Battle of Leyte Gulf

• 1. Strategic Context And Objectives

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  The Battle of Leyte Gulf began on the 23rd of October 1944 and ended on the 26th of that same month. It involved over 200,000 naval personnel across more than 100,000 square miles of ocean. By late 1944, the Japanese fleet had become much weaker than that of the Allied forces. The Imperial Japanese Navy contained fewer capital ships like aircraft carriers and battleships than the Allies possessed in their carrier groups alone. Senior Japanese military leaders understood after the catastrophic Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 that their remaining naval forces were incapable of achieving a strategic victory against the Allies. Despite this reality, the Japanese general staff believed that continuing to contest Allied offensives at sea was necessary to deter an invasion of mainland Japan. They sought to give the Japanese navy an opportunity to use its remaining strength one last time. As a result, the Imperial Japanese Navy mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to repel the Allied invasion of the Philippines. The battle consisted of four main engagements including the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Cape Engaño, and the Battle off Samar. Allied forces announced the end of organized Japanese resistance on the island of Leyte at the end of December. This engagement marked the first battle in which Japanese aircraft carried out organized kamikaze attacks. It also stands as the last-ever battle between battleships.

• 2. Submarine Ambush In Palawan Passage

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  Kurita's powerful Center Force sortied from its base in Brunei in October 1944 for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. His force included five battleships, ten heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 15 destroyers. The Yamato and Musashi were two of the largest warships in service at the time, each displacing more than 60,000 tons. Kurita's ships passed Palawan Island around midnight on the 22nd and the 23rd of October. American submarines Darter and Dace positioned themselves together on the surface close by. At 01:16 on the 23rd of October, Darters radar detected the Japanese formation in the Palawan Passage at a range of 18,000 yards. Her captain promptly made visual contact. The two submarines quickly moved off in pursuit of the ships while Darter made the first of three contact reports. At least one of these was picked up by a radio operator on Yamato, but Kurita failed to take appropriate antisubmarine precautions. Darter and Dace traveled on the surface at full power for several hours and gained a position ahead of Kurita's formation with the intention of making a submerged attack at first light. This attack was unusually successful. At 05:24, Darter fired a salvo of six torpedoes, at least four of which hit Kurita's flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago. Ten minutes later, using her stern tubes to launch another spread of torpedoes, Darter made two hits on Atagos sister ship, Takao. At 05:56, Dace made four torpedo hits on the heavy cruiser Maya. Atago and Maya both went down quickly with significant loss of life. Atago sank so rapidly that Kurita was forced to swim to survive though he was rescued by the Japanese destroyer and then later transferred to the battleship Yamato.

• 3. Aerial Warfare In The Sibuyan Sea

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  On the morning of the 24th of October, only three groups were available to strike Kurita's force. One best positioned to do so, Gerald F. Bogan's Task Group 38.2, was by mischance the weakest of the groups containing only one large carrier and the light carriers Independence and Princeton. Vice Admiral Takijirō Onishi directed three waves of aircraft from his First Air Fleet based on Luzon against the carriers of Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman's TG 38.3. Each of Onishi's strike waves consisted of some 50 to 60 aircraft. Most of the attacking Japanese planes were intercepted and shot down or driven off by Hellcats of Sherman's combat air patrol. However, one Japanese aircraft, a Yokosuka D4Y3 Judy, slipped through the defences. At 09:38 it hit the light carrier Princeton with an armor-piercing bomb. Just prior to the bomb hitting the carrier ten fighter planes had landed on the flight deck from a previous mission. In the hangar deck six fully loaded and fueled Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bombers were waiting for the next mission. One of the torpedo bombers was directly hit by this bomb as it pierced the ship and exploded triggering the other five torpedo bombers to also explode. The resulting explosion caused a severe fire in Princetons hangar and her emergency sprinkler system failed to operate. As the fire spread rapidly, a series of secondary explosions followed. At 15:23 there was an enormous explosion causing more casualties aboard Princeton and even heavier casualties, 241 dead and 412 wounded, aboard the light cruiser Birmingham which was coming back alongside to assist with the firefighting. Of Princetons crew, 108 men were killed while 1,361 survivors were rescued by nearby ships. USS Princeton was the largest American ship lost during the battles around Leyte Gulf and the only fast carrier sunk in combat during the war.

• 4. The Last Battleship Duel At Surigao Strait

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  As of 2025, the Battle of Surigao Strait remains the last battleship-to-battleship action in history. It is one of only two battleship-versus-battleship naval battles in the Pacific campaign of World War II. Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf had a substantial force comprising six battleships including California, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Tennessee, and West Virginia. These ships carried 48 14-inch guns and 16 16-inch guns. Four heavy cruisers and four light cruisers also formed part of his line along with 28 destroyers and 39 motor torpedo boats. Nishimura's Southern Force entered the Surigao Strait at 02:00 on the 25th of October. The Japanese line consisted of the old battleships Yamashiro and Fuso, the heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers. At about 03:00, both Japanese battleships were hit by torpedoes. Yamashiro was able to steam on but Fusō was torpedoed by USS Albatross and fell out of formation sinking 40 minutes later. Two of Nishimura's four destroyers were sunk while the destroyer Asagumo was hit and forced to retire before it later sank. At 03:16, West Virginias radar picked up the surviving ships of Nishimura's force at a range of 27,000 yards. West Virginia tracked them as they approached in the pitch black night. At 03:53 she fired the eight guns of her main battery at a range of 20,000 yards striking Yamashiro with her first salvo. She went on to fire 93 shells. At 03:55, California and Tennessee joined in firing 63 and 69 shells respectively from their guns. Radar fire control allowed these American battleships to hit targets from a distance at which the Japanese battleships could not return fire. At 04:05 Yamashiro was struck by a torpedo fired by the destroyer Monssen and suddenly sank at about 04:20 with Nishimura on board.

