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War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)

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— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

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War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)

8 sections
  • The war in Afghanistan lasted from 2001 to 2021, and it became the longest war in United States military history. It ran six months longer than the Vietnam War. A United States-led coalition launched it under the name Operation Enduring Freedom, in response to the September 11 attacks. Within months, the coalition had pushed the Taliban out of the major population centers and ended their rule. Twenty years later, the Taliban were back in charge of the country.

    Their return is the puzzle at the center of this documentary. How does a movement that has lost its cities and its government rebuild itself? Why could a coalition with high-technology militaries not finish it? What did Afghanistan's geography, religion and tribal society contribute? And who bore the cost of two decades of fighting?

  • In 2020, some 80 percent of Afghanistan's 33 million people lived in the countryside. That fact shaped the war before the first shot. Fighting gravitated to rural areas, where guerrillas had ample places to hide. Winters were harsh, so offensives tended to come in spring or summer, after a lull in the cold months.

    Religion gave the conflict its vocabulary. Afghanistan is 99.7 percent Muslim, and centuries of foreign invasion by non-Muslims had tied the Afghan identity to resisting outsiders. Local mullahs could sway the population as much as the government could. Traditionally, they were the voices that prescribed resistance to outsiders through calls for holy war, or jihad. Both the Taliban and the Afghan government had to reckon with that influence.

    Tribe divided what Islam united. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group, making up between 38 and 50 percent of the population. Their traditional way of life, Pashtunwali, guided most tribal decisions, and its method of settling feuds often weakened tribal unity. Afghan leaders had long depended on tribes to keep order in rural areas, because the state alone was weak. Afghans tended to be more loyal to their community and tribe than to the state. Tribes therefore aligned with the Taliban or the government, whichever was more beneficial at the time.

    The gap in power between high-technology coalition militaries and the guerrilla Taliban produced asymmetric warfare. The Taliban inherited their methods from the anti-Soviet mujahideen of the 1980s. Those fighters worked in small cadres of 10 to 50 men, armed with a mix of outdated weapons and modern ones, usually looted. The Taliban added suicide bombs, car bombs, roadside bombs known as IEDs, and targeted assassinations. They also planted personnel inside the Afghan military and police to carry out insider attacks. By 2009, the IED had become the Taliban's weapon of choice. It would drive up the number of wounded coalition soldiers during the troop surge of 2010.

  • In 1996, the Taliban seized Kabul with military support from Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia. They had grown out of religious students, known as the Talib, who wanted to end warlordism through stricter adherence to Sharia. In Kabul they founded the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and imposed a fundamentalist Deobandi interpretation of Islam. Their edicts forbade women to work outside the home or to attend school. Women could not even leave their homes unless accompanied by a male relative. United Nations officials counted 15 massacres of civilians between 1996 and 2001, many aimed at Shias and Hazaras. By 2001, the Taliban controlled as much as 90 percent of the country, while the Northern Alliance was confined to the northeast corner. Fighting alongside the Taliban were some 28,000 to 30,000 Pakistanis and 2,000 to 3,000 al-Qaeda militants.

    The 9/11 Commission in the United States later found that al-Qaeda used Afghanistan to train fighters, import weapons, coordinate with other jihadists and plot terrorist actions. An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 men passed through the camps before 9/11. Most were sent to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, and a smaller number were inducted into al-Qaeda. After the 1998 US embassy bombings were linked to Osama bin Laden, President Bill Clinton ordered missile strikes on an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. In 1999, the international community imposed sanctions to push the Taliban toward extraditing bin Laden. The Taliban rebuffed the demand. Meanwhile, paramilitary teams from the CIA's Special Activities Division operated in Afghanistan through the 1990s, trying to locate and kill or capture bin Laden. They planned several operations but never received Clinton's order to proceed. The relationships they built with Afghan leaders proved essential in 2001.

    On the morning of the 11th of September 2001-19 members of al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial airliners in coordinated attacks. Two were crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, which collapsed. A third hit the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. The fourth, aimed at Washington, D.C., crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. No one aboard any of the four flights survived. Total deaths were 2,996, including the 19 hijackers. Bin Laden had planned and coordinated the attacks, and afterward he hoped to draw the US into an extended war like the one fought against the Soviets. The Taliban publicly condemned the attacks, but they greatly underestimated American willingness to go to war. The US, for its part, wrongly believed that the Taliban and al-Qaeda were almost inseparable. In fact they had very different goals and leaders.

