Popular Mobilization Forces
The Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq came together in just five days in the summer of 2014. Mosul fell to the Islamic State on the 10th of June. On the 13th, the senior Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa called Sufficiency Jihad. It urged Iraqis to defend their cities, Baghdad above all, and to join the counter-offensive. On the 15th of June 2014, the Iraqi government formally created the force.
On paper, the result is a part of the Iraqi Armed Forces that reports directly to the prime minister. In practice, its leaders act independently of state control. They answer instead to the supreme leader of Iran. Known in Arabic as al-Hashd al-Shaabi, the force is an umbrella over about 67 armed factions, mostly Shia and almost all backed by Iran.
That contradiction frames the questions this documentary follows. Who were the groups gathered under one banner, and where did they come from? How does a state army hold units that do not take the state's orders? What have these fighters done on the battlefield, and what have they been accused of doing away from it?
The Arabic phrase al-Hashd al-Shaabi packs more into its name than the English translation lets on. Shaabi means popular, or belonging to the people. Hashd means mobilization, in the sense of a mass of people who have been gathered rather than the act of gathering them. Depending on context, hashd can also mean a crowd, a horde, a throng, or a gathering.
The banners tell their own story. A yellow or white flag reading Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi flies alongside the Iraqi flag, and each faction carries its own flag as well. Members also frequently raise Iranian flags and posters of Iranian religious figures such as Ruhollah Khomeini.
The lineage runs back to the Special Groups, a United States term for Shia insurgent groups funded and supported by the Iranian Quds Force. The label set them apart from Ba'athist loyalists and radical Sunni Salafi jihadists. They fought the US-led coalition during the Iraqi insurgency. They also fought Sunni jihadist and Ba'athist insurgents in a sectarian conflict.
Seven forces formed the original core, operating with the support of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki from early 2014. They were the Badr Brigades, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kata'ib Jund al-Imam, and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali. Analysts Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour, writing for the Carnegie Middle East Center, argue that Maliki used such forces to fight the rise of ISIL. They add that he also used them to keep his influence in predominantly Sunni areas.
Many more groups joined. Some were the military wings of political bodies, such as the Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr of the Islamic Dawa Party and the Babylon Brigades of the Babylon Movement. Others were local or tribal, from the Turkmen Brigades and the Ninawa Guards to the Sinjar Resistance Units.
On the 7th of April 2015, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered the force moved under the direct command of his own office. That order gave the militias a further measure of official status. Until then they had sat beneath a Popular Mobilization Committee in the Interior Ministry. That committee had united existing militias with a small number of Sunni tribesmen.
Parliament passed a law in November 2016, and President Fuad Masum approved it on the 19th of December 2016. The law incorporated the force into the country's armed forces under the supreme commander. A pro-Assad news website reported that members would no longer belong to any political or social group. Many of these irregulars nonetheless kept operating independently of the Iraqi state.
On the 21st of March 2017, the force announced a course to build a Special Forces Division, with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. In early 2018, Abadi reorganized the force and issued regulations to adapt the status of its fighters. Observers began calling it the new Iraqi Republican Guard. Yet as late as May 2018, members still lacked the wages and privileges of regular soldiers, even though consolidation under the armed forces had begun on the 11th of December 2017 after a call from Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
In 2025, the force is led by a chairman appointed by the prime minister and by a chief of staff who shapes its strategy. The chairman has a dedicated office and nine directorates. They cover administrative affairs, doctrinal guidance, financial affairs, legal affairs, media, planning, public relations, security, and an inspector-general. The chief of staff commands five deputies, responsible for medical affairs and casualties, logistics, administration and personnel, intelligence, and operations. Eleven regional operations commands divide the country, from Anbar, Baghdad, and Basra to Samarra.
Beneath those commands sit numbered brigades, each tied to a parent militia, party, or tribe. The Badr Organization anchors many of them. The 41st, 42nd, and 43rd brigades are listed under Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and the 45th, 46th, and 47th under Kata'ib Hezbollah. The 313th and 314th are listed under Saraya al-Salam.
The chain of command on paper means less than it appears. According to Iraqi sources and the London-based, pro-Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat, the militias rely on their own commanders. They rarely cooperate with one another or follow orders from the regular army. The force is also said to run its own military intelligence, its own administrative systems, a court of law, and a media war team. That team supplies morale boosting, battlefield updates, and propaganda videos.
The limits of central control showed in February 2019, when the force raided a base belonging to the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces. Iraqi forces arrested the group's leader, Aws al-Khafaji. The force said it was cracking down on fake groups that claimed membership in order to commit crimes. The group had never declared itself part of the force or registered with the Iraqi government.
