White flight
White flight is the name given to a pattern that reshaped American cities, African nations, and European suburbs alike: the large-scale departure of white residents from areas growing more racially and ethnically diverse. The term entered popular use in the 1950s and 1960s, when observers began noticing that cities such as Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, and Oakland were losing white middle-class residents faster than simple economics could explain. Yet the phrase itself carries a contested history stretching back more than a century. In 1870, The Nation reported that Louisiana's emigration commissioners estimated white departures from the Southern Atlantic States, Alabama, and Mississippi into the tens of thousands. By the 1880s, political writers were already treating "white exodus" as a recognized social phenomenon with its own dramatic vocabulary.
What actually drove those departures? Was it fear, prejudice, economics, or something built into the structure of cities and suburbs themselves? The answers turn out to be far more complicated than a single motive, and they span continents. Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling spent years building mathematical models to show that even people who prefer integrated neighborhoods can produce almost complete segregation through the accumulation of individual small decisions. Historian Amanda Seligman, studying the West Side of Chicago after the Second World War, found that white residents did not simply flee; many first defended their space with violence, intimidation, and legal tactics. Princeton economist Leah Boustan placed both racism and economic calculation at the root of the flight. Meanwhile, in post-apartheid South Africa, roughly 800,000 out of a white population that once numbered 5.2 million left after 1995, citing violent crime and political conditions. In Rhodesia, a colorful local vocabulary grew up around the departures: those who left were said to be taking the "chicken run", a phrase coined contemptuously by the whites who stayed.
The phrase "white flight" arrived in print long before sociologists gave it academic standing. An 1894 biography of abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison used "white exodus" to describe Northerners moving south in the tense years before the Civil War. By the early 20th century, newspapers in the Union of South Africa were writing about the "spectre of white flight" as Afrikaners sailed from Durban toward Britain and Australia.
For decades after those early appearances, the concept resisted quantification. Before the 1950 US census, the migration of disproportionate numbers of white residents from cities to suburbs was easily dismissed as anecdotal. Urban populations were still growing overall, so a relative decline in one racial group was hard to isolate. The US Census Bureau's original processing of the 1950 data, run on older tabulation machines, failed to produce statistically acceptable proof. It took a rigorous reprocessing of the same raw data on a UNIVAC I, led by Donald J. Bogue of the Scripps Foundation and Emerson Seim of the University of Chicago, to put the reality of white flight beyond dispute. Seim also developed new statistical methods specifically designed to cut through a confounding variable: many cities had responded to the loss of a wealthier tax base by annexing their new suburbs, which meant that families who had left the inner city were not even being counted as having moved.
Academic skepticism about the term persists. Historian Amanda Seligman's study of post-war Chicago argued that "white flight" misleadingly implies white residents vanished the moment black families arrived, when the actual sequence was often prolonged and violent. Researcher Ludi Simpson has contended that population shifts in Britain reflect counter-urbanisation rather than racial flight, with white and non-white Britons of similar economic standing equally likely to leave mixed-race inner-city areas. Political scientist Morton Grodzins named the underlying mechanism in 1958: once the proportion of non-white residents exceeded what he called a neighborhood's "tolerance for interracial living", whites moved out, and he coined the term "tipping point" to describe that threshold.
In 1969, Thomas Schelling published a paper titled "Models of Segregation" that would become one of the most cited works in the social sciences. Using a "checkerboard model" and careful mathematical analysis, Schelling showed that even when every individual in a simulated population prefers to live in a mixed-race neighborhood, nearly complete segregation emerges as an outcome of those same individuals' private choices accumulating over time.
Schelling's complementary "tipping model" mapped the mechanism precisely. Residents of an ethnic group tolerate some mixing in their neighborhood and do not move as long as the share of other groups stays below their personal threshold. Once enough members of the majority group with the lowest tolerance for diversity leave and are replaced by residents of another group, the overall level of mixing rises. That rise then exceeds the departure threshold for a second, slightly more tolerant group. The cascade continues until the neighborhood has turned over almost completely. The tipping point, in Schelling's framing, is the visible end of a domino effect that began the moment the most segregation-sensitive residents crossed their private threshold.
