Russian Ground Forces

• 1. Post-Soviet Formation And Early Struggles

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  On the 7th of May 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the Russian Ground Forces. This action created a new military structure following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The process involved withdrawing tens of thousands of personnel from former Warsaw Pact territories including Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Mongolia. Thirty-seven Soviet Ground Forces divisions had to be pulled back to Russia while four military districts were handed over to Belarus and Ukraine. The withdrawal proved extremely demanding and expensive for the new nation. Facilities in remaining Russian districts were inadequate to house the flood of returning personnel and equipment. Many units were unloaded from rail wagons directly into empty fields. The need to destroy or transfer large amounts of weaponry under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe necessitated great adjustments. A reform plan published by the Ministry of Defence newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda on the 21st of July 1992 was described as hastily put together to satisfy public demand for radical changes. General Pavel Grachev, the first Russian Minister of Defence from 1992 to 1996, broadly advertised reforms yet wished to preserve old Soviet-style Army structures with large numbers of low-strength formations.

• 2. Corruption And Personnel Crisis In The 1990s

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  Crime rates soared within the new Russian military during the chaotic transition period. The military procurator in Moscow reported a 40-percent increase in crime over six months ending September 1990, including a 41-percent rise in serious bodily injuries. Disappearances of weapons rose to rampant levels especially in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Generals directing withdrawals from Eastern Europe diverted arms, equipment, and foreign monies intended to build housing for withdrawn troops. Former commander in Germany General Matvey Burlakov and defence minister Pavel Grachev had their involvement exposed years later. They were also accused of ordering the murder of reporter Dmitry Kholodov who investigated these scandals. A 1995 study by the U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office stated that the Armed Forces were an institution increasingly defined by high levels of criminality embedded at every level. Within units rations are sold while soldiers grow hungry while fuel spare parts and equipment can be bought. Voyenkomats take bribes to arrange avoidance of service or more comfortable postings. Beyond the Russian frontier drugs were smuggled across the Tajik border by military aircraft. A senior officer General Major Alexander Perelyakin was dismissed from his post with UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Hercegovina following complaints of smuggling profiteering and corruption. In March 2011 Military Prosecutor General Sergei Fridinsky reported crimes had been increasing steadily for 18 months with 500 crimes reported in January to March alone.

• 3. Chechen Wars And Combat Performance Review

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  The First Chechen War began on the 11th of December 1994 when Russian forces entered Grozny the Chechen capital. The 131st Motor Rifle Brigade was ordered to make a swift push for the center of the city but was then virtually destroyed in Chechen ambushes. Writing some years later Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko described the Russian military performance as grossly deficient at all levels from commander-in-chief to drafted private. British academic Michael Orr assessed the Ground Forces performance as appallingly bad stating one root cause was inability to raise and deploy properly trained military force. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Hertling visited Russian barracks in 1994 finding them spartan with twenty beds lined up in large rooms similar to U.S. Army conditions during World War II. Food in mess halls was terrible while training exercises were rote demonstrations with little opportunity for maneuver or imagination. A T-80 tank crawled into by Hertling was cramped dirty and in poor repair. The formal ceasefire was signed in Dagestan town of Khasavyurt on the 31st of August 1996. The Second Chechen War began in August 1999 after Chechen militias invaded neighboring Dagestan followed quickly by four terrorist bombings across Russia. Improvements made between 1996 and 1999 meant formations were brought up to strength with replacements put through preparatory training before dispatch. Combat performance improved accordingly and large-scale opposition was crippled.

• 4. Modernization Reforms Under Serdyukov And Shoygu

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  A major reorganization began in 2007 under Minister for Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov aiming to convert all divisions into brigades and cut surplus officers. By the 1st of June 2009 half of Russian land forces had been reformed creating 85 brigades of constant combat preparedness including combined-arms missile assault and electronic warfare brigades. During General Mark Hertling's term as Commander United States Army Europe from 2011 to 2012 he visited Russia at invitation of Ground Forces Commander Colonel-General Aleksandr Streitsov. U.S. Defence Attache told Hertling that while still substantive in quantity the Ground Forces continued to decline in capability and quality. Classroom discussions were sophomoric and units went through motions of scripts with no true training value or combined arms interaction. After Sergey Shoygu took over Ministry of Defence role reforms implemented by Serdyukov were reversed. Shoygu aimed to restore trust with senior officers and integrated himself by wearing a military uniform. He ordered 750 military exercises such as Vostok 2018 which seemed to validate general direction of reform. Rearmament became important goal with target of 70 percent modernization by 2020. From 1998 to 2001 Ground Forces received almost no new equipment but Shoygu took less confrontational approach with defense industry awarding contracts primarily to domestic firms. By August 2021 Shoygu claimed Russian army had around 170 battalion tactical groups making preponderance of units deployed in war in Donbas.

• 5. The 2022 Invasion Of Ukraine And Tactical Failures

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  On the 24th of February 2022 Russian troops began invading Ukraine after deploying some 150,000 soldiers around Ukrainian border starting late 2021. During fighting tank losses were reported due to Ukrainian use of sophisticated anti-tank weapons and lack of air support. Professor Phillips O'Brien described Russian army as boxer with great right hook and glass jaw. Retired US four-star general Curtis Scaparrotti blamed confusion and poor morale among Russian soldiers for their poor performance. The 2022 Moscow Victory Day Parade was reduced by 35 percent purely in ground combat vehicles or systems featuring only 25 combat systems and 131 ground combat vehicles compared to 198 vehicles and 35 combat systems in 2021. As of the 6th of May at least 12 generals have been killed in Ukraine according to Ukrainian Ministry of Defence suggesting need to be at front lines to ensure battle plan conducted correctly. Ukraine further claims some 317 officers have been killed a third being senior command staff. United States officials estimated Russian forces lost 150,000 plus killed and wounded from the 24th of February 2022 to the 21st of January 2023 while Russian Defence Minister claimed only 5,937 personnel killed from the 24th of February to the 21st of September 2022. After 14 months of fighting Russian forces estimated to have lost over 2,000 tanks struggling to replace losses due to sanctions. In October 2023 growth of mutinies reported among troops due to large amount of losses around Avdiivka with lack of artillery food water and poor command also reported.

• 6. Manpower Dynamics And Conscription Policies

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  The Ground Forces began existence in 1992 inheriting Soviet military manpower system practically unchanged though state of rapid decay. Conscripts are male Russian citizens between ages 18 and 30 while contract soldiers can be citizen or non-citizen voluntarily signing contract with Ministry of Defense. During 1990s draft evasion skyrocketed with ten percent actually appearing when summoned. New conscripts picked up by officer from future unit usually sent by train across country. In early 2000s many junior officers did not wish to serve with more than half leaving forces early in 2002. Their morale was low because postings entirely in hands of immediate superiors and personnel department. In 2006 Ground Forces included estimated total of 360,000 persons including approximately 190,000 conscripts compared to 670,000 with 210,000 conscripts in 1995-96. By 2025 IISS estimated 550,000 soldiers including about 100,000 conscripts. From small beginnings employment of contract soldiers grew greatly within Ground Forces but recruitment declined following decade after strong start late 1990s. CIA reported 30 percent of Russian army personnel were contract servicemen at end 2005 with 178,000 serving in Ground Forces and Navy as May 2006. Since invasion start Russia reportedly recruiting between 400,000 and 500,000 contract soldiers each year according to Ministry of Defense. There is little available information on current status of women who are not conscripted though BBC stated 90,000 women in Russian Army in 2002. By 2013 there were 29,000 women serving none above rank of colonel with 3.5 percent in command posts.