• 5. Taffy Three Defense Off Samar

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  Kurita's Center Force emerged unopposed from San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on the 25th of October and steamed southward along the coast of the island of Samar. In its path stood only Seventh Fleet's three escort carrier units call signs Taffy 1, 2, and 3. These units carried 16 small very slow and unarmored escort carriers protected by a screen of lightly armed and unarmored destroyers and smaller destroyer escorts. Kurita's force caught Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 Taffy 3 by surprise. Sprague directed his carriers to launch their planes then ran for the cover of a rain squall to the east. He ordered the destroyers and DEs to make a smoke screen to conceal the retreating carriers. The destroyer Johnston was the closest to the enemy. On his own initiative Lieutenant Commander Ernest E. Evans steered his hopelessly outclassed ship into the Japanese fleet at flank speed. Johnston fired its torpedoes at the heavy cruiser Kumano damaging her and forcing her out of line. Seeing this Sprague gave the order small boys attack sending the rest of Taffy 3's screening ships into the fray. Taffy 3's two other destroyers Hoel and Heermann and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts attacked with suicidal determination drawing fire and disrupting the Japanese formation as ships turned to avoid their torpedoes. As the ships approached the enemy columns Lt. Cdr. Robert Copeland of Samuel B. Roberts told all hands via bullhorn that this would be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival could not be expected. As the Japanese fleet continued to approach Hoel and Roberts were hit multiple times and quickly sank.

• 6. Halseys Decoy Trap At Cape Engaño

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  Vice-Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa's Northern Force built around the four aircraft carriers of the 3rd Carrier Division included two World War I battleships partially converted to carriers. These ships had their aft turrets replaced by a hangar, aircraft handling deck and catapult but neither carried any aircraft in this battle. The force also included three light cruisers and nine destroyers. Ozawa's carrier group was a decoy force divested of all but 108 aircraft intended to lure the American fleet away from protecting the transports at the landing beaches on Leyte island. Ozawa's force was not located until 16:40 on the 24th of October largely because Sherman's TG38.3, the northernmost of Halsey's groups, had been preoccupied with the action in the Sibuyan Sea. Thus Ozawa's group, the one Japanese force that wanted to be discovered, was the only force the Americans had not been able to find. Between them these groups had five large fleet carriers Intrepid Franklin Lexington and Essex plus six modern battleships New Jersey Washington Iowa and Missouri. The air groups of the ten U.S. carriers present contained 600 to 1,000 aircraft. At 08:00 as the attack went in its escorting fighters destroyed Ozawa's combat air patrol of about 30 planes. The U.S. air strikes continued until the evening by which time TF38 had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force sinking Zuikaku the light carriers Chitose and Zuihō and the destroyer Akizuki all with heavy loss of life.

• 7. Command Failures And Controversies

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  Halsey was questioned for his decision to take TF 34 north in pursuit of Ozawa and for failing to detach it when Kinkaid first appealed for help. A piece of U.S. Navy slang for Halsey's actions is Bull's Run a phrase combining Halsey's newspaper nickname Bull with an allusion to the Battle of Bull Run in the American Civil War. Clifton Sprague commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the Battle off Samar was later bitterly critical of Halsey's decision and of his failure to clearly inform Kinkaid and Seventh Fleet that their northern flank was no longer protected. Regarding Halsey's failure to turn TF 34 southwards when Seventh Fleet's first calls for assistance off Samar were received Morison writes that Vice Admiral Lee said in his action report as Commander of TF 34: No battle damage was incurred nor inflicted on the enemy by vessels while operating as Task Force Thirty-Four. Halsey also argued that he had feared leaving TF 34 to defend the strait without carrier support as that would have left it vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft. However Morison states that Admiral Lee said after the battle that he would have been fully prepared for the battleships to cover the San Bernardino Strait without air cover. Lieutenant Commander Kent Coleman argues in his master's thesis submitted at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College that the division of command hierarchies of Third Fleet under Halsey reporting to Nimitz and Seventh Fleet under Kinkaid reporting to General MacArthur was the primary contributor to the near-success of Kurita's attack.

• 8. Crippling Losses And Strategic Aftermath

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  The United States lost at least 11 warships during the Battle of Leyte Gulf including one light aircraft carrier Princeton two escort carriers Gambier Bay and St. Lo two destroyers Johnston and Hoel one destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts and one PT boat USS PT-493. More than 1,600 sailors and aircrew of the Allied escort carrier units were killed. At the mismatched Battle off Samar alone five of the seven ships of the combined actions were lost along with 23 aircraft lost and 1,161 killed and missing and 913 wounded comparable to the combined losses at the Battle of Midway and Battle of Coral Sea. The Japanese lost 26 warships during the Battle of Leyte Gulf including one fleet aircraft carrier Zuikaku three battleships Fuso Yamashiro and Musashi six heavy cruisers Atago Myoko Mogami Kumano Nachi and Ashigara four light cruisers Abukuma Tama Chitose and Zuiho and nine destroyers Akizuki Asagumo Hatsuzuki Isokaze Kazagumo Shiranui Shigure Urakaze Wakatsuki and Yugumo. Listed Japanese losses include only those ships sunk in the battle. After the nominal end of the battle several damaged ships were faced with the option of either making their way to Singapore close to Japan's oil supplies but where comprehensive repairs could not be undertaken or making their way back to Japan where there were better repair facilities but scant oil. Many of the other survivors of the battle were bombed and sunk at anchor in Japan unable to move without fuel. The Japanese navy suffered crippling losses and did not sail in comparable force for the remainder of the war as most of its vessels were stranded in port for lack of fuel.