskins & Company, a manufacturer of metal ship berths, and served as its managing director for 17 years, during which time the company prospered. He was a man of quiet competence, deeply involved in civic activities in Birmingham, and by the age of 40, he was expecting to remain a bachelor, but in 1910 he fell in love with Anne Cole, a recent connection by marriage, and married her the following year. They met through his Aunt Lilian, the Canadian-born widow of Joseph Chamberlain's brother Herbert, who in 1907 had married Anne Cole's uncle Alfred Clayton Cole, a director of the Bank of England. She encouraged and supported his entry into local politics and was to be his constant companion, helper, and trusted colleague, fully sharing his interests in housing and other political and social activities after his election as an MP. The couple had a son and a daughter, and Chamberlain's life was one of steady, unassuming progress until the storm of war began to gather on the horizon.

The Architect of Domestic Reform

Chamberlain's entry into politics was not immediate, though his father and half-brother were in Parliament. During the Khaki election of 1900 he made speeches in support of Joseph Chamberlain's Liberal Unionists, but it was not until 1911 that he successfully stood as a Liberal Unionist for Birmingham City Council for the All Saints' Ward, located within his father's parliamentary constituency. He was made chairman of the Town Planning Committee, and under his direction, Birmingham soon adopted one of the first town planning schemes in Britain. The start of the First World War in 1914 prevented implementation of his plans, but in 1915, Chamberlain became Lord Mayor of Birmingham. Apart from his father Joseph, five of Chamberlain's uncles had also attained the chief Birmingham civic dignity, and as a lord mayor in wartime, Chamberlain had a huge burden of work and he insisted that his councillors and officials work equally hard. He halved the lord mayor's expense allowance and cut back on the number of civic functions expected of the incumbent. In 1915, Chamberlain was appointed a member of the Central Control Board on liquor traffic, and in December 1916, Prime Minister David Lloyd George offered Chamberlain the new position of Director of National Service, with responsibility for co-ordinating conscription and ensuring that essential war industries were able to function with sufficient workforces. His tenure was marked by conflict with Lloyd George, and in August 1917, having received little support from the Prime Minister, Chamberlain resigned. The relationship between Chamberlain and Lloyd George would, thereafter, be one of mutual hatred. Chamberlain decided to stand for the House of Commons, and was adopted as Unionist candidate for Birmingham Ladywood. After the war ended, a general election was called almost immediately. The campaign in this constituency was notable because his Liberal Party opponent was Margery Corbett Ashby, one of the seventeen women who stood for Parliament at the first election at which women were eligible to do so. Chamberlain reacted to this intervention by being one of the few male candidates to specifically target women voters deploying his wife, issuing a special leaflet headed A word to the Ladies and holding two meetings in the afternoon. Chamberlain was elected with almost 70% of the vote and a majority of 6,833. He was 49 years old, which was at the time the greatest age at which any future prime minister had first been elected to the Commons.

When was Neville Chamberlain born and where did he grow up?

Arthur Neville Chamberlain was born on the 18th of March 1869 at a house called Southbourne in the Edgbaston district of Birmingham. He was the only son of Joseph Chamberlain and Florence Kenrick and was educated at home by his elder sister Beatrice and later at Rugby School.

What role did Neville Chamberlain hold before becoming Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?

Neville Chamberlain served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from August 1923 until the Conservatives were defeated at the 1923 general election. He also held the position of Minister of Health from 1924 to 1929, where he initiated the Local Government Act 1929 to abolish the Poor Law boards entirely.

Why did Neville Chamberlain resign from his position as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?

Neville Chamberlain did not resign voluntarily but died in office on the 9th of November 1940 after serving as Prime Minister from the 28th of May 1937. His premiership ended due to his death rather than a political resignation or election defeat.

What agreement did Neville Chamberlain sign with Adolf Hitler in 1938?

Neville Chamberlain signed the Munich Agreement on the 30th of September 1938 with Adolf Hitler, Édouard Daladier, and Benito Mussolini. This agreement allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia in exchange for a pledge that Germany would not seek further territorial expansion.

When did Neville Chamberlain declare war on Germany as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?

Neville Chamberlain addressed the nation by radio on the 3rd of September 1939 stating that the United Kingdom was at war with Germany. This declaration followed Germany's invasion of Poland on the 1st of September 1939 and the expiration of a British ultimatum.

