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— CH. 1 · STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND PLANNING —

1939–1940 Winter Offensive

~5 min read · Ch. 1 of 6
6 sections
  • The Chinese National Revolutionary Army launched a multi-front counter-offensive in the winter of 1939. This operation marked the first major coordinated attack by Chinese forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. By late 1938, Japanese troops had been pushed back at Suixian-Zaoyang and Changsha. The Japanese military command believed they could hold territory with fewer resources. They replaced large four-regiment square divisions with smaller three regiment triangular Divisions. Weak Independent Mixed Brigades filled out their ranks. Chinese planners saw this weakening as an opportunity to strike. They intended to use exterior lines to tie down Japanese forces across multiple regions. The main effort came from the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 9th War Areas. These areas received newly trained and reorganized units for the offensive. Secondary efforts were assigned to the 1st, 4th, 8th, Shandong-Jiangsu and Hebei-Chahar War Areas. Their existing units would conduct diversions or support attacks. The goal was to prevent Japan from launching new local offensives or shifting forces to concentrate against China.

  • In southwestern Shanxi, the main effort of the 2nd War Area failed to seize major towns on the railroad. The Tongpu railway remained largely under Japanese control except between Wenxi and Anyi. The 40th Corps and 27th Corps pinned down Japanese forces in the Zhangzi and Changzhi area. At the end of the campaign, the 2nd War Area claimed that 13,770 Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded. The 1st War Area reported that 5,130 Japanese died and seemed to have tied down enemy troops effectively. In Wuyuan, Muslim Generals Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin defended west Suiyuan during 1940. Ma Hongbin commanded the 81st Corps which suffered heavy casualties but eventually repulsed the Japanese. A single Muslim officer holding the rank of major fought off 300 Mongol collaborators at the Battle of Wulan Obo in April. Intelligence from 1937 revealed plans for a puppet Hui Muslim regime around Suiyuan and Ningxia. Owen Lattimore wrote an article predicting Japan would suffer a crushing defeat at the hands of Muslims. The Kuomintang Muslim General Ma Hongbin defeated the Japanese invasion plan in 1940.

  • The River North Army was driven back behind the river by December 23. This freed up units of the Japanese 13th Division for use elsewhere. The Right Flank Army held positions far from the planned stop line between Xinshi and Songhe. The Left Flank Army remained distant from its final objectives. Southern Honan Army attacked the enemy 3rd Division north of Yingshan and Xishuanghe. They sent a strong force to cut lines of communications near Guangshui and Xinyang. Neither objective was achieved despite committing the 31st Army Group. Eastern Hupei Guerrilla forces failed to advance to enemy rear areas at Guangshui, Huayuan and Hankow. One of the main objectives that Chinese forces managed to retake was the city of Kaifeng. After two weeks of fighting they liberated the city on December 16th. They captured a good amount of Japanese equipment before being pushed out again. According to the history of the 65th Infantry Regiment of the Japanese 13th Division, combat deaths reached as high as 303 during the Winter Offensive. The regiment received 1,558 soldiers from early February until early April 1940 to supplement previous losses.

  • After routing the Japanese force coming from Longxian on January 1, the 54th Corps recaptured that town on the 2nd. Guandu fell on the 4th and Qingtang on January 5. The Japanese retreated to Shatian while 54th Corps advanced southwest to Shijiao. On January 3 the 2nd Provisional Corps laid siege to Yingde and took it on the 5th. It then continued to advance to Lianjiangkou while Japanese remnants fled southwest. Portions of 64th Corps and 2nd Provisional Corps recovered Qingcheng on January 10. Across the river the next day 14th Division of 54th Corps recovered Pajiangkou. Yuantan along the Guangzhou, Hankou railway fell the following day. Yinzhan'ao fell on January 16. The main force of 35th Army Group moved along the west bank of the Bei River near Zhaoqing. The 4th War Area reported more than 10,300 enemy killed and captured large amounts of supplies. The Chinese Army suffered 6,564 killed, 4,595 wounded, and 2,828 missing in the First Battle of Northern Guangdong from the 17th of December 1939 to the 10th of January 1940.

  • Japan made heavy use of chemical weapons against China to make up for lack of numbers in combat. China did not have any poison gas stockpiles of its own to retaliate. Japan also used poison gas against Chinese Muslim armies at the Battle of Wuyuan and the Battle of West Suiyuan. The Japanese military command had not expected the Chinese to be able to launch an offensive operation at such a large scale. Their reliance on chemical agents compensated for manpower shortages during the offensive. This tactic became a defining feature of their response to Chinese multi-front attacks. The use of poison gas targeted both regular forces and specific Muslim units defending key regions. No Chinese countermeasures existed to neutralize these chemical attacks effectively.

  • By April 1940, the Japanese army had successfully fought the operation to a halt. A Japanese counter-offensive to seize Ningxia failed and was defeated in Suiyuan by Chinese Muslim forces. Although it failed to achieve its original objectives, later studies showed that it came as a blow to the Japanese forces. The Japanese military command had not expected the Chinese to be able to launch an offensive operation at such a large scale. The campaign demonstrated that Chinese forces could coordinate attacks across multiple fronts despite logistical challenges. It forced Japan to divert resources from other theaters to contain the threat. The psychological impact on both belligerents shifted perceptions of the war's trajectory. Chinese morale improved after liberating Kaifeng even if only temporarily. The failure to hold ground ultimately left strategic positions unchanged but proved resilience against overwhelming odds.

Common questions

What was the main goal of the 1939, 1940 Winter Offensive?

The Chinese National Revolutionary Army launched a multi-front counter-offensive in the winter of 1939 to prevent Japan from launching new local offensives or shifting forces to concentrate against China. This operation marked the first major coordinated attack by Chinese forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

When did the Chinese forces liberate Kaifeng during the 1939, 1940 Winter Offensive?

Chinese forces liberated the city of Kaifeng on December 16th after two weeks of fighting. They captured Japanese equipment before being pushed out again despite managing to retake the city.

How many casualties did the Chinese Army suffer in the First Battle of Northern Guangdong during the 1939, 1940 Winter Offensive?

The Chinese Army suffered 6,564 killed, 4,595 wounded, and 2,828 missing in the First Battle of Northern Guangdong from the 17th of December 1939 to the 10th of January 1940. The 4th War Area reported more than 10,300 enemy killed and captured large amounts of supplies.

Why did Japan use chemical weapons during the 1939, 1940 Winter Offensive?

Japan made heavy use of chemical weapons against China to make up for lack of numbers in combat. Their reliance on poison gas compensated for manpower shortages during the offensive and targeted both regular forces and specific Muslim units defending key regions.

Which Muslim generals defended west Suiyuan during the 1939, 1940 Winter Offensive?

Muslim Generals Ma Hongkui and Ma Hongbin defended west Suiyuan during 1940. Ma Hongbin commanded the 81st Corps which suffered heavy casualties but eventually repulsed the Japanese invasion plan.