    President George W. Bush chose to issue an ultimatum before taking military action. He demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden. He told them to "close immediately every terrorist training camp." He told them to "hand over every terrorist and their supporters." And he demanded that they "give the US full access to terrorist training camps for inspection." On the same day, religious scholars meeting in Kabul decided that bin Laden should be surrendered. Mullah Omar, the Taliban founder, decided otherwise. He said that "turning over Osama would only be a disgrace for us and Islamic thought and belief would be a weakness." He also argued that the US would keep making demands after bin Laden was surrendered, and he claimed bin Laden was innocent. The Taliban said that bin Laden was protected by traditional Pashtun laws of hospitality.

    In the weeks that followed, the Taliban demanded evidence of bin Laden's guilt. They later offered to hand him to a third country if the US stopped its bombing and provided that evidence. A Bush administration official answered that the demands were "not subject to negotiation" and that it was "time for the Taliban to act now." Covert American action began soon afterward, and the war started officially on the 7th of October 2001.

  • Fifteen days after 9/11, the CIA covertly sent members of its Special Activities Division into Afghanistan. They formed the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team and linked up with the Northern Alliance in the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul. In October, twelve-man Special Forces teams began arriving to work with the CIA and the Alliance. Within a few weeks, with help from American ground and air forces, the Northern Alliance captured several key cities. The Taliban held steady only in Kunduz Province, and everywhere else they were outmatched by US air support. By November, they had lost control of most of the country.

    The United States did not invade alone. The United Kingdom assisted from the start, and eventually more than a dozen other countries joined. Most al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters were never captured. They escaped into neighboring Pakistan or retreated to rural and mountainous regions.

    The best chance to catch bin Laden came in the mountains. By late November, he was at a fortified training camp in Tora Bora, and the battle there began on the 30th of November. CIA teams working with tribal militias followed him and called in airstrikes, with special forces arriving soon after. The militia numbered 1,000, but it was not fighting eagerly during Ramadan. The CIA requested that US Army Rangers be sent, and Marines were ready to deploy, but both requests were declined. At some point in December, bin Laden escaped to Pakistan.

    Politics moved as fast as the fighting. At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration. After a 2002 loya jirga, a grand assembly held in Kabul, it became the Afghan Transitional Administration. On the 20th of December 2001, the UN authorized an International Security Assistance Force, known as ISAF. Its task was to help Afghans maintain security in Kabul and the surrounding areas, and its mandate did not reach beyond that for the first few years. By February 2002-18 countries contributed to the force. The CIA also created Counter-terrorism Pursuit Teams staffed by Afghans. By 2010 they had grown to over 3,000 members and were considered one of the best Afghan fighting forces.

    Shortly after Karzai's elevation to the presidency on the 5th of December, the Taliban may have tried to seek a conditional surrender. Two accounts conflict. In one, an agreement, possibly signed by Mullah Omar, would have traded surrender for immunity. In the other, the deal was narrower and covered only the surrender of Kandahar. Taliban sources said that Omar was not part of any deal. Whatever the truth, the US vetoed any sort of negotiation. Omar disappeared, and most Taliban leaders and thousands of fighters went to Pakistan.

    By the numbers, the invasion was a striking military success. Fewer than twelve US soldiers died between October and March, compared with some 15,000 Taliban killed or taken prisoner. Malkasian, however, writes that the failure to capture bin Laden, to negotiate with the Taliban, or to include them in the new government set the course for the long war that bin Laden had dreamed of.

    Pakistan complicated the picture. In the war's early years, it was seen as a firm ally and helped capture numerous top al-Qaeda leaders, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Internally, however, it was providing the Taliban with significant funding, access to safe houses and political support. Public opinion in Pakistan heavily favored the Taliban, and the government could not expel them without risking conflict inside its fragile country. The Taliban kept using Pakistan as a base and safe haven, and there they began rebuilding their strength.

  • In April 2002, Bush made a speech expressing a desire to rebuild Afghanistan. His administration had initially opposed nation-building, yet the idea slowly crept into the rationale for staying. The US also sought to instill democracy and women's rights as a moral matter. Its reconstruction efforts focused on education, health care and community development. The new Afghan army, created and funded by the US in early 2002, fared worse. It was built slowly, because of competing interests and a belief that the Taliban were no longer a strong threat. Some in the administration preferred to rely on the Northern Alliance and warlords. The army became an afterthought, poorly trained and equipped.

    That same month, the Taliban began to organize. In Gardi Jangal, a refugee camp near the Helmand border, former mid-level Taliban officials set up a shura. It was composed of 23 groups of about 50 individuals each, around 1,200 in total. In North Waziristan in Pakistan, Jalaluddin Haqqani had started organizing the Haqqani network after exiling himself there in 2001. In early 2002, its membership was estimated at 1,400.

