Six Days' Campaign
The Six Days' Campaign ran from the 10th to the 15th of February 1814, and in that brief window Napoleon I of France pulled off something that stunned even the generals sent to destroy him. His army numbered roughly 30,000 men. The force bearing down on him from one direction alone counted 50,000 to 56,000 soldiers. His troops were, by and large, inexperienced. And yet, in six days, he fought four separate engagements and won all four.
An Austrian general named Johann von Nostitz-Rieneck, who was serving on the opposing side, later said the campaign showed Napoleon's talents as a field commander "to the highest degree." That kind of tribute from an enemy is rare. It plants a question worth sitting with: how does a commander running short on men, time, and experienced soldiers deliver four consecutive victories against a much larger force? The answer lives in the particular geography of north-east France, in the scattered state of the allied army, and in a series of intelligence failures that left that army's commander, the Prussian Field Marshal Blücher, dangerously exposed. By the time Blücher understood what was happening, his force had already been cut in two.
By the start of 1814, France was being squeezed from multiple directions. The Sixth Coalition had defeated Napoleon's forces in Germany through 1813 and had pushed the French out of Spain through the Peninsular War. Now two massive armies were crossing into France from the north-east.
The Army of Bohemia, sometimes called the Grand Army, brought between 200,000 and 210,000 Austrian, Russian, Bavarian, and Wurttemberg soldiers under Prince Schwarzenberg. It crossed the Rhine between Basel and Schaffhausen on the 20th of December 1813, after passing through Swiss territory and violating the neutrality of the cantons. The Army of Silesia, smaller but aggressive, carried 50,000 to 56,000 Prussians and Russians under Blücher. It crossed the Rhine between Rastadt and Koblenz on the 1st of January 1814.
On France's south-western frontier, Wellington was pushing across the Pyrenees. Napoleon left Marshals Soult and Suchet to hold that front and took personal command in the north-east. His total manpower across all fronts stood at roughly 200,000. More than 100,000 of those were tied down facing Wellington. Another 20,000 were needed to watch the Alpine passes. That left fewer than 80,000 for the north-eastern and eastern frontiers. Numbers alone made this a losing proposition, yet Napoleon was at least fighting on home ground, where food was available and supply lines ran short.
January fighting in north-east France produced no decisive result. At the Battle of Brienne on the 29th of January 1814, Napoleon surprised Blücher at his own headquarters and came close to capturing the Prussian field marshal outright.
Blücher pulled back a few miles east to a strong position covering the exits from the Bar-sur-Aube defile, where he was joined by the Austrian advance guard. Together they decided to stand and fight at La Rothière on the 2nd of February. The weather turned against the French. Deep snow drifts swept across the field and the ground was so waterlogged that Napoleon's artillery, the weapon he depended on most, was rendered useless. French columns lost direction in the snowstorms and took heavy losses from Cossack attacks. Napoleon withdrew to Lesmont and then to Troyes. Marshal Marmont stayed behind to watch the enemy.
Schwarzenberg, notorious for a kind of strategic lethargy that exasperated his allies, made no pursuit. Blücher chafed at the inaction and on the 4th of February obtained permission from his own sovereign, King Frederick Wilhelm III, to shift his line of operations to the valley of the Marne. General Pahlen's Cossack corps was assigned to cover his left flank and keep contact with the Austrians.
Feeling protected by that screen, Blücher stretched his army across the Marne valley roads. His columns separated for foraging and shelter, which was nearly unavoidable in the brutal winter. Blücher himself spent the night of the 7th-the 8th of February at Sézanne, wanting to stay close to his intelligence sources. His corps were distributed at or near Epernay, Montmirail, and Étoges, with reinforcements still coming up from around Vitry.
What made the Six Days' Campaign possible was a chain of errors on the allied side. Each failure compounded the one before it, and together they left Blücher's army in the worst possible position when Napoleon struck.
Russian corps commander Osten-Sacken had already made contact with the leading French units on the 8th of February. He chose not to report this to Blücher. Meanwhile Blücher's own chief of staff, Gneisenau, drew the wrong conclusion from what he could see: he believed that Napoleon's movement from Villenauxe to Sézanne was nothing more than a reconnaissance, because the French cavalrymen who had come into view promptly withdrew. He did not guess that they were pulling back deliberately.
A Russian officer arrived at Blücher's headquarters late on the 9th and told headquarters the army was threatened from the south. That night, intelligence reached the staff that Napoleon himself was already at Sézanne. At almost the same moment, Blücher learned that Pahlen's Cossacks, the screen meant to protect his left flank, had been withdrawn forty-eight hours earlier without his knowledge. His flank was bare. He retreated toward Étoges and tried to pull his scattered detachments together, but Napoleon had already moved too fast.
Napoleon attacked first on the 10th of February at Champaubert, striking the central corps of the Army of Silesia. He shattered Lieutenant General Olsufiev's Russian IX Corps almost entirely. Around 4,000 Russians became casualties and Olsufiev himself was taken prisoner, while French losses ran to approximately 200 men. That single blow drove a wedge between Blücher's vanguard to the north and his main body further back.
With the army split, Napoleon turned north after the vanguard. On the 11th of February at Montmirail he defeated Osten-Sacken and Yorck; coalition casualties reached roughly 4,000 against approximately 2,000 French. The next day at Château-Thierry he struck the same forces again, inflicting about 1,250 Prussian and 1,500 Russian casualties and capturing nine cannons, at a cost of roughly 600 French dead and wounded. The allied vanguard was driven across the Marne and forced to escape north-east.
