Russian Air Force

• 1. Introduction

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  In the summer of 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine struck deep into Russian territory, reaching as far as an Arctic airfield and a base in Siberia, destroying rows of aircraft that Russia could not replace. The bombers lost that day - Tu-95s and Tu-22M3s - had not been manufactured since the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. According to the Financial Times, the raid wiped out around 20% of Russia's operational long-range aviation fleet in a single operation.

  The Russian Air Force, known by its Russian initials VVS, carries one of the longest institutional histories in military aviation. Officially established on the 12th of August 1912, it has survived the collapse of an empire, a revolution, a world war, a Cold War, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. How a force with that pedigree arrived at a place where its pilots were reportedly taping civilian GPS units to the dashboards of their aircraft is a question the full story of the VVS answers.

• 2. Imperial Roots to Soviet Power

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  The Imperial Russian Air Service, founded in 1912, was among the earliest military aviation forces anywhere in the world. Its early years were constrained by the demands of World War I, and the Russian Revolution of 1917 brought a complete reorganisation. Under the Soviet regime, the air service was reborn as the Red Air Fleet in 1918, which eventually became the Soviet Air Forces.

  After the Second World War, the Soviet Air Force invested heavily in modernisation. The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 jet fighter became one of the defining aircraft of the Korean War era. Through the Cold War, the force developed a portfolio that made it a constant presence in Western strategic calculations. Long-range Tu-95 bombers, capable of reaching targets across the globe, flew alongside advanced fighters like the MiG-21 and the Su-27. These aircraft became iconic representations of Soviet air power, not just weapons but symbols of a superpower's reach.

• 3. The Collapse and Its Cost

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  Boris Yeltsin signed the decree creating the Russian Ministry of Defence on the 7th of May 1992, and with it the modern Russian armed forces began to take shape from the ruins of the Soviet military. The VVS inherited vast infrastructure and a huge fleet, but almost no money to sustain either.

  The financial strain was severe enough that pilots went without wages for months at a stretch. In 1996, four MiG-31 pilots at Yelizovo in the Russian Far East went on hunger strike to demand back pay that was several months overdue. The crisis was resolved only by diverting funds meant for other unit expenses.

  Flight hours collapsed. By the 1990s, Russian pilots were achieving roughly 10% of the training hours logged by their American counterparts. A 2007 assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies found that tactical aviation pilots were flying just 20-25 hours a year. Transport pilots were doing 60 hours, and army aviation pilots 55 hours. These figures matter because combat aviation skill degrades without practice, and the gap between the VVS and Western air forces had grown wide.

  Merger negotiations between the Air Force and the former Soviet Air Defence Forces dragged on for years. President Yeltsin issued the decree combining the two forces on the 16th of July 1997. The process was immense: during 1998 alone, 580 units and formations were disbanded, 134 were reorganised, and over 600 were reassigned to new jurisdictions. The combined headcount fell from 318,000 to around 185,000. On the 29th of December 1998, the new commander-in-chief, Colonel General Anatoly Kornukov, reported to the defence minister that the consolidation had in principle been achieved.

• 4. Structural Overhaul

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  In December 2003, the aviation assets of the Russian Ground Forces - mostly helicopters - were transferred to the VVS, following the shoot-down of a Mi-26 helicopter in Chechnya on the 19th of August 2002 that killed 19 people. The reasoning was straightforward: unified command would improve coordination. In 2010, however, that decision was reversed, with Army Aviation scheduled to transfer back to the Ground Forces sometime in 2015 or 2016.

  A deeper restructuring followed the 2008 war in South Ossetia, where the VVS lost between four and seven aircraft to Georgian anti-aircraft fire. Western experts assessed the conflict as revealing serious deficiencies. Starting in early 2009, air armies were replaced by commands, and most air regiments became air bases. The trade press confirmed that the reorganisation would be complete by December 2009 and would include a 40% reduction in aircrew numbers.

  In 2009, a Russian newspaper reported that 200 of the 291 MiG-29s across all Russian air arms were deemed unsafe and would have to be permanently grounded. That would have meant removing roughly a third of Russia's total fighter force. The Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, stated that year that the VVS could run bombing missions only in daytime and still missed their targets. Major General Pavel Androsov announced that long-range bombers would be upgraded to strike within 20 meters of their targets.