    Some Taliban reached out to Karzai to open negotiations several times between 2002 and 2004. The US was adamantly against it and made sure that all top Taliban leaders were blacklisted, so the Afghan government could not negotiate with them. Malkasian argues that talks would have been low cost but highly effective. He attributes the refusal to American overconfidence and hubris, and notes that all the information about a possible Taliban resurgence was available but ignored.

    Meanwhile, pressure to hunt down terrorists led to excesses. Coalition troops went on missions with questionable intelligence, at one point falling prey to a false tip supplied by a target's political opponents. Those captured were mostly low-level operatives who knew little about al-Qaeda. Numerous civilians were killed, including at a wedding that was misread as a Taliban gathering. Such errors drove Taliban recruitment. Many Taliban leaders who had given up arms, especially after Karzai promised amnesty, were increasingly harassed. By 2004, most Taliban leaders in Afghanistan had fled back to Pakistan. Malkasian adds that American missteps alone did not restart the conflict. The Taliban would have re-emerged anyway, because leaders like Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani had never put down their arms.

    Pamphlets urging a holy war against Americans and other foreign troops appeared in early 2003. In March 2003, American attention shifted when US forces invaded Iraq. In May 2003, Abdul Salam, the chief justice of the Taliban Supreme Court, proclaimed that the Taliban were back, regrouped, rearmed and ready for guerrilla war. Up to 1,000 guerrillas gathered in the Dey Chopan District of Zabul Province, where the Taliban decided to make a stand. Over 220 people, including several dozen Afghan police, were killed in August 2003. Omar reorganized the movement and launched the insurgency that year.

    A commander named Dadullah was put in charge of the grand offensive the Taliban were preparing. Around 2004, he introduced suicide bombing into wide use, a tactic previously confined to al-Qaeda. A network of madrassas in Pakistan serving Afghan refugees supplied a steady stream of extremist recruits willing to die. Night letters were followed by kidnappings and assassinations of government officials and of village elders who collaborated with them. Government schools and clinics were burned down. Operation Asbury Park cleared Taliban forces out of Dey Chopan during the summer of 2004. In late 2004, the still-hidden Omar announced an insurgency to "regain the sovereignty of our country." The Taliban targeted that year's presidential election, and Karzai was elected president of what was now the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The US also began using drone strikes in Pakistan in 2004.

    In June and July 2005, US Navy SEALs carried out Operation Red Wings in Kunar Province, aiming to disrupt a local Taliban group led by Ahmad Shah. The operation had one survivor and left 19 dead. Operation Whalers followed several weeks later, and Shah was seriously wounded. Even so, by the end of 2005 the Taliban had regained control of several villages in the south, where residents were frustrated by the lack of government help. The government was in a very weak position. The average district had only 50 police officers, and some districts had no government presence at all.

  • In January 2006, a multinational ISAF contingent began replacing US troops in southern Afghanistan. The United Kingdom formed its core, joined by Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Estonia. Canada wanted Kandahar, so the UK took Helmand province. Helmand was a center of poppy production, which suited the anti-narcotics focus of the British. Yet Pashtun Helmandis had never forgotten the 1880 Battle of Maiwand against the British, and it fed fierce resistance.

    The warnings had been clear. Local intelligence suggested the Taliban would wage a brutal campaign in the summer of 2006, and coalition generals sent that information up the chain of command. Decision-makers ignored it. The US was distracted by Iraq, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was more interested in making the Afghan army affordable than effective. Of the 70,000 soldiers the army was supposed to have, only 26,000 had been trained and retained. Insurgent attacks reportedly grew fourfold between 2002 and 2006. By late 2007, Afghanistan was said to be in "serious danger" of falling to the Taliban, despite 40,000 ISAF troops.

    Resentment of foreigners was rising too. On the 29th of May 2006, a US military truck in a Kabul convoy lost control and plowed into civilian vehicles. A riot followed, ending with 20 dead and 160 injured. On the 4th of March 2007, US Marines allegedly killed at least 12 civilians and injured 33 in Nangarhar. The 120-member Marine unit was ordered out of the country because the incident had damaged its relations with local people.

    Western analysts in 2007 estimated that the Taliban fielded about 10,000 fighters at a time. Only 2,000 to 3,000 were highly motivated, full-time insurgents. The rest were volunteers, young Afghans angered by civilian deaths from airstrikes and by American detention of Muslim prisoners held for years without charge. About 100 to 300 full-time combatants were foreigners, many from Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Chechnya. They were reportedly more violent and harder to control, and often brought superior video-production or bomb-making expertise. On the 13th of June 2008, Taliban fighters freed all the prisoners in Kandahar jail, some 1,200 people, 400 of them Taliban. It was a major embarrassment for NATO. By 2010, the Taliban had as many as 25,000 dedicated soldiers, almost as many as before 9/11.

