Anglo-German Naval Agreement
Deep cuts to the Royal Navy after the Washington Naval Conference of 1921, 1922 caused significant problems. The London Naval Conference of 1930 imposed further reductions. Combined with the effects of the Great Depression, these cuts collapsed much of the British shipbuilding industry in the early 1930s. That collapse seriously hindered efforts at British naval rearmament later in the decade. The British Admiralty valued treaties with quantitative and qualitative limitations on potential enemies. Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield served as First Sea Lord between 1933 and 1938. He argued in favour of such treaties because they promised standardized classification of different warships. These agreements discouraged technical innovations which under existing conditions the Royal Navy could not always hope to match. Chatfield especially wished for Germans to do away with their Panzerschiffe. Known in the London press as pocket battleships, these ships embraced characteristics of both battleships and cruisers. They were dangerous to his vision of a world of regulated warship types and designs. As part of this effort, the British Admiralty stated in March 1932 that Germany was entitled to relaxation of the treaty. This position was reiterated again in the spring of 1933. Captain Edward King, Director of the Royal Navy's Plans Division, conducted a study in December 1934. His report suggested that the most dangerous form a future German Navy might take would be a Kreuzerkrieg fleet. Such a fleet of Panzerschiffe, cruisers, and U-boats operating in task forces would be dangerous for the Royal Navy. A balanced fleet mirroring the Royal Navy would be the least dangerous form from the British point of view.
During the 1920s, Hitler's thinking on foreign policy underwent dramatic change. At the beginning of his political career, Hitler was hostile to Britain and considered it an enemy of the Reich. However, after the British opposed the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, he came to rank Britain as a potential ally. In Mein Kampf and its sequel Zweites Buch, Hitler strongly criticized pre-1914 German government actions. He argued they unnecessarily antagonized Britain by embarking on naval and colonial challenges. In Hitler's view, Britain was a fellow Aryan power whose friendship could be won through renunciation. This renunciation involved giving up any naval and colonial ambitions against Britain. In return for such renunciation, Hitler expected an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union. He also sought concomitant British support for German efforts to acquire Lebensraum in Eastern Europe. As the first step towards this alliance, Hitler had written in Mein Kampf of seeking a sea pact. By this pact, Germany would renounce any naval challenge against Britain. During January 1933, Hitler became German chancellor. He inherited a relatively strong negotiating position at Geneva from Schleicher's government. The German strategy involved making idealistic offers of limited rearmament out of expectation that all such offers would be rejected by the French. This rejection would allow Germany to proceed ultimately with maximum rearmament regardless of Paris' thoughts.
On the 27th of March 1935, Hitler appointed Joachim von Ribbentrop to head the German delegation. Ribbentrop served as both Hitler's Extraordinary Ambassador, Plenipotentiary at Large and chief of a Nazi Party organization called Dienststelle Ribbentrop. This organization competed with the Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Office. Baron Konstantin von Neurath was initially opposed to the arrangement but changed his mind. He decided that the British would never accept the 35:100 ratio. Having Ribbentrop head the mission was the best way to discredit his rival. On the 2nd of June 1935, Ribbentrop arrived in London. Talks began on Tuesday, the 4th of June 1935, at the Admiralty office. Ribbentrop headed the German delegation while Sir John Simon led the British delegation. Ribbentrop stated the British could accept the 35:100 ratio as fixed and unalterable by the weekend. Otherwise, the German delegation would go home and build their navy up to any size they wished. Simon walked out of the talks visibly angry. On the 5th of June 1935, a change of opinion came over the British delegation. A report to the British Cabinet stated it was definitely of the opinion that in their own interest they should accept this offer while still open. If they refused now, Herr Hitler would withdraw the offer and Germany would seek to build to a higher level than 35 per cent. During the afternoon of that same day, the British Cabinet voted to accept the 35:100 ratio. Ribbentrop was informed of the Cabinet's acceptance in the evening. The agreement was signed in London on the 18th of June 1935 by Ribbentrop and new British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare.
The Naval Pact was signed in London on the 18th of June 1935 without consulting France or Italy. Later, Britain did not inform them of secret agreements stipulating Germans could build more powerful warships than any of the three other major Western European nations then possessed. The French government regarded that as treachery and saw it as further appeasement of Hitler. His appetite grew on concessions. They resented that the British agreement had for private gain further weakened the peace treaty. This added to Germany's growing overall military power. France contended that the British had no legal right to absolve Germany from respecting naval clauses of the Versailles Treaty. As an additional insult for France, the Naval Pact was signed on the 120th anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo. Prussian and British-led troops defeated the French under Napoleon at that battle. The exclusion of France and Italy damaged Allied relations and fueled resentment. London made the agreement without consulting these allies. This action created deep diplomatic rifts within the existing alliance structure. The French felt betrayed by their traditional partner across the Channel.
Because of the lengthy period needed to construct warships and short duration of the agreement, its impact was limited. Experts estimated earliest year that Germany could reach the 35% limit was 1942. Lack of shipbuilding space slowed rebuilding of German Navy. Design problems also hindered progress. Shortages of skilled workers contributed to delays. Scarcity of foreign exchange to purchase necessary raw materials caused further slowdown. A lack of steel and non-ferrous metals resulted from Kriegsmarine being third in rearmament priorities behind Heer and Luftwaffe. When Hitler denounced the agreement in 1939, the Kriegsmarine remained far from the 35% limit. Requirement for dividing tonnage ratio by warship categories forced Germans to build symmetrical balanced fleet program reflecting British priorities. Since Royal Navy leadership thought balanced fleet would be easiest German fleet to defeat, agreement brought considerable strategic benefits. Above all, since Royal Navy did not build pocket battleships, Chatfield valued end of Panzerschiff building. When Kriegsmarine began planning for war against Britain in May 1938, Commander Hellmuth Heye concluded best strategy was Kreuzerkrieg fleet. This fleet of U-boats, light cruisers and Panzerschiffe operating in tandem would attack British Merchant Marine. Senior German naval officers advocated switching to this type but were overruled by Hitler. He insisted on prestige of Germany building a balanced fleet attempting Mahanian strategy of winning maritime supremacy by decisive battle with Royal Navy in North Sea.
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was abrogated by Adolf Hitler on the 28th of April 1939. At conference in Munich leading to Munich Agreement in September 1938, Hitler informed Neville Chamberlain that if British policy made clear Britain might intervene in mainland European war, political preconditions no longer existed. That led to Chamberlain including mention of it in Anglo-German Declaration of the 30th of September 1938. By late 1930s, Hitler's disillusionment with Britain led to increasing anti-British course in German foreign policy. Important sign of changed perceptions was decision in January 1939 to give first priority to Kriegsmarine in allocations. Hitler launched Plan Z to build colossal Kriegsmarine of 10 battleships, 16 pocket battleships, 8 aircraft carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 36 light cruisers and 249 U-boats by 1944. These were purposed to crush Royal Navy. Since fleet envisioned in Z Plan considerably larger than allowed by 35:100 ratio, inevitable Germany would renounce agreement. Over winter of 1938, 1939, it became clearer to London Germans no longer intended to abide by agreement. Reports received in October 1938 that Germans considering denouncing agreement used by Halifax for need of tougher policy. German statement of the 9th of December 1938 intending to build to 100% ratio allowed in submarines played role in straining relations. On the 28th of April 1939, Hitler denounced the agreement. To provide excuse for its denunciation, Germans began refusing to share information about shipbuilding. This left Britain with choice of either accepting unilateral move or rejecting it and providing excuse to denounce it.
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Common questions
What were the specific naval restrictions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles?
The Treaty of Versailles allowed no submarines, no naval aviation, and only six obsolete pre-dreadnought battleships. German naval forces were restricted to six armoured vessels of no more than 10,000 tons displacement. They could also possess six light cruisers of no more than 6,000 tons displacement.
When was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement signed in London?
The agreement was signed in London on the 18th of June 1935 by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Sir Samuel Hoare. Talks began on Tuesday, the 4th of June 1935, at the Admiralty office before the final signing occurred later that month.
Why did France regard the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as treachery?
The French government regarded the pact as treachery because Britain did not consult them or Italy during negotiations. The British agreement stipulated Germans could build more powerful warships than any of the three other major Western European nations then possessed.
On what date did Adolf Hitler abrogate the Anglo-German Naval Agreement?
Adolf Hitler abrogated the agreement on the 28th of April 1939. This decision followed his disillusionment with Britain and the implementation of Plan Z to build a colossal Kriegsmarine intended to crush the Royal Navy.
What naval strategy did Commander Hellmuth Heye propose for Germany in May 1938?
Commander Hellmuth Heye concluded the best strategy was a Kreuzerkrieg fleet consisting of U-boats, light cruisers, and Panzerschiffe operating in tandem. This fleet would attack the British Merchant Marine rather than engaging in a decisive battle with the Royal Navy.