Research in the 1980s and 1990s put some real numbers around these abstract models. Studies showed that black residents at that time said they were comfortable in neighborhoods with a 50/50 ethnic split. White residents also expressed willingness to live in integrated settings, but they preferred proportions in which whites were the majority. Despite stated preferences for integration, the majority of both groups continued to live in largely segregated neighborhoods. A 2018 Indiana University study of 27,891 US Census tracts found that between 2000 and 2010, 3,252 of those tracts experienced white flight as defined by the researchers. The affected areas lost an average of 40 percent of their original white population. The study, published in Social Science Research, also found that white flight was systematically more likely in middle-class neighborhoods than in poorer ones, and that it was more pronounced as the threshold of black, Hispanic, and Asian population presence increased.
The physical redesign of American cities after the Second World War created the material conditions for white flight on a scale no individual prejudice alone could have produced. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, low-cost mortgages available through the GI Bill, and residential redlining worked together to enable white families to leave inner cities while simultaneously blocking most ethnic minorities from following them to the suburbs.
In the 1930s, states outside the South had practiced unofficial segregation through exclusionary covenants in property deeds and redlining, which was explicit, legally sanctioned discrimination in mortgage lending. Black buyers were effectively barred from homeownership even when they could afford it. Federally guaranteed mortgages through the Veterans Administration, the Federal Housing Administration, and the Home Owners Loan Corporation were available only to white buyers purchasing new houses. The Supreme Court ruled in 1948 that racially restrictive covenants could not constitutionally be enforced by states, but the lending structures persisted in practice.
The Interstate Highway System did more than move commuters. In the Southern United States, local governments used highway construction to deliberately divide and isolate black neighborhoods from goods and services, often routing roads through industrial corridors. In Birmingham, Alabama, the highway system was used to reinforce racial residence boundaries first drawn by a 1926 racial zoning law. Running freeways through majority-black neighborhoods eventually reduced those communities to their poorest residents, those who lacked the financial means to relocate.
The real estate practice known as blockbusting turned these structural pressures into profit. Agents would arrange for a black family to buy a house in a white neighborhood, sometimes by purchasing it themselves or using a white proxy buyer. Alarmed white residents, often nudged by agents and local news coverage predicting falling property values, would sell quickly and at a loss. The agents then collected commissions from both the panicked sellers and the incoming buyers, profiting through arbitrage. Through this mechanism, entire neighborhoods changed their racial composition within a few years. New suburban municipalities beyond the old city limits then used restrictive zoning to prevent low-income and non-white residents from following, while the federal government withheld maintenance capital mortgages from inner-city communities, hastening the decay that justified the departure.
The 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education declared racially segregated public schools unconstitutional, overturning the "separate but equal" doctrine established by Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. In many parts of the South, white parents responded with organized resistance. Between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s, so-called segregation academies, typically private religious schools, spread across the South as a way to keep children out of racially mixed classrooms.
The numbers from Baltimore illustrate the speed of the shift. Upon desegregation in 1957, Clifton Park Junior High School had 2,023 white students and 34 black students. Ten years later, the same school had twelve white students and 2,037 black students. At Garrison Junior High School in northwest Baltimore, the white student body fell from 2,504 to 297 over the same period, while black enrollment rose from twelve to 1,263. The school shifts coincided with a broader loss of working-class jobs as heavy industry restructured across the city.
In 1971, the Supreme Court's ruling in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education ordered busing: poor black students would ride to suburban white schools and suburban white students would be sent into the city to achieve integration. The backlash accelerated departures. The 1977 federal ruling in Penick v. The Columbus Board of Education had a similar effect in Columbus, Ohio. Justice William Douglas, dissenting in the 1974 Milliken v. Bradley case about Detroit, noted bluntly that "the inner core of Detroit is now rather solidly black; and the blacks, we know, in many instances are likely to be poorer."
Pasadena, California illustrates what researchers called "cultural" white flight: families who could afford it withdrew children from the public system entirely rather than moving to a different neighborhood. When a California federal court ordered Pasadena Unified School District desegregated in 1970, white students made up 54 percent of enrollment, closely matching the district's 53 percent white population. After desegregation took effect, affluent white families shifted to private schools. By 2004, Pasadena had 63 private schools educating roughly 33 percent of all schoolchildren in the area, while white students had fallen to just 16 percent of the public school population.