The Chancellor Who Balanced the Books

Chamberlain threw himself into parliamentary work, begrudging the times when he was unable to attend debates and spending much time on committee work. He was chairman of the national Unhealthy Areas Committee from 1919 to 1921 and in that role, had visited the slums of London, Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool and Cardiff. Consequently, in March 1920, Bonar Law offered him a junior post at the Ministry of Health on behalf of the Prime Minister, but Chamberlain was unwilling to serve under Lloyd George and was offered no further posts during Lloyd George's premiership. When Law resigned as party leader, Austen Chamberlain took his place as head of the Unionists in Parliament. Unionist leaders were willing to fight the 1922 election in coalition with the Lloyd George National Liberals, but on the 19th of October, Unionist MPs held a meeting at which they voted to fight the election as a single party. Lloyd George resigned, as did Austen Chamberlain, and Law was recalled from retirement to lead the Unionists as prime minister. Many high-ranking Unionists refused to serve under Law to the benefit of Chamberlain, who rose over the course of ten months from backbencher to Chancellor of the Exchequer. Law initially appointed Chamberlain Postmaster General and Chamberlain was sworn of the Privy Council. When Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, the Minister of Health, lost his seat in the 1922 election and was defeated in a by-election in March 1923 by future home secretary James Chuter Ede, Law offered the position to Chamberlain. Two months later, Law was diagnosed with advanced, terminal throat cancer. He immediately resigned and was replaced by Chancellor of the Exchequer Stanley Baldwin. In August 1923, Baldwin promoted Chamberlain to the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Chamberlain served only five months in the office before the Conservatives were defeated at the 1923 general election. Ramsay MacDonald became the first-ever Labour prime minister, but his government fell within months, necessitating another general election. By a margin of only 77 votes, Chamberlain narrowly defeated the Labour candidate, Oswald Mosley, who later led the British Union of Fascists. Believing he would lose if he stood again in Birmingham Ladywood, Chamberlain arranged to be adopted for Birmingham Edgbaston, the district of the city where he was born and which was a much safer seat, which he would hold for the rest of his life. The Unionists won the election, but Chamberlain declined to serve again as chancellor, preferring his former position as Minister of Health. Within two weeks of his appointment as Minister of Health, Chamberlain presented the Cabinet with an agenda containing 25 pieces of legislation he hoped to see enacted. Before he left office in 1929, 21 of the 25 bills had passed into law. Chamberlain sought the abolition of the elected Poor Law Boards of Guardians which administered relief, and which in some areas were responsible for rates. Many of the boards were controlled by Labour, and such boards had defied the government by distributing relief funds to the able-bodied unemployed. In 1929, Chamberlain initiated the Local Government Act 1929 to abolish the Poor Law boards entirely. Chamberlain spoke in the Commons for two and a half hours on the second reading of the bill, and when he concluded he was applauded by all parties. The bill was passed into law. Though Chamberlain struck a conciliatory note during the 1926 General Strike, in general he had poor relations with the Labour opposition. Future Labour prime minister Clement Attlee complained that Chamberlain always treated us like dirt, and in April 1927 Chamberlain wrote: More and more do I feel an utter contempt for their lamentable stupidity. His poor relations with the Labour Party later played a major part in his downfall as prime minister.

The Diplomat Who Sought Peace

Upon his appointment as prime minister on the 28th of May 1937, Chamberlain considered calling a general election, but with three and a half years remaining in the current Parliament's term he decided to wait. At 68 he was the second-oldest person in the 20th century to become prime minister for the first time, and was widely seen as a caretaker who would lead the Conservative Party until the next election and then step down in favour of a younger man, with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden a likely candidate. From the start of Chamberlain's premiership a number of would-be successors were rumoured to be jockeying for the position. Chamberlain had disliked what he considered to be the overly sentimental attitude of both Baldwin and MacDonald on Cabinet appointments and reshuffles. Although he had worked closely with the President of the Board of Trade, Walter Runciman, on the tariff issue, Chamberlain dismissed him from his post, instead offering him the token position of Lord Privy Seal, which an angry Runciman declined. Chamberlain thought Runciman, a member of the Liberal National Party, to be lazy. Soon after taking office Chamberlain instructed his ministers to prepare two-year policy programmes. These reports were to be integrated with the intent of co-ordinating the passage of legislation through the current Parliament, the term of which was to expire in November 1940. At the time of his appointment, Chamberlain's personality was not well known to the public, though he had made annual budget broadcasts for six years. According to Chamberlain biographer Robert Self, these appeared relaxed and modern, showing an ability to speak directly to the camera. Chamberlain had few friends among his parliamentary colleagues; an attempt by his parliamentary private secretary, Lord Dunglass, later prime minister himself as Alec Douglas-Home, to bring him to the Commons Smoking Room to socialise with colleagues ended in embarrassing silence. Chamberlain compensated for these shortcomings by devising the most sophisticated press management system employed by a prime minister up to that time, with officials at Number 10, led by his chief of press George Steward, convincing members of the press that they were colleagues sharing power and insider knowledge, and should espouse the government line. Chamberlain sought to conciliate Germany and make the Nazi state a partner in a stable Europe. He believed Germany could be satisfied by the restoration of some of its colonies, and during the Rhineland crisis of March 1936 he had stated that if we were in sight of an all-round settlement the British government ought to consider the question of restoration of colonies. The new prime minister's attempts to secure such a settlement were frustrated because Germany was in no hurry to talk to Britain. Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath was supposed to visit Britain in July 1937 but cancelled his visit. Lord Halifax, the Lord President of the Council, visited Germany privately in November and met Hitler and other German officials. Both Chamberlain and British Ambassador to Germany Nevile Henderson pronounced the visit a success. Foreign Office officials complained that the Halifax visit made it appear Britain was too eager for talks, and the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, felt that he had been bypassed. Chamberlain also bypassed Eden while the latter was on holiday by opening direct talks with Fascist Italy, an international pariah for its invasion and conquest of Ethiopia. At a Cabinet meeting on the 8th of September 1937, Chamberlain indicated that he saw the lessening of the tension between this country and Italy as a very valuable contribution toward the pacification and appeasement of Europe which would weaken the Rome, Berlin axis. Chamberlain also set up a private line of communication with the Italian Duce Benito Mussolini through the Italian Ambassador, Count Dino Grandi. In February 1938, Hitler began to press the Austrian government to accept Anschluss or joining Germany and Austria into a single state. Chamberlain believed that it was essential to cement relations with Italy in the hope that an Anglo, Italian alliance would forestall Hitler from imposing his rule over Austria. Eden believed that Chamberlain was being too hasty in talking with Italy and holding out the prospect of de jure recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. Chamberlain concluded that Eden would have to accept his policy or resign. The Cabinet heard both men out but unanimously decided for Chamberlain, and despite efforts by other Cabinet members to prevent it, Eden resigned from office. In later years, Eden tried to portray his resignation as a stand against appeasement, but many ministers and MPs believed there was no issue at stake worth resignation. Chamberlain appointed Lord Halifax as foreign secretary in Eden's place.

