Karl Dönitz

• 1. Introduction

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  Karl Dönitz spent the last days of the Second World War not in a submarine, but in the office of the German head of state. Born on the 16th of September 1891 in Grünau, near Berlin, he rose from a junior naval officer to become the man Adolf Hitler chose as his successor. When Hitler died by suicide on the 30th of April 1945, Dönitz inherited what remained of a collapsing empire. He held the title of President of Germany for less than a month before the Allied powers dissolved his government.

  Before that strange final chapter, Dönitz had spent years orchestrating one of the most devastating submarine campaigns in history. He developed the wolfpack tactic that terrorised Allied shipping across the Atlantic. He oversaw a fleet that sank hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo each month. And he sent roughly 40,000 men to sea, of whom around 30,000 never came home.

  How did a man captured as a prisoner of war in 1918 come to command the entire German Navy? What drove him to keep sending submarines into battle long after the strategic situation had turned irreversibly against him? And how did a dedicated naval officer end up standing trial at Nuremberg as a major war criminal?

• 2. From Prisoner to Fleet Commander

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  On the 4th of October 1918, Dönitz surfaced his submarine under duress after technical failures and scuttled the boat. British forces captured him and sent him to the Redmires camp near Sheffield, where he remained until 1919. He returned to Germany in 1920 and resumed his naval career under the Weimar Republic.

  The path from prisoner to submarine fleet commander was gradual and deliberate. By the 1st of September 1933, he held the rank of Fregattenkapitän and commanded the cruiser Emden, the vessel used for cadet training voyages around the world. Two years later, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 permitted Germany to possess submarines again, and Dönitz was placed in charge of the Weddigen flotilla, a small group of three boats.

  Dönitz used the interwar years to refine an idea that had first appealed to him in 1917. He revived a concept traced to Hermann Bauer: grouping multiple submarines together, the Rudeltaktik, or wolfpack, to overwhelm convoy escorts. The technical barrier that had made this unworkable in the First World War, the limitations of radio, had been addressed by Germany's development of ultra-high-frequency transmitters. The Enigma cipher machine was believed to have secured communications completely.

  In January 1939 he published his tactical ideas in a booklet called Die U-Bootwaffe. The British Admiralty, confident in ASDIC sonar technology, apparently took little notice. By the time war began, Dönitz had 57 boats, of which only 27 could reach the Atlantic from German bases. He believed he could win the war with 300 vessels. He would spend the entire conflict fighting to get close to that number.

• 3. The Wolfpack War

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  On Sunday the 3rd of September 1939, Dönitz chaired a conference at Wilhelmshaven when the signal "Total Germany" arrived from the British Admiralty, intercepted by B-Dienst. His staff reportedly heard him pace the room repeating "My God! So it's war with England again!" Within an hour he returned composed and addressed his officers directly: "We know our enemy. We have today the weapon and a leadership that can face up to this enemy."

  The early months brought complications nobody had anticipated. Faulty German torpedoes plagued convoy attacks throughout the Norwegian campaign, to the point that Dönitz wrote in May 1940, "I doubt whether men have ever had to rely on such a useless weapon." In no fewer than 40 attacks on Allied warships, not a single sinking was achieved. Defective magnetic pistols had to be replaced with contact fuses.

  The fall of France changed everything. Germany acquired U-boat bases at Lorient, Brest, Saint-Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bordeaux, dramatically extending the operational range of the Type VII submarines. The period from June 1940 into 1941, which U-boat crews called the "First Happy Time", saw heavy Allied shipping losses. The most celebrated commanders of this era included Otto Kretschmer, Joachim Schepke, and Gunther Prien. Their successes owed much to poorly defended shipping lanes. Within the space of several days in March 1941, Prien and Schepke were dead and Kretschmer was a prisoner, all lost in battle with convoy escorts.

  Dönitz concentrated his forces against convoys, ordering attacks on the surface at night, where ASDIC could not detect a submarine. He was involved in daily operations personally and debriefed captains directly, cultivating a rapport between commander and crew. He gave awards without bureaucratic delay, describing decorations as psychologically important.

