Cairo Conference

• 1. Origins Of The Meeting

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  The idea for the Cairo Conference originated from a gathering of foreign ministers in Moscow during October 1943. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull lobbied the Soviet Union to include China as one of the four powers alongside the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. This proposal faced resistance because the Soviet Union had signed a neutrality pact with Japan. Despite this friction, all three major allies eventually accepted the American plan to invite the Republic of China to sign the Moscow Declaration on the 1st of November 1943. President Franklin D. Roosevelt then telegraphed an invitation to Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek to join him and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at a summit in Egypt. Security concerns initially pushed planners toward Khartoum or Malta, but both locations lacked suitable accommodation. Churchill insisted on holding the meeting in Cairo itself, deploying a brigade of British troops to install anti-aircraft guns and defensive radar networks around the city. The conference took place between November 22 and 26, 1943, at the residence of Alexander Comstock Kirk, the American ambassador to Egypt.

• 2. Personalities And Power Struggles

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  Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Cairo on Sunday, November 21, accompanied by his wife Soong Mei-ling and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Churchill invited the couple to dinner before briefing them on British military plans in various theaters of war. Tensions flared immediately as Churchill held a conservative colonialist mindset that refused to believe Asians could unite for victory. He was prejudiced against China and did not want it to become a world power. Lord Alan Brooke, the British Chief of Staff, expressed even more contempt for the Chinese position. In contrast, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt envisioned a new world where European colonies would grant independence to their territories. Roosevelt wanted the Four Policemen to guide the post-war world from potential conflicts. This vision clashed with Churchill's desire for Britain to dominate Asia after the war. John Patton Davies, Second Secretary of the US Embassy in Chongqing, sent a memorandum warning against using US troops to help rebuild colonial empires. He pointed out levels of corruption within the Chinese National Army and suggested opening an overland line of communication instead. Chiang found Roosevelt's demeanor superb but had no high hopes for Britain or the United States regarding future sacrifices.

• 3. Debates Over Burma Campaigns

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  Lord Louis Mountbatten presented three operational plans during the conference: Operation Tarzan, Operation Musket, and Operation Buccaneer. Operation Tarzan called for four Indian divisions to cross the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line in mid-January 1944. Operation Musket involved capturing Cape Sumatra to recapture Singapore, which Churchill favored. Operation Buccaneer proposed seizing the Andaman Islands south of Rangoon to cut Japanese supply lines. Chiang insisted that land operations in northern Burma must be coupled with massive naval amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal. The British argued that land and naval operations could run separately due to long distances and Navy commitments elsewhere. Admiral Ernest King of the US Navy was less enthusiastic about counteroffensives in Southeast Asia. He stated that the main theater should remain the Pacific Ocean rather than continental Asia. Churchill eventually agreed to land on the Andaman Islands under pressure from US representatives. However, he told Chiang that the navy could not be dispatched to the Indian Ocean until after Italy surrendered. The British Chief of Staff Alan Brooke pointed out that pursuing amphibious landings would require postponing the landing of troops in France. This disagreement over timing and resources created a fragile alliance between the three nations.

• 4. Drafting The Cairo Declaration

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  The Cairo Declaration was issued on the 1st of December 1943, following the conclusion of the conference. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's special secretary, drafted the document before it was amended by Roosevelt and revised by Churchill. The declaration demanded Japan surrender unconditionally and return all occupied lands to China. It specified that territories taken since the September 18 Incident, including Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. The text also stated that Korea shall become free and independent in due course. Churchill removed a specific reference to an attack route from China and Southeast Asia because mobilizing landing ships for the Bay of Bengal would hinder Normandy landings. The declaration made no mention of the future status of the Ryukyu Islands, which China believed should be returned entirely. The United States argued these islands could remain with Japan if demilitarized. Dalian was designated as a free port while Lushun became a public military port for both China and the US. Chiang accepted the terms regarding Japanese industries but declined American offers to control French Indochina. He strongly advocated for Korean independence and assistance for Vietnam.

• 5. Cancellation Of Naval Operations

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  At the subsequent Tehran Conference held from November 28 to December 1, Stalin controlled strategic discussions. He proposed ending World War II rapidly and making the strategic importance of China secondary. Churchill declared fighting deep in Burma's swamps like jumping into the sea to fight sharks. He urged Roosevelt to break his promise to Chiang regarding amphibious operations. On December 5, Roosevelt agreed to cancel Operation Buccaneer after consulting his military advisers. He telegraphed Chiang suggesting China launch counterattacks alone or wait until November 1944 when Allied naval capabilities improved. Churchill insisted on allocating landing craft to the European theater instead of the Pacific. The British-American Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to cancel Operation Tarzan while arguing that occupying Andaman Islands was worth the loss. Mountbatten drew up alternative plans for attacking northern and central Burma without the promised southern amphibious assault. In January 1944, Stilwell commanded Chinese Expeditionary Forces to advance on Mon-Kwan. Chiang refused to accept small attacks on the Rakhine coast as a substitute for the cancelled operation.

• 6. Broken Promises And Aid Cuts

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  Roosevelt verbally pledged to increase airlift supply to China to 12,000 tons per month but failed to fulfill this commitment. He also promised to equip and train 90 army divisions for China, equipping 30 immediately and another 60 later. The latter promise was never fulfilled by August 1945 when US President Harry Truman reneged on the equipment pledge. After learning of Operation Buccaneer's cancellation, Chiang asked to borrow one billion US dollars. Roosevelt turned down the request before it reached Congress, viewing it as extortion. He limited monthly troop costs in China to twenty-five million US dollars. To support B-29 Superfortress bombers, 450,000 civilian workers built nine airfields with 9,000-foot runways in Chengdu. Despite these efforts, aid to China became less significant by 1945. Roosevelt admitted to General George Marshall that he was disgusted with events in the China-Burma-India theater. He confessed that they had broken their word every time without fulfilling any promises. This breakdown in trust marked a turning point in Sino-American relations during the war.

• 7. Post-War Geopolitical Legacy

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  The Cairo Conference established China's status as one of four world powers with great political significance. It formalized the framework for collaboration among the Four Policemen: the United States, British Empire, Soviet Union, and Republic of China. The declaration influenced post-war territorial adjustments including Korean independence and the return of Manchuria and Formosa to China. However, the Yalta Conference in February 1945 resulted in Lushun becoming a Soviet leased military port, causing a loss of Chinese sovereignty. Historian Rana Mitter notes that modern interest in the conference stems from its symbolism of treating Chiang as an equal. The text also legitimizes claims to disputed islands like the Senkaku Islands according to present Chinese government views. Following the announcement, Emperor Hirohito convened the Imperial Council where moderate forces grew in power compared to militarists. In July 1945, the Potsdam Proclamation used the Cairo Declaration as the basis for Japan's unconditional surrender. By 1945, aid to China was brought only by the Stilwell Highway, rendering earlier strategic plans largely irrelevant.