The real line of obedience was stated openly in 2024. Chief of Staff Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi declared that the force took orders from Ali Khamenei. Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh is described as working with the Iranian IRGC to carry out Iranian instructions in Iraq and to strengthen Iranian influence over the militias.
In March 2025, Iraq's parliament introduced a draft law to bring the force fully under the prime minister, who is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. It would also set a mandatory retirement age for senior commanders. That rule could remove key figures with longstanding ties to Tehran. In February 2025, Fayyadh had visited senior Iranian officials, a trip widely read as an effort to rally Tehran's support against the bill.
Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour divide the Shia side of the force into three camps. One pledges allegiance to Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei, one to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and one follows the Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. A Sunni newspaper offers a different cut. It sorts the groups into those formed after the fatwa without political ambitions, those that began as wings of political parties, and those that had fought American forces for years.
The pro-Khamenei camp holds the most power. It includes Saraya Khurasani, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Abu Fadhl al-Abbas, the Badr Organization, and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. The authors describe these groups as a kind of border guard, an insurance policy for Iran against threats on its frontier. Their leaders profess loyalty to Khamenei and to his doctrine of Vilayat al-Faqih with pride.
The pro-Sistani camp grew out of the fatwa and was meant to protect Shia holy sites. Four major groups were organized from Najaf. They are Saraya al-Ataba al-Abbasiya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Hussainiya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Alawiya, and Liwa 'Ali al-Akbar, which correspond to shrines in Kadhimiya, Karbala, and Najaf. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq also swears allegiance to Sistani. After the Badr Organization left that council, its leader Ammar al-Hakim formed new units, including Saraya el-Jihad, Saraya el-'Aqida, and Saraya 'Ashura.
Muqtada al-Sadr's Peace Companies, called Saraya al-Salam, were founded in June 2014 from the old Mahdi Army. According to Jabar and Mansour, the Sadrists have largely been cut off from Iranian funding.
Recruitment leans on the religious establishment. Shia Islamist parties, individual clerics, and members of parliament recruit more actively than the official commission, which has no recruitment offices. Officials say scholars from the hawza, the Shia seminary system, are instrumental.
Sunnis began as a tiny minority of 1,000 to 3,000 men. In January 2016, Abadi approved the appointment of 40,000 Sunni fighters. Al-Monitor said the move was meant to give the force a multiconfessional image, though Sunnis had begun volunteering before the decision. The Economist counted approximately 16,000 Sunnis by late April 2016. Yazan al-Jabouri, a secular Sunni commander of the anti-ISIS Liwa Salahaddin, put the figure at 30,000 in November 2016. The tribes that joined in 2015 were those that had enjoyed good relations with Maliki.
The Shia Turkmen contribute around four thousand members, organized as Brigade 12. Jabar and Mansour say they joined to increase their local autonomy from the Kurdistan Region and to counter Sunni Turkmen who had joined the Islamic State.
Christian units exist on the Nineveh plains. The Imam Ali Brigades trained two of them, Kata'ib Rouh Allah Issa Ibn Miriam, meaning the Spirit of God, Jesus Son of Mary Brigade, and the Babylon Brigades. The Babylon Brigades have a Christian commander but are mostly made up of Shabaks and Shia Arabs, and have been called pseudo-Christian. In March 2023, they clashed briefly with the Assyrians of Qaraqosh after trying to take control of a base belonging to the Nineveh Plains Protection Units.
At the end of January 2015, a video showed a Kata'ib Hezbollah convoy carrying American-made vehicles. They included an M1 Abrams tank, M113 armoured personnel carriers, Humvees, and MRAP vehicles. Iranian-made Safir 4x4s and technicals flew the militia's flags alongside them. Some sources say the Iraqi government supplies American equipment to the militias. Badr Organization head Hadi al-Amiri, then transportation minister, complained that the United States was not providing enough arms. American officials argued that the heavy weapons were operated by regular Iraqi soldiers who raised the Hezbollah flag in solidarity. They also admitted that it is generally difficult to track US-made weapons.
Iran is a major supplier. According to some sources, Tehran sold Baghdad nearly 10 billion dollars in weapons and hardware in 2014. A daily flow of Iranian arms includes 106 millimetre anti-tank guns and 120, 82, and 60 millimetre mortars.
In May 2015, the United States began delivering about 1.6 billion dollars in military equipment under the supervision of the Iraqi government. According to some sources, the force was set to be a major beneficiary. Heavy armour appeared to be operated by the force in the operations around the battle of Mosul.
