Six-Day War

• 1. Sirens Over Israel

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  The Six-Day War began at 7:45 on the morning of the 5th of June 1967, Israeli time, with civil defense sirens sounding all over Israel. All but 12 of the Israeli Air Force's nearly 200 operational jets took off together. Their target was Egypt's airfields. The plan had a name, Operation Focus, or Moked in Hebrew. It was a gamble on surprise, and it opened a war between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, chiefly Egypt, Syria and Jordan. When the fighting stopped, Israel held ground that had belonged to three of its neighbors, and the map of the region looked different.

  How did a long-simmering rivalry tip into war in a single spring? Why did a few hours in the air matter so much? And how did a war that Israel's own leaders did not plan to widen end in places they never meant to go? The answers begin years earlier, at a sea passage that led to a port on Israel's southeastern tip.

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• 2. Road To June

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  The Straits of Tiran gave Israel access to Eilat, a port on its southeastern tip, and in 1956 they were already a flashpoint. Egypt had closed the maritime passageways to Israeli shipping. Israel invaded Egypt in response, in what became known as the Suez Crisis. The crisis ended with the Straits reopened to Israel and a United Nations Emergency Force, called UNEF, deployed along the Egypt-Israel border. Egypt agreed to have that force in the Sinai so that all parties would keep to the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Over the following years, minor border clashes continued between Israel and its Arab neighbors, particularly Syria.

  In early November 1966, Syrian president Nureddin al-Atassi signed a mutual defense agreement with Egypt. Soon afterward, guerrilla activity by the Palestine Liberation Organization, including a mine attack that left three dead, drew an Israeli reprisal. The Israeli Defense Force attacked the village of as-Samu in the Jordanian-ruled West Bank. Jordanian units that engaged the Israelis were quickly beaten back. King Hussein of Jordan then criticized Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser for failing to come to Jordan's aid. He accused Nasser of "hiding behind UNEF skirts".

  In May 1967, Nasser received false reports from the Soviet Union that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border. On the 16th of May he began massing his own troops in two defensive lines in the Sinai Peninsula. On the 19th of May he expelled UNEF from Gaza and Sinai and took over its positions at Sharm el-Sheikh, which overlooks the Straits of Tiran. Israel had declared in 1957 that closing the Straits would be an act of war, or justification for war. On the 22nd and the 23rd of May, Nasser nonetheless ordered the Straits closed to Israeli shipping.

  After the war, United States president Lyndon B. Johnson said that one act of folly stood above the rest in causing the explosion. It was, in his words, "the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Straits of Tiran would be closed." Johnson added: "The right of innocent, maritime passage must be preserved for all nations."

  On the 30th of May, Jordan and Egypt signed a defense pact. The next day, Iraqi president Abdul Rahman Arif agreed to deploy troops and armored units in Jordan. He had earlier declined Hussein's invitation to send them. An Egyptian contingent later reinforced the Iraqi force.

  On the 23rd of May 1967, James Reston wrote in The New York Times that Nasser's army and the other Arab forces, without direct Soviet help, were "no match for the Israelis." He noted that even with 50,000 troops and his best generals and air force in Yemen, Nasser had not gotten his way there. On the eve of the war, Israel believed it could win in three to four days. The United States estimated Israel would need seven to ten days, and British estimates supported the American view.

  On the 1st of June, Israel formed a National Unity Government by widening its cabinet. On the 4th of June, the decision was made to go to war. What Israel's pilots had rehearsed was about to be tested.

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• 3. Surprise From The Sky

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  Israeli ground crews had trained until a single aircraft could fly up to four sorties in a day, while Arab air forces normally managed one or two. That speed in refitting returning planes let the Israeli Air Force send several attack waves against Egyptian airfields on the first day. The Egyptian Air Force was overwhelmed. Pilots were schooled in detail on their targets, memorized the layouts and rehearsed the operation several times on dummy runways, in total secrecy.

  Egypt had about 420 combat aircraft, by far the largest and most modern of the Arab air forces. All were Soviet-built, and many were top-of-the-line MiG-21s. Israeli planners worried most about 30 Tu-16 "Badger" medium bombers, which could inflict heavy damage on Israeli military and civilian centers. Israel's own air force was composed principally of French aircraft, and its best plane was the Dassault Mirage III.