    Troop numbers climbed in response. In January 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated, and in mid-February it was announced that 17,000 additional troops would deploy. ISAF commander General David McKiernan had called for as many as 30,000. In a classified assessment dated the 23rd of September 2009, General McChrystal concluded that a successful counterinsurgency would require 500,000 troops and five years. On the 1st of December 2009, Obama announced 30,000 more troops. Protests broke out in American cities the next day, with many protesters comparing the decision to Lyndon B. Johnson's expansion of the Vietnam War.

    Civilian deaths shadowed the surge. On the 4th of September 2009, a NATO air raid southwest of Kunduz struck Taliban fighters who had hijacked civilian supply trucks. It killed up to 179 people, including over 100 civilians. The scale of the fighting then grew. In September 2010 alone there were 700 airstrikes, against 257 in all of 2009. The year 2010 saw more insurgent attacks than any year before it, peaking in September at over 1,500. From May 2010, NATO special forces concentrated on capturing or killing specific Taliban leaders. By March 2011, the US military claimed that this had netted more than 900 low- to mid-level commanders. At its peak in 2011, roughly 140,000 foreign troops were serving under ISAF command.

    Talks flickered alongside the fighting. Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's co-founder and then second-in-command, favored negotiations. In February 2010, he was captured in a joint US-Pakistani raid in Karachi, which infuriated Karzai. In October 2010, a Taliban delegation was reportedly flown to Kabul by NATO aircraft for talks. Afterward it emerged that the man leading it, who claimed to be Akhtar Mansour, was an imposter who had duped NATO officials. On the 25th of July 2010, WikiLeaks released 91,731 classified documents covering US military reports from January 2004 to December 2009. They included accounts of civilian casualties and reports of Pakistani collusion with the Taliban.

    On the 2nd of May 2011, US officials announced that bin Laden had been killed by Navy SEALs in Operation Neptune Spear, in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Pakistan denied sheltering him and said it had shared information about the compound with the CIA since 2009. NATO leaders began planning an exit strategy. On the 22nd of June 2011, Obama announced that 10,000 troops would leave by the end of the year and 23,000 more by the summer of 2012. After the first 10,000 departed, 80,000 American troops remained.

  • On the 2nd of May 2012, Obama arrived unannounced in Kabul and signed a strategic partnership agreement with Karzai. In July, the US designated Afghanistan a major non-NATO ally. Earlier that year, Karzai and Obama had agreed to shift combat operations to Afghan forces by spring 2013. "What's going to happen this spring is that Afghans will be in the lead throughout the country," Obama said. The year had also brought a series of damaging incidents involving US troops. They included soldiers posing with the body parts of dead insurgents, a video of a helicopter crew firing a Hellfire missile at a group of Afghan men, the 2012 Quran burning protests and the Panjwai shooting spree.

    On the 18th of June 2013, the transfer of security responsibilities from NATO to Afghan forces was completed. On the 26th of October 2014, the United Kingdom and the United States officially ended combat operations. The British handed over Camp Bastion and the Americans handed over Camp Leatherneck. On the 28th of December, NATO ended combat operations in a ceremony in Kabul. American forces continued under Operation Freedom's Sentinel, and the new NATO mission was Operation Resolute Support. From the Western perspective, the war thus divides into 2001 to 2014, the ISAF mission, when coalition forces did most of the fighting, and 2015 to 2021, when the Afghan armed forces did. In Afghanistan itself, the conflict is known simply as the war in Afghanistan. Departing troops were partly replaced by military contractors, many of them ex-coalition personnel, which let the US and Britain stay involved in ground actions without stationing their own forces.

    Several factors fed a Taliban resurgence. With most foreign forces gone, the risk of being bombed and raided fell. In June 2014, Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, and thousands of mainly Uzbek, Arab and Pakistani militants flooded into Afghanistan, swelling Taliban ranks. International attention turned to crises in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine. Afghan security forces lacked, among other things, air power and reconnaissance. The Taliban also expanded governance in areas they held, especially by providing justice that many viewed as less corrupt than the government's courts.

    In Kunduz Province, where clashes dated from 2009, flights into Kunduz city were suspended in May 2015 after weeks of fighting. In late September, Taliban forces attacked from four districts, entered the city and stormed the regional hospital. They reportedly blocked the route to the airport to stop civilians fleeing. Farther south in Helmand, the Taliban took Musa Qala on the 26th of August 2015. On the 21st of December, Sangin fell after fierce clashes that killed more than 90 soldiers in two days. Senior American commanders said Afghan troops there lacked effective leaders, weapons and ammunition. Some soldiers had fought for years without seeing their families, causing poor morale and high desertion.