The Munich Agreement and Its Aftermath

In March 1938, Austria became a part of Germany in the Anschluss. Though some Austrians requested help from Britain, none was forthcoming. Britain did send Berlin a strong note of protest without specifying any actual action that the British government might take. In addressing the Cabinet shortly after German forces crossed the border, Chamberlain placed blame on both Germany and Austria. Chamberlain noted, On the 14th of March, the day after the Anschluss, Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons and strongly condemned the methods used by the Germans in the takeover of Austria. Chamberlain's address met with the approval of the House. With Austria absorbed by Germany, attention turned to Hitler's obvious next target, the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. With three million ethnic Germans, the Sudetenland represented the largest German population outside the Reich and Hitler began to call for the union of the region with Germany. Britain had no military obligations toward Czechoslovakia, but France and Czechoslovakia had a mutual assistance pact and both the French and Czechoslovaks also had an alliance with the Soviet Union. After the fall of Austria, the Cabinet's Foreign Policy Committee considered seeking a grand alliance to thwart Germany or, alternatively, an assurance to France of assistance if the French went to war. Instead, the committee chose to advocate that Czechoslovakia be urged to make the best terms it could with Germany. The full Cabinet agreed with the committee's recommendation, influenced by a report from the chiefs of staff stating that there was little that Britain could do to help the Czechs in the event of a German invasion. Chamberlain reported to an amenable House that he was unwilling to limit his government's discretion by giving commitments. Britain and Italy signed an agreement on the 16th of April 1938. In exchange for de jure recognition of Italy's Ethiopian conquest, Italy agreed to withdraw some Italian volunteers from the Nationalist pro-Franco side of the Spanish Civil War. By this point, the Nationalists strongly had the upper hand in that conflict, and they completed their victory the following year. Later that month, the new French prime minister, Édouard Daladier, came to London for talks with Chamberlain, and agreed to follow the British position on Czechoslovakia. In May, Czech border guards shot two Sudeten German farmers who were trying to cross the border from Germany into Czechoslovakia without stopping for border controls. This incident caused unrest among the Sudeten Germans, and Germany was then said to be moving troops to the border. In response to the report, Prague moved troops to the German border. Halifax sent a note to Germany warning that if France intervened in the crisis on Czechoslovakia's behalf, Britain might support France. Tensions appeared to calm, and Chamberlain and Halifax were applauded for their masterly handling of the crisis. Though it was not known at the time, it later became clear that Germany had had no plans for a May invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, the Chamberlain government received strong and almost unanimous support from the British press. Negotiations between the Czech government and the Sudeten Germans dragged on through mid-1938. They achieved little result; Sudeten leader Konrad Henlein was under private instructions from Hitler not to reach an agreement. On the 3rd of August, Walter Runciman, by now Lord Runciman, travelled to Prague as a mediator sent by the British government. Over the next two weeks, Runciman met separately with Henlein, Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš, and other leaders, but made no progress. On the 30th of August, Chamberlain met his Cabinet and Ambassador Henderson and secured their backing, with only First Lord of the Admiralty Duff Cooper dissenting against Chamberlain's policy to pressure Czechoslovakia into making concessions, on the grounds that Britain was then in no position to back up any threat to go to war. Chamberlain realised that Hitler would likely signal his intentions in his the 12th of September speech at the annual Nuremberg Rally, and so he discussed with his advisors how to respond if war seemed likely. In consultation with his close advisor Horace Wilson, Chamberlain set out Plan Z. If war seemed inevitable, Chamberlain would fly to Germany to negotiate directly with Hitler. September 1938: Munich Preliminary meetings Lord Runciman continued his attempts to pressure the Czechoslovak government into concessions. On the 7th of September there was an altercation involving Sudeten members of the Czechoslovak parliament in the North Moravian city of Ostrava. The Germans made considerable propaganda out of the incident, though the Prague government tried to conciliate them by dismissing Czech police who had been involved. As the tempest grew, Runciman concluded that there was no point in attempting further negotiations until after Hitler's speech. The