  Most Israeli warplanes flew out low over the Mediterranean Sea to avoid radar, then turned toward Egypt. Others flew over the Red Sea. Egypt had meanwhile shut down its entire air defense system. Its leaders feared that rebel Egyptian forces might shoot down the plane carrying Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer and Lieutenant General Sidqi Mahmoud. The two were flying from al Maza to Bir Tamada in the Sinai to meet commanders there. It made little difference, because the Israelis came in below radar cover and below the lowest altitude Egypt's SA-2 missile batteries could reach.

  The powerful Jordanian radar facility at Ajloun did detect waves of aircraft approaching Egypt. It reported the code word for war up the Egyptian chain of command. Egyptian command and communications problems kept that warning from reaching the targeted airfields.

  Israeli pilots bombed and strafed aircraft parked on the ground. They also used special tarmac-shredding penetration bombs, developed jointly with France, to wreck runways so that surviving planes could not take off. The runway at Arish was spared, because Israel expected to turn it into a military airport for its transports after the war. Later waves finished off the surviving aircraft.

  Only four unarmed Egyptian training flights were in the air when the strike began. A total of 338 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed and 100 pilots killed, although the aircraft count is disputed. The losses included all 30 Tu-16 bombers, 27 of 40 Il-28 bombers, over 90 MiG-21s and 25 MiG-17 fighters. Egyptian radars and missile sites were also destroyed.

  Israel lost 19 planes, two in air-to-air combat and 13 to anti-aircraft artillery. One damaged jet could not break radio silence and strayed over the Negev Nuclear Research Center, where Israeli Hawk missiles shot it down. Another was destroyed by an exploding Egyptian bomber.

  At first, both Egypt and Israel announced that the other had attacked first. Egyptian state radio falsely claimed that 70 Israeli planes had been downed on the first day. Western press at first regarded the number of Arab aircraft claimed destroyed as "greatly exaggerated". The speed of the Israeli strike also fed a belief in Arab countries that foreign air forces had helped the Israelis. Yet the Egyptian Air Force, and the other Arab air forces Israel attacked later that day, made practically no appearance for the rest of the conflict. Israeli aircraft kept strafing Arab runways throughout the war so that no damaged airfield could return to use.

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• 4. Sinai And Gaza

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  Israeli forces massed on the Egyptian border the night before the war, camouflaged and observing radio silence. They numbered around 70,000 men and 700 tanks, organized in three armored divisions. Their plan was to surprise Egypt three ways. In timing, the ground attack coincided exactly with the air strike. In location, the thrusts went through northern and central Sinai, while Egypt expected a repeat of 1956, when Israel attacked through the central and southern routes. In method, the Israelis used a combined-force flanking approach rather than direct tank assaults.

  Egypt had massed approximately 100,000 of its 160,000 troops in the Sinai, in seven divisions. They had 950 tanks, 1,100 armored personnel carriers and more than 1,000 artillery pieces. Over a third of these soldiers were veterans of Egypt's intervention in the North Yemen Civil War, and another third were reservists. The fortified defenses assumed an attack would follow the few roads through the desert rather than the difficult terrain. The Israelis chose not to risk hitting those defenses head-on.

  At 7:50 a.m. on the 5th of June, Major General Israel Tal's division crossed the border at two points, opposite Nahal Oz and south of Khan Yunis. Tal was one of Israel's most prominent armor commanders. His target was the Rafah Gap, a 7-mile stretch holding the shortest of three main routes to El Qantara and the Suez Canal. The Egyptians had four divisions there, backed by minefields, pillboxes, underground bunkers, hidden gun emplacements and trenches.

  Colonel Shmuel Gonen's 7th Armored Brigade led the advance and entrusted the breakthrough to a single battalion. At first resistance was light, because Egyptian intelligence had concluded this was a diversion. Then the lead battalion came under intense fire and took heavy losses, and a second battalion was also pinned down. The 60th Armored Brigade bogged down in the sand, and the paratroopers struggled to navigate the dunes. Even so, in a little over four hours the Israelis reached the Khan Yunis railway junction.

  At Sheikh Zuweid, two Egyptian brigades were deeply entrenched and camouflaged. Many abandoned their positions after their commander and several of his staff were killed. Gonen later told reporters, "we left many of our dead soldiers in Rafah and many burnt-out tanks." The Egyptians suffered some 2,000 casualties and lost 40 tanks.