Training comes from abroad. Military advisers from Turkey help Sunni and Turkmen troops. Advisers from Iran and Hezbollah, including Quds Force figures, train the others. Qasem Soleimani was one of them until his death in 2020. Several militant groups also received training and strategic aid from Hezbollah's Unit 3800.
On the battlefield, the force was said to be led by Jamal Jaafar Mohammed, better known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of Kata'ib Hezbollah. But the chain of command ran through pre-existing leaders. Others in charge included Qais al-Khazali, commander of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Hadi al-Amiri. According to The New York Times, this autonomy could challenge Abadi's authority.
No official figure exists for the force's strength, and estimates differ significantly. Reports from 2015 suggested that about 20,000 militiamen were engaged around Tikrit.
The Second Battle of Tikrit stands as the force's most important engagement against ISIL. On the 6th of April 2015, Prime Minister Abadi said the force would not join the planned conquest of Mosul. In March 2016 that position reversed, when he reportedly rejected calls from Nineveh's provincial council to bar it from retaking the city.
Shia volunteers reportedly entered Anbar in the first days of May 2015, amid heavy protests from Sunni personalities. In autumn 2016, the force joined the Mosul offensive as the left flank. By November it had captured a number of smaller towns and villages along a line from Qayyarah to Tal Afar. It kept a distance of more than 20 kilometres from Mosul itself. In October 2017, it was part of the government force that recaptured Kirkuk, which had been under Kurdish control since 2014. Some sources credit the force with undermining ISIL's superiority in guerrilla warfare and psychological operations.
In January 2015, the pro-Iran Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada announced that two of its fighters had died defending the Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque in Damascus. Factions loyal to the Iranian supreme leader have been heavily deployed in Syria on the side of the Assad regime, often citing the defense of Shia shrines. After the immediate ISIL threat in Iraq shrank from 2015, many returned there. Between 2013 and early 2016, 1,200 Iraqi fighters died in Syria. Among them were members of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, including the senior commanders Abu al-Fadl and Abu Haider al-Nazari.
In the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests, reports surfaced that Iran had brought in Iraqi allies, including members of Hashd al-Shaabi and Kata'ib Hezbollah, to help crack down. Eyewitnesses reported their arrival in Iran.
The reports returned during the 2025-2026 Iranian protests. One account says approximately 800 members of Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Sayyid al-Shuhada, and the Badr Corps were sent to Iran. According to an Iraqi security force, around 5,000 Iraqi Shia militants crossed in. They reportedly entered through the border crossings of Shalamcheh, Chazhabeh, and Khosravi, under the cover of a pilgrimage to the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad. In practice they gathered at a base in Ahvaz before being sent to different regions. On the 9th of January 2026, the United States warned Iran against using foreign militias to crush protests. In April 2026, Reza Pahlavi posted on X calling for the expulsion of the force from Iran, saying its members had been seen on Iranian streets carrying Iraqi flags.
At home, the pro-Sistani and Sadrist militias wary of Iranian influence are strongly opposed to the Syrian intervention. They have resisted recruitment efforts by pro-Iran factions to send Iraqis to die on Assad's side.
On the 7th of August 2017, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada said American planes bombed its forces in Anbar near the Syrian border. Army Colonel Ryan Dillon, spokesman for the US-led coalition, dismissed the claim on Twitter and said no coalition airstrikes took place there. The militia's deputy, Ahmed al-Maksousi, then said artillery fire had hit them in Syria's Jamouna area, about 12 kilometres from the Iraqi border. He said 40 were killed.
On the 22nd of August 2019, the force blamed the United States and Israel for bombings on its warehouses and bases. It accused the US of permitting Israeli drones to join its forces. The next day, Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri issued a fatwa declaring the presence of any US military force in Iraq forbidden, or haram, under any title.
On the 29th of December 2019, the United States bombed the headquarters of Kata'ib Hezbollah near Al-Qa'im, killing 25 militiamen. On the 3rd of January 2020, an assassination near Baghdad Airport killed three men. They were Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the force's public relations head Mohammed Redha al-Jabri, and Quds Force head Qasem Soleimani. On the 12th of March 2020, the US hit five Kata'ib Hezbollah weapons storage bases in retaliation for the Camp Taji attacks.
In 2020, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada formed the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. Since 2020, Iranian-backed factions have launched attacks against American forces and their allies in the region under that name.