• 4. Intelligence and the Broken Codes

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  On the 7th of May 1941, the Royal Navy captured the German Arctic meteorological vessel München and took its Enigma machine intact, allowing the decryption of U-boat radio traffic in June of that year. Two days later, the capture of U-110 was an even larger windfall. The settings for high-level officer-only signals, short-signal codes, and the standardised messages designed to defeat direction-finding by their brevity were all recovered.

  Beginning in August 1941, Bletchley Park operatives could read signals between Dönitz and his submarines at sea without restriction. The capture of U-110 enabled the Admiralty to identify individual boats, their commanders, operational readiness, damage reports, position, type, speed, and endurance. The Germans remained convinced Enigma was unbreakable. When Dönitz became suspicious about Allied foreknowledge, the BdU concluded the explanation was internal sabotage rather than cryptographic penetration, and responded by reducing staff numbers, which worsened the very problem of over-centralisation that made the signals so exploitable.

  On the 1st of February 1942, Germany introduced the M4 cipher machine, which secured communications until it was cracked again in December 1942. Even during the intelligence blackout, the Allies suffered severe losses. The Admiralty later stated that Germany had never come so near to disrupting Atlantic communications as in the first twenty days of March 1943.

  At the height of the battle in mid-1943, around 2,000 signals were being sent from the 110 U-boats at sea. That volume of radio traffic gave the Allies more material to work with for direction-finding. The over-centralised BdU structure, with its insistence on micromanaging operations, provided Allied intelligence services a constant stream of data to exploit.

• 5. Black May and Collapse

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  By April 1943, U-boat morale was reaching a crisis point. Ninety-eight new boats had been sent into the Atlantic that month, but their crews were inexperienced. Fifteen U-boats were destroyed in March and another fifteen in April. Werner Hartenstein and Johann Mohr were notable losses across those eight weeks. Hartenstein's decision to rescue survivors of a ship he had sunk led to the Laconia Order, Dönitz's instruction to stop such rescues, which later formed part of the criminal case against him at Nuremberg.

  The decisive factor was air power. In late March 1943, twenty Very Long Range aircraft were operational, rising to forty-one by mid-April. Twenty-eight anti-submarine squadrons and eleven anti-shipping squadrons were available to RAF Coastal Command, totalling 619 aircraft. The combination of escort carriers, support groups, and land-based aircraft closed the mid-Atlantic gap that had been the U-boats' sanctuary.

  From the 10th to the 24th of May 1943, ten convoys passed through the mid-Atlantic. Only six of the 370 ships were sunk. Thirteen U-boats were destroyed. On the 24th of May, Dönitz conceded defeat and withdrew surviving crews from the field of battle. They had already lost 33 U-boats before that withdrawal. By the end of May the total had risen to 41. Dönitz described the suspension as temporary, claiming the battle would be resumed when German weapons were no longer at a disadvantage. The Admiralty's official historian wrote that the collapse of the U-boat offensive came so suddenly it took the Germans completely by surprise.

  Dönitz refused to pull the submarines from combat entirely, reasoning that the ships, men, and aircraft engaged in suppressing the U-boats would otherwise be turned directly against Germany. The battle would continue, but the strategic initiative was gone permanently.

• 6. Head of State

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  Hitler's last will and testament named Dönitz as his successor, and on the 30th of April 1945 that succession became operational. Dönitz held the title of President of Germany and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. His first cabinet took the name of Joseph Goebbels, who was second-in-command, until Goebbels died by suicide and the cabinet was reformed into what became known as the Flensburg Government.

  On the 7th of May 1945, Dönitz ordered Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, to sign the German Instrument of Surrender at Reims in France, formally ending the war in Europe. The Allied powers dissolved his government on the 23rd of May, with the legal dissolution following on the 5th of June.

  By his own admission, Dönitz was a dedicated Nazi and supporter of Hitler. He had expressed it plainly in August 1943, saying of Hitler that "anyone who thinks he can do better than the Fuhrer is stupid." After the war, he claimed ignorance of the Holocaust. At Nuremberg he was indicted on three counts: conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. He was found not guilty on the charge of crimes against humanity, but guilty on the other two. The court sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment.

  After his release, Dönitz lived in a village near Hamburg until his death on the 24th of December 1980. The human cost of the campaign he commanded had been enormous. Around 30,000 of the 40,000 men who served in U-boats perished. Of 648 U-boats lost, 429 were sunk with no survivors, and 215 were lost on their very first patrol.