  Late on the afternoon of the 5th of June, the 79th Armored Battalion charged through the 7-mile Jiradi defile, a narrow pass held by the Egyptian 112th Infantry Brigade. The pass changed hands several times. Israeli losses there stood at 66 dead, 93 wounded and 28 tanks.

  On the 6th of June, after receiving supplies by airdrop, the Israelis captured the airport at Arish at 7:50 a.m. and entered the city at 8:00. Company commander Yossi Peled recalled: "Al-Arish was totally quiet, desolate. Suddenly, the city turned into a madhouse." Shots came from every alley, window and house, and the city was eventually taken.

  Further south, Major General Ariel Sharon's 38th Armored Division assaulted Um-Katef on the 6th of June. The Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division held it with 90 T-34-85 tanks, 22 SU-100 tank destroyers and about 16,000 men. Sharon had about 14,000 men and 150 post-World War II tanks. Meanwhile two armored brigades under Avraham Yoffe slipped across the border through sandy wastes that Egypt had left undefended because they were considered impassable.

  As night fell, Israeli assault troops lit flashlights, each battalion a different color, to prevent friendly fire. At 10:00 p.m., Israeli artillery fired some 6,000 shells in less than 20 minutes. It was the most concentrated artillery barrage in Israel's history. Paratroopers under Colonel Danny Matt landed behind Egyptian lines, although half their helicopters got lost and never found the battlefield. Those that landed destroyed artillery and ammunition dumps and sowed enough confusion to reduce Egyptian artillery fire significantly. Israeli and Egyptian tanks later fought at ranges as close as ten yards, and the battle ended in an Israeli victory.

  Israel had initially avoided entering the Gaza Strip, apart from Rafah and Khan Yunis. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had expressly forbidden it. After Palestinian positions in Gaza opened fire on the Negev settlements of Nirim and Kissufim, Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin overrode Dayan and ordered in the 11th Mechanized Brigade under Colonel Yehuda Reshef. It took the Ali Muntar ridge, overlooking Gaza City, but was beaten back from the city itself. Some 70 Israelis were killed, along with journalists Ben Oyserman and Paul Schutzer. Twelve members of UNEF were also killed.

  On the 6th of June, the 35th Paratroopers Brigade under Colonel Rafael Eitan took Gaza City and the entire Strip. The fighting accounted for nearly half of all Israeli casualties on the southern front.

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• 5. Retreat Through The Passes

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  Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer panicked when he heard that Abu-Ageila had fallen, and he ordered all units in the Sinai to retreat. Many Egyptian units were still intact and could have tried to block the road to the Suez Canal. Nasser, having learned the results of the Israeli air strikes, decided with Amer to order a general withdrawal within 24 hours. No detailed instructions were given for how or in what sequence to pull back.

  The Israeli High Command chose not to chase the retreating columns but to bypass and destroy them in the mountain passes of western Sinai. On the 6th and the 7th of June, all three Israeli divisions rushed west. Sharon's division went south and then west through An-Nakhl to Mitla Pass, with air support, and parts of Yoffe's division joined it. Other units blocked the Gidi Pass. Both passes became killing grounds, as Egyptians ran straight into waiting Israeli positions. Egyptian diplomat Mahmoud Riad said 10,000 men were killed in a day, and many others died of thirst.

  Israeli aircraft and artillery attacked the retreating columns, and Israeli jets used napalm bombs. At Jabal Libni, Egyptian soldiers were fired on by their own artillery. At Bir Gafgafa, the Egyptians resisted fiercely, knocking out three tanks and eight half-tracks and killing 20 soldiers. The blocking action only partly worked. Only the Gidi Pass was captured before the Egyptians approached it, and at other places Egyptian units crossed the canal to safety.

  In their haste, Egyptian soldiers abandoned weapons, equipment and hundreds of vehicles. Many were cut off from their units and walked about 200 km toward the canal, with limited food and water, in intense heat. Thousands died. Others chose to surrender, until the Israelis had more prisoners than they could feed. They began directing soldiers toward the Suez Canal and imprisoned only high-ranking officers, who were expected to be exchanged for captured Israeli pilots.

  According to some accounts, a unit of Soviet Marines from a warship in Port Said came ashore and tried to cross the canal eastward. The force was reportedly decimated by an Israeli air attack, with 17 dead and 34 wounded. The wounded included its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Shevchenko.

