Permesta
Permesta was a rebel movement in Indonesia that began before dawn on the 2nd of March 1957, when Lt. Col. Ventje Sumual stood in the governor's residence in Makassar in front of roughly 50 witnesses and proclaimed a state of war across all of eastern Indonesia. After reading a charter that pledged not to break from the Indonesian republic but only to fight for a fairer share of its wealth and power, the attendees signed their names to it. By the time the last Permesta fighters surrendered in late 1961, the conflict had claimed the lives of 4,000 government soldiers and 2,000 rebels.
The name Permesta is a syllabic abbreviation of the Indonesian phrase Perjuangan Semesta, meaning Universal Struggle Charter. That phrase carries a specific claim about purpose: this was not a secessionist uprising but a demand for economic and political equity inside Indonesia. What drove civil and military leaders from Sulawesi and Sumatra to risk everything for that demand? How did a regional grievance draw in the CIA, Taiwanese arms shipments, mercenary pilots, and eventually a US-piloted bomber downed over Ambon? And how did a movement that once controlled its own air force end up surrendering in village ceremonies scattered across the mountains of North Sulawesi?
In January 1957, Lt. Col. Muhammad Saleh Lahade and Maj. Andi Muhammad Jusuf Amir traveled from Makassar to Jakarta to meet Army Chief of Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution. Their message was straightforward: Jakarta's economic policies were strangling the regions that produced Indonesia's wealth. The island of Java dominated political life, yet the revenues that funded it came largely from other islands. In February of that year, Sulawesi Governor Andi Pangerang Pettarani went to Jakarta separately, meeting Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and Interior Minister R. Sunarjo to push for greater regional autonomy and a larger share of government revenue for local development.
Lahade and Jusuf also raised a military grievance. The Ko-DPSST, the security command covering South and Southeast Sulawesi, answered directly to army headquarters in Java rather than to the regional command in Makassar. They wanted that replaced with a Regional Military Command that would be rooted in local authority. At the end of February 1957, two more Sulawesi officials, Andi Burhanuddin and Henk Rondonuwu, made a final trip to Jakarta as a last attempt at persuasion. Sumual joined them. On the 1st of March 1957, all three returned to Makassar empty-handed, and the civil and military leadership that had met on the 25th of February to plan a declaration went ahead with it the following day.
At 3:00 am on the 2nd of March 1957, Sumual proclaimed the state of war and Lahade read the Universal Struggle Charter aloud. The charter closed with a direct statement that Permesta was not breaking away from the Republic but was fighting for the betterment of the Indonesian people. Governor Pangerang urged calm. By the following day, a military government structure had been announced: Sumual as military administrator, Lahade as chief of staff, and a Central Advisory Council of 101 members. Four military governors covered the regions of eastern Indonesia.
Nasution responded the same day with radiograms to both Sumual and Col. Sudirman, instructing them not to endanger the security of the army or the people of Makassar. At a meeting of all army and territorial commanders on the 15th of March 1957, the military governors were provisionally accepted. Nasution even agreed to form the regional military commands that Lahade and Jusuf had originally requested. The South and Southeast Sulawesi Regional Military Command was inaugurated by Nasution in Makassar on the 1st of June 1957.
But these concessions came with a structural consequence. The reorganization left Sumual without any position in Makassar. At a meeting of officers on the 4th of June 1957, disagreements broke between those from South Sulawesi and those from North Sulawesi. Sumual moved Permesta's headquarters north to Kinilow, near Tomohon. Jusuf later described the split to Sumual in plain terms: "Ven, I was just for Permesta, but you were for Permesta and war."
President Sukarno visited North Sulawesi on the 27th of September 1957 for two days, giving speeches about national unity in Manado, Tomohon, and Tondano. The crowds that received him also carried banners supporting Sumual and Permesta. Earlier that month, on the 10th-the 14th of September, a National Conference had convened to address tensions between the regions and the capital, covering problems in government, the economy, the military, and even the strained relationship between Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta. A seven-member committee was formed to carry the work forward, and a National Development Conference followed in November 1957.
Juanda's government had sent four senior Minahasan officials to meet Sumual in July 1957. After meeting with Sumual on the 23rd of July 1957, the delegation announced an agreement that included the recognition of new autonomous provinces in eastern Indonesia, including a province of North Sulawesi, and the establishment of a university there. These were real concessions. But none of the conferences ultimately produced an agreement that all parties could accept, and negotiations gave way to a harder path.
Sumual met rebel leaders from Sumatra in Palembang during the same month as the September conference. Lt. Col. Ahmad Husein led the Banteng Council in West Sumatra, and Lt. Col. Barlian had formed the Garuda Council in South Sumatra. The three signed the Palembang Agreement Charter, demanding restoration of the Sukarno-Hatta partnership, decentralization of state authority, and a prohibition on communism. The Sumatran and eastern Indonesian rebellions were converging.