mission never resumed. There was tremendous tension in the final days before Hitler's speech on the last day of the Rally, as Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia all partially mobilised their troops. Thousands gathered outside 10 Downing Street on the night of the speech. At last Hitler addressed his wildly enthusiastic followers: The following morning, the 13th of September, Chamberlain and the Cabinet were informed by Secret Service sources that all German embassies had been told that Germany would invade Czechoslovakia on the 25th of September. Convinced that the French would not fight, Chamberlain decided to implement Plan Z and sent a message to Hitler that he was willing to come to Germany to negotiate. Hitler accepted and Chamberlain flew to Germany on the morning of the 15th of September; this was the first time, excepting a short jaunt at an industrial fair, that Chamberlain had ever flown. Chamberlain flew to Munich and then travelled by rail to Hitler's retreat at Berchtesgaden. The face-to-face meeting lasted about three hours. Hitler demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland, and through questioning him, Chamberlain was able to obtain assurances that Hitler had no designs on the remainder of Czechoslovakia or on the areas in Eastern Europe which had German minorities. After the meeting Chamberlain returned to London, believing that he had obtained a breathing space during which agreement could be reached and the peace preserved. Under the proposals made at Berchtesgaden the Sudetenland would be annexed by Germany if a plebiscite in the Sudetenland favoured it. Czechoslovakia would receive international guarantees of its independence which would replace existing treaty obligations, principally the French pledge to the Czechoslovaks. The French agreed to the requirements. Under considerable pressure the Czechoslovaks also agreed, causing the Czechoslovak government to fall. Chamberlain flew back to Germany, meeting Hitler in Bad Godesberg on the 22nd of September. Hitler brushed aside the proposals of the previous meeting, saying that won't do any more. Hitler demanded immediate occupation of the Sudetenland and that Polish and Hungarian territorial claims on Czechoslovakia be addressed. Chamberlain objected strenuously, telling Hitler that he had worked to bring the French and Czechoslovaks into line with Germany's demands, so much so that he had been accused of giving in to dictators and had been booed on his departure that morning. Hitler was unmoved. That evening, Chamberlain told Lord Halifax that the meeting with Herr Hitler had been most unsatisfactory. The following day, Hitler kept Chamberlain waiting until mid-afternoon, when he sent a five-page letter, in German, outlining the demands he had made orally the previous day. Chamberlain replied by offering to act as an intermediary with the Czechoslovaks, and suggested that Hitler put his demands in a memorandum which could be circulated to the French and Czechoslovaks. The leaders met again late on the evening of the 23rd of September, a meeting that stretched into the early morning hours. Hitler demanded that fleeing Czechs in the zones to be occupied take nothing with them. He extended his deadline for occupation of the Sudetenland to the 1st of October, the date he had long before secretly set for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The meeting ended amicably, with Chamberlain confiding to Hitler his hopes they would be able to work out other problems in Europe in the same spirit. Hitler hinted that the Sudetenland fulfilled his territorial ambitions in Europe. Chamberlain flew back to London, saying It is up to the Czechs now. Hitler's proposals met with resistance not only from the French and Czechoslovaks, but also from some members of Chamberlain's cabinet. With no agreement in sight, war seemed inevitable. Chamberlain issued a press statement calling on Germany to abandon the threat of force in exchange for British help in obtaining the concessions it sought. On the evening of the 27th of September, Chamberlain addressed the nation by radio, and after thanking those who wrote to him, stated: On the 28th of September, Chamberlain called on Hitler to invite him to Germany again to seek a solution through a summit involving the British, French, Germans, and Italians. Hitler replied favourably, and word of this response came to Chamberlain as he was winding up a speech in the House of Commons which sat in gloomy anticipation of war. Chamberlain informed the House of this in his speech. The response was a passionate demonstration, with members cheering Chamberlain wildly. Even diplomats in the galleries applauded. Lord Dunglass later commented, There were a lot of appeasers in Parliament that day. On the morning of the 29th of September Chamberlain left Heston Aerodrome for his third and final visit to Germany. On arrival in Munich the British delegation was taken directly to the Führerbau, where Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler soon