  At sea, the Israeli Navy landed six combat divers from the Shayetet 13 commando unit in Alexandria harbor. They sank an Egyptian minesweeper before being taken prisoner. Commandos also entered Port Said harbor but found no ships. A planned commando raid against the Syrian Navy never happened.

  On the 7th of June, around 4:30 a.m., three Israeli missile boats opened fire on Egyptian shore batteries at Sharm el-Sheikh. Paratroopers and commandos boarded helicopters and Nord Noratlas transport planes bound for Al-Tur, because Rabin thought landing directly at Sharm el-Sheikh was too risky. The city had been largely abandoned the day before, and reports from air and naval forces convinced Rabin to divert the aircraft. After a pitched battle in which 20 Egyptian soldiers were killed and eight taken prisoner, the Israelis held the city. At 12:15 p.m., Dayan announced that the Straits of Tiran were an international waterway open to all ships without restriction.

  On the 8th of June, Israeli infantry reached Ras Sudar on the western coast of the peninsula, completing the capture of the Sinai.

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• 6. Jerusalem And Jordan

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  On the 1st of June, King Hussein put his army under Egyptian control. Egyptian General Abdul Munim Riad arrived in Amman that day to take command of the Jordanian military. Shortly before 9:00 a.m. on the 5th of June, Field Marshal Amer used the confusion of the first hours to cable Amman that he was victorious. As proof he cited a radar sighting of a squadron of aircraft, which he said was an Egyptian formation heading to attack Israel. In fact it was Israeli aircraft returning from bombing raids in Egypt. The cable ordered Riad to attack.

  Israel had planned to stay on the defensive against Jordan so that it could focus on Egypt. Intermittent machine-gun exchanges began in Jerusalem at 9:30 a.m. General Uzi Narkis ordered only small-arms replies, fired on a flat trajectory to avoid hitting civilians, holy sites or the Old City.

  At 10:00 a.m., the Jordanian Army began shelling Israel. Two batteries of 155-mm Long Tom cannons fired on the suburbs of Tel Aviv and on Ramat David Airbase. By 10:30, Prime Minister Eshkol had sent Hussein a message through General Odd Bull, commander of the UN observers. It promised that Israel would not initiate any action against Jordan if it stayed out of the war. Hussein replied that it was too late and that "the die was cast".

  At 11:15 a.m., Jordanian howitzers began a 6,000-shell barrage on Israeli Jerusalem. The targets ranged from kibbutz Ramat Rachel and Mount Scopus to the city center, the Prime Minister's Residence and the Knesset compound. Shells hit the Beit HaNassi and the Biblical Zoo, killing 15 civilians. In all, 20 Israeli civilians were killed and over 1,000 wounded. About 900 buildings were damaged, including Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital, whose windows made by Chagall were destroyed.

  In the Israeli cabinet, Yigal Allon and Menahem Begin argued that this was a chance to take the Old City of Jerusalem. Eshkol deferred any decision until Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin could be consulted. Narkis proposed military action, including the capture of Latrun, and the cabinet turned him down. Dayan refused several requests for an infantry assault toward Mount Scopus, but he approved some limited retaliatory actions.

  Shortly before 12:30 p.m., Israeli aircraft struck Jordan's two airbases in two waves, while its Hawker Hunters were refueling. The first wave cratered the runways and knocked out the control towers. The second destroyed all 21 of Jordan's Hunters, six transport aircraft and two helicopters. Israeli Fouga Magister jets also rocketed the Jordanian 40th Brigade as it moved south from the Damia Bridge. Dozens of tanks were knocked out, along with a convoy of 26 ammunition trucks.

  A Jordanian battalion advanced up the ridge to Government House, the headquarters of the UN observers, and opened fire with mortars and recoilless rifles. UN observers protested, and several manhandled a Jordanian machine gun out of a second-floor window. Lieutenant-Colonel Asher Dreizin's Reserve Battalion 161 was sent to retake the ridge, with two infantry companies and, after breakdowns and mud, only three tanks. Odd Bull stopped the Israelis from clearing the building with grenades, telling them the Jordanians had already fled. By 6:30 am the surviving Jordanians had retreated to Bethlehem, having suffered about 100 casualties. All but ten of Dreizin's soldiers were casualties, and Dreizin himself was wounded three times.