The departures from Rhodesia unfolded under conditions that had no parallel in North America or Europe: an ongoing guerrilla war, international sanctions, and a white minority population that was itself largely immigrant rather than multigenerational. In 1969, only 41 percent of Rhodesia's white community were natural-born citizens, totaling 93,600 people. The remainder held naturalised European or South African citizenship, or were expatriates with dual citizenship.
During the Rhodesian Bush War, almost every white male between the ages of eighteen and fifty-eight faced military commitments. Men spent up to five or six months of each year on combat duty, away from careers in the civil service, commerce, industry, or agriculture. State media in November 1963 identified the chief reasons for emigration as uncertainty about the future, economic decline driven by embargo and war, and the burden of national service, which it called "the overriding factor causing people to leave". About half of the male emigrants in 1976 fell into the fifteen to thirty-nine age bracket.
Between 1960 and 1976, a striking symmetry emerged: 160,182 whites arrived in the country while 157,724 departed. The churn suppressed the property market, slumped the construction industry, and reduced retail sales. White Rhodesia's population peaked at 278,000 in 1975. By 1976, around 14,000 whites left in a single year, making it the first year since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 that outflows exceeded inflows. Most went to South Africa. Those who stayed coined the phrase "chicken run" to describe the departure, an expression recorded in print the following year and used with contempt. "Taking the gap" and "gapping it" served as synonyms. As the flow continued and attitudes shifted, a third phrase entered use: "owl run", signalling that those who left had simply made the wise choice.
The establishment of the Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980 ended white political power, and emigration peaked between 1980 and 1982 at 53,000 persons, with observers citing the breakdown of law and order, rising rural crime, and the attitude of Zimbabwean officials. Between 1982 and 2000, Zimbabwe registered a net loss of 100,000 whites, averaging 5,000 departures per year. A second wave followed President Robert Mugabe's violent land reform programme after 2000, with emigrants heading mainly to South Africa and Australia. Among those who settled in the United States, 53.7 percent held a bachelor's degree and only 2 percent had not completed secondary school. Most had held technical or supervisory positions. Because black workers had not entered apprenticeship and training programs in large numbers until the 1970s, few were positioned to replace their white colleagues in the skilled roles they vacated during the 1980s.
In Britain, the pattern of white residents moving out as immigrant populations moved in has deep roots. For centuries, London received successive waves of European refugees; as each group settled into a neighborhood, earlier residents relocated, and new arrivals filled the space. A 2004 study based on UK census data from the London School of Economics documented the modern version: white population losses in London, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, and Greater Manchester between 1991 and 2001 were largest in exactly the areas with the highest concentrations of ethnic minorities. By the 2001 census, the London boroughs of Newham and Brent had become the first areas in Britain with non-white majorities. The 2011 census found that less than half of London's overall population were white British, and that in some London neighborhoods the white British share had fallen below 20 percent.
In Sweden, researcher Emma Neuman at Linnaeus University identified a specific trigger: the phenomenon begins when the fraction of non-European immigrants in a neighborhood reaches 3-4 percent. European immigration carries no such effect. High earners and the highly educated leave first, meaning that racial segregation in Swedish neighborhoods quickly becomes class segregation as well. Detailed analysis of data from the 1990s onward found that concentration of immigrants in districts such as Husby in Stockholm and Rosengård in Malmö was primarily caused not by where immigrants settled but by where native-born residents chose to leave.
A study of mothers in Örebro found that women who openly valued ethnic diversity as an enriching factor still chose schools and neighborhoods with robust Swedish majorities when it came to their own children. Their stated reason was that they did not want their children to be a minority in their school environment, and they were concerned about language acquisition. Copenhagen presented a specific numerical threshold: a school's immigrant proportion below 35 percent did not affect Danish parents' school choices. Above that level, parents were far more likely to enroll children elsewhere. In the Groruddalen borough of Oslo, over thirteen years a total of 18,000 ethnic Norwegians moved out. In 2010, the Norwegian public broadcaster Dagsrevyen described Oslo as "a racially divided city" where racial segregation begins in kindergarten.
Urban decay is the sociological term for the process by which a city or district falls into disrepair: depopulation, abandoned buildings, high unemployment, poverty, fragmented families, political disenfranchisement, rising crime, and a deteriorating physical environment. White flight contributed to this cycle directly by draining the tax base as middle-class residents departed. Abandoned properties attracted criminal activity and street gangs, which in turn reinforced the conditions that had prompted the earlier departures.