  On the 1st of August 2015, the VVS was merged once more, this time with the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces and the Air Defense Troops, to form a new branch called the Russian Aerospace Forces. Lieutenant General Andrey Yudin became the first holder of the new combined command title.

• 5. Syrian Operations and Growing Controversy

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  On the 30th of September 2015, Russia launched its military intervention in Syria, beginning operations in the Homs region. Within weeks, on the 24th of November 2015, a Turkish Air Force F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24 during a bombing mission. Turkey claimed the aircraft had violated its airspace.

  Russia's air campaign in Syria lasted years. By March 2020, a United Nations Human Rights Council report described the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets by the VVS as amounting to war crimes. The Syria campaign offered the VVS its most sustained combat experience since the Soviet era, but that experience came with a cost measured in both material and international standing.

  Flight hours had recovered somewhat by this period. By August 2010, the commander-in-chief of the VVS reported that tactical aviation pilots were averaging 80 hours a year, with transport and army aviation pilots exceeding 100 hours annually. In the 2012 training year, pilots in the Western Military District averaged 125 hours, and those at the Kursk air base reached 150 hours. Transport aviation averaged 170. These improvements were real, but they would be tested severely in the years ahead.

• 6. Ukraine and the Limits of Modernisation

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  On the 24th of February 2022, the VVS deployed approximately 300 combat aircraft within range of Ukraine in support of the invasion. Within 24 hours, Ukrainian forces had reportedly destroyed several aircraft and set a Russian airbase ablaze at Millerovo.

  The VVS struggled throughout the opening phase of the campaign. By the 1st of April 2022, it had failed to achieve air supremacy. Analysis pointed to a shortage of dedicated SEAD units - those tasked with suppressing enemy air defenses - as well as a lack of precision-guided munitions. The mobility of Ukrainian air defense systems, combined with NATO sharing early warning intelligence with Ukrainian forces, compounded these problems. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence claimed at least 77 aircraft losses as of the 16th of March 2022, though independent sources could verify only 12 at that point.

  In the first six months, less than 40% of the 2,154 missiles fired hit their targets, according to an American intelligence analyst. The VVS reportedly flew over 20,000 sorties in the war's early phase, but fewer than 3,000 entered Ukrainian airspace - a figure attributed in part to fear of Ukrainian air defense systems. Reports surfaced of Russian pilots flying older aircraft with civilian GPS units taped to their dashboards.

  Russia adapted. Beginning in early 2023, the VVS deployed UMPK glide bomb kits, which converted Soviet-era unguided bombs into precision-guided munitions. These kits were fitted to FAB-250, FAB-500, and FAB-1500 bombs and allowed Su-34 bombers to release weapons from outside the range of Ukrainian air defense coverage. According to Ukrainian General Ivan Havryliuk, Russia dropped over 3,500 of these bombs on Ukrainian positions in the first part of 2024 alone.

  During the Wagner Group rebellion of 2023, the VVS lost one Il-22M Airborne Command Post - one of only 12 in the entire fleet - along with five helicopters including the Mi-35M and a KA-52. Two of the destroyed Mi-8s were the newest Mi-8MTPR-1 electronic warfare variants. UK Defense Intelligence assessed the loss of the Il-22M as a significant blow with direct consequences for the ongoing Ukraine campaign.

• 7. Operation Spider's Web

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  On the 1st of June 2025, Ukraine's Security Service struck at least two Russian airfields simultaneously: Olenya air base in the Arctic and Belaya air base in Siberia. Ukrainian sources claimed additional strikes at Diaghilev and Ivanovo air bases and reported the destruction of more than 40 Russian aircraft, including A-50 surveillance planes, Tu-95 bombers, and Tu-22M3 strike aircraft.

  The Financial Times reported that the damaged and destroyed aircraft represented around 20% of Russia's operational long-range aviation fleet. What made this particularly damaging was a production gap that stretches back decades: the Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 have not been manufactured since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia cannot simply order more of them. The Sukhoi Su-75, Russia's next-generation fighter, was listed as having a first flight expected in early 2026, while the Tupolev PAK DA stealth bomber remained in development with a first flight expected in the mid-2020s according to Russian state media. Russia's long-range aviation force is shrinking faster than any replacement program can address.