  In the late afternoon of the 5th of June, the Israelis launched an offensive to encircle Jerusalem. Searchlights on top of the Labor Federation building, then the tallest in Israeli Jerusalem, exposed and blinded the Jordanians. Mordechai Gur's 66th paratroop battalion used Bangalore torpedoes to blast through barbed wire under heavy fire and captured the Police Academy. Next came Ammunition Hill, where heavily dug-in defenders fought fiercely. All the Israeli officers except two company commanders were killed, and individual soldiers led the fighting, often hand-to-hand, for four hours. In the battle, 36 Israeli and 71 Jordanian soldiers were killed.

  At Har Adar, seven Israeli tanks were knocked out by mines, so infantry attacked without armor. They jumped between rocks to avoid mines and fought with knives and bayonets. By evening the Harel Brigade had reached Ramallah. Meanwhile 600 Egyptian commandos stationed in the West Bank crossed the border to attack Israeli airfields. They were soon detected and sheltered in nearby fields, which the Israelis set on fire. Some 450 were killed.

  The paratroopers meant to approach the Old City by the lightly defended Salah al-Din Street but made a wrong turn onto the heavily defended Nablus Road. The Israelis suffered some 30 casualties, half the original force, while the Jordanians lost 45 dead and 142 wounded. At Tel al-Ful, the Harel Brigade fought a running battle with up to 30 Jordanian tanks. Israeli air attacks exploited the vulnerability of the external fuel tanks mounted on the Jordanian tanks, and Jordan lost half of them.

  Arab help arrived piecemeal. A Saudi infantry battalion entered Jordan on the 6th of June and another followed on the 8th, both based in Ma'an. Saudi forces remained in Jordan until the end of 1977. On the 7th of June, an air battle over the H-3 airfield in western Iraq involved Hunters flown by Iraqis, a Jordanian and the Pakistani pilot Saiful Azam. One Iraqi Hunter was shot down, and Israel lost two Vautours and one Mirage.

  Dayan ordered his troops not to enter the Old City. He feared damage to holy sites, fighting in built-up areas, and a fierce international backlash, including the outrage of Christians worldwide. Privately, he told David Ben-Gurion he worried that Israel might capture Jerusalem's holy sites only to be forced to give them up under threat of sanctions.

  At midday on the 6th of June, Riad cabled Nasser that the situation on the West Bank was rapidly deteriorating. He relayed three choices from Hussein. A third party could impose a ceasefire, the army could leave the West Bank that night, or it could fight one more day and risk destruction. An order to withdraw across the Jordan River went out at 10 a.m. That afternoon Hussein learned of the impending United Nations Security Council Resolution 233 and decided instead to hold out. The counterorder caused confusion, and in many cases abandoned positions could not be regained.

  On the 7th of June, Dayan heard that the UN was about to declare a ceasefire and changed his mind. Without cabinet clearance, he decided to capture the Old City. Two paratroop battalions attacked Augusta-Victoria Hill, and Gur personally led another battalion into the Old City. They met little resistance. The paratroopers fought alone, and the Israelis used no armor for fear of severe damage to the Old City.

  Israel took Bethlehem after a brief battle that left some 40 Jordanian soldiers dead. In Hebron, residents fearing retribution for the 1929 massacre of the city's Jewish community flew white sheets from windows and rooftops. Israeli forces seized Nablus the same day. Engineering Corps sappers blew up the Abdullah and Hussein bridges. Elements of the Harel Brigade crossed the river but quickly pulled back under American pressure. The Egyptian-Jordanian command ordered a full Jordanian withdrawal for the second time, and it was complete by nightfall on the 7th of June.

  By that evening Israel had near total control of the West Bank, and it issued a military order that began its occupation. The order set up a military government and gave the area's commander full legislative, executive and judicial power. Narkis later said that the government had not intended to capture the West Bank and was opposed to it. The rein was loosened, he said, only "when a real threat to Jerusalem's security emerged." His conclusion: "The result was something that no one had planned."

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• 7. Golan Heights

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  For the first four days, Syria largely stayed out of the war. False Egyptian reports of a crushing victory over the Israeli army, and forecasts that Egyptian forces would soon attack Tel Aviv, sporadically pushed Syria toward joining. Syrian artillery began shelling northern Israel, and 12 Syrian jets attacked Israeli settlements in the Galilee. Israeli fighters shot down three and drove off the rest. Two of Lebanon's 12 Hawker Hunter jets also crossed into Israeli airspace to strafe positions in the Galilee, and one was shot down.

