Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
The Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Nanjing on the 21st of August 1937, as Japanese forces were pushing deep into Chinese territory. On paper, it bound two nations together in a promise of mutual restraint. In practice, it was breached almost the moment the ink dried. How could a treaty designed to hold back aggression be shattered by the very country that signed it? And how did China's government respond to an invasion it could not publicly admit was happening?
Chiang Kai-shek, leading the Kuomintang government, had reason to feel cautiously optimistic after the signing. The Soviets almost immediately launched Operation Zet, a program to send aircraft and economic aid to the Chinese national government. Chiang read this as the opening move toward full Soviet intervention in the war against Japan. That hope faded as months passed. The Soviet Union found itself hemmed in by a more delicate calculation. Any robust assistance to China risked unsettling a tacit arrangement with the United Kingdom, France, and later the United States. Those powers favored China against Japan yet would, if pushed, back Japan over the Soviets. The pact also gave the Soviets a freer hand to watch the west, where Nazi Germany was visibly preparing for conflict. That western focus came at a direct cost to China: it contributed to the deterioration of China's relationship with Germany, which had already pulled back its military assistance.
While the Nanjing signing ceremony was still fresh, Soviet forces were already fighting inside Chinese territory. From August to October 1937, the Soviets conducted what became known as the Xinjiang War, backing the puppet Governor Sheng Shicai against Chinese government forces. The Kuomintang Muslim general Ma Hushan led the 36th Division of the National Revolutionary Army to resist the incursion. Ma had communicated directly with Chiang Kai-shek beforehand and also spoke with the British journalist Peter Fleming, mentioning that Chiang had promised to send reinforcements. The Japanese attack in the east changed everything. Ma was left to face the Soviet army without the help he had been promised. His forces killed Soviet soldiers and held on longer than might have been expected, but Soviet mustard gas bombardment eventually broke their resistance. Ma Hushan fled to India, then took a steamer back to China. Sheng Shicai subsequently invited Soviet forces to garrison in Turfan, a position that sat directly adjacent to Gansu Province.
Beijing's dilemma was stark. The Republic of China government was fully informed of the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang and tracked Soviet troop movements through both Xinjiang and Gansu. Acknowledging any of this publicly would have ended the flow of Soviet military supplies that China desperately needed against Japan. The government's solution was to label reports of the Soviet presence as "Japanese propaganda," actively misleading its own population to preserve the supply relationship. It was a calculated humiliation accepted in silence. Beneath that silence, the Chinese government was moving its own pieces. Muslim general Ma Buqing came to virtually control the Gansu corridor, a strategically vital stretch linking central China to the northwest. In July 1942, Chiang Kai-shek instructed Ma Buqing to move 30,000 troops to the Tsaidam marsh in the Qaidam Basin of Qinghai. Chiang gave Ma the title of Reclamation Commissioner, a designation designed to let those troops menace Sheng Shicai's southern flank in Xinjiang, which bordered the Tsaidam region.
Ma Buqing's repositioning opened a corridor that China's central government moved quickly to fill. Once Ma's forces vacated their positions in Gansu, Kuomintang troops from central China poured in and began penetrating Soviet-occupied Xinjiang. The pressure was patient and deliberate rather than confrontational. Over time it forced Sheng Shicai to calculate that his Soviet patrons could no longer protect him, and he broke with the Soviets. The final chapter in Xinjiang came with a different flashpoint. In November 1944, a Kuomintang Muslim officer named Liu Bin-Di was killed while fighting Turkic Uyghur rebels, and the Ili Rebellion ignited. The Soviets threw their support behind the Turkic rebels, and Kuomintang forces fought back. The Kuomintang government ordered Ma Bufang to march Muslim Cavalry troops into Xinjiang repeatedly, using their presence to intimidate Sheng Shicai's forces and shield Chinese settlers in the province. In 1945, Ma Bufang was dispatched to Urumqi to guard it against the Uyghur army advancing from Hi, the territory now known as Ili.
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Common questions
When was the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed and where?
The Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Nanjing on the 21st of August 1937. It was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on the 8th of September 1937, the same day it came into force.
What was Operation Zet in relation to the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact?
Operation Zet was a Soviet program launched after the signing of the pact in which the USSR sent aircraft and economic aid to the Chinese national government under Chiang Kai-shek. It was intended to help China resist the Japanese invasion.
How did the Soviets breach the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact?
The Soviets breached the pact by conducting the Xinjiang War from August to October 1937, the same period in which the pact was being signed. Soviet forces supported puppet Governor Sheng Shicai against Chinese Kuomintang troops, deploying mustard gas bombardment against the 36th Division led by General Ma Hushan.
Why did China cover up the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang?
The Republic of China government concealed the Soviet invasion because publicly acknowledging it would have ended the flow of Soviet military supplies China needed to fight Japan. Officials publicly dismissed reports of Soviet troops as "Japanese propaganda" to preserve the supply relationship.
What role did Ma Buqing play in the Sino-Soviet conflict over Xinjiang?
In July 1942, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Ma Buqing to move 30,000 troops to the Tsaidam marsh in the Qaidam Basin of Qinghai. Chiang named him Reclamation Commissioner so the troop presence would threaten Sheng Shicai's southern flank and pressure the Soviet-backed governor.
What was the Ili Rebellion and how did it connect to the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact?
The Ili Rebellion broke out in Xinjiang in November 1944 after a Kuomintang Muslim officer named Liu Bin-Di was killed fighting Turkic Uyghur rebels. The Soviets backed the Turkic rebels against the Kuomintang, extending the pattern of Soviet interference in Xinjiang that had continued since the pact was signed in 1937.
All sources
6 references cited across the entry
- 1BookModern China's Ethnic Frontiers: A Journey to the WestHsiao-ting Lin — Taylor & Francis — 2010
- 2BookAsia, Volume 40Asia Magazine — 1940
- 3JournalWar, Leadership and Ethnopolitics: Chiang Kai-shek and China's frontiers, 1941–1945Hsiao-Ting Lin — 2009
- 5BookA regional handbook on Northwest China, Volume 1Human Relations Area Files, inc — Printed by the Human Relations Area Files — 1956
- 6BookBritish documents on foreign affairs: reports and papers from the Foreign Office confidential print. From 1946 through 1950. Asia, Volume 1Paul Preston et al. — University Publications of America — 2000