On the 25th of February 2021, a US air raid killed one person and wounded four at facilities on the Iraqi-Syrian border in Deir ez-Zor. The facilities were used by forces fighting ISIL with the Iraqi and Syrian governments. American officials called the force an Iranian-backed militia and described the strike as retaliation for purported Iranian aggression. Iranian officials denied involvement, and Iraqi officials rejected any link to the earlier attackers. The Pentagon said it had consulted the Iraqi government, but the Iraqi military denied giving the US any location information about Syria.
On the 27th of June 2021, US forces bombed two locations after a rise in drone attacks. One was a drone-making facility and the other a conventional weapons depot. Four members of Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada were claimed killed.
On the 4th of January 2024, strikes on the force's logistical headquarters killed two people, including deputy head of operations in Baghdad Mushtaq Talib Al-Saeedi. On the 2nd of February 2024, strikes on the headquarters in Akashat in Anbar killed 16 fighters and wounded 25. On the 23rd of March 2026, strikes in Anbar killed at least 15 fighters. They also hit the Mosul residence of Falih Al-Fayyadh, who was not present.
The 2026 Iran war brought a new kind of fight. On the 14th of March 2026, a Kataib Hezbollah drone breached the air defenses of Camp Victory and struck it. On the 17th of March, the Saraya Awliya al-Dam faction published footage of a reconnaissance drone over the US embassy compound in Baghdad. An observer judged the footage consistent with a fiber optic drone, suggesting the group had acquired advanced technology.
On the 21st of March 2026, the Ashab al-Kahf faction claimed to have killed a French soldier in an attack on a base in Iraq. The same day it set Camp Victory ablaze. On the 25th of March, an AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel and a Black Hawk were struck at the Victory Base Complex by a fiber optic drone. On the 28th of March 2026, reports said Iranian-backed militia was mobilizing forces to Iran. Videos showed a convoy later spotted at Khorramshahr in southwestern Iran.
The American response has also come through terrorism designations. Washington designated Kata'ib Hezbollah as a terrorist entity in 2009, along with its leader, al-Muhandis. Japan's Public Security Intelligence Agency and the United Arab Emirates also list the group. In March 2019, the US designated Harakat al-Nujaba and its leader Akram al-Ka'abi as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq became a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2020. Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada joined the global terrorist list in November 2023. In June 2024, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya was designated after attacks on US bases, including the Tower 22 drone attack.
In 2014, Amnesty International reported that Shia militias had abducted, tortured, and killed numerous Sunni civilians. After the conquest of Tikrit, Western sources said militants had committed some violence while being publicly praised. Iraqi authorities declared that war crimes would be investigated and punished. Critics have also accused factions of ethnic cleansing and of displacing Sunnis, and of destroying villages in Anbar, Saladin, and Diyala.
Sistani issued a 20-point guide called Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields. Its second point draws on a hadith and tells fighters not to kill an elder, a child, or a woman. It also forbids stealing or disrespecting people, even the families of ISIS fighters. Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Ayatollah Hussein Al-Sadr urged the fighters to refrain from war crimes. In 2015, ad hoc government committees were set up to investigate civilian deaths attributed to the militias.
In 2016, Sunni dignitaries and officials in Mosul accused the force of killings and of taking over schools. They also said Sunnis were pressed to sell property near the Mosul shrine. City council deputy chairman Muzher Fleih said 650 Sunnis had disappeared. Militia leaders insist any abuses are isolated and aimed only at captured collaborators of the Islamic State.
During the 2019-2021 Iraqi protests, which called for an end to the sectarian political system, militias associated with the force were accused of violent suppression. Methods included live bullets, marksmen, hot water, hot pepper gas, and tear gas. The toll was over 1,000 deaths and over 30,000 injuries.
In 2015, critics argued that the force had no basis in Iraq's Constitution yet drew a budget and regular pay. Meanwhile the legally established Peshmerga had gone unpaid. In February 2015, Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani asked the Peshmerga minister to stop militia activity in the area after the force recruited Yazidis there. Clerics from the Najaf seminary, reportedly including Sistani, also criticized the monopolistic conduct of al-Muhandis.
The deepest worry is permanence. In early January 2016, police in Muthanna Governorate said they were commissioning battalions of the force for security tasks, such as protecting establishments in open desert. Other reports describe the force securing border outlets and controlling security in liberated cities. General Ali Omran, commander of the army's 5th Infantry Division, warned that the militias were too entrenched in politics and risked coming to blows with the army. In February 2016, militiamen refused orders to vacate a building in a military base north of Baghdad.