On the 10th of February 1958, Husein announced a charter giving the central government five days to comply with its demands or face consequences. When the deadline passed, a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, the PRRI, was declared in Padang on the 15th of February 1958. Its cabinet included Sjafruddin Prawiranegara as Prime Minister, with posts distributed among Sumatran and Permesta figures. Warouw was appointed Minister of Development, Lahade Minister of Information, and Mochtar Lintang Minister of Religion. Sumual was named Commander of the PRRI Army. He acknowledged the appointments but had not approved them in advance.
The very next day, the 16th of February 1958, a rally at the Sario field in Manado pressed Somba to choose sides. His staff, including Maj. Jan Willem Gerungan, Abe Mantiri, and Capt. Lendy Tumbelaka, urged him to cut ties with Jakarta. Sumual was still abroad in Manila. Somba sided with the crowd. He was dishonorably discharged by the army after his statement. Sumual and Lahade followed on the 1st of March 1958.
The response in Makassar was different. South Sulawesi Permesta signatories including Jusuf, Mattalatta, and Pangerang moved back to the government side. On the 27th of May 1958, Lahade and Lintang were arrested after fleeing Makassar. They were held in Makassar until September 1957, then moved to Denpasar in Bali and then to Madiun in East Java, where they remained until 1962.
During 1957, the United States grew concerned about the rising influence of the Indonesian Communist Party. In January 1958, the CIA began building covert support networks for the PRRI and Permesta. Meetings between CIA officers and Sumual, as well as Nun Pantouw, who managed the bartering of copra from Sulawesi to overseas buyers, took place several times in Singapore and Manila. When the AURI bombed Manado's radio station at 8:15 am on the 22nd of February 1958 with two B-25 Mitchell bombers, Sumual chartered a Consolidated PBY Catalina and rushed back. He was greeted at the plane by Brig. Gen. Pelagio Cruz of Philippine national intelligence, who told him that cargo loaded at the rear could be considered "American goodwill." That cargo was six M2 Browning .50 caliber machine guns.
CIA support escalated to aircraft. The Revolutionary Air Force, the AUREV, was formed and equipped with 15 B-26 Invader bombers and P-51 Mustang fighters. The CIA also sent pilots, mechanics, and spare parts. Taiwan separately sent weapons and two Beech C-45 transport planes with three chartered pilots, though Permesta had to pay for these. An early Taiwan shipment arrived by PBY Catalina and included 100 rifles and three M20 recoilless rifles; a subsequent ship delivered enough weapons for several battalions plus anti-aircraft guns. Foreign personnel ultimately included CIA agents and mercenaries from Taiwan, the Philippines, Poland, and the United States.
The AUREV struck cities across Sulawesi and Maluku, including Ambon, Balikpapan, Makassar, Palu, and Ternate. On the 28th of April 1958, attacks on ports at Donggala and Balikpapan sank four ships: the SS Flying Lark, SS Aquila, SS Armonia at Donggala, and the SS San Flaviano at Balikpapan. The Indonesian Navy corvette RI Hang Tuah was also sunk, killing 18 crew members and seriously injuring 28 more. The warship had just left Balikpapan for East Java when it was struck.
On the 18th of May 1958, CIA pilot Allen Pope and radio operator Harry Rantung departed from Mapanget in a B-26 bound for Ambon. After bombing the runway, Pope spotted the ALRI fleet and targeted the transport ship RI Sewaga. He did not notice that a P-51 piloted by Capt. Ignatius Dewanto was closing behind him. Dewanto's shots damaged the starboard wing. Fire from the ships struck the bottom of the plane. The B-26 caught fire. Pope told Rantung to jump, then jumped himself; his leg struck the tail of the aircraft on the way out. Both men descended by parachute and landed on the edge of Hatata Island west of Ambon, where local residents and marines from RI Sewaga, led by Lt. Col. Huhnholz, found them.
Two days after Pope was captured, CIA personnel at Mapanget received orders from the Philippines to withdraw from Manado. The Indonesian government's official statement about Pope was not released until the 27th of May 1958. His capture ended the period of AUREV air supremacy. Before he was shot down, the United States had already begun reassessing its position. American officials concluded that senior TNI officers, including Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani, were reliable opponents of the communist movement and that backing the central government in Jakarta was consistent with US interests. At a seminar on Permesta at the University of Indonesia in 1991, Sumual told attendees that the United States had helped Permesta to secure its own interests, and that when it switched to helping the Jakarta generals, that too was to secure its own interests.
Manado fell on the 24th of June 1958 after eight days of fierce resistance in which Permesta troops fought with heavy machine guns and 60 mm mortars. Warouw ordered the evacuation of the city and Permesta's headquarters moved to Tomohon. Tondano, the second largest city in Minahasa, was not taken by TNI troops until the 21st of July 1958. Tomohon held until the 16th of August 1958, when a local Permesta commander named Maj. Eddy Mongdong contacted the TNI troops in Tondano and offered to surrender with 1,500 soldiers under him. Langowan and Kalawiran fell a few days later on the 20th of August 1958.