Studies of the 1960s and 1970s suggest that rising crime rates were among the factors pushing white households to the suburbs. Samuel Kye's 2018 research cited multiple earlier studies identifying crime and neighborhood deterioration, rather than racial prejudice alone, as robust determinants. Ellen and O'Regan's 2010 research found that lower crime rates in city centers were associated with reduced out-migration to suburbs, though lower crime did not appear to draw new households back in.
New suburban municipalities incorporated specifically to avoid the costs of maintaining older city infrastructure, spending their tax revenues instead on building new suburban systems. Wisconsin provided a clear case: Milwaukee's then-mayor Frank Zeidler complained in the post-war decade about what he called the "Iron Ring", a belt of new municipalities incorporated to avoid annexation by Milwaukee. Semi-rural communities including Oak Creek, South Milwaukee, and Franklin formally incorporated as separate entities. Wisconsin state law allowed Milwaukee to annex rural and suburban areas that did not meet the legal standards for discrete incorporation, but those that did meet the threshold escaped.
White flight in North America began to reverse in the 1990s, when wealthier residents returned to cities and began gentrifying neighborhoods that had experienced decades of decay. In Brampton, Ontario, the white population fell from 192,400 in 2001 to 169,230 in 2011, and by 2018 hovered around 151,000, even as the overall city population rose by 60 percent over the same decade, illustrating that the phenomenon had spread well beyond the American context that gave it its name.
Common questions
What does white flight mean and where did the term originate?
White flight refers to the large-scale migration of white people from areas becoming more racially or ethnically diverse to more homogenous suburban or exurban regions. The term became widely popular in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, though earlier versions such as "white exodus" appear in print as far back as an 1870 issue of The Nation.
What was Thomas Schelling's contribution to the study of white flight?
In 1969, Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling published "Models of Segregation", demonstrating through a checkerboard model and mathematical analysis that even when every individual prefers a mixed-race neighborhood, nearly complete segregation emerges from the accumulation of individual decisions. His complementary tipping model showed that departures accelerate in a domino effect once the most segregation-sensitive residents cross their personal tolerance threshold.
How did US government policies contribute to white flight after World War II?
Federally guaranteed mortgages through the Veterans Administration, the Federal Housing Administration, and the Home Owners Loan Corporation were available only to white buyers of new suburban homes, while redlining blocked black buyers from the same opportunities. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 further enabled suburban expansion, and in some Southern cities local governments deliberately routed highways through majority-black neighborhoods, destroying communities and dispersing residents.
What happened to white Rhodesians and how many left Zimbabwe?
White Rhodesians peaked at 278,000 in 1975 and began departing rapidly as the Bush War intensified. Between 1980 and 1982 alone, 53,000 whites emigrated following the establishment of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Between 1982 and 2000, Zimbabwe registered a net loss of 100,000 whites, averaging 5,000 departures per year, with a second wave following President Robert Mugabe's land reform programme after 2000.
How did school desegregation drive white flight in the United States?
Following the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling, many white families removed their children from public schools. In Baltimore, Clifton Park Junior High went from 2,023 white students and 34 black students in 1957 to just twelve white students and 2,037 black students ten years later. By 2004, Pasadena had 63 private schools educating roughly 33 percent of all schoolchildren, while white students had fallen to only 16 percent of the public school population.
At what percentage of immigrants does white flight begin in Sweden and Denmark?
In Sweden, researcher Emma Neuman at Linnaeus University found that the phenomenon begins when the share of non-European immigrants in a neighborhood reaches 3-4 percent, with high earners and the highly educated moving out first. In Denmark, a study of school choice in Copenhagen found that an immigrant proportion below 35 percent in local schools did not affect Danish parents' decisions, but above that level parents were far more likely to choose other schools.