arrived. The four leaders and their translators held an informal meeting; Hitler said that he intended to invade Czechoslovakia on the 1st of October. Mussolini distributed a proposal similar to Hitler's Bad Godesberg terms. In reality, the proposal had been drafted by German officials and transmitted to Rome the previous day. The four leaders debated the draft and Chamberlain raised the question of compensation for the Czechoslovak government and citizens, but Hitler refused to consider this. The leaders were joined by advisors after lunch, and hours were spent on long discussions of each clause of the Italian draft agreement. Late that evening the British and French left for their hotels, saying that they had to seek advice from their respective capitals. Meanwhile, the Germans and Italians enjoyed the feast which Hitler had intended for all the participants. During this break, Chamberlain advisor Horace Wilson met with the Czechoslovaks; he informed them of the draft agreement and asked which districts were particularly important to them. The conference resumed at about 10 pm and was mostly in the hands of a small drafting committee. At 1:30 am the Munich Agreement was ready for signing, though the signing ceremony was delayed when Hitler discovered that the ornate inkwell on his desk was empty. Chamberlain and Daladier returned to their hotel and informed the Czechoslovaks of the agreement. The two prime ministers urged quick acceptance by the Czechoslovaks of the agreement, since the evacuation by the Czechs was to begin the following day. At 12:30 pm the Czechoslovak government in Prague objected to the decision but agreed to its terms. Before leaving the Führerbau, Chamberlain requested a private conference with Hitler. Hitler agreed, and the two met at Hitler's apartment in the city later that morning. Chamberlain urged restraint in the implementation of the agreement and requested that the Germans not bomb Prague if the Czechs resisted, to which Hitler seemed agreeable. Chamberlain took from his pocket a paper headed Anglo, German Agreement, which contained three paragraphs, including a statement that the two nations considered the Munich Agreement symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again. According to Chamberlain, Hitler interjected Ja! Ja! Yes! Yes!. The two men signed the paper then and there. When, later that day, German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop remonstrated with Hitler for signing it, the Führer replied, Oh, don't take it so seriously. That piece of paper is of no further significance whatever. Chamberlain, on the other hand, patted his breast pocket when he returned to his hotel for lunch and said, I've got it! Word leaked of the outcome of the meetings before Chamberlain's return, causing delight among many in London but gloom for Churchill and his supporters. Chamberlain returned to London in triumph. Large crowds mobbed Heston, where he was met by the Lord Chamberlain, the Earl of Clarendon, who gave him a letter from King George VI assuring him of the Empire's lasting gratitude and urging him to come straight to Buckingham Palace to report. The streets were so packed with cheering people that it took Chamberlain an hour and a half to journey the from Heston to the Palace. After reporting to the King, Chamberlain and his wife appeared on the Palace balcony with the King and Queen. He then went to Downing Street; both the street and the front hall of Number 10 were packed. As he headed upstairs to address the crowd from a first-floor window, someone called to him, Neville, go up to the window and say peace for our time. Chamberlain turned around and responded, No, I don't do that sort of thing. Nevertheless, in his statement to the crowd, Chamberlain recalled the words of his predecessor, Benjamin Disraeli, upon the latter's return from the Congress of Berlin: King George issued a statement to his people, After the magnificent efforts of the Prime Minister in the cause of peace it is my fervent hope that a new era of friendship and prosperity may be dawning among the peoples of the world. When the King met Duff Cooper, who resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty over the Munich Agreement, he told Cooper that he respected people who had the courage of their convictions, but could not agree with him. He wrote to his mother, Queen Mary, that the Prime Minister was delighted with the results of his mission, as are we all. She responded to her son with anger against those who spoke against Chamberlain: He brought home peace, why can't they be grateful? Most newspapers supported Chamberlain uncritically, and he received thousands of gifts, from a silver dinner service to many of his trademark umbrellas. The Commons discussed the Munich Agreement on the 3rd of October. Though Cooper opened by setting forth the reasons for his resignation and Churchill spoke harshly against the pact, no Conservative voted against the government. Only between 20 and 30 abstained, including Churchill, Eden, Cooper, and Harold Macmillan.