The Permesta resistance continued at a guerrilla scale for nearly three years. Between the 17th and the 19th of February 1959, a large coordinated attack called Operation Jakarta Special struck simultaneously at Amurang, Kawangkoan, Langowan, and Tondano. The attacks nearly repelled the TNI in several locations but cost around 100 Permesta soldiers their lives. Internal cohesion also crumbled. In April 1960, Warouw was captured by Jan Timbuleng, a former rebel who had surrendered in March 1957 and been folded into Permesta. Timbuleng was then detained by Sumual, but Timbuleng had instructed his men to execute Warouw if that happened. Warouw was killed sometime in October 1960. Warouw had been the usual mediator between Kawilarang and Sumual; his death deepened suspicion across the Permesta camp.
Peace negotiations were pursued simultaneously by church leader Albertus Zacharias Roentoerambi Wenas, chairman of the Christian Evangelical Church in Minahasa, and by Frits Johannes Tumbelaka, a former TT-V/Brawijaya officer. On the 15th of March 1960, Tumbelaka met Somba in the village of Matungkas near Airmadidi, starting a negotiation process that ran through the end of 1960. The central government signaled seriousness: a presidential decree announced the division of Sulawesi into new provinces, and Nasution broadcast a speech on Radio Republik Indonesia about the importance of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila.
The first formal surrender came on the 15th of February 1961 in Langowan, where the Manguni Brigade under Laurens Saerang laid down arms in a military ceremony attended by Maj. Gen. Ahmad Yani. Somba's own surrender took place on the 4th of April 1961, marked by his signing of a statement with the commander of Kodam XIII/Merdeka in the village of Malenos near Amurang. Kawilarang surrendered near Tomohon on the 14th of April 1961, in a ceremony attended also by the US Embassy military attaché Col. George Benson. Sumual held out until the 20th of October 1961, after the President of the United Republic of Indonesia announced the end of hostilities. Presidential Decree No. 322 of 1961, issued on the 22nd of June 1961, formally granted amnesty to those who had responded to the government's call. Sumual received amnesty but remained imprisoned until Suharto took power.
Continue Browsing
Common questions
What was the Permesta movement in Indonesia?
Permesta was a rebel movement founded on the 2nd of March 1957 by civil and military leaders in eastern Indonesia. Its name is a syllabic abbreviation of Perjuangan Semesta, meaning Universal Struggle Charter. The movement demanded greater regional autonomy and a fairer distribution of government revenue, and explicitly stated it was not seeking to break away from Indonesia.
Who founded Permesta and where was it proclaimed?
Permesta was proclaimed by Lt. Col. Ventje Sumual at the governor's residence in Makassar at 3:00 am on the 2nd of March 1957, in front of approximately 50 attendees. Sumual declared a state of war across the entire territory of eastern Indonesia and Lt. Col. Muhammad Saleh Lahade read the Universal Struggle Charter aloud.
Did the CIA support the Permesta rebels?
Yes. Beginning in January 1958, the CIA developed covert support networks for Permesta and the PRRI rebels. Support included six M2 Browning .50 caliber machine guns, 15 B-26 Invader bombers, P-51 Mustang fighters, pilots, mechanics, and spare parts. Foreign personnel included CIA agents and mercenaries from Taiwan, the Philippines, Poland, and the United States.
Who was Allen Pope and why was his capture significant?
Allen Pope was a CIA pilot flying for Permesta's Revolutionary Air Force. He was shot down on the 18th of May 1958 over Ambon by Capt. Ignatius Dewanto after attacking an Indonesian naval transport ship. His capture exposed US covert involvement in the rebellion and coincided with a shift in US policy toward supporting the central Indonesian government instead.
When did the Permesta rebellion end and how many people died?
The last Permesta leader, Sumual, surrendered on the 20th of October 1961. Presidential Decree No. 322 of 1961, issued on the 22nd of June 1961, formally granted amnesty. The conflict killed 4,000 government soldiers and 2,000 Permesta rebels.
What relationship did Permesta have with the PRRI rebellion?
On the 17th of February 1958, Permesta formally joined forces with the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, known as the PRRI, which had declared itself in Padang on the 15th of February 1958. Permesta leaders including Sumual, Warouw, and Lahade received cabinet posts in the PRRI government. After government forces defeated the PRRI in Sumatra, military operations shifted east to the Permesta stronghold in North Sulawesi.
All sources
5 references cited across the entry
- 1bookGerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah (GPST di POSO 1957-1963: Perjuangan anti Permesta dan pembentukakn Provinsi Sulawesi TengahHaliadi Sadi et al. — Ombak — 2007
- 3bookSukarno, tentara, PKI: Segitiga kekuasaan sebelum prahara politik, 1961-1965Rosihan Anwar — Yayasan Obor Indonesia — 2006
- 5webLeo Wattimena:Si Gila Kebanggaan AURISitompul Martin — 2020-10-27