According to government officials and militia leaders interviewed by the AP, the militias fear a return of Sunni minority rule and want to stay a permanent, independent force. Hamed al-Jazaeery, head of the al-Khorasani Brigades, said the model is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In 2016, Lieutenant General Stephen J. Townsend, commander of the coalition task force CJTF-OIR, called the force remarkably disciplined. He said it could make Iraq more secure if it became a national guard-like force and not a puppet of Iran.
Continue browsing
Updated
Common questions
What are the Popular Mobilization Forces?
They are an Iranian-backed paramilitary umbrella group in Iraq, made up of about 67 mostly Shia armed factions. Formally they are part of the Iraqi Armed Forces and report to the prime minister, but their leaders act independently of state control.
When and why were they formed?
The Iraqi government created them on the 15th of June 2014. This followed the fall of Mosul on the 10th of June and a fatwa by Ali al-Sistani on the 13th of June calling for the defense of Iraqi cities.
Where do the factions come from?
Many trace their origins to the Special Groups, Shia insurgent groups supported and funded by the Iranian Quds Force. Seven forces formed the original core, including the Badr Brigades, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Hezbollah.
Are all members Shia?
No. The force is overwhelmingly Shia, but it also includes Sunni Arab tribesmen, Shia Turkmen, and Christian units on the Nineveh plains. Estimates of Sunni numbers differ, from about 16,000 to 30,000 in 2016.
What are the main accusations against the force?
Some factions have been accused of sectarian violence, abductions, killings, and the displacement of Iraqi Sunnis, as well as of violently suppressing the 2019-2021 Iraqi protests. Militia leaders say any abuses were isolated incidents.
What did the 2025 reform bill propose?
The draft law would formally subordinate the force to the prime minister and set a mandatory retirement age for senior commanders. It reflects American pressure to reduce Iranian influence.
All sources
190 references cited across the entry
- 1The Future of Iraq's Popular Mobilization ForcesCarnegie Endowment for International Peace
- 2Iraqi PMF Chief of Staff Commits to Fulfill Iranian Supreme Leader's PlansThe Washington Institute
- 3NewsWill Sistani be able to control popular mobilization forces?Mustafa al Khadimi — 12 March 2015
- 4JournalA Short Profile of Iraq's Shi'a MilitiasZana K. Gulmohamad — Jamestown Foundation — 17 April 2015
- 5The Iraq Report: Missing Sunnis an admission of 'war crimes'Tallha Abdulrazaq — 2023-01-05
- 62.2. Sunni ArabsEuropean Union Agency for Asylum
- 7NewsPart 2: Pro-Iran Militias in IraqWilson Center — April 27, 2018
- 9The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's FutureCarnegie Endowment for International Peace
- 10NewsThe Iraqi militias are copying their overmighty cousins in Iran8 June 2023
- 11Iraq orders militias to fully integrate into state security forcesAli Mamouri — July 2, 2019
- 12Shiite militias react angrily to decree integrating them into Iraqi forcesAli Mamouri — July 8, 2019
- 13NewsThe Badr OrganizationGuido Steinberg — German Institute for International and Security Affairs — July 2017
- 14Iraq: Legislating the Status of the Popular Mobilization ForcesLibrary of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA
- 15Iraq's Popular Mobilisation ForcesLondon School of Economics and Political Science
- 16Iraq: Row over the Hashd al-Shaabi reveals cracks in the pro-Iran coalitional-Salhy Suadad — Middle East Eyes
- 17The Leadership and Purpose of Iraq's Popular Mobilization ForcesInstitute for the Study of War
- 18The Political Logic Behind Iraq's Fragmented Armed ForcesAlyssa Bivins — MERIP — 2023-04-04
- 19JournalOperation Inherent Resolve2018
- 20NewsIslamic State: The caliphate strikes back23 May 2015
- 21NewsTop Iraqi Shiite cleric calls for scaling back militia influence, backing prime ministerTamer El-Ghobashy et al. — 2017-12-15
- 22PMC law of 2016Ministry of Justice
- 23The Evolution of Iran's Special Groups in IraqCombating Terrorism Center at West Point — 2010-11-01
- 24Who's Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State ForcesAndras Derszi-Horvath et al. — Global Public Policy Institute — 16 August 2017
- 25Hezbollah's Regional Activities in Support of Iran's Proxy NetworksMiddle East Institute
- 26The Quds Force and Hezbollah Involvement Alongside the Houthis in YemenBoaz Shapira — Alma Research and Education Center — 2025-01-05
- 27Hezbollah in Iraq: A Little Help Can Go a Long WayThe Washington Institute
- 28MagazineIran-backed militias officially join Iraqi military and threaten U.S. troopsTom O'Connor — March 9, 2018
- 29NewsAbadi seeks alliance with Popular Mobilization Units based on his terms13 January 2018
- 30Iraqi volunteers' victories don't justify atrocitiesMustafa al-Khadhimi — 22 December 2014
- 321.2. Popular Mobilisation Forces and Tribal Mobilisation MilitiasEuropean Union Agency for Asylum
- 33The U.S. Is Providing Air Cover for Ethnic Cleansing in IraqMichael Pregent et al. — 2025-04-23
- 34NewsWin or lose Tikrit, Isis can only be defeated in Iraq by the SunniHassan Hassan — 2015-03-08
- 36GICJ Report - Fallujah: Inside the GenocideGICJ — 2020-02-19
- 38Iran's attempted genocide of the Sunni Arabs2016-12-09
- 39News'There Is Chaos': Iran-Backed Militias Battle Activists in a Holy Iraqi CityJane Arraf — 2021-09-18
- 40The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's FutureRenad Mansour et al. — Carnegie Middle East Center — 28 April 2017
- 41NewsIraq: At least 23 dead amid fighting after Moqtada al-Sadr quitsRaffi Berg et al. — BBC News — 30 August 2022
- 43Who is the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, the mysterious group attacking US and Israeli targets over Gaza?Dana Taib Menmy et al. — 8 November 2023
- 44Iran Update, November 3, 2023Institute for the Study of War — 2023-11-03
- 46A Look at Iraq's Competing Shiite Armed Factions and Parties, Many Iran-AlignedVoice of America — 2024-02-18
- 47Iraq's PMF Wants to Be Iran's IRGCAnas Al Qaed — Gulf International Forum — 2023-06-09
- 48Special Report: Massacre reports show U.S. inability to curb Iraq militiasNed Parker et al. — Reuters — 2016-08-23
- 52أبرز فصائل الحشد الشعبي في العراقAl Jazeera
- 55MagazineWhat to Know About the Attacks on U.S. Military Bases in the Middle EastMathias Hammer — 25 October 2023
- 56IRAN UPDATE, JULY 26, 202426 July 2024
- 57NewsAP Interview: Iraq's al-Maliki denies seeking comeback2 February 2015
- 59Law passes making the PMU a part of Iraq's national forces.Paul Antonopoulos — December 19, 2016
- 60NewsConcern in Iraq grows over unregulated Shiite forcesAli Mamouri — 17 February 2015
- 61NewsIraq elections become a battleground for Iranian influence12 May 2018
- 62NewsIraqi volunteers' victories don't justify atrocitiesMustafa al-Khadimi — 22 December 2014
- 63Iran's Shadow Army: The PMF's Growing Influence in IraqCenter for Strategic Studies — 30 April 2025
- 64The Leadership and Purpose of Iraq's Popular Mobilization ForcesAnnika Ganzeveld et al. — Institute for the Study of War — 19 March 2024
- 65Hashd Brigade Numbers IndexAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — 31 October 2017
- 66الوقتJune 18, 2016
- 67Iraqi PMF attempts to cut off Islamic State in Mosul4 November 2016
- 68الغد برس
- 70US mulls how best to Control pro-Iran Factions30 May 2017
- 71سرايا "الجهاد" تدمر رتلا عسكريا لـ"داعش" من 8 مركبات غرب الموصلNovember 29, 2016
- 72Iraqi Shiite militia commander close to Qassem Soleimani killed in Aleppo -27 September 2016
- 73Institute for the Study of War15 February 2025