Napoleon then reversed direction and fell on the main body. On the 14th of February, near Étoges, he met Blücher himself at Vauchamps. Around 7,000 Prussians became casualties and 16 cannons were lost; French losses were again close to 600. Blücher's pursuit was broken off near Vertus. Napoleon left Marshals Mortier and Marmont to manage the broken remnants of the Army of Silesia and turned his own attention south, racing back to Troyes to face the second allied force under Schwarzenberg.
Through all four battles Napoleon had fought at a numerical disadvantage. He compensated by relying heavily on the Imperial Guard and by targeting each fragment of the enemy army before it could join the others.
Ralph Ashby, writing in Napoleon Against Great Odds in 2010, summed up what the six days had done to Blücher's force: the Army of Silesia had lost roughly a third of its total strength, and the men who survived were, in his words, "whipped and demoralized." Napoleon's 30,000-man army suffered 3,400 casualties overall. Blücher's force of 50,000 to 56,000 absorbed 17,750.
David Zabecki, writing in Germany at War in 2014, noted that the campaign resulted in the elimination of approximately 20,000 enemy troops, which nearly halved the coalition force Napoleon then faced in that sector. Zabecki emphasized that Napoleon achieved those results through "careful tactical manoeuvring" rather than the kind of mass assault that had characterized earlier French campaigns.
Michael Leggiere, in Blücher: Scourge of Napoleon published in 2014, quoted Nostitz-Rieneck's observation that Napoleon defeated five enemy corps in sequence, and then posed the harder question: by failing to destroy Blücher's army completely and drive its remnants back into Germany, Napoleon missed what may have been his only real chance to force the Coalition Powers toward negotiations on anything close to his terms. Five days after the defeat at Vauchamps, the Army of Silesia had been replenished and was back on the offensive.
Schwarzenberg, commanding the larger Army of Bohemia, outnumbered Napoleon six to one but ordered a retreat the moment word of Napoleon's victories reached him. He left a rearguard under the Prince of Württemberg to fight at Montereau.
On the 22nd of February a council of war convened near Troyes among coalition leaders. They offered Napoleon an armistice: he could keep his throne if France returned to its 1791 borders. Napoleon refused unless they agreed to the 1813 Frankfurt proposals, which offered more favorable terms. On the 28th of February coalition forces resumed their advance, and Napoleon continued to inflict defeats on both Schwarzenberg's and Blücher's armies through late March.
The turning point came at the Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube on the 20th of March. Austrian forces numbered 80,000 against Napoleon's dwindling 28,000. Recognizing that he could no longer defeat the coalition armies in piecemeal fashion, Napoleon decided to move east to Saint-Dizier, rally garrison troops, and attempt to cut coalition supply lines while raising resistance behind the allied advance. He outlined this plan in a letter that was intercepted by his enemies.
Coalition commanders met at Pougy on the 23rd of March and initially voted to follow Napoleon. The next day Tsar Alexander I of Russia and King Frederick of Prussia reconsidered. Aware of how badly weakened Napoleon had become, they chose to march directly on Paris, then an open city, and let Napoleon threaten their communications. Paris fell on the 31st of March after Marshals Marmont and Mortier, holding the Montmartre heights, judged further resistance hopeless. Napoleon signed an unconditional abdication and was exiled to the island of Elba. The Treaty of Paris formally ended the War of the Sixth Coalition on the 30th of May 1814.
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Common questions
When did the Six Days' Campaign take place?
The Six Days' Campaign was fought from the 10th to the 15th of February 1814, during the campaign in north-east France as the Sixth Coalition moved toward Paris.
What battles were fought during the Six Days' Campaign?
Napoleon fought four battles: Champaubert on the 10th of February, Montmirail on the 11th, Château-Thierry on the 12th, and Vauchamps on the 14th. All four were French victories against elements of Blücher's Army of Silesia.
How many casualties did Napoleon inflict during the Six Days' Campaign?
Napoleon's force of approximately 30,000 men inflicted around 17,750 casualties on Blücher's army of 50,000-56,000, while suffering only 3,400 losses of their own. The Army of Silesia lost roughly a third of its total strength.
Why was the Six Days' Campaign considered a masterpiece of tactics?
Austrian general Johann von Nostitz-Rieneck said the campaign displayed Napoleon's talents as a field commander "to the highest degree" because he defeated five enemy corps in sequence while outnumbered, using careful manoeuvre rather than mass assault. He achieved this despite commanding a largely inexperienced army.
Who was Blücher and what role did he play in the Six Days' Campaign?
Field Marshal Blücher commanded the Army of Silesia, a Russo-Prussian force of 50,000-56,000 men that Napoleon targeted during the campaign. A series of intelligence failures left his army scattered along the Marne valley, allowing Napoleon to defeat its corps individually before Blücher could concentrate his forces.
What happened to Napoleon after the Six Days' Campaign?
Napoleon continued fighting but was ultimately outmaneuvered after his plan to cut coalition supply lines was exposed when a letter outlining his strategy was captured. Paris fell on the 31st of March 1814, and Napoleon signed an unconditional abdication and was exiled to the island of Elba. The Treaty of Fontainebleau formalized his abdication, and the War of the Sixth Coalition officially ended with the Treaty of Paris on the 30th of May 1814.
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1 references cited across the entry
- 1harvnbChandler (1999) p. 87, 90, 286–87, 459Chandler — 1999