    The insurgency was also reshaping itself. In January 2015, the Islamic State established a branch in Afghanistan called Khorasan, or ISIS-K, and began clashing with the Taliban. On the 11th of November 2015, in Zabul Province, Taliban fighters loyal to Mullah Akhtar Mansoor fought a pro-Islamic State splinter faction led by Mullah Mansoor Dadullah, and more than 100 militants died. Sirajuddin Haqqani was named deputy Taliban leader in the summer of 2015. He and other Haqqani leaders increasingly ran day-to-day military operations, urban attacks and a complex international fundraising network. Tensions with the Pakistani military grew, because American and Afghan officials accused it of sheltering the Haqqanis as a proxy group.

    By early January 2017-33 districts across 16 provinces were under insurgent control, 258 were under government control and nearly 120 were contested. The Afghan army had about 169,000 soldiers, but suffered a 33 percent attrition rate in 2016. Sangin was captured by the Taliban again on the 23rd of March 2017. Almost a quarter of British casualties earlier in the war had come from fighting for that one town. On the 21st of April 2017, the Taliban attacked Camp Shaheen near Mazar-e-Sharif and killed over 140 Afghan soldiers. In September 2017, the Trump administration deployed another 3,000 US troops, adding to roughly 11,000 already there. On the 20th of November, General Nicholson announced airstrikes on Taliban-run drug production facilities, saying the Taliban were "becoming a criminal organization" that earned about $200 million a year from drug-related activities.

  • In January 2018, the Taliban were openly active in 70 percent of Afghanistan. They fully controlled 14 districts and had an active physical presence in 263 more. After the Kabul ambulance bombing on the 27th of January, Donald Trump and Afghan officials ruled out talks. Yet on the 27th of February, President Ashraf Ghani proposed unconditional peace talks. He offered the Taliban recognition as a legal political party and the release of Taliban prisoners. It was the most favorable offer to the Taliban since the war began, and it followed months of consensus building that found Afghans overwhelmingly supported a negotiated end. On the 27th of March, a conference of 20 countries in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, backed the offer.

    A peace movement grew alongside it. The People's Peace Movement walked several hundred kilometers from Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province, through Taliban-held territory, to Kabul. Afghan media dubbed it the Helmand Peace Convoy. The marchers met Ghani and held sit-in protests outside the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and nearby embassies. In June 2018, Ghani and the Taliban agreed an unprecedented mutual ceasefire for the Eid al-Fitr celebrations. Taliban members flocked into Kabul and talked with locals and security forces, creating a mood of both hope and fear. Civilians called for the ceasefire to be made permanent. The Taliban rejected an extension and resumed fighting after it ended on the 18th of June.

    The diplomacy that mattered bypassed Kabul. In July 2018, American officials secretly met members of the Taliban's political commission in Qatar. In September, Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as special adviser on Afghanistan, and he led further talks in Qatar. The Taliban refused to let the Afghan government attend, considering it a puppet of the US. In January 2019, Ghani said more than 45,000 members of the Afghan security forces had been killed since he became president in 2014. A US report that month estimated that 53.8 percent of districts were under government control or influence, 33.9 percent were contested and 12.3 percent were under insurgent control or influence.

    These efforts culminated in the United States-Taliban deal of 2020. It stipulated that all US troops would leave Afghanistan by 2021. In exchange, the Taliban pledged to prevent any militant group from staging attacks against the US and its allies from Afghan territory. The Afghan government was not a party to the deal and rejected its terms. As troops withdrew, the Taliban launched a broad offensive throughout the summer of 2021. On the 15th of August, they reestablished control of Kabul, and on the same day Ghani fled the country. The Taliban declared victory, and the war was formally brought to a close. By the 30th of August, the last American military aircraft had departed.

    The war killed an estimated 176,000 to 212,000 people or more, including 46,319 civilians. Another 66,650 people died in the related War in North-West Pakistan. More than 5.7 million former refugees returned to Afghanistan after the 2001 invasion. Yet by the fall of Kabul, 2.6 million Afghans remained refugees, and another 4 million were displaced inside their own country.

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Updated

Common questions

How long did the war in Afghanistan last?

The war in Afghanistan lasted from 2001 to 2021. It was the longest war in United States military history, surpassing the Vietnam War by six months.

What started the war in Afghanistan?

The war in Afghanistan began in response to the September 11 attacks, carried out by al-Qaeda, which was based in Afghanistan and allied with the Taliban. The Taliban refused George W. Bush's ultimatum to hand over Osama bin Laden, and the war started officially on the 7th of October 2001.