- 76NewsThe Christian militia fighting ISBBC News — 11 April 2016
- 78Hashd Formations of Ninawa: Interview with Nawader ShammarAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — 6 April 2019
- 79Regiment 14 of the Tribal Hashd in Ninawa: InterviewAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — 21 October 2020
- 80Tribal Hashd in Ninawa: 'Bayariq al-Iraq' (Regiment 38)Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — 30 September 2020
- 81Tribal Hashd of Ninawa: Interview with the 39th RegimentAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — 6 September 2019
- 82Tribal Hashd in Ninawa: 'Quwat al-Karar' (Regiment 41)Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — 30 September 2020
- 83The Asayish Izidkhan: InterviewAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — 6 April 2021
- 84الفرطوسي: قوات البراق ستشارك في معارك تحرير هيتهيئة التحرير — February 29, 2016
- 86NewsBetter pay, better weapons: are shiite militias growing more powerful than iraqi army?Niqash — January 29, 2015
- 87NewsPro-Iran militias' success in Iraq could undermine U.S.Liz Sly — 15 February 2015
- 88NewsIt's official: Sunnis joining Iraq's Popular Mobilization UnitsMustafa Saadoun — 14 January 2016
- 89In War Against ISIS, Numbers Don't Always Tell the StoryRobin Wright — 13 March 2015
- 90NewsDentro a Tikrit, gli sciiti arrivano sui luoghi delle stragiDaniele Raineri — 4 April 2015
- 91NewsShiite militia recruiting Yezidis, strengthening foothold in ShingalAli Nasir — Rudaw — 2 March 2015
- 92NewsWhy Iraq needs to depoliticize their Popular Mobilization UnitsMustafa al-Kadhimi — 10 July 2015
- 93Iraq's Prime Minister Reshuffles the Security CommandersAhmed Ali — Institute for the Study of War — 14 November 2014
- 94NewsIraqi Popular Forces Warn to Disclose Coalition's Support for ISILIslamic Invitation Turkey — 1 March 2015
- 95NewsAfter Victory Over ISIS in Tikrit, Next Battle Requires a New TemplateRod Nordland — 7 April 2015
- 98NewsExporting the Islamic RevolutionTony Badran — 6 March 2015
- 99NewsIraqi town celebrates victory over Islamic StateAli Hashem — 2 January 2015
- 100NewsIraq's pro-Iranian Shiite militias lead the war against the Islamic StateLiz Sly — 16 February 2015
- 101NewsPossible Armed Confrontations between Popular Mobilization Forces, Iraqi Army9 February 2016
- 102Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields12 February 2015
- 103NewsIran's Strategic Victory: Hezbollah-ized IraqGary Grappo — 14 March 2015
- 104NewsA Balancing Act as Iraq Claims Gains in TikritAnne Barnard — 12 March 2015
- 105News20 Turkish officers train Iraqi Mobilization Forces, media sourcesIraq Tradelink News Agency — 15 April 2015
- 106NewsIraq's Shiite forces claim victory over ISAli Hashem — 16 March 2015
- 107Analysis 03-06-2015Center for American and Arab Studies — 7 March 2015
- 108NewsIraqi forces retake region, police station in Anbar15 March 2015
- 109JournalA short profile of Iraq's Shi'a militiasZana K. Gulmohamad — 17 April 2015
- 110NewsFears in Iraqi government, army over Shiite militias' powerHamza Hendawi et al. — 20 March 2016
- 111The Popularity of the Hashd in IraqRenad Mansour — Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — 1 February 2016
- 113BookA new controversial actor in post-ISIS Iraq: al-Hashd al-Shaabi (the Popular Mobilization Forces)Bilgay Duman — ORSAM — May 2015
- 114Iraq's 'Good Sunni'Nour Samaha — 16 November 2016
- 115The Myth and Reality of Iraq's al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Front Forces): A Way ForwardHassan Abbas — Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Amman Office — September 2017
- 118Nineveh Plains Christians Defend Against the Babiliyoun MilitiaThe Washington Institute
- 119Video shows Hezbollah Brigades convoy transporting American M1 tankBill Roggio et al. — 28 January 2015
- 120NewsIran-Backed Militias Are Getting U.S. WeaponsJosh Rogin et al.
