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Persecution of Uyghurs in China

Ch. 1 of 8
— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

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Persecution of Uyghurs in China

8 sections
  • Since 2014, the government of the People's Republic of China has stood accused of persecuting Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. Critics have called the persecution of Uyghurs in China an ongoing campaign of human rights abuses, and some have called it genocide. Beginning in 2017, an estimated one million or more Uyghurs were held without legal process in internment camps. Officials described these sites as "vocational education and training centers". Researchers have called it the largest mass internment of an ethnic-religious minority group since World War II. The Chinese government denies committing any human rights abuses in Xinjiang.

    Three questions run through this documentary. Who are the Uyghurs, and why did one far-western region become the focus of such a program? What do detainees, former police officers and leaked records say happened there? And how has the world judged a state that rejects the charge outright?

  • Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group native to Xinjiang, and they are distinct from the Han Chinese, the predominant ethnic group in China. Their language has around 10 million speakers and is shared with other minority groups in the region. Sunni Islam is an important part of Uyghur identity. Only the Hui outnumber Uyghurs among China's predominantly Muslim ethnicities.

    Chinese dynasties had long held parts of what is now Xinjiang, but the whole region came under Chinese rule only in the 1700s. That was when the Manchu-led Qing dynasty pushed west, also conquering Tibet and Mongolia. Xinjiang stayed on the empire's margins and briefly won independence during the Dungan Revolt of 1862-1877.

    In 1933, the Kumul Rebellion produced a breakaway First East Turkestan Republic. Warlord Sheng Shicai conquered it the following year with Soviet help. In 1944, the Ili Rebellion created a Second East Turkestan Republic, which depended on the Soviet Union until it was absorbed into the People's Republic of China in 1949.

    From the 1950s to the 1970s, Beijing sponsored a mass migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang and adopted policies meant to suppress cultural identity and religion. Independence organizations emerged with some Soviet support, and the East Turkestan People's Party was the largest of them in 1968. The 1980s under Deng Xiaoping brought cultural liberalization and a flexible national language policy, which party officials and minority groups welcomed. The government nonetheless judged it unsuccessful. From the mid-1980s, official pluralism gave way to a covert aim of assimilation, driven by geopolitical concerns. The resulting "monolingual, monocultural model" helped embed and strengthen an oppositional Uyghur identity.

    In April 1990, the People's Liberation Army suppressed the Barin uprising near Kashgar, and a large number of people died. Efforts to develop the region by exploiting its natural resources had fed ethnic tension over its lack of autonomy. Writing in 1998, political scientist Barry Sautman argued that programs to narrow inequality failed because of a "paternalistic and hierarchical approach to ethnic relations".

    In February 1997, a police roundup and the execution of suspected "separatists" during Ramadan sparked large demonstrations in the Ghulja incident. The army cracked down, and at least nine protesters died. Later that month, bus bombings in Ürümqi killed nine people and injured 68. Uyghur exile groups claimed responsibility. A bus bomb in March 1997 killed two more.

    The July 2009 Ürümqi riots left over one hundred people dead. They erupted after the Shaoguan incident, a violent dispute between Uyghur and Han Chinese factory workers. From 2009 to 2016, coordinated attacks by Uyghur separatists killed dozens of Han Chinese, including the 2011 Hotan attack and the 2014 Kunming attack. Some were orchestrated by the Turkistan Islamic Party, which the United Nations designates a terrorist organization.

    Sinologists Anna Hayes and Michael Clarke describe the government's larger goal as turning Xinjiang from a frontier region into an "integral" province of a unitary Chinese state.

  • Weiwen, meaning stability maintenance, became a watchword in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and intensified repression across the country. Some within the Party warned that fighting instability that might not even exist could set off a spiral of repression and unrest. In April 2010, after the Ürümqi riots, Zhang Chunxian replaced Wang Lequan, who had shaped religious policy in Xinjiang for 14 years. Party theorists began calling for a more monocultural society built around a single "state-race", which would let China become "a new type of superpower".

    After an attack in Yunnan Province, Xi Jinping told the politburo, "We should unite the people to build a copper and iron wall against terrorism". In April 2014, he traveled to Xinjiang and told police in Kashgar, "We must be as harsh as them, and show absolutely no mercy." A suicide bombing struck Ürümqi on the last day of his visit. A secret meeting of Party leaders in Beijing that year produced the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism, which China publicly launched in Xinjiang in May 2014.

