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— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

Battle of Guilin–Liuzhou

4 min listen · Ch. 1 of 5
5 sections
  • The Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou put two of southern China's most storied cities in the crosshairs of the largest Japanese land offensive of the entire Second Sino-Japanese War. On the 1st of November, when Japanese forces began their assault on Guilin, only 20,000 Chinese troops stood in the city to meet them. The question the rest of this documentary will answer is not simply whether those soldiers could hold the line. It is why the Chinese government chose to fight a battle it already knew it would lose, and what the cost of that choice turned out to be.

  • The Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou was the third and final chapter of the Battle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi, a massive Japanese campaign formally called Operation Ichigo. Japan's strategic aims were twofold. The first was to stitch together the scattered pockets of Japanese-held territory across mainland China into one continuous corridor. The second was to destroy the airbases in the region that were sheltering aircraft of the United States Army Air Forces, which had been hitting Japanese positions from those fields.

    In August, after completing battles in Hunan and Guangdong, the Japanese 11th Army turned toward Guilin and the 23rd Army turned toward Liuzhou, advancing on both cities at once. The forces they would face were already spent. The Chinese defenders in the area were largely survivors from the earlier Battle of Hengyang, units that had been ground down in heavy fighting before being pushed toward Guilin. By the time Japanese pressure arrived, those battered remnants were all that stood between the advancing columns and the city.

  • General Bai Chongxi, a Muslim general commanding the Guangxi provincial troops, had spent considerable effort fortifying the city. Guilin's hills were threaded with trenches, its approaches studded with pillboxes and barbed wire. General Joseph Stilwell, who had a friendly relationship with Bai, went to great pains to route American munitions to Bai's forces.

    Yet the Chinese government in Chongqing already accepted that Guilin could not be saved. The decision to fight on regardless was driven by domestic political calculation rather than military logic. To manage public perception, the government sent food and supplies to the besieged garrison. Most civilians had already read the situation clearly and fled the city weeks before the battle began. Those who remained watched Guilin scorched heavily by fire as the defense stiffened and then collapsed.

  • After ten days of intense fighting, Japanese forces occupied Guilin. On that same day, they entered Liuzhou as well. The speed with which both cities fell set off a rapid Chinese retreat across the wider region. Fighting continued in sporadic bursts as the Japanese extended their grip, and by the 24th of November they controlled 75 counties across Guangxi, roughly two-thirds of the province's total area.

    The human toll fell most heavily on civilians. Japanese forces are said to have killed 215,000 civilians in reprisal and during crossfire, and to have wounded more than 431,000 others across the territory they seized. For the National Revolutionary Army, the fall of the two cities triggered a collapse in morale among the broader force. Most NRA troops abandoned their positions and retreated without ever engaging the enemy, leaving behind tremendous quantities of equipment and men.

  • Japan's destruction of the USAAF airbases in the Guilin-Liuzhou corridor did not achieve the effect the operation's planners had hoped for. American aircraft could still reach the Japanese home islands from bases elsewhere in the region, so the air threat was not eliminated, only displaced. The campaign's final balance sheet contained a paradox that its architects had not fully anticipated.

    By overrunning such a large swath of Guangxi, Japanese forces took on responsibility for defending a territory that sharply stretched their lines. The area under Japanese control expanded faster than the manpower available to hold it. That thinning of Japanese defensive depth would set up favorable conditions for subsequent Chinese counterattacks, a consequence that made Operation Ichigo's apparent success considerably more complicated than the fall of two cities suggested. The Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou stands as one of the 22 major engagements between the National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army during the war, and historians have called it one of the most devastating Chinese losses of the entire conflict.

Common questions

What was the Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou and when did it take place?

The Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou was the third part of Operation Ichigo, the large Japanese campaign also called the Battle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi, fought during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese assault on Guilin began on the 1st of November, and by the 24th of November Japanese forces controlled 75 counties across Guangxi, roughly two-thirds of the province.

Why did Japan attack Guilin and Liuzhou during Operation Ichigo?

Japan's two main objectives were to connect scattered pieces of Japanese-held territory across mainland China into a continuous corridor and to destroy airbases in the region that housed USAAF aircraft. The 11th Army advanced on Guilin while the 23rd Army targeted Liuzhou simultaneously.

Who commanded the Chinese defense of Guilin during the battle?

Muslim General Bai Chongxi commanded the Guangxi troops defending Guilin. General Joseph Stilwell, who had a friendly relationship with Bai, went to great pains to send American munitions to Bai's forces.

How many Chinese troops defended Guilin when the Japanese attack began?

Only 20,000 troops were at Guilin on the 1st of November when the Japanese started their attack. Most were remnants from the earlier Battle of Hengyang, already depleted from prior fighting.

How many civilians were killed or wounded during the Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou?

Japanese forces are said to have killed 215,000 civilians in reprisal and during crossfire, and wounded more than 431,000 others across the territory they seized in Guangxi.

Did Japan succeed in destroying the USAAF airbases during the Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou?

Japan did destroy the airbases in the Guilin-Liuzhou region, but the USAAF could still strike at the Japanese home islands from other bases. The operation also stretched Japanese defensive lines thin across the large territory they had seized, creating favorable conditions for subsequent Chinese counterattacks.

All sources

8 references cited across the entry

  1. 1Book抗日戰史: 桂柳會戰History and Political Compilation Department — Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China) — 1981
  2. 2Book中國陸軍第三方面軍抗戰紀實Gou Jitang — Wenxing Bookstore — 1962
  3. 3Book一号作戦<3>広西の会戦War History Office of the National Defence College of Japan — Asagumo Shimbunsha — 1966
  4. 4Book民间记忆 桂林1937-1945Peng Minling — Guangxi Normal University Press — 1991
  5. 5Book侵华日军大屠杀暴行Liu Jingshan — People's Daily Publishing House — 2005
  6. 8BookUnited States Army in World War II China-Burma-India Theater Stillwell's Command ProblemsCharles F. Romanus et al. — Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army — 1956