- 121NewsArmed with U.S. weapons, infamous militia beating ISIS2 February 2015
- 122News"Those Kissed US Hands, Didn't Get Anything": Iraq Shiite Commander14 March 2015
- 123NewsTracking U.S. weapons grows harder in the fog of Iraq's fragmented warRyan Missy — 26 March 2015
- 124NewsIran eclipses U.S. as Iraq's ally in fight against militantsHamza Hemdawi et al. — 12 January 2015
- 125Better pay, better weapons: Are Shiite militias growing more powerful than Iraqi army?Preemptive Love Coalition — 31 January 2015
- 126NewsUS Starts Sending $1.6 Billion Worth of Promised Arms to Iraq — But Who Will Get Them?David Enders — 6 June 2015
- 127The Battle for Mosul Enters Its Final StageAnn Taylor — 28 June 2017
- 128NewsMobilization forces hand over security affairs to local police in TikritIraq Tradelink News Agency — 4 April 2015
- 129NewsIraqi PM Abadi: Shiite militia won't join battle for MosulRudaw Media Network — 7 April 2015
- 130News'All Iraqis' can help retake Mosul from Daesh: PMIbrahim Saleh — Anadolu Agency — 3 March 2016
- 131NewsShiite volunteers enter Anbar provinceIraq TradeLink News Agency — 6 May 2015
- 132NewsIraq militias say they don't need US help in Anbar operationVivian Salama — 13 June 2015
- 134NewsIraqi forces push into disputed Kirkuk as Kurds withdrawABC News — 16 October 2017
- 135NewsIraqi Kurdish forces take Kirkuk as Isis sets its sights on Baghdad12 June 2014
- 137The Return of Iraqi Shi'i Militias to SyriaAymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi — Middle East Institute — 2015-03-16
- 138Bodies of Iraqis killed in Syria received in BaghdadThe New Arab — 2016-02-02
- 139Hashd force claims 'large number' of casualties in US airstrikeRudaw — 7 August 2017
- 140WAAR Media
- 142NewsWill Iran-backed factions attack US troops in Iraq?Ali Mamouri — 28 August 2019
- 143US airstrikes in Iraq anger Baghdad governmentDeutsche Welle — 30 December 2019
- 144Trump orders U.S. drone strike killing Iranian general who had "plans to attack" American diplomats and militaryTom O'Connor et al. — January 2, 2020
- 145NewsIran's Soleimani and Iraq's Muhandis Killed in Air Strike: Militia Spokesman2 January 2020
- 147NewsIraq base attack: US in retaliatory strikes on Iran-backed fightersBBC News — 13 March 2020
- 148Biden's airstrikes are first test of role as world's policeHjelmgaard, Kim — 26 February 2021
- 149After Syria air strikes, Iraq military denies exchanging information with U.S.Reuters — 26 February 2021
- 150U.S. warplanes strike Iran-backed militia in Iraq, SyriaReuters — 27 June 2021
- 152NewsAmerica launches retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria in response to the Jordanian attackSky News Arabia — 2 February 2024
- 153News16 martyrs and 25 wounded.. The Popular Mobilization Forces reveals the death toll of the American raidsAlmorageb — 3 February 2024
- 155Iraq advances PMF law amid US calls for greater control over the forceRudaw Media Network
- 156Dramatic video of Iranian militias’ drone strike against US military base goes viralFinancial Express — 15 March 2026
- 157FPV drone slams into US military base in IraqAl Jazeera — 15 March 2026
- 159Iranian-backed armed groups targeting Western interests in Iraq21 March 2026
- 160NewsUS Camp Victory targeted in drone attack by pro-Iran forces21 March 2026
- 162NewsMoment Iranian drone attacks Black Hawk helicopter at military base in Iraq25 March 2026
- 165カタイブ・ヒズボラ（KH） | 国際テロリズム要覧（Web版） | 公安調査庁March 2, 2019
- 166مجلس الوزراء يعتمد قائمة التنظيمات الإرهابية. | WAMNovember 17, 2014
- 167Iraq Situation Report: May 23–25, 2015John Lawrence — Institute for the Study of War — 26 May 2015
- 168Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in IraqUnited States Treasury
- 169U.S. to designate Iran-backed Iraqi militia as foreign terrorist organizationReuters — January 3, 2020
- 170US designates Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, officer as specially designated global terrorists -statementReuters — November 17, 2023
- 171Terrorist Designation of Harakat Ansar Allah al-AwfiyaU.S. Department of State — 17 June 2024
- 172NewsExclusive: Iran-backed militias deployed snipers in Iraq protests – sourcesReuters — 2019-10-17
- 174Iraq: HRW denounces lethal force against protesters, urges probeAl Jazeera English
- 182NewsIraqi Shia militias accused of murder spree14 October 2014
- 183NewsIraq needs justice, not revengeAli Mamouri — 12 March 2015
- 184NewsIraq's PM Abadi Orders Probe Into Two Civilian Deaths at Anbar Security HQ13 February 2015
- 185ISIS cross-dressers busted trying to escape Fallujah21 June 2016
- 186The Constitutionality of the Popular Mobilization ForceImad Farhadi — 24 March 2015
- 187NewsShiite "Popular Mobilization" is unconstitutional2 February 2015
- 188From Militia to State Force: the Transformation of al-Hashd al-ShaabiRenad Mansour — Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — 16 November 2015
- 189The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq's FutureRenad Mansour et al. — Carnegie Middle East Center — 28 April 2017
- 192Is the influence of Iraq's popular mobilization forces growing?The Regional Center for Strategic Studies Cairo — 13 January 2016
- 193NewsTop U.S. General: Two More Years to Beat ISISKimberly Dozier — 26 December 2016