The War That Changed Everything

In the aftermath of Munich, Chamberlain continued to pursue a course of cautious rearmament. He told the Cabinet in early October 1938, it would be madness for the country to stop rearming until we were convinced that other countries would act in the same way. For the time being, therefore, we should relax no particle of effort until our deficiencies had been made good. Later in October, he resisted calls to put industry on a war footing, convinced that such an action would show Hitler that Chamberlain had decided to abandon Munich. Chamberlain hoped that the understanding he had signed with Hitler at Munich would lead toward a general settlement of European disputes, but Hitler expressed no public interest in following up on the accord. Having considered a general election immediately following Munich, Chamberlain instead reshuffled his Cabinet. By the end of the year, public concerns caused Chamberlain to conclude that to get rid of this uneasy and disgruntled House of Commons by a General Election would be suicidal. Despite Hitler's relative quietness as the Reich absorbed the Sudetenland, foreign policy concerns continued to preoccupy Chamberlain. He made trips to Paris and Rome, hoping to persuade the French to hasten their rearmament and Mussolini to be a positive influence on Hitler. Several of his Cabinet members, led by Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, began to draw away from the appeasement policy. Halifax was by now convinced that Munich, though better than a European war, had been a horrid business and humiliating. Public revulsion over the pogrom of Kristallnacht on the 9th of November 1938 made any attempt at a rapprochement with Hitler unacceptable, though Chamberlain did not abandon his hopes. Still hoping for reconciliation with Germany, Chamberlain made a major speech in Birmingham on the 28th of January 1939, in which he expressed his desire for international peace, and had an advance copy sent to Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Hitler seemed to respond; in his Reichstag speech on the 30th of January 1939, he stated that he wanted a long peace. Chamberlain was confident that improvements in British defence since Munich would bring the dictator to the bargaining table. This belief was reinforced by a German official's conciliatory speech welcoming Ambassador Henderson back to Berlin after an absence for medical treatment in Britain. Chamberlain responded with a speech in Blackburn on the 22nd of February hoping that the nations would resolve their differences through trade, and was gratified when his comments were printed in German newspapers. With matters appearing to improve, Chamberlain's rule over the House of Commons was firm and he was convinced the government would romp home in a late 1939 election. On the 15th of March 1939, Germany invaded the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, including Prague. Though Chamberlain's initial parliamentary response was, according to biographer Nick Smart, feeble, within 48 hours he had spoken more forcefully against the German aggression. In another Birmingham speech, on the 17th of March, Chamberlain warned that Hitler was attempting to dominate the world by force and that no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that because it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing the nation has so lost its fibre that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it were ever made. The Prime Minister questioned whether the invasion of Czechoslovakia was the end of an old adventure, or the beginning of a new and whether it was a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force. Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald said, whereas the Prime Minister was once a strong advocate of peace, he has now definitely swung around to the war point of view. This speech was met with widespread approval in Britain and recruitment for the armed services increased considerably. Chamberlain set out to build an interlocking series of defence pacts among the remaining European countries as a means of deterring Hitler from war. He sought an agreement among Britain, France, the USSR, and Poland, whereby the first three would go to the assistance of Poland if her independence were threatened, but Polish mistrust of the Soviet Union caused those negotiations to fail. Instead, on the 31st of March 1939, Chamberlain informed an approving House of Commons of British and French guarantees that they would lend Poland all possible aid in the event of any action which threatened Polish independence. In the ensuing debate, Eden stated that the nation was now united behind the government. Even Churchill and Lloyd George praised Chamberlain's government for issuing the guarantee to Poland. The Prime Minister took other steps to deter Hitler from aggression. He doubled the size of the Territorial Army, created a Ministry of Supply to expedite the provision of equipment to the armed forces, and instituted peacetime conscription. The Italian invasion of Albania on the 7th of April 1939 led to guarantees being given to Greece and Romania. On the 17th of June 1939, Handley Page received an order for 200 Hampden twin-engined medium bombers, and by the 3rd of September 1939, the chain of radar stations girding the British coast was fully operational. Chamberlain was reluctant to seek a military alliance with the Soviet Union; he distrusted Joseph Stalin ideologically and felt that there was little to gain, given the recent massive purges in the Red Army. Much of his Cabinet favoured such an alliance, and when Poland withdrew her objection to an Anglo, Soviet