Russian Armed Forces

• 1. Post-Soviet Formation And Early Struggles

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  On the 25th of December 1991, the Soviet Union officially dissolved, leaving a military machine in chaos. Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov worked to create unified forces for the Commonwealth of Independent States, but President Boris Yeltsin established the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in May 1992 instead. By June 1993, the pretense of CIS armed forces ended when Russia refused funding, and Shaposhnikov resigned as commander-in-chief. The new Russian government inherited a massive force that shrank from 2.7 million personnel in 1992 to just over one million by 2000. During this period, the Ground Forces were cut by two-thirds, dropping from 1.4 million to 348,000 soldiers. Economic collapse meant entire units moved piecemeal to Russia without proper accommodations, leading to severe discipline issues. Crime and hazing became common among conscripts, causing many officers and sergeants to leave the service. Equipment maintenance and training drastically declined, with no exercises above division level held since 1992 until the late 1990s. Annual flight hours for pilots dropped to 25, far less than NATO standards. This decline was starkly visible during the First Chechen War from 1994 to 1996, where the military failed to subdue separatists in Russia's North Caucasus region.

• 2. Serdyukov Reforms And Modernization Efforts

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  In October 2008, Anatoly Serdyukov launched the New Look reform alongside Chief of the General Staff General Nikolai Makarov. These changes are described as the most radical shifts in Russian military history since the creation of the Red Army in 1918. The reforms aimed to transform a conventional mobilization army into a permanently combat-ready force. Previous attempts at major restructuring had been largely undermined, but this initiative merged the Air Defence Forces with the Air Force and abolished most divisions in favor of separate maneuver brigades. These new brigades were intended to be fully manned and equipped with modernized or new equipment. Four new military districts replaced nine older ones, giving them a combat command role alongside their support functions. Multiple logistical support arms were consolidated under one command called Logistical Support of the Russian Armed Forces. Battalion tactical groups were established, fully manned by enlisted soldiers, though for every two such battalions, one remained manned by conscripts. Rearmament efforts began after 2008, prioritizing research and development over immediate procurement. Despite these structural changes, corruption remained a significant impediment to success. By 2012, when Sergey Shoigu took office, some controversial aspects of the reform were dismantled, including the restoration of famed divisions like the Tamanskaya and Kantemirovskaya.

• 3. Global Power Projection In Syria And Ukraine

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  In August 2015, an agreement was signed allowing Russia to use Khmeimim Air Base and Tartus naval base for operations in Syria. Starting from September, aircraft and warships began arriving to assist Syrian Arab Armed Forces in offensives across Hama, Homs, and Aleppo regions. By March 2016, Russian forces helped retake Palmyra from ISIS, followed by a major campaign against insurgents up to the Euphrates river valley until late 2017. Over 48,000 personnel had been deployed to Syria by 2017, with 90 percent of Aerospace Forces pilots rotating through there before a drawdown announced in November 2017. The intervention allowed testing of new equipment and command systems, including the first combat use of the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. However, Russia faced accusations of war crimes, such as double-tap strikes on markets in Maarat al-Numan that killed at least 43 civilians including four children. On the 24th of February 2022, President Vladimir Putin gave the execute order for the invasion of Ukraine. Five strategic directions were assigned: Kyiv for the Eastern Group, Brovary for the Central group, Poltava for the Western group, and Mariupol plus Kherson for the Southern Group. After the Kyiv offensive was abandoned in March 2022, attacks shifted southeast toward Donetsk Oblast. General Aleksandr Dvornikov assumed field command in April 2022, while a separate Joint Group of Forces was established in October 2022. By July 2022, severe casualties forced changes, including positioning ammunition near civilian structures to counter Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.

• 4. Command Structure And Military Districts

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  The Ministry of Defense serves as the administrative body responsible for readiness, manpower, and procurement under presidential directives. The General Staff studies threats and develops defense plans, holding operational command over all forces alongside long-term planning duties. In 2014, the National Defense Management Center opened in Moscow as a key component of the command system. Unlike U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Russian General Staff has inspector general-like powers within its structure. Five military districts now exist: Moscow, Leningrad, Southern, Central, and Eastern. These replaced four districts formed in 2010 from six older ones, which themselves condensed eight original Soviet-era districts. Each district functions as a joint operational-strategic command comparable to U.S. geographic unified combatant commands. They oversee permanent forces from each branch and attach Airborne Forces or other arms when needed. At the start of the 2022 war, these districts formed groups of forces directly linked to their headquarters. Below them lie numbered armies consisting of eleven combined arms units plus one Guards Tank Army. During the Ukraine conflict, army-level headquarters sometimes bypassed division or brigade commands to direct battalion tactical groups directly. The Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command was established in 2015 but dissolved into the Leningrad district by 2024. Military bases in Armenia, Tajikistan, and Moldova report to specific southern or western districts depending on location.

• 5. Personnel Policies And Foreign Recruitment

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  All male citizens aged 18 to 27 must perform twelve months of service under Russia's hybrid conscription system. The term was reduced from two years to eighteen months in March 2007, then to one year in January 2008. In December 2022, the maximum age for conscription rose to 30, with proposals to restore the original two-year term. Before the 2022 invasion, an estimated 900,000 active troops existed, dropping significantly after heavy losses. By June 2025, Ukrainian estimates placed Russian casualties over one million, with up to 25,000 soldiers killed monthly according to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in January 2026. To fill gaps, Russia recruited foreign nationals from across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. By October 2025, nearly 200 foreigners from 37 countries were held as prisoners of war by Ukraine. Five times more non-Russian soldiers were captured in 2024 than in 2023. Indian authorities confirmed at least 44 citizens served, while Kenyan police rescued 22 people tricked into joining in September 2025. South African men alleged deception through job scams, leading to parliamentary resignations involving family members of former leaders. Human trafficking networks sent men under false promises of civilian employment or tourism roles. Some recruits believed they would work as technicians or farmers but ended up on front lines facing combat duties.

• 6. Logistical Systems And Material Support

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  The Logistical Support service sustains armed forces using a centralized pushdown system where higher units determine supply amounts based on algorithmic calculations. No requisition process exists; instead, railway brigades and pipeline battalions move vast quantities of personnel and cargo via rail. The Railway Troops organize ten separate brigades and two battalions for construction and protection of transport lines. Departments within this system include Transportation Support, Automobiles and Tanks, and Missile and Artillery divisions. Corruption costs the military up to US$13 billion annually according to Alexander Kanshin, Chairman of Russia's Public Chamber. In 2009, defense spending reached $41.5 billion despite global financial crises causing budget slashes. By 2024, Russia spent approximately US$149 billion, over seven percent of GDP, ranking third globally behind the United States and China. Equipment maintenance suffered from embezzlement during repairs of ships like the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has been out of commission since 2018. Despite these challenges, Russia produces multiple times more ammunition than NATO combined, though its smaller economy struggles to sustain such output indefinitely. Military courts received thousands of absent-without-leave cases after mobilization began in September 2022.