Who fought in the war in Afghanistan?

The war in Afghanistan pitted a coalition led by the United States, which later supported the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, against the Taliban, its allies and its militias. Splinter groups, al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State complicated the fighting.

How did the war in Afghanistan end?

The war in Afghanistan ended after a Taliban offensive in the summer of 2021 that reestablished their control, including Kabul on the 15th of August. Ashraf Ghani fled the country that day, and the last American military aircraft departed by the 30th of August.

How many people died in the war in Afghanistan?

The war in Afghanistan killed an estimated 176,000 to 212,000 people or more, including 46,319 civilians. Another 66,650 people died in the related War in North-West Pakistan.

What was the 2020 United States-Taliban deal in the war in Afghanistan?

The 2020 deal stipulated that all US troops would withdraw from Afghanistan by 2021. In exchange, the Taliban pledged to prevent any militant group from staging attacks against the US and its allies from Afghan territory. The Afghan government was not a party to the deal and rejected its terms.

What was ISAF in the war in Afghanistan?

ISAF was the International Security Assistance Force, authorized by the UN on the 20th of December 2001. It first helped Afghans maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas, and NATO formally ended its combat operations in 2014.

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  76. 145NewsAnti-war Leaders Blast Escalation of Afghanistan WarFight Back! News — 1 December 2009
  77. 147NewsAfghan troop numbers to eclipse Iraq soonUnited Press International — 25 March 2010
  78. 148NewsTaliban Fighters Appear Blunted in AfghanistanEric Schmitt — 26 December 2010
  79. 149NewsThe Afghan Surge is OverRajiv Chandrasekaren — 25 September 2015
  80. 150NewsWhat the numbers say about progress in AfghanistanAdam Levine — 15 October 2010
  81. 151Perry, Tom, "U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Suffer More Critical Injuries", Los Angeles Times, 7 April 2011, p. 4.
  82. 152NewsU.S.: Raids have taken out 900 Taliban leadersTom Vanden Brook — 7 March 2011
  83. 153Vanden Brook, Tom, "U.S.: Raids Have Taken Out 900 Taliban Leaders", USA Today, 8 March 2011, p. 6.
  84. 154NewsAn Uncharacteristically Upbeat General in AfghanistanRod Nordland — 24 January 2011
  85. 155NewsNato hails Afghanistan operation14 February 2010
  86. 156Afghanistan's fluffy peace jirgaCaroline Wadhams — 4 June 2010
  87. 158NewsProfile: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar21 September 2013
  88. 160White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with TalibanEwen MacAskill Simon Tisdall — 19 July 2010
  89. 161NewsTaliban Elite, Aided by NATO, Join Talks for Afghan PeaceDexter Filkins — 19 October 2010
  90. 162Fake Taliban leader 'dupes Nato negotiators'Jon Boone — 23 November 2010
  91. 163NewsThe War Logs – Interactive FeatureEric Schmitt — 25 July 2010
  92. 167NewsPakistan says had no knowledge of US bin Laden raidChris Allbritton — 3 May 2011
  93. 168NewsTaliban Say Offensive Will Begin SundayAlissa J. Rubin — 1 May 2011
  94. 173NewsObama Will Speed Pullout From War in AfghanistanMark Landler et al. — 22 June 2011
  95. 174NewsAPNEWSBREAK: Taliban Attacks Not Down After AllRobert Burns — 26 February 2013
  96. 175NewsSignaling Tensions, Pakistan Shuts NATO RouteJane Perlez et al. — 30 September 2010
  97. 178NATO 'Regrets' Pakistan StrikeNazarul Islam — 27 November 2011
  98. 182NewsHow will leaked photos impact U.S. mission in Afghanistan?Ashley Fantz — CNN — 19 April 2012
  99. 183NewsLeaders condemn US troops in body-parts photosJessica Wright — 19 April 2012
  100. 184NewsDismantling US bases as the Taliban fight onQuentin Sommerville — BBC — 19 April 2012
  101. 189NewsU.S. Is Open to Withdraw Afghan Force After 2014Mark Landler et al. — 8 January 2012
  102. 190NewsThe Afghan War's Last Chapter?12 January 2013
  103. 192NewsObama announces reduced U.S. role in Afghanistan starting this springScott Wilson et al. — 11 January 2013
  104. 193NewsObama moves up deadline for Afghans to take lead security roleChristi Parsons et al. — 11 January 2013
