Russian mafia

• 1. A Birthday Party in Prague

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  The Russian mafia, known in Russian as bratva, stepped into the spotlight in May 1995, when Czech police raided the U Holubu restaurant in Anděl, a neighborhood of Prague. Semion Mogilevich had gathered Russian mafia bosses there for a summit. The excuse was a birthday party for Victor Averin, second-in-command of the Solntsevskaya Bratva. Major Tomas Machacek of the Czech police had heard an anonymous tip that the Solntsevskaya planned to assassinate Mogilevich at the venue. Rumor held that Mogilevich and the Solntsevskaya leader, Sergei Mikhailov, had fallen out over $5 million.

  The raid swept up 200 guests, yet no charges followed. Only key figures were banned from the country, and most of them relocated to Hungary. The host himself was not among the people detained. Mogilevich later claimed that "by the time I arrived at U Holubu, everything was already in full swing." He said he spent the night in the bar of a neighboring hotel, until about five or six in the morning.

  That strange evening raises questions the rest of this documentary will answer. Is the Russian mafia one organization or many? Where did its codes and titles come from? And how did criminals shaped by the Soviet Union end up operating in Miami, Brighton Beach and Málaga?

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• 2. One Name, Many Groups

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  In December 2009, Timur Lakhonin, head of Interpol's National Central Bureau within Russia, stated that there was "no data suggesting that an organized structure of criminal groups comprising former Russians exists abroad." He acknowledged that former compatriots did commit crimes overseas. Months later, in August 2010, the French criminologist Alain Bauer painted the opposite picture. He called the Russian mafia "one of the best structured criminal organizations in Europe, with a quasi-military operation" in its international activities.

  Both men were looking at the same label from different angles. "Russian mafia" is a convenient umbrella term, widely used in Western media and public talk. Behind it sits something closer to a loose network of autonomous criminal organizations, each with its own codes, leaders and sphere of influence.

  The word bratva means brotherhood. Inside the criminal world it is a casual way to refer to fellow members and associates. It names solidarity, not rank.

  Rank belongs to the vory v zakone, which translates as Thieves in Law. This is an elite status at the top of the criminal hierarchy. Holders act as arbiters and authority figures, and they are recognized by extensive tattoos that record their status, personal history and loyalty to the code.

  Law enforcement in Russia and the former Soviet states prefers drier terms. OPG, short for organizovannaya prestupnaya gruppa, means organized crime group, while OