Munich Agreement: the story on HearLore

Munich Agreement

On the 30th of September 1938, four leaders signed a document in Munich that would strip a sovereign nation of its defenses without its consent. Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Édouard Daladier, and Benito Mussolini met to decide the fate of Czechoslovakia, yet the Czechoslovak government was excluded from the negotiations entirely. This agreement, known as the Munich Agreement, mandated the cession of the Sudetenland, a mountainous border region home to three million ethnic Germans, to Nazi Germany. The decision was made in the Führerbau, a building that would later become infamous, but at that moment it was merely the site where the fate of a small democracy was sealed by the great powers of Europe. The Sudetenland was not just any territory; it contained the majority of Czechoslovakia's border fortifications, its heavy industry, and its entire army. By surrendering this land, Czechoslovakia lost 70 percent of its iron and steel production, 70 percent of its electrical power, and 3.5 million citizens, leaving the remainder of the country defenseless against future aggression. The phrase Munich Betrayal entered the lexicon of the Czech people, reflecting the shock of being abandoned by their allies France and Britain, who had signed mutual defense treaties with Prague just years prior. The agreement was presented to the world as a triumph of peace, a way to prevent a major war on the continent, but it was in reality a forced cession under the threat of immediate military invasion. Hitler had already begun a low-intensity undeclared war on the 17th of September 1938, sending paramilitary groups across the border to create chaos, and the Western powers had responded not with support for the victim, but with demands for capitulation. The Sudetenland marked a natural border between the Czech state and the Germanic states since the early Middle Ages, and its loss meant that the rest of Czechoslovakia was now exposed to a direct German attack. The agreement was signed at 1:30 a.m. on the 30th of September, and by the 10th of October, the German army was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland. The Czechoslovak government, realizing the hopelessness of fighting alone, reluctantly capitulated, but the price of peace was the destruction of their state's integrity. The Munich Agreement was soon followed by the First Vienna Award on the 2nd of November 1938, which separated largely Hungarian inhabited territories in southern Slovakia and southern Subcarpathian Rus' from Czechoslovakia, and on the 30th of November, Czechoslovakia ceded small patches of land in the Spiš and Orava regions to Poland. The nation was being picked apart piece by piece, and the world watched in silence, believing that the last territorial claim had been made. Hitler announced that it was his last territorial claim in Northern Europe, a promise that would be broken less than six months later when he occupied the remainder of the country and created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The agreement is now regarded as a failed act of appeasement, and the term has become a byword for the futility of appeasing expansionist totalitarian states, yet at the time, much of Europe celebrated the outcome as a way to prevent a major war.

Who signed the Munich Agreement on the 30th of September 1938?

Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Édouard Daladier, and Benito Mussolini signed the Munich Agreement on the 30th of September 1938. The Czechoslovak government was excluded from the negotiations entirely.

What territory did the Munich Agreement cede to Nazi Germany?

The Munich Agreement mandated the cession of the Sudetenland, a mountainous border region home to three million ethnic Germans, to Nazi Germany. The Sudetenland contained the majority of Czechoslovakia's border fortifications, its heavy industry, and its entire army.

When did the German army complete the occupation of the Sudetenland?

The German army was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland by the 10th of October 1938. The agreement was signed at 1:30 a.m. on the 30th of September 1938.

Why did the Sudetenland hold strategic importance for Czechoslovakia?

The Sudetenland held strategic importance because it contained the majority of Czechoslovakia's border fortifications, its heavy industry, and its entire army. By surrendering this land, Czechoslovakia lost 70 percent of its iron and steel production, 70 percent of its electrical power, and 3.5 million citizens.

What happened to Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement was signed?

After the Munich Agreement, the Sudetenland was occupied by Germany starting on the 10th of October 1938, and the rest of Czechoslovakia was exposed to direct German attack. On the 15th of March 1939, Slovakia seceded from Czechoslovakia and became a separate Nazi-subordinate state, and the remainder of the country was transformed into a protectorate of the Reich.

The Sudeten Crisis

The crisis began not with a declaration of war, but with a political maneuver orchestrated by Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German Party. Henlein, a branch of the Nazi Party of Germany in Czechoslovakia, was instructed by Hitler to make demands that were unacceptable to the democratic Czechoslovak government. On the 28th of March 1938, Henlein met with Hitler in Berlin and was told to push for autonomy for Germans in Czechoslovakia, a demand that the Czechoslovak government, led by President Edvard Beneš, was initially reluctant to grant. The Sudeten German Party, founded in 1933, was described as militant, populist, and openly hostile to the Czechoslovak government, and by 1935, it had become the second-largest political party in Czechoslovakia. The Great Depression, beginning in 1929, had impacted the highly industrialized and export-oriented Sudeten Germans more than it did the Czech and Slovak populations, and by 1936, 60 percent of the unemployed people in Czechoslovakia were Germans. This economic desperation was exploited by Henlein, who gained 88 percent of the ethnic German votes in May 1938. The Sudeten Germans were not consulted on whether they wished to be citizens of Czechoslovakia when the First Czechoslovak Republic was created in 1918 following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Although the constitution guaranteed equality for all citizens, there was a tendency among political leaders to transform the country into an instrument of Czech and Slovak nationalism, and the Sudeten Germans continued to be underrepresented in the government and the army. The crisis escalated when Hitler ordered the establishment of the Sudetendeutsches Freikorps on the 17th of September 1938, a paramilitary organization that took over the structure of Ordnersgruppe, an organization of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia that had been dissolved by the Czechoslovak authorities the previous day due to its implication in a large number of terrorist activities. The organization was sheltered, trained, and equipped by German authorities and conducted cross-border terrorist operations into Czechoslovak territory. In the following days, Czechoslovak forces suffered over 100 personnel killed in action, hundreds wounded, and over 2,000 abducted to Germany. The Sudeten Germans used false allegations of atrocities and the incident in Ostrava on the 7th of September, in which two of their parliamentary deputies were arrested, as an excuse to break off further negotiations. Hitler's rhetoric became increasingly aggressive, and on the 12th of September, he made a speech at a Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg condemning the actions of the government of Czechoslovakia. He denounced Czechoslovakia as being a fraudulent state that was in violation of international law's emphasis of national self-determination, claiming it was a Czech hegemony. Hitler accused Beneš of seeking to gradually exterminate the Sudeten Germans and claimed that since Czechoslovakia's creation, over 600,000 Germans had been intentionally forced out of their homes under the threat of starvation if they did not leave. The situation in Czechoslovakia became tenser that day, with the Czechoslovak government issuing an arrest warrant for Henlein, who had arrived in Germany a day earlier to take part in the negotiations. The French proposals ranged from waging war against Germany to supporting the Sudetenland being ceded to Germany, but the discussions ended with a firm British-French plan in place. Britain and France demanded that Czechoslovakia cede to Germany all territories in which the German population represented over 50 percent of the Sudetenland's total population. In exchange for that concession, Britain and France would guarantee the independence of Czechoslovakia, but Czechoslovakia rejected the proposed solution. The crisis was a low-intensity undeclared war, and the Sudetenland was of absolute strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, strengthened by border fortifications that were now being targeted by German paramilitary groups. The Sudetenland was the key to the defense of the country, and its loss would leave the rest of Czechoslovakia exposed to a direct German attack. The crisis was a test of the Western powers' resolve, and the decision to appease Hitler would have far-reaching consequences for the future of Europe.

The Chamberlain Flight

Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, decided to take a personal meeting with Adolf Hitler to find a solution to avert a war. Chamberlain arrived by a chartered British Airways Lockheed Electra in Germany on the 15th of September and then arrived at Hitler's residence in Berchtesgaden for the meeting. The flight was one of the first times a head of state or diplomatic official flew to a diplomatic meeting in an airplane, as the tense situation left little time to take a train or boat. Henlein flew to Germany on the same day, and that day, Hitler and Chamberlain held discussions in which Hitler insisted that the Sudeten Germans must be allowed to exercise the right of national self-determination and be able to join Sudetenland with Germany. Hitler repeatedly falsely claimed that the Czechoslovak government had killed 300 Sudeten Germans, and he also expressed concern to Chamberlain about what he perceived as British threats. Chamberlain responded that he had not issued threats and in frustration asked Hitler why he had come over here to waste his time. Hitler responded that if Chamberlain was willing to accept the self-determination of the Sudeten Germans, he would be willing to discuss the matter. Chamberlain and Hitler held discussions for three hours, and the meeting adjourned. Chamberlain flew back to Britain and met with his cabinet to discuss the issue. After the meeting, Daladier flew to London on the 16th of September to meet with British officials to discuss a course of action. The situation in Czechoslovakia became tenser that day, with the Czechoslovak government issuing an arrest warrant for Henlein, who had arrived in Germany a day earlier to take part in the negotiations. The French proposals ranged from waging war against Germany to supporting the Sudetenland being ceded to Germany, but the discussions ended with a firm British-French plan in place. Britain and France demanded that Czechoslovakia cede to Germany all territories in which the German population represented over 50 percent of the Sudetenland's total population. In exchange for that concession, Britain and France would guarantee the independence of Czechoslovakia, but Czechoslovakia rejected the proposed solution. The crisis was a low-intensity undeclared war, and the Sudetenland was of absolute strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, strengthened by border fortifications that were now being targeted by German paramilitary groups. The Sudetenland was the key to the defense of the country, and its loss would leave the rest of Czechoslovakia exposed to a direct German attack. The crisis was a test of the Western powers' resolve, and the decision to appease Hitler would have far-reaching consequences for the future of Europe. Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden was a pivotal moment in the crisis, as it marked the first time a British Prime Minister had met with Hitler in person. The meeting was a personal encounter between two leaders who had very different views on the future of Europe, and the outcome of the meeting would determine the course of history. Chamberlain's decision to meet with Hitler was based on the belief that he could reason with the German leader and that a personal meeting would help to resolve the crisis. The meeting was a failure, as Hitler's demands were unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government, and the Western powers were forced to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The meeting was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe. The meeting was a personal encounter between two leaders who had very different views on the future of Europe, and the outcome of the meeting would determine the course of history. Chamberlain's decision to meet with Hitler was based on the belief that he could reason with the German leader and that a personal meeting would help to resolve the crisis. The meeting was a failure, as Hitler's demands were unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government, and the Western powers were forced to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The meeting was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe.

The Bad Godesberg Ultimatum

On the 22nd of September, Chamberlain, about to board his plane to go to Germany for further talks at Bad Godesberg, told the press who met him there that his objective was peace in Europe, and he trusted this trip was the way to that peace. Chamberlain arrived in Cologne, where he received a lavish grand welcome with a German band playing God Save the King and Germans giving Chamberlain flowers and gifts. Chamberlain had calculated that fully accepting German annexation of all of the Sudetenland with no reductions would force Hitler to accept the agreement. Upon being told of this, Hitler responded Does this mean that the Allies have agreed with Prague's approval to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany? Chamberlain responded Precisely, to which Hitler responded by shaking his head, saying that the Allied offer was insufficient. He told Chamberlain that he wanted Czechoslovakia to be completely dissolved and its territories redistributed to Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and told Chamberlain to take it or leave it. Chamberlain was shaken by this statement. Hitler went on to tell Chamberlain that since their last meeting on the 15th, Czechoslovakia's actions, which Hitler claimed included killings of Germans, had made the situation unbearable for Germany. Later in the meeting, a deception was undertaken to influence and put pressure on Chamberlain: one of Hitler's aides entered the room to inform Hitler of more Germans being killed in Czechoslovakia, to which Hitler screamed in response I will avenge every one of them. The Czechs must be destroyed. The meeting ended with Hitler refusing to make any concessions to the Allies' demands. Later that evening, Hitler grew worried that he had gone too far in pressuring Chamberlain, and telephoned Chamberlain's hotel suite, saying that he would accept annexing only the Sudetenland, with no designs on other territories, provided that Czechoslovakia begin the evacuation of ethnic Czechs from the German majority territories by the 26th of September at 8:00 a.m. After being pressed by Chamberlain, Hitler agreed to have the ultimatum set for the 1st of October, the same date that Operation Green was set to begin. Hitler then said to Chamberlain that this was one concession that he was willing to make to the Prime Minister as a gift out of respect for the fact that Chamberlain had been willing to back down somewhat on his earlier position. Hitler went on to say that upon annexing the Sudetenland, Germany would hold no further territorial claims upon Czechoslovakia and would enter into a collective agreement to guarantee the borders of Germany and Czechoslovakia. A new Czechoslovak cabinet, under General Jan Syrový, was installed and on the 23rd of September a decree of general mobilization was issued which was accepted by the public with a strong enthusiasm. Within 24 hours, one million men joined the army to defend the country. The Czechoslovak Army, modern, experienced, and possessing an excellent system of frontier fortifications, was prepared to fight. The Soviet Union announced its willingness to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance, provided that the Red Army would be able to cross Polish and Romanian territory. Both countries refused to allow the Soviet army to use their territories. In the early hours of the 24th of September, Hitler issued the Godesberg Memorandum, which demanded that Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland to Germany no later than the 28th of September, with plebiscites to be held in unspecified areas under the supervision of German and Czechoslovak forces. The memorandum also stated that if Czechoslovakia did not agree to the German demands by 2 p.m. on the 28th of September, Germany would take the Sudetenland by force. On the same day, Chamberlain returned to Britain and announced that Hitler demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland without delay. The announcement enraged those in Britain and France who wanted to confront Hitler once and for all, even if it meant war, and its supporters gained strength. The Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Jan Masaryk, was elated upon hearing of the support for Czechoslovakia from British and French opponents of Hitler's plans, saying The nation of Saint Wenceslas will never be a nation of slaves. The crisis was a low-intensity undeclared war, and the Sudetenland was of absolute strategic importance to Czechoslovakia, strengthened by border fortifications that were now being targeted by German paramilitary groups. The Sudetenland was the key to the defense of the country, and its loss would leave the rest of Czechoslovakia exposed to a direct German attack. The crisis was a test of the Western powers' resolve, and the decision to appease Hitler would have far-reaching consequences for the future of Europe. The Bad Godesberg meeting was a pivotal moment in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe. The meeting was a personal encounter between two leaders who had very different views on the future of Europe, and the outcome of the meeting would determine the course of history. Chamberlain's decision to meet with Hitler was based on the belief that he could reason with the German leader and that a personal meeting would help to resolve the crisis. The meeting was a failure, as Hitler's demands were unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government, and the Western powers were forced to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The meeting was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe.

The Munich Conference

Discussions began at the Führerbau immediately after Chamberlain and Daladier arrived, giving them little time to consult. The meeting was held in English, French, and German. A deal was reached on the 29th of September, and at about 1:30 a.m. on the 30th of September 1938, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini, and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement. The agreement was officially introduced by Mussolini although in fact the Italian plan was nearly identical to the Godesberg proposal: the German army was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland by the 10th of October, and an international commission would decide the future of other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia was informed by Britain and France that it could either resist Nazi Germany alone or submit to the prescribed annexations. The Czechoslovak government, realizing the hopelessness of fighting the Nazis alone, reluctantly capitulated on the 30th of September and agreed to abide by the agreement. The settlement gave Germany the Sudetenland starting the 10th of October, and de facto control over the rest of Czechoslovakia as long as Hitler promised to go no further. On the 30th of September after some rest, Chamberlain went to Hitler's apartment in the Prinzregentenstraße and asked him to sign a statement calling the Anglo-German Naval Agreement symbolic of the desire of our two countries never to go to war with one another again. After Hitler's interpreter translated it for him, he happily agreed. On the 30th of September, upon his return to Britain, Chamberlain delivered his controversial peace for our time speech to crowds in London. The agreement was generally applauded. Prime Minister Daladier of France did not believe, as one scholar put it, that a European War was justified to maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty. Gallup Polls in Britain, France, and the United States indicated that the majority of people supported the agreement. President Beneš of Czechoslovakia was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 1939. The New York Times headline on the Munich agreement read Hitler gets less than his Sudeten demands and reported that a joyful crowd hailed Daladier on his return to France and that Chamberlain was wildly cheered on his return to Britain. In France, the only political party to oppose the Munich Agreement was the Communist Party. The British population had expected an imminent war, and the statesman-like gesture of Chamberlain was at first greeted with acclaim. He was greeted as a hero by the royal family and invited on the balcony at Buckingham Palace before he had presented the agreement to the British Parliament. The generally positive reaction quickly soured, despite royal patronage. However, there was opposition from the start. Clement Attlee and the Labour Party opposed the agreement, in alliance with two Conservative MPs, Duff Cooper and Vyvyan Adams, who had been seen up to then as a reactionary element in the Conservative Party. Daladier believed that Hitler's ultimate goals were a threat. He told the British in a late April 1938 meeting that Hitler's real long-term aim was to secure a domination of the Continent in comparison with which the ambitions of Napoleon were feeble. He went on to say: Today it is the turn of Czechoslovakia. Tomorrow it will be the turn of Poland and Romania. When Germany has obtained the oil and wheat it needs, she will turn on the West. Certainly we must multiply our efforts to avoid war. But that will not be obtained unless Great Britain and France stick together, intervening in Prague for new concessions but declaring at the same time that they will safeguard the independence of Czechoslovakia. If, on the contrary, the Western Powers capitulate again they will only precipitate the war they wish to avoid. Perhaps discouraged by the arguments of French military leaders and civilian officials regarding their unprepared military and weak financial situation, and still traumatized by France's bloodbath in World War I, which he had personally witnessed, Daladier ultimately let Chamberlain have his way. On his return to Paris, Daladier, who had expected a hostile crowd, was acclaimed. In the days following Munich, Chamberlain received more than 20,000 letters and telegrams of thanks, and gifts including 6000 assorted bulbs from grateful Dutch admirers and a cross from Pope Pius XI. The agreement was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe. The meeting was a personal encounter between two leaders who had very different views on the future of Europe, and the outcome of the meeting would determine the course of history. Chamberlain's decision to meet with Hitler was based on the belief that he could reason with the German leader and that a personal meeting would help to resolve the crisis. The meeting was a failure, as Hitler's demands were unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government, and the Western powers were forced to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The meeting was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe.

The Vultures Strike

Poland was building up a secret Polish organization in the area of Trans-Olza from 1935. In summer 1938, Poland tried to organize guerrilla groups in the area. On the 21st of September, Poland officially requested a direct transfer of the area to its own control. Polish envoy to Prague Kazimierz Papée marked that the return of Cieszyn Silesia will be a sign of a goodwill and the redress of injustice of 1920. Similar notes were sent to Paris and London with a request that Polish minority in Czechoslovakia should gain the same rights as Sudeten Germans. On the next day Beneš sent a letter to Polish president Ignacy Mościcki with a promise of border's rectification, but the letter was delivered only on the 26th of September. The answer of Mościcki delivered on the 27th of September was evasive, but it was accompanied with the demand of Polish government to hand over two Trans-Olza counties immediately, as a prelude to ultimate settlement of the border dispute. Beneš's answer was not conclusive: he agreed to hand over the disputed territory to Poland but argued that it could not be done on the eve of the German invasion, because it would disrupt Czechoslovak preparations for war. Poles recognised the answer as playing for time. Polish diplomatic actions were accompanied by placing army along the Czechoslovak border on the 23rd and the 24th of September and by giving an order to the so-called battle units of Trans-Olza Poles and the Trans-Olza Legion, a paramilitary organisation that was made up of volunteers from all over Poland, to cross the border to Czechoslovakia and attack Czechoslovak units. The few who crossed, however, were repulsed by Czechoslovak forces and retreated to Poland. The Polish ambassador in Germany learned about the results of Munich Conference on the 30th of September from Ribbentrop, who assured him that Berlin conditioned the guarantees for the remainder of Czechoslovakia on the fulfilment of Polish and Hungarian territorial demands. Polish foreign minister Józef Beck was disappointed with such a turn of events. In his own words the conference was an attempt by the directorate of great powers to impose binding decisions on other states and Poland cannot agree on that, as it would then be reduced to a political object that others conduct at their will. As a result, at 11:45 p.m. on the 30th of September, 11 hours after the Czechoslovak government accepted the Munich terms, Poland gave an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government. It demanded the immediate evacuation of Czechoslovak troops and police and gave Prague time until noon the following day. At 11:45 a.m. on the 1st of October the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry called the Polish ambassador in Prague and told him that Poland could have what it wanted but then requested a 24-hour delay. On the 2nd of October, the Polish Army, commanded by General Władysław Bortnowski, annexed an area of 801.5 km2 with a population of 227,399 people. Administratively the annexed area was divided between Frysztat County and Cieszyn County. The historian Dariusz Baliszewski wrote that during the annexation there was no co-operation between Polish and German troops, but there were cases of co-operation between Polish and Czech troops defending territory against Germans, for example in Bohumín. The Polish ultimatum finally led Beneš to decide, by his own account, to abandon any idea of resisting the settlement, as Czechoslovakia would have been attacked on all sides. The Germans were delighted with that outcome and were happy to give up the sacrifice of a small provincial rail centre to Poland in exchange for the ensuing propaganda benefits. It spread the blame of the partition of Czechoslovakia, made Poland a participant in the process and confused political expectations. Poland was accused of being an accomplice of Germany. However, there was no formal agreement between Poland and Germany about Czechoslovakia at any time. The Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, General Ludvík Krejčí, reported on the 29th of September that Our army will in about two days' time be in full condition to withstand an attack even by all Germany's forces together, provided Poland does not move against us. Historians such as H.L. Roberts and Anna Cienciala have characterised Beck's actions during the crisis as unfriendly to Czechoslovakia, but not actively seeking its destruction. Whilst Stalin-era Polish historiography typically followed the line that Beck had been a German Agent and had collaborated with Germany, post-1956 historiography has generally rejected this characterisation. Hungary followed Polish request for transfer of territory with its own request on the 22nd of September. Hungarian demands were ultimately fulfilled during the Vienna Arbitration on the 2nd of November 1938. The Sudetenland was the key to the defense of the country, and its loss would leave the rest of Czechoslovakia exposed to a direct German attack. The crisis was a test of the Western powers' resolve, and the decision to appease Hitler would have far-reaching consequences for the future of Europe. The Munich Agreement was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe. The meeting was a personal encounter between two leaders who had very different views on the future of Europe, and the outcome of the meeting would determine the course of history. Chamberlain's decision to meet with Hitler was based on the belief that he could reason with the German leader and that a personal meeting would help to resolve the crisis. The meeting was a failure, as Hitler's demands were unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government, and the Western powers were forced to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The meeting was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe.

The Final Collapse

On the 5th of October, Beneš resigned as President of Czechoslovakia since he realized that the fall of Czechoslovakia was inevitable. After the outbreak of World War II, he formed a Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London. On the 6th of December 1938, the French-German Non-aggression Pact was signed in Paris by French Foreign Minister Bonnet and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Nazi Germany occupied the Sudetenland from 1938 to 1945. In early November 1938, under the First Vienna Award, after the failed negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as a recommendation to settle the territorial disputes by the appendix of the Munich Agreement, the German-Italian arbitration required Czechoslovakia to cede southern Slovakia to Hungary, and Poland independently gained small territorial cessions shortly afterward. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia lost about 38 percent of their combined area to Germany, with some 2.8 million German and 513,000 to 750,000 Czech inhabitants. Hungary, in turn, received in southern Slovakia and southern Carpathian Ruthenia. According to a 1941 census, about 86.5 percent of the population in the territory was Hungarian. Slovakia lost and 854,218 inhabitants for Hungary, according to a Czechoslovak 1930 census about 59 percent were Hungarians and 32 percent were Slovaks and Czechs. Poland annexed the town of Český Těšín with the surrounding area, some, with 250,000 inhabitants. Poles made up about 36 percent of the population, down from 69 percent in 1910, and two minor border areas in northern Slovakia, more precisely in the regions Spiš and Orava, 4,280 inhabitants, only 0.3 percent Poles. Soon after Munich, 115,000 Czechs and 30,000 Germans fled to the rump of Czechoslovakia. According to the Institute for Refugee Assistance, the actual count of refugees on the 1st of March 1939 stood at almost 150,000. In 1937, the Wehrmacht had formulated a plan, Operation Green, for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was implemented shortly after the proclamation of the Slovak State on the 15th of March 1939. On the 14th of March, Slovakia seceded from Czechoslovakia and became a separate Nazi-subordinate state. The following day, Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed independence as well, but after three days, it was completely occupied and annexed by Hungary. Czechoslovak President Emil Hácha traveled to Berlin and was left waiting, and orders to invade had already been given. During the meeting with Hitler, Hácha was threatened with the bombing of Prague if he refused to order the Czech troops to lay down their arms. That news induced a heart attack from which he was revived by an injection from Hitler's doctor. Hácha then agreed to sign the communiqué accepting the German occupation of the remainder of Bohemia and Moravia, which in its unctuous mendacity was remarkable even for the Nazis. Churchill's prediction was fulfilled, as German armies entered Prague and proceeded to occupy the rest of the country, which was transformed into a protectorate of the Reich. In March 1939, Konstantin von Neurath was appointed as Reichsprotektor and served as Hitler's personal representative in the protectorate. Immediately after the occupation, a wave of arrests began, mostly of refugees from Germany, Jews and Czech public figures. By November, Jewish children had been expelled from their schools and their parents fired from their jobs. Universities and colleges were closed after demonstrations against the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Over 1200 students were sent to concentration camps, and nine student leaders were executed on the 17th of November, International Students' Day. By seizing Bohemia and Moravia, Nazi Germany gained all of the skilled labour force and heavy industry located there as well as all the weapons of the Czechoslovak Army. During the 1940 Battle of France, roughly 25 percent of all German weapons came from the protectorate. Nazi Germany also gained all of the Czechoslovakia's gold treasure, including gold stored in the Bank of England. Of a total 227 tons of gold found after the war in salt mines, only 18.4 tons were returned to Czechoslovakia in 1982, but most of it came from Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was also forced to sell war material to the Wehrmacht for 648 million of prewar Czechoslovak koruna, a debt that was never repaid. Chamberlain claimed the Prague annexation was a completely different category that moved beyond the legitimate Versailles grievances. Meanwhile, concerns arose in Britain that Poland, which was now encircled by many German possessions, would become the next target of Nazi expansionism. That was made apparent by the dispute over the Polish Corridor and the Free City of Danzig and resulted in the signing of an Anglo-Polish military alliance. That made the Polish government refuse to accept German negotiation proposals over the Polish Corridor and the status of Danzig. Chamberlain felt betrayed by the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia, realized that his policy of appeasement towards Hitler had failed and so began to take a much harder line against Germany. He immediately began to mobilize the British armed forces to a war footing, and France did the same. Italy saw itself threatened by the British and French fleets and started its own invasion of Albania in April 1939. The Sudetenland was the key to the defense of the country, and its loss would leave the rest of Czechoslovakia exposed to a direct German attack. The crisis was a test of the Western powers' resolve, and the decision to appease Hitler would have far-reaching consequences for the future of Europe. The Munich Agreement was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe. The meeting was a personal encounter between two leaders who had very different views on the future of Europe, and the outcome of the meeting would determine the course of history. Chamberlain's decision to meet with Hitler was based on the belief that he could reason with the German leader and that a personal meeting would help to resolve the crisis. The meeting was a failure, as Hitler's demands were unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government, and the Western powers were forced to accept the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The meeting was a turning point in the crisis, as it marked the beginning of the end for Czechoslovakia and the beginning of the end for peace in Europe.