  105. 195Chicago NATO Summit 2012 DeclarationNATO — Defence Talk – Global Defense, Aerospace & Military Portal — 21 May 2012
  106. 196NewsNATO leaders agree on framework to wind down Afghan missionScott Wilson et al. — 21 May 2012
  107. 197NewsNATO accepts Obama timetable to end war in Afghanistan by 2014Elise Labott et al. — CNN — 22 May 2012
  108. 202NewsUS troops will end 'most' Afghanistan combat this springBBC News US & Canada — 11 January 2012
  109. 203NewsObama Accelerates Transition of Security to AfghansMark Landler et al. — 11 January 2013
  110. 205NewsBlast Mars Day of Security Handover in KabulNathan Hodge — 18 June 2013
  111. 209NewsUK to increase troops in Afghanistan from 450 to 500Rowena Mason — 8 July 2016
  112. 210NewsU.S. formally ends the war in AfghanistanCBA News — 28 December 2014
  113. 215BookWaiting for Dignity: Legitimacy and Authority in AfghanistanFlorian Weigand — Columbia University Press — 2022
  114. 216JournalAfghanistan's Taliban–legitimate jihadists or coercive extremists?Florian Weigand — 2017
  115. 226Taliban attempt to capture key Afghan citySune Engel Rasmussen — 28 September 2015
  116. 227NewsAfghan Taliban seize Kunduz city center in landmark gainFeroz Sultani Hamdard — 28 September 2015
  117. 240Taliban attempt attack on Afghan Parliament in KabulMasoud Popalzai and Jethro Mullen — CNN — 22 June 2015
  118. 246Taliban holds 'informal' peace talks with AfghanistanJames Rothwell et al. — 18 October 2016
  119. 247NewsTaliban, Afghan figures talk ceasefire but fail to agreeAmena Bakr Ahmad — 3 May 2015
  120. 295NewsOpinion | An Unprecedented Peace Offer to the TalibanHekmat Khalil Karzai — 11 March 2018
  121. 298NewsTashkent Conference Backs Afghan Government's Peace OfferRadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty — 27 March 2018
  122. 311NewsU.S. Envoy Meets Taliban In Push for Afghan Peace TalksCraig Nelson et al. — 12 October 2018
  123. 314Marginalised governmentNawid Paigham — 24 March 2019
  124. 316NewsIn Moscow, Afghan Peace Talks Without the Afghan GovernmentAndrew Higgins et al. — 4 February 2019
  125. 324NewsAfter Trump Calls Off Talks, Afghanistan Braces for ViolenceDavid Sanger et al. — 8 September 2019
  126. 334NewsA peace deal signed. Then America and the Taliban resume fighting
  127. 341NewsTaliban team arrives in Kabul to begin prisoner exchange processAbdul Qadir Sediqi — Reuters — 31 March 2020
  128. 353MagazineHistory's Warning for the U.S. Withdrawal From AfghanistanPriya Satia — 27 April 2021
  129. 354NewsBiden set to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11Phil Stewart et al. — 13 April 2021
  130. 356NewsEven the Taliban are surprised at how fast they're advancing in AfghanistanDan De Luce et al. — NBC News — 25 June 2021
  131. 357NewsNearly half of Afghanistan's provincial capitals under threat from TalibanBill Roggio — FDD's Long War Journal — 15 July 2021
  132. 358NewsMapping Taliban Contested and Controlled Districts in AfghanistanBill Roggio — FDD's Long War Journal — 25 July 2021
  133. 368BookThe Taliban at War: 2001 - 2021Antonio Giustozzi — Oxford University Press — 2022-05-01
  134. 370NewsAfghan civilian death toll reaches record highDamien Pearse and agencies — 4 February 2012
  135. 374JournalSocial science goes to war: the Human Terrain System in Iraq and AfghanistanAnthony King — 4 November 2016
  136. 376NewsAfghan civilian casualties at record high in 2016: UNAl Jazeera English — 6 February 2017
  137. 377JournalInjury profile suffered by targets of antipersonnel improvised explosive devices: prospective cohort studySmith S et al. — 2017
  138. 380Afghan RefugeesCosts of War — 2012
  139. 384NewsTaliban attack civilians to spread fear: AmnestyReuters — 24 April 2007
  140. 385NewsAfghan Rights Groups Shift Focus to TalibanRod Nordland — 10 February 2011
  141. 386BookWorld Politics: Trend and TransformationCharles W. Kegley — Cengage — 2011
  142. 392NewsAfghan Massacre Haunts PentagonLuke Harding — 14 September 2002
  143. 397BookThe Organized Crime Community: Essays in Honor of Alan A. BlockFrancisco E. Thourni — Springer — 2006
  144. 398BookOpium: uncovering the politics of the poppyPierre-Arnaud Chouvy — Harvard University Press — 2010
  145. 400How the heroin trade explains the US-UK failure in AfghanistanAlfred McCoy — The Guardian — 9 January 2018