    In 2016, there was a brief window in which Uyghurs holding passports could leave China. Many did, but they had to leave behind relatives and children who had no passports, and many of those families have never been reunited. That same year, Xinjiang's leaders began a "People's War" against the "Three Evils" of separatism, terrorism and extremism. They sent two hundred thousand party cadres to the region and launched the Civil Servant-Family Pair Up program.

    Xi was dissatisfied with the early results and replaced Zhang with Chen Quanguo in 2016. Chen oversaw the recruitment of tens of thousands of additional police officers. He had society divided into three categories: trusted, average and untrustworthy. He told subordinates to "Take this crackdown as the top project" and "to preempt the enemy, to strike at the outset".

    After a meeting with Xi in Beijing, Chen held a rally in Ürümqi with ten thousand troops, helicopters and armored vehicles. He promised a "smashing, obliterating offensive" and ordered his forces to "Round up everyone who should be rounded up". Mass arrests began by April 2017. New bans took effect on the 1st of April 2017, covering abnormally long beards and veils worn in public. Residents were also forbidden to skip state-run television or radio, refuse family planning policies, or keep their children out of state-run schools.

    In 2017-73% of foreign journalists in China reported being restricted or prohibited from reporting in Xinjiang, up from 42% the year before.

  • Chen Quanguo ordered that the camps "be managed like the military and defended like a prison". The Chinese government did not acknowledge that they existed until 2018, and then called them "vocational education and training centers". From 2019, it used the name "vocational training centers". The camps tripled in size from 2018 to 2019, even as the government said most detainees had been released.

    Estimates of the number held vary widely. In 2018, Gay McDougall, a vice chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, said around 1 million Uyghurs were detained, without citing sources. Human Rights Watch estimated at least tens of thousands, and Amnesty International put it at tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. Researcher Adrian Zenz told the United Nations in March 2019 that the figure was 1.5 million. By November 2019 he counted more than 1,000 camps, and in July 2020 he raised his estimate to 1.8 million. He called this "the largest incarceration of an ethnoreligious minority since the Holocaust".

    A Chinese government white paper in September 2020 said an average of 1.29 million workers went through "vocational training" each year from 2014 to 2019. It did not say how many trained in camps. Zenz said the number "gives us a possible scope of coercive labor".

    Former detainees describe a regime of control. Mihrigul Tursun said she was drugged, interrogated for days without sleep and strapped into a chair for electric shocks. She remembered interrogators telling her, "Being a Uighur is a crime." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said police held Tursun for 20 days on suspicion of inciting ethnic hatred and denied she was ever in a camp. Kayrat Samarkand described "iron clothes", a metal suit weighing over 50 pounds that forced his limbs outstretched. He said inmates had to sing songs praising Xi Jinping before eating and memorize a list of "126 lies" about religion.

    A former Xinjiang police officer told CNN in 2021 that raids sometimes began with a village meeting, so officers could arrest everyone gathered. Other nights, police went door to door with rifles. In 2021, BBC News and other outlets reported accounts of organized sexual violence in the camps from women including Tursunay Ziawudun and the teacher Sayragul Sauytbay. Officials deny all such allegations. Reuters reported that officials disclosed personal medical information about women witnesses to discredit them.

    Deaths are harder to count. Human Rights Watch said that by April 2021 there had been at least 177 reported deaths in detention or after release, and that the government often refused to acknowledge them. Radio Free Asia reported in 2019 that a police officer who had worked at the No. 1 camp in Kuqa County confirmed 150 deaths there. Researcher Gene Bunin's Xinjiang Victims Database documented 12,050 victims by April 2021. It drew ridicule online when it listed photos of Hong Kong actors Andy Lau and Chow Yun-fat among police officers. Its staff explained that the officers' own profiles used such avatars.

    The camps began to wind down in late 2019. Academic Kerry Brown attributes this to the expense of running them, though international pressure also played a part. Some detainees were moved into the formal prison system and others into forced labor programs. In 2023, Amnesty International said it was "witnessing more and more arbitrary detention". The Uyghur Human Rights Project estimated that China had imprisoned 449,000 Uyghurs, about one in 17. In 2022, a Washington Post reporter visited a dozen sites previously identified as camps. Most appeared empty or converted, and several were labeled as coronavirus quarantine facilities or schools.