alliance, Chamberlain had little choice but to proceed. The talks with Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, to which Britain sent only a low-level delegation, dragged on over several months and eventually foundered on the 14th of August 1939 when Poland and Romania refused to allow Soviet troops to be stationed on their territories. A week after the failure of these talks, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Molotov, Ribbentrop Pact, committing the countries to non-aggression toward each other. A secret agreement divided up Poland in the event of war. Chamberlain had disregarded rumours of a Soviet, German rapprochement and was dismissive of the publicly announced pact, stating that it in no way affected British obligations toward Poland. On the 23rd of August 1939, Chamberlain had Henderson deliver a letter to Hitler telling him that Britain was fully prepared to comply with its obligations to Poland. Hitler instructed his generals to prepare for an invasion of Poland, telling them, Our enemies are small worms. I saw them at Munich. Germany invaded Poland in the early morning of the 1st of September 1939. The British Cabinet met late that morning and issued a warning to Germany that unless it withdrew from Polish territory the UK would carry out its obligations to Poland. When the House of Commons met at 6:00 pm, Chamberlain and Labour deputy leader Arthur Greenwood, deputising for the sick Clement Attlee, entered the chamber to loud cheers. Chamberlain spoke emotionally, laying the blame for the conflict on Hitler. No formal declaration of war was immediately made. French foreign minister Georges Bonnet stated that France could do nothing until its parliament met on the evening of the 2nd of September. Bonnet was trying to rally support for a Munich-style summit proposed by the Italians to be held on the 5th of September. The British Cabinet demanded that Hitler be given an ultimatum at once and if troops were not withdrawn by the end of the 2nd of September, war would be declared forthwith. Chamberlain and Halifax were convinced by Bonnet's pleas, from Paris, that France needed more time for mobilisation and evacuation. Chamberlain postponed the expiry of the ultimatum which had, in fact, not yet been served. Chamberlain's lengthy statement to the House of Commons made no mention of an ultimatum and was consequently poorly received by the House. When Greenwood rose to speak for the working classes, Conservative backbencher and former First Lord of the Admiralty Leo Amery shouted, Speak for England, Arthur! implying that the Prime Minister was not doing so. Chamberlain replied that telephone difficulties were making it hard to communicate with Paris and tried to dispel fears that the French were weakening. He had little success; too many members knew of Bonnet's efforts. National Labour MP and diarist Harold Nicolson later wrote, In those few minutes he flung away his reputation. The seeming delay gave rise to fears that Chamberlain would again seek a settlement with Hitler. Chamberlain's last peacetime Cabinet met at 11:30 that night, with a thunderstorm raging outside, and determined that the ultimatum would be presented in Berlin at nine o'clock the following morning, to expire two hours later, before the House of Commons convened at noon. At 11:15 am, the 3rd of September 1939, Chamberlain addressed the nation by radio, stating that the United Kingdom was at war with Germany: That afternoon Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons' first Sunday session in over 120 years. He spoke to a quiet House in a statement which even opponents termed restrained and therefore effective: Chamberlain instituted a War Cabinet and invited the Labour and Liberal parties to join his government, but they declined. He restored Churchill to the Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty, with a seat in the War Cabinet. Chamberlain also gave Eden a government post dominions secretary but not a seat in the small War Cabinet. The new First Lord deluged the Prime Minister with a sea of lengthy memos. Chamberlain castigated Churchill for sending so many memos, as the two met in War Cabinet every day. Chamberlain suspected, correctly as it proved after the war, that these letters are for the purpose of quotation in the Book that he will write hereafter. Chamberlain also deterred some of Churchill's plans, such as Operation Catherine, which would have sent three heavily armoured battleships into the Baltic Sea with an aircraft carrier and other support vessels as a means of stopping shipments of iron ore to Germany. With the naval war the only significant front involving the British in the early months of the conflict, the First Lord's obvious desire to wage a ruthless, victorious war established him as a leader-in-waiting in the public consciousness and among parliamentary colleagues. With little land action in the west, the initial months of the war were dubbed the Bore War, later renamed the Phoney War by journalists. Chamberlain, in common with most Allied officials and generals, felt the war could be won relatively quickly by keeping economic pressure on Germany through a blockade while continuing rearmament. The Prime Minister was reluctant to go too far in altering the British economy. The government submitted an emergency war budget about which Chamberlain stated, the only thing that matters is to win the war, though we may go bankrupt in the process. Government expenditures rose by little more than the rate of inflation between September 1939 and March 1940. Despite these difficulties, Chamberlain still enjoyed approval ratings as high as 68% and almost 60% in April 1940.

