Operation Ichi-Go

• 1. Strategic Objectives And Planning

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  Emperor Hirohito approved the offensive on the 24th of January 1944. The Imperial General Staff sought to secure an overland rail route through French Indochina and China for raw materials from south-east Asia. These resources were intended to develop offensives in 1946. A second goal was neutralizing United States Army Air Forces bases near Chengdu, Sichuan. American bombers launched attacks from these locations against the Japanese homeland and shipping lanes. Japan decided to attack in Burma and China to improve its position after Allied victories eroded their defensive perimeter in the Pacific. General Yasuji Okamura took charge of Operation Ichi-Go. By early February, preparations along the Yangtze included repairs to a major bridge and air field maintenance. The Imperial Japanese Army mobilized 500,000 troops, 100,000 horses, 1,500 pieces of artillery, 800 tanks, 15,000 mechanised vehicles, and 200 bombers. They carried eight months of fuel and two years of ammunition. Historian Hara Takeshi described it as the largest military operation carried out in the history of the Japanese army.

• 2. Economic Collapse And Chinese Readiness

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  The Chinese economy started collapsing in 1941. China entered the war in 1937 with a primarily agrarian economy and quickly lost much of its industrial capacity to the Japanese. Maintaining forces imposed an unsustainable burden on an economy further weakened by blockade, shortages of staple goods, poor weather, and inflation. Widespread famine occurred from 1942. The government encouraged the military to produce its own food to respond to economic pressure. Some troops entered industry and smuggling activities. This self-sufficiency drive reduced military preparedness and increased corruption. By Operation Ichi-Go, the effectiveness of the Chinese military had plummeted. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, China agreed to major combined operations in Burma on the condition that Western Allies committed significant resources. No such commitment occurred. In January 1944, Chiang warned US President Franklin D. Roosevelt that prioritizing Europe would encourage Japan to attack and knock China out of the war. China believed a Japanese offensive was imminent in late-March. American ambassador Clarence E. Gauss provided corroborating reports. China sought to reinforce defenses with Yunnan-based Y Force, which was earmarked for Burma. The United States threatened to halt Lend-Lease if Y Force was withheld from Stilwell in Burma. Ultimately, Y Force joined the Allied campaign in Burma in mid-May as Operation Ichi-Go was underway.

• 3. The Henan Campaign Phase

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  The first phase of Operation Ichi-Go, codenamed Kogo, opened on the 17th of April. It involved capturing the Beijing, Hankou railway in Henan and destroying the Republic of China's First War Zone. Sixty thousand to seventy thousand Japanese troops participated in this operation. General Jiang Dingwen commanded the First War Zone with General Tang Enbo as deputy. The zone held only 6,000 to 7,000 troops, representing 60% to 70% of its authorized strength. USAF General Claire Chennault described the troops as a poorly disciplined mob. Divisional commander Lu Gongliang died when Xuchang fell on the 1st of May. Deputy divisional commander Huang Yonghuai also died that day. Two regimental commanders were killed alongside them. None of the officers of the divisional headquarters were found after defenders broke out. Tang's 31st Army Group reported casualties of the New 29th Division as 4,092 killed, wounded, or missing. Senshi Sōsho put Chinese losses at 2,432 killed and 858 captured. Japanese losses stood at 50 killed and 149 wounded. Chiang intended to allow the Japanese to close around Luoyang before attacking flanks once they became overextended. He requested permission to attack as early as the 23rd of April but did not receive it until the 1st of May. By then the Japanese had advanced too far. The Japanese encircled Luoyang on the 14th of May and captured the city on the 25th of May. The Chinese lost more than 19,000 troops from three divisions defending the city.