  • Adrian Zenz reported that 80% of new intrauterine device placements in China in 2018 happened in Xinjiang, a region with only 1.8% of the country's population. Xinjiang University professor Lin Fangfei disputed the framing. He argued that 8.7% of such operations was the right measure and that the Uyghur population had grown faster than the Han population there.

    The birth figures are stark. Chinese government statistics showed that birth rates in the mostly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar fell by more than 60% from 2015 to 2018. The national rate fell 9.7% in the same period. A fax from the Xinjiang regional government, provided to CNN, showed a 32.68% drop in births from 2017 to 2018. In 2019, Xinjiang's births fell another 24%, against a 4.2% decline nationwide. Zenz found that population growth in Kashgar and Hotan fell by 84% between 2015 and 2018, after a decade in which Uyghur growth had run 2.6 times the Han rate.

    Zenz's reading of government documents found plans in 2019 to sterilize between 14% and 34% of married women of childbearing age in two predominantly Uyghur counties. In four southern prefectures, the target was 80%. Leaked records from Karakax County for 2017-2019 showed that violating family planning rules was the most common reason for sending Uyghurs to camps. Practicing Islam ranked second. In 2020, an Associated Press investigation concluded that forced birth control was "far more widespread and systematic than previously known", reaching hundreds of thousands of women.

    Individual accounts put faces on those numbers. Zumrat Dwut said she was sterilized by tubal ligation in a camp, a claim the regional government denies. The exiled doctor Gülgine said that on some days about 80 forced sterilization surgeries were carried out. Because Beijing does not collect or share relevant data, and because victims fear stigma, the full scale is unknown.

    Officials give a different explanation. Liu Yilei, a Party official in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, said the Han share of southern Xinjiang was "too low, less than 15 percent". Xinjiang authorities attribute falling births to the "comprehensive implementation of the family planning policy". The Chinese Embassy in the United States wrote that Uyghur women were no longer "baby-making machines". Twitter removed that post for violating its policies.

  • In 2017, security-related construction in Xinjiang tripled. Charles Rollet counted security cameras, video analytics hubs, big data centers, police checkpoints and drones among the projects. Drone maker DJI began supplying local police that year. The Skynet and Sharp Eyes projects, backed by billions of dollars from the Ministry of Public Security, aimed to leave "no blind spots, no gaps, no blank spots" by 2020. Morgan Stanley projected 400 million cameras operating by that year. In 2017, the ministry also began buying systems that could reportedly identify Uyghurs by ethnicity, which allowed a "Uyghur alarm" in surveillance software.

    Under Chen Quanguo, a program called "Physicals for All" required every resident of Xinjiang between ages twelve and 65 to provide DNA, along with fingerprints, voice-prints and iris patterns. Yahir Imin described having his blood drawn, face scanned, fingerprints recorded and voice documented. A forensic DNA lab built in Tumxuk in January 2018 used software from Thermo Fisher Scientific, which later said it would stop selling to Xinjiang. In July 2020, the United States Department of Commerce sanctioned 11 Chinese firms, including two subsidiaries of BGI Group, over the use of Uyghur DNA. Officials also ordered vehicle owners to install GPS trackers, citing the threat of Islamist extremism.

    The watching reaches abroad. A joint report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project and the Oxus Society found 1,546 cases of Uyghurs detained or deported at Chinese request in 28 countries between 1997 and March 2021. Facebook reported in March 2021 that China-based hackers were spying on the diaspora. Chinese officials dismiss such accusations as fabrications.

    Forced labor is the other pillar. BuzzFeed News reported in December 2020 that 135 factory facilities had been identified inside the camps, covering over 21 million square feet. Fourteen million square feet of that was built in 2018 alone. Former detainees said they had no choice about working and earned little or nothing. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute traced Uyghur workers to the supply chains of at least 82 well-known global companies, including Marks & Spencer, Samsung and Nike. Marks & Spencer pledged to check its supply lines. Apple, Esprit and Fila did not respond.

    By 2021, the Chinese government had relocated more than 600,000 Uyghurs to industrial workplaces, according to the sources cited here. A June 2025 report by Global Rights Compliance linked 68 Western and international companies to forced labor in China's critical minerals industry. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian answered that Xinjiang "has never forced anyone to transfer employment" and called the report a "complete lie".