  146. 401NewsAhmed Wali Karzai, the corrupt and lawless face of modern AfghanistanSimon Tisdall — The Guardian — 12 July 2011
  147. 402NewsTwo Decades of American Lies in AfghanistanJames Risen — The Intercept — 26 August 2021
  148. 403NewsReports Link Karzai's Brother to Afghanistan Heroin TradeJames Risen — The New York Times — 4 October 2008
  149. 404NewsAfghanistan riddled with drug tiesChristian Science Monitor
  150. 406Opium, the CIA and the Karzai AdministrationPeter Dale Scott — 12 April 2010
  151. 409NewsTaliban Outlaw Opium Poppy Cultivation in AfghanistanSafiullah Padshah et al. — 2022-04-03
  152. 414NewsPortrait of a Foreign Policy FailureBarnett R. Rubin is Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center et al. — 2025-03-18
  153. 415NewsHow climate change helped strengthen the TalibanCARA KORTE — 20 August 2021
  154. 417NewsWhy is the world at war?Jason Burke — 2018-03-04
  155. 420Could monarchy have saved Afghanistan?Gawain Towler — 17 August 2021
  156. 421JournalBold move to save Afghanistan: Bring back a kingShireen K. Burki — 30 June 2010
  157. 422A Return to Monarchy Could Solve the Afghan ConflictWahab Raofi — Foreign Policy Journal — 17 May 2018
  158. 423Afghan Kings and the Failure of U.S. Military InterventionCarlo J.V. Caro — February 12, 2020
  159. 424NewsThe Sun in the Sky: The relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan insurgentsMatt Waldman — Crisis States Research Centre — June 2010
  160. 427BookWar and peace in Afghanistan: the Pakistani role / Marvin G. Weinbaum.University of Arizona Libraries — 1991
  161. 428NewsIn Afghanistan, US Exits, and Iran Comes InCarlotta Gall — 5 August 2017
  162. 430Is China Bringing Peace to Afghanistan?Sudha Ramachandran — June 20, 2018
  163. 433NewsThe Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the WarCraig Whitlock — 9 December 2019
  164. 436Russia and Iran: Disappointed Friends of the Taliban?Antonio Giustozzi — Royal United Services Institute — 30 September 2021
  165. 437NewsKabul residents relish new freedomsCNN — 14 November 2001
  166. 438NewsKabul women keep the veilKate Clark — 24 November 2001
  167. 444NewsProtesters oppose sending more troops to AfghanistanHarold J. Adams — 6 December 2009
  168. 445NewsSaturday Word: Health Care (and Finance)Janie Lorber — 20 March 2010
  169. 453NewsU.S. could work with Taliban against terrorists, Pentagon saysRachel Pannett et al. — 2021-09-02
  170. 454Hardline Haqqani Network Put in Charge of Kabul SecurityVoice of America — 19 August 2021
  171. 455It's Crazy to Trust the HaqqanisAnchal Vohra — 27 August 2021
  172. 456NewsWhy Are Pakistan's Militant Groups Splintering?Majeed Babar — 1 October 2011
  173. 459NewsDoes Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) Actually Exist?Iftikhar Firdous — 29 April 2023
  174. 476BookDirectorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and PakistanSteve Coll — Penguin Press — 2018
  175. 477BookKilling the Cranes: A Reporter's Journey Through Three Decades of War in AfghanistanEdward Girardet — Chelsea Green Publishing — 2011
  176. 479BookState of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush AdministrationJames Risen — Simon & Schuster — 2008
  177. 480BookNATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting AloneDavid P. Auerswald et al. — Princeton University Press — 2014
  178. 481BookThe American War in Afghanistan: A HistoryCarter Malkasian — Oxford University Press — 2021
  179. 482JournalLessons on Political Violence from America's Post-9/11 WarsChristoph Mikulaschek et al. — 2018
  180. 483BookChoosing Defeat: The Twenty-Year Saga of How America Lost AfghanistanPaul D. Miller — Cambridge University Press — 2025
  181. 484JournalCreating common sense: getting NATO to AfghanistanPhilipp Münch — 2021
  182. 485ReportOperation Enduring FreedomRichard W. Stewart — United States Army — 2004
  183. 486America and the War on TerrorAEI Public Opinion Study — 24 July 2008
  184. 487BookDanger CloseSteve Call — Texas A&M University Press — 2010
  185. 488BookTaliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and BeyondAhmed Rashid — Yale University Press — 2022
  186. 489BookObama's WarsBob Woodward — Simon & Schuster — 2010

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