All sources
94 references cited across the entry
- 1bookThe Oxford Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile JusticeOxford University Press — 2013
- 2bookPeople and Politics in Urban America, Second EditionRobert W. Kweit — Routledge — 2015
- 3bookAfter the Dream: Black and White Southerners since 1965 (Civil Rights and Struggle)Timothy J. Minchin et al. — University Press of Kentucky — 2011
- 4magazineMichelle Obama Opens Up About the Pain of Witnessing 'White Flight' as a Child in ChicagoJosiah Bates — October 30, 2019
- 5newsMichelle Obama on white flight in Chicago: 'Y'all were running from us'Lateshia Beachum — October 30, 2019
- 6bookThe Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and SocietySAGE publications — 2008
- 7encyclopediawhite flight
- 8bookForced Justice: School Desegregation and the LawArmor, David J. — Oxford University Press US — 1986
- 9news(Almost) Out of Africa: The White TribesJoshua Hammer — May–June 2010
- 10newsMosiuoa 'Terror' Lekota threatens to topple the ANCJohnson, RW — October 19, 2008
- 11bookThe atlas of changing South AfricaChristopher, A.J. — Routledge — 2000
- 12bookThe uncertain promise of Southern AfricaIndiana Univ. Press — 2001
- 13bookTransatlantic historyTexas A&M University Press — 2006
- 14newsWhite flight from South Africa: Between staying and goingSeptember 25, 2008
- 15bookAfter Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School DesegregationClotfelter, Charles T. — Princeton University Press — 2004
- 16bookThe Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945–1980Diane Ravitch — Basic Books — 1983
- 17journalWas Postwar Suburbanization "White Flight"? Evidence from the Black Migration*L. P. Boustan — 2010
- 18bookBlock by block: neighborhoods and public policy on Chicago's West SideAmanda Seligman — University of Chicago Press — 2005
- 19newsThe Culprits behind White FlightLeah Boustan — May 15, 2017
- 20bookWhite Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern ConservatismKevin M. Kruse — Princeton University Press — 2007
- 21bookHow East New York Became a GhettoThabit, Walter — New York University Press — 2003
- 22journalRethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development in Southern CaliforniaPulido, Laura — Mar 2000
- 23newsThe Week, New York, ThursdayApril 14, 1870
- 24newsThe StatesmanWalter Thomas Mills — Statesman Publishing Company — 1888
- 25bookWilliam Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879: The Story of His Life Told by His ChildrenWendell Phillips Garrison et al. — Houghton Mifflin — 1894
- 26citationJournal of Southern African StudiesTimothy Keegan — Routledge — 2001
- 27bookWhite Flight and Urban Decay in Suburban ChicagoLindsey Haines — Illinois Wesleyan University — 2010
- 28newsRace divide in big cities widens as whites move outRichard Ford — December 8, 2004
- 29bookThe persistence of white flight in middle-class suburbiaSamuel H.Kye — Social Science Research — 2018
- 30news'White Flight' Remains a RealityTom Jacobs — March 6, 2018
- 31journalTipping and Residential Segregation: A Unified Schelling ModelJ. Zhang — 2011
- 32journalModels of segregationSchelling, T. — 1969
- 33webWe're running out of whitesZinhle Mapumulo et al.
- 34newsFleeing From South AfricaJohnson, Scott — February 14, 2009
- 35bookZimbabwe, a Country StudyDepartment of the Army, American University — 1983
- 36bookWe are everywhere: Narratives from Rhodesian guerillasMichael Raeburn
- 37bookThe Great BetrayalSmith, Ian — Blake Publishing Ltd. — 1997
- 38bookLabor and Health Economics in the Mediterranean Region: Migration and Mobility of Medical DoctorsDriouchi, Ahmed — IGI Global — 2014
- 39journalSchool Choice, Universal Vouchers and Native Flight from Local SchoolsB. S. Rangvid — 2009
- 41bookYhteiskuntapolitiikka2013
- 43newsReport finds evidence of 'white flight' from immigrants in northwest DublinOctober 19, 2007
- 44webOla og Kari flytter fra innvandrerneAndreas Slettholm — 15 December 2009
- 45webRømmer til hvitere skolerJo Moen Bredeveien — June 2, 2009
- 46webForeldre flytter barna til 'hvitere' skolerHilde Lundgaard — August 22, 2009
- 47webOla og Kari flytter fra innvandrerneAndreas Slettholm — December 15, 2009