  • An estimated 16,000 mosques in Xinjiang have been destroyed or damaged, with minarets knocked down and decorative features scrubbed away or painted over. Uyghur Muslims believe repeated pilgrimages to shrines such as the tomb of Imam Asim can fulfill the obligation of the Hajj, and such sites were razed too. At Id Kah Mosque, China's largest, Radio Free Asia reported that a plaque of Quranic scripture was removed in 2018. The Globe and Mail reported that services there were staged for foreign visitors. In 2019, Indonesian scholar Said Aqil Siradj disputed that Uyghurs faced persecution, citing mosques being built and repaired. Indonesian outlet Antara filmed 800 worshipers there during Ramadan in 2021.

    In September 2019, Agence France-Presse visited 13 destroyed cemeteries in four cities and found exposed bones in four of them. Satellite images showed the destruction had gone on for more than a decade. In January 2020, CNN found that authorities had destroyed more than 100 graveyards. Sultanim Cemetery, the central Uyghur historical graveyard in Hotan, became a parking lot between 2018 and 2019. The Chinese government says graves were relocated because of poor maintenance.

    Schools changed in 2011, when Xinjiang moved to what officials called bilingual education. Standard Chinese became the main language of instruction, with only a few hours a week of Uyghur literature. In 2021, Uyghur textbooks used since the early 2000s were outlawed. Their authors and editors received death sentences with reprieve, life terms or long prison sentences. Yalqun Rozi, a textbook editor, got 15 years. His son Kamaltürk Yalqun said the textbooks were "rich in Uyghur culture". The government said the 2003 and 2009 editions contained 84 passages preaching separatism, violence, terrorism and extremism.

    The Uyghur Human Rights Project identified 386 Uyghur intellectuals imprisoned, detained or disappeared since early 2017. Economist Ilham Tohti was sentenced to life in prison in 2014. Anthropologist Rahile Dawut, who studied and preserved shrines, songs and folklore, disappeared. Imam Abduheber Ahmet, once praised by China as a "five-star" imam, was sentenced in 2018 to over five years for taking his son to an unsanctioned religious school.

    Private life came under direction as well. In August 2014, Cherchen County announced incentives for Uyghur-Han intermarriage, including 10,000 yuan a year for the first five years. In 2015, Hotan banned names such as "Islam", "Quran" and "Jihad", and a 2017 law extended the ban to names that "exaggerate religious fervor". On the 20th of May 2014, a protest in Alakaga followed the detention of 25 women and schoolgirls for wearing headscarves. A local official said two people died when police fired on protesters.

  • Once the camps could no longer be denied, the government shifted to portraying them as humane. The campaign grew in 2020 and 2021 as international backlash rose. In April 2021, officials released five videos titled "Xinjiang is a Wonderful Land" and a musical called "The Wings of Songs". ProPublica documented more than 5000 pro-government videos on Twitter and YouTube in June 2021, many showing Uyghurs denying abuses. BBC News reporter John Sudworth and his wife Yvonne Murray fled China for Taiwan after state-affiliated media attacked them.

    Beijing's central argument is counter-terrorism. Scholars Sean Roberts and David Tobin argue that Islamophobia and fear of terrorism have been used to justify repression, and that the violence belongs in the context of Chinese colonialism. Arienne Dwyer says China used the global war on terror to conflate Uyghur nationalism with terrorism. In December 2015, China effectively expelled French journalist Ursula Gauthier after she questioned that equation. In August 2018, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination criticized China's "broad definition of terrorism and vague references to extremism".

    The legal question centers on Article II of the Genocide Convention, which covers "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part" a "racial or religious group". It lists "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and "measures intended to prevent births within the group". Those accusing China of genocide cite such acts. Others describe forced assimilation, ethnocide or cultural genocide. At the United Nations, countries mostly in North America and Europe signed letters of condemnation, while countries mostly in Asia and Africa signed letters supporting the policies as counter-terrorism.

    In 2020, a case brought to the International Criminal Court was dismissed because China is not a party to the Rome Statute. In 2021, the United States Department of State declared China's actions genocide, and several legislatures passed non-binding motions doing the same. Other parliaments condemned "severe human rights abuses" or crimes against humanity. A 2022 assessment by the UN human rights office said the policies may constitute crimes against humanity but did not use the word genocide. In 2026, that office described them as potentially amounting to "forcible transfer and/or enslavement as a crime against humanity."

Updated

Common questions

What is the persecution of Uyghurs in China?