  On the evening of the 5th of June, the Israeli Air Force attacked Syrian airfields. Syria lost some 32 MiG-21s, 23 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters and two Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, two-thirds of its fighting strength. The survivors retreated to distant bases and played no further role. After the attack, Syria realized that the news it had received from Egypt could not have been true.

  Professor David W. Lesch wrote that "One would be hard-pressed to find a military less prepared for war with a clearly superior foe." Syria's army of about 75,000 men, grouped in nine brigades, had been decimated in the months and years before by coups and attempted coups. These had produced purges, fractures and uprisings within the armed forces.

  On the 6th of June, a minor Syrian force tried to capture the water plants at Tel Dan, Dan and She'ar Yashuv. Israel repulsed the attacks, and Syria lost twenty soldiers and seven tanks. A broader offensive quickly failed. Reserve units were broken up by Israeli air attacks, and several tanks reportedly sank in the Jordan River. Tanks were too wide for bridges, tanks and infantry had no radio contact, and some units ignored orders to advance. A post-war Syrian army report concluded that the reserves "could not withstand the air attacks" and dispersed after their morale plummeted.

  Syria's bombardment of the Galilee Panhandle used two battalions of M-46 130mm guns, four companies of heavy mortars and dug-in Panzer IV tanks. It killed two civilians and hit 205 houses and farming installations. An inaccurate Syrian officer's report claimed that the enemy appeared to have suffered heavy losses and was retreating.

  On the 7th and the 8th of June, the Israeli leadership debated whether to attack the Golan Heights too. Syria had supported pre-war raids and routinely shelled Israel from the Heights, so some leaders wanted it punished. Military opinion held that an uphill attack on a strongly fortified enemy would be extremely costly. The western side of the Heights is a rock escarpment that rises 500 meters, or 1,700 feet, from the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan River, before flattening into a gently sloping plateau.

  Dayan at first opposed the operation bitterly. He believed it would cost 30,000 lives and might trigger Soviet intervention. Eshkol was more open to it, as was Northern Command head David Elazar, whose unbridled enthusiasm may have eroded Dayan's reluctance. Then the situation on the southern and central fronts cleared up. Intelligence judged Soviet intervention less likely, and reconnaissance showed some Syrian defenses collapsing. An intercepted cable revealed that Nasser was urging the Syrian president to accept a ceasefire at once.

  At 3 a.m. on the 9th of June, Syria announced its acceptance of the ceasefire. Dayan nevertheless grew more enthusiastic, and at 7 a.m. he gave the order to go into action against Syria without consultation or government authorization.

  Israel committed two brigades, the 8th Armored and the Golani, to the northern part of the front at Givat HaEm. Another two, one infantry and one of Peled's brigades summoned from Jenin, went in at the center. The terrain was mountainous, with parallel streams every several kilometers running east to west. That channeled both sides along east-west axes and made it hard for units to support those on either flank. Syria built defenses up to 15 kilometers deep. Israel had one advantage, the intelligence on Syrian battle positions collected by Mossad operative Eli Cohen, who was captured and executed in Syria in 1965.

  The Israeli Air Force was only partially effective here, because the fixed fortifications were so sturdy. Syrian officers were poor leaders who treated their soldiers badly, and often retreated from danger and left their men confused. In the many bunkers, close combat favored the Israelis, who carried the Uzi submachine gun, while Syrian soldiers carried the heavier AK-47, designed for more open ground. That morning Israeli jets began dozens of sorties against Syrian positions.

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• 8. Cost And Aftermath

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  The war is dated the 5th to the 10th of June 1967, but the ceasefire came in stages. Egypt and Jordan agreed to one on the 8th of June, Syria followed on the 9th of June, and it was signed with Israel on the 11th of June.

  More than 15,000 Arab fatalities were recorded, while Israel suffered fewer than 1,000. Others died outside the main armies. Fifteen UN peacekeepers were killed by Israeli strikes in the Sinai at the outset of the war. Thirty-four United States personnel were killed in the USS Liberty incident, when Israeli air and naval forces attacked a United States Navy spy ship.

  The displacement of civilians had long-term consequences. Around 280,000 to 325,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from the West Bank, and 100,000 Syrians from the Golan Heights.

  In Egypt, Nasser resigned in shame after Israel's victory. A series of protests across the country brought him back. The war also changed the map of world shipping. Egypt closed the Suez Canal in 1967, and it stayed closed until 1975.

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