• 4. Battles For Changsha And Hengyang

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  The next phase was Togo 1 with the objective of securing the Guangzhou, Hankou railway from Wuhan to Hengyang. It started on the 27th of May and involved 200,000 Japanese troops advancing south from Wuhan to Changsha. Central China was defended by another 400,000 troops. General Xue Yue commanded the Ninth War Zone which defended Changsha. The zone had held the city against three Japanese campaigns from 1939 to 1942. Strategy involved a fighting withdrawal combined with scorched earth tactics. On the 29th of May, the ROC Military Affairs Commission ordered Changsha to be held to defend USAF air bases. Chiang refused to send supplies because he believed Xue was disloyal. The Japanese reached Changsha in early June. The city was defended by three understrength Chinese divisions commanded by General Zhang Deneng. Two of the divisions and artillery were on Yuelu Mountain south of the city across the Xiang River. One of two attacking Japanese divisions had urban warfare training. Japanese bombers attacked artillery on Yuelu while infantry moved around the city to attack from the south. Zhang's redeployment of troops disorganized the defense. Staff officers could not organize movement over the Xiang, leaving many units stranded. The Japanese took Changsha on the 18th of June after three days of fighting. Xue retreated south to Hengyang where 18,000 troops defended the city.

• 5. Guangxi Advance And Final Withdrawal

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  Japanese forces entered Guangxi in early September 1944 and quickly captured US air bases at Guilin, Liuzhou, and Nanning. The 170,000 Nationalist troops defending northern Guangxi were largely unwilling to fight and units disintegrated. Leaders of the Guangxi Clique like General Bai Chongxi decided that neither Guilin nor Liuzhou could be successfully defended. Chinese forces abandoned those cities. In late November 1944, the Japanese advance slowed approximately 300 kilometers from Chongqing as it experienced shortages of trained soldiers and materiel. Overextended supply lines and mounting casualties caused the Japanese to end Operation Ichi-Go. American bombers in Chengdu were moved to the Mariana Islands where they could still bomb the Japanese home islands. The Japanese also failed to destroy Mission 204 which had been working with the Chinese. Before US bases were overrun, the mission left China and returned to Burma. ROC 8th War Zone in Guizhou was redeployed to fight the Japanese toward the end of Operation Ichi-Go. Until mid-November, Imperial Japanese Army had an illness toll of 66,000. A field hospital took in 6,164 soldiers, 2,281 of which died due to malnutrition. The total death toll reached about 100,000 by the end of 1944.

• 6. Political Fallout And Stilwell Crisis

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  After the battle of central Henan, Chiang convened with his generals starting from the 21st of July in meetings known as the Huangshan Conference. He assessed that there were too many vacancies in each unit reducing fighting capabilities. He ordered He Yingqin to verify that each division was at full strength. In November 1944, He Yingqin resigned as Ministry of Military Affairs and Chen Cheng took over his position. There were still 5.9 million troops by then. From January until March 1945, Chen Cheng worked to eliminate unneeded personnel and reduce vacancies. By the end of the war, Chen Cheng had reduced the army to 4.3 million personnel. The poor performance of Chiang's forces became widely viewed as demonstrating incompetence. Stilwell saw Operation Ichi-Go as an opportunity to win his political struggle against Chiang. He convinced General George Marshall to have President Roosevelt send an ultimatum to Chiang threatening to end all American aid unless Chiang placed Stilwell in unrestricted command. Stilwell immediately delivered this letter despite pleas from Patrick Hurley to delay. A defiant Chiang gave a formal reply saying Stilwell must be replaced immediately. Stilwell was replaced as Chief of Staff to Chiang and commander of US Forces China Theater by Major General Albert Wedemeyer.

• 7. Long Term Consequences For Civil War

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  The Japanese successes in Operation Ichi-Go had limited effect on the broader war. Japan never got time or resources needed to achieve final victory over China. Operation Ichi-Go created great social confusion in affected areas of China. Chinese Communist guerrillas exploited this confusion to gain influence and control of greater countryside areas. Historian Hans van de Ven argues that impact on political situation was as important to post-war world order as Operation Overlord and Operation Bagration were in Europe. Kuomintang corruption and other factors allowed Communists to gain victory in resumed Chinese Civil War after World War II. In spring 1945, United States agreed to train and equip 36 Chinese divisions. China began planning counter-offensive for fall of 1945 called White Tower and Iceman to recapture coastal ports. The 1958 novel The Mountain Road by Theodore White was based on interview with former OSS Major Frank Gleason who led demolition group during offensive. His group destroyed over 150 bridges and 50,000 tons of munitions helping slow Japanese advance. In 1960 it was adapted into film starring James Stewart and Lisa Lu.