- 48newsNoen barn er bruneJanuary 15, 2010
- 49newsEt stort flertall av barna er bruneGunnar Ringheim et al. — January 14, 2010
- 50harvnbAndersson (2007) p. 64Andersson — 2007
- 51harvnbAndersson (2007) p. 68Andersson — 2007
- 52harvnbAndersson (2007) p. 74–75Andersson — 2007
- 53journal'White flight'? The production and reproduction of immigrant concentration areas in Swedish cities, 1990–2000Åsa Bråmå — 2006
- 55bookLondon: A Social HistoryPorter, Roy — Harvard University Press — 1994
- 56newsCensus 2001: Ethnicity
- 57newsWhites 'leaving cities as migrants move in'Johnston, Philip — February 10, 2005
- 58newsThe invention of Essex: how a county became a caricatureJune 27, 2019
- 59newsWhite flight? Britain's new problem—segregationDavid Goodhart — January 23, 2013
- 60newsSo who's right over segregation?Dominic Casciani — September 4, 2006
- 61newsBrampton suffers identity crisis as newcomers swell city's populationSan Grewal — May 24, 2013
- 62newsHow Brampton, a town in suburban Ontario, was dubbed a ghettoNoreen Ahmed-Ullah — June 3, 2016
- 63news'Everybody fits in': inside the Canadian cities where minorities are the majoritySadiya Ansari — September 4, 2018
- 64newsLondon, Toronto, Vancouver undergoing "unconscious segregation"Douglas Todd — November 23, 2014
- 65newsChanging Face of Western Cities: Migration Within U.S. Makes Whites a Minority in 3 More AreasAnushka Asthana — August 21, 2006
- 66journalResidential Security, Risk, and Race: The Home Owners' Loan Corporation and Mortgage Access in Two CitiesKristen Crossney — December 1, 2005
- 67web2006 Housing Policy DebateCrossney et al.
- 69journalLocational Dimensions of Urban Highway Impact: An Empirical AnalysisWheeler, James O. — 1976
- 70journalFrom Racial Zoning to Community Empowerment: The Interstate Highway System and the African American Community in Birmingham, AlabamaC. E. Connerly — December 1, 2002
- 71bookThe Race Card: How Bluffing about Bias Makes Race Relations WorseRichard Thompson Ford — Farrar, Straus and Giroux — 2008
- 72encyclopediaBlockbustingHirsch, Arnold R.
- 73bookUrban Sores: On the Interaction Between Segregation, Urban Decay, and Deprived NeighbourhoodsHans Skifter Andersen — Ashgate — 2003
- 74bookComeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood RevivalProscio, Tony — Westview Press — 2000
- 75bookWhen Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban PoorWilliam Julius Wilson — Vintage Books — 1997
- 76newsMayor served 'the public welfare': Longtime city icon known for integrity, energy, principles]Borsuk, by Alan J. — July 8, 2006
- 77journalGoverning the Regimeless City: The Frank Zeidler Administration in Milwaukee, 1948-1960J. Rast — September 1, 2006
- 78journalInfra-Metropolitan CompetitionCurran, Donald J. Curran — February 1964
- 80webFrom the Old Order to the New Order–Reasons and Results, 1957-1997Baltimore City Public School System
- 81journalDesegregation Rulings and Public Attitude Changes: White Resistance or Resignation?Jacobson, Cardell K. — 1978
- 82newsRacism alive and well in S.F. schools – here's proofNevius, C.W. — September 9, 2007
- 83webTackling Local Resistance to Public SchoolsRyan, John
- 84journalCrime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for CitiesJulie Berry Cullen et al. — May 1, 1999
- 85journalWas Postwar Suburbanization "White Flight"? Evidence from the Black Migration*Leah Platt Boustan — February 1, 2010
- 86journalThe persistence of white flight in middle-class suburbiaSamuel H. Kye — May 1, 2018
- 87journalCrime and urban flight revisited: The effect of the 1990s drop in crime on citiesIngrid Gould Ellen et al. — November 1, 2010
- 89web'White flight' from Aussie public schoolsMarch 10, 2008
- 90newsNSW Labor leader apologises for 'white flight' migration commentsMay 24, 2018
- 91webLuke Foley blasted for 'white flight' commentsMay 23, 2018
- 92newsLuke Foley apologises for 'white flight' comment, saying he now knows it's offensiveAnne Davies — May 24, 2018
- 93newsClaim of 'white flight' from low decile schoolsGarret-Walker, Hana — June 18, 2012
- 94webSome parents stereotyping pupils – principalsRadio New Zealand — June 19, 2012
- 95news'White flight' threatens schoolCollins, Simon — July 24, 2006