The persecution of Uyghurs in China refers to a series of ongoing human rights abuses committed since 2014 against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. Reported abuses include mass detention, surveillance, forced labor, family separation and forced sterilization. The Chinese government denies committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang.

When did the persecution of Uyghurs in China begin?

The persecution of Uyghurs in China is dated to 2014, when Xi Jinping's administration launched the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism. Mass arrests began by April 2017 under Xinjiang Party secretary Chen Quanguo.

How many Uyghurs were held in camps in the persecution of Uyghurs in China?

Estimates vary widely. In 2018, a United Nations committee vice chairperson cited around 1 million, and researcher Adrian Zenz estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities by July 2020. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International gave lower estimates in the tens or hundreds of thousands.

Why do some countries call the persecution of Uyghurs in China genocide?

Those accusing China of genocide point to acts they say violate Article II of the Genocide Convention, including serious bodily or mental harm and measures intended to prevent births. In 2021, the United States Department of State declared China's actions genocide.

What did the United Nations say about the persecution of Uyghurs in China?

A 2022 assessment by the UN human rights office said China's policies in Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity, without using the term genocide. In 2026, the office described them as potentially amounting to "forcible transfer and/or enslavement as a crime against humanity."

How does China respond to claims about the persecution of Uyghurs in China?

The Chinese government denies committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang and says its policies counter terrorism and extremism. It first denied the camps existed, then described them as "vocational education and training centers". Officials attribute falling birth rates to family planning policy.

Which companies were linked to the persecution of Uyghurs in China through forced labor?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute found Uyghur workers in the supply chains of at least 82 well-known global companies, including Marks & Spencer, Samsung and Nike. A June 2025 report by Global Rights Compliance linked 68 Western and international companies to forced labor in China's critical minerals industry.

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  105. 371JournalContemporary Chinese colonial paternalism and the hypocrisy of US far-left denialismDibyesh Anand — 2026-08-08
  106. 373The American blog pushing Xinjiang denialismBethany Allen-Ebrahimian — 11 August 2020
  107. 375MagazineXinjiang Denialists Are Only Aiding ImperialismGerald Roche — 6 July 2021
  108. 378Those who ignore Uyghur genocideShohret Hoshur — 2021-08-08
  109. 379NewsThe Big Business of Uyghur Genocide DenialAlexander Reid Ross et al. — Fairfax University of America — 18 January 2022
  110. 380NewsWho killed New Frame?Micah Reddy et al. — 27 July 2022
  111. 381NewsA Global Web of Chinese Propaganda Leads to a U.S. Tech MogulMara Hvistendahl et al. — 5 August 2023
  112. 382MagazineThe Global Outrage Machine Skips the UyghursMichael Schuman — 6 January 2025
  113. 383Labor groups, TSP slam Hung over XinjiangJason Pan — 28 May 2022
  114. 388BookCulture of Enmity: The Discursive Struggle for Taiwan in the Making of the New Cold WarAlain Brossat et al. — Springer — 2023
  115. 391BookChina Incorporated: The Politics of a World Where China is Number OneKerry Brown — Bloomsbury Academic — 2023
  116. 392JournalChina's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur SeparatismMichael Clarke — Informa UK Limited — 9 April 2008
  117. 393BookXinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia - A HistoryMichael E. Clarke — Taylor & Francis — 2011
  118. 394BookThe Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy and Political DiscourseArienne M. Dwyer — East-West Center Washington — 2005
  119. 395NewsU.S. Says China Is Committing 'Genocide' Against Uighur MuslimsMichael R. Gordon — 19 January 2021
  120. 396BookInside Xinjiang: Space, Place and Power in China's Muslim Far NorthwestAnna Hayes et al. — Routledge — 2015
  121. 398BookMenace: China's Colonization of the Islamic World & Uyghur GenocideAbdulhakim Idris — Center for Uyghur Studies — 2020
  122. 403BookChina's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic EngagementDavid H. Shinn et al. — Columbia University Press — 2023
  123. 404BookXinjiang: China's Muslim BorderlandM. E. Sharpe — 2004
  124. 405BookThe Political Thought of Xi JinpingSteve Tsang et al. — Oxford University Press — 2024
  125. 408BookChina's Changing Role in the Middle East: Filling a Power Vacuum?Chuchu Zhang — Routledge — 2025

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