The Fall and The Final Days

In early 1940 the Allies approved a naval campaign designed to seize the northern part of Norway, a neutral country, including the key port of Narvik, and possibly also to seize the iron mines at Gällivare in northern Sweden, from which Germany obtained much of its iron ore. As the Baltic froze in winter, the iron ore was then sent south by ship from Narvik. The Allies planned to begin by mining Norwegian waters, thus provoking a German reaction in Norway, and then would occupy much of the country. Unforeseen by the Allies, Germany had also planned to occupy Norway, and on the 9th of April German troops occupied Denmark and began an invasion of Norway. German forces quickly overran much of the country. The Allies sent troops to Norway, but they met with little success, and on the 26th of April the War Cabinet ordered a withdrawal. The Prime Minister's opponents decided to turn the adjournment debate for the Whitsun recess into a challenge to Chamberlain, who soon heard about the plan. After initial anger, Chamberlain determined to fight. What became known as the Norway Debate opened on the 7th of May, and lasted for two days. The initial speeches, including Chamberlain's, were nondescript, but Admiral of the Fleet Roger Keyes, member for Portsmouth North, in full uniform, delivered a withering attack on the conduct of the Norway campaign, though he excluded Churchill from criticism. Leo Amery then delivered a speech which he concluded by echoing Oliver Cromwell's words on dissolving the Long Parliament: You have sat here too long for any good you are doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go! When Labour announced that they would call for a division of the House of Commons, Chamberlain called upon his friends, and I still have some friends in this House, to support the Government tonight. Because the use of the word friends was a conventional term to refer to party colleagues, and, according to biographer Robert Self, many MPs took it that way, it was an error of judgment for Chamberlain to refer to party loyalty when the gravity of the war situation required national unity. Lloyd George joined the attackers, and Churchill concluded the debate with a vigorous speech in support of the government. When the division took place, the government, which had a normal majority of over 200, prevailed by only 81, with 38 MPs in receipt of the government whip voting against it, with between 20 and 25 abstaining. Chamberlain spent much of the 9th of May in meetings with his Cabinet colleagues. Many Conservative MPs, even those who had voted against the government, indicated on the 9th of May and in the days following that they did not wish Chamberlain to depart but rather would seek to reconstruct his government. Chamberlain decided that he would resign unless the Labour Party was willing to join his government, and so he met with Attlee later that day. Attlee was unwilling, but agreed to consult his National Executive then meeting in Bournemouth. Chamberlain favoured Halifax as the next prime minister, but Halifax proved reluctant to press his own claims thinking that his position in the House of Lords would limit his effectiveness in the House of Commons, and Churchill emerged as the choice. The following day, Germany invaded the Low Countries and Chamberlain considered remaining in office. Attlee confirmed that Labour would not serve under Chamberlain, though they were willing to serve under someone else. Accordingly, Chamberlain went to Buckingham Palace to resign and advise the King to send for Churchill. Churchill later expressed gratitude to Chamberlain for not advising the King to send for Halifax, who would have commanded the support of most government MPs. In a resignation broadcast that evening, Chamberlain told the nation, Queen Elizabeth told Chamberlain that her daughter, Princess Elizabeth, wept as she heard the broadcast. Churchill wrote to express his gratitude for Chamberlain's willingness to stand by him in the nation's hour of need, and Baldwin, the only living former prime minister besides Chamberlain and Lloyd George, wrote, You have passed through fire since we were talking together only a fortnight ago, and you have come out pure gold. In a departure from usual practice, Chamberlain did not issue any resignation Honours list. With Chamberlain remaining leader of the Conservative Party, and with many MPs still supporting him and distrusting the new prime minister, Churchill refrained from any purge of Chamberlain loyalists. Churchill wished Chamberlain to return to the Exchequer, but he declined, convinced that this would lead to difficulties with the Labour Party. Instead, he accepted the post of Lord President of the Council with a seat in the shrunken five-member War Cabinet. When Chamberlain entered the House of Commons on the 13th of May 1940, for the first time since his resignation, MPs lost their heads, they shouted, they cheered, they waved their order papers, and his reception was a regular ovation. The House received Churchill coolly; some of his great speeches to the chamber, such as We shall fight on the beaches, met with only half-hearted enthusiasm. Chamberlain's fall from power left him deeply depressed; he wrote, Few men can have known such a reversal of fortune in so short a time. He especially regretted the loss of Chequers as a place where I have been so happy, though after a farewell visit there by the Chamberlains on the 19th of June, he wrote, I am content now that I have done that, and shall put Chequers out of my mind. As lord president, Chamberlain assumed vast responsibilities over domestic issues and chaired the War Cabinet during Churchill's many absences. Attlee later remembered him as free from any of the rancour he might have felt against us. He worked very hard and well: a good chairman, a good committeeman, always very businesslike. As chairman of the Lord President's Committee, he exerted great influence over the wartime economy. Halifax reported to the War Cabinet on the 26th of May 1940, with the Low Countries conquered and French prime minister Paul Reynaud warning that France might have to sign an armistice, that diplomatic contacts with a still-neutral Italy offered the possibility of a negotiated peace. Halifax urged following up and seeing if a worthwhile offer could be obtained. The battle over the course of action within the war cabinet lasted three days; Chamberlain's statement on the final day, that there was unlikely to be an acceptable offer and that the matter should not be pursued at that time, helped persuade the War Cabinet to reject negotiations. Twice in May 1940, Churchill broached the subject of bringing Lloyd George into the government. Each time, Chamberlain indicated that due to their longtime antipathy he would immediately retire if Lloyd George were appointed a minister. Churchill did not appoint Lloyd George, but brought up the subject with Chamberlain again early in June. This time, Chamberlain agreed to Lloyd George's appointment provided Lloyd George gave a personal assurance to put aside the feud. Chamberlain died aged 71 on the 9th of November of cancer, six months after leaving the premiership. Chamberlain's reputation remains controversial among historians, the initial high regard for him being entirely eroded by books such as Guilty Men, published in July 1940, which blamed Chamberlain and his associates for the Munich accord and for allegedly failing to prepare the country for war. Most historians in the generation following Chamberlain's death held similar views, led by Churchill in The Gathering Storm. Some later historians have taken a more favourable perspective of Chamberlain and his policies, citing government papers released under the thirty-year rule and arguing that going to war with Germany in 1938 would have been disastrous as the UK was unprepared. Nonetheless, Chamberlain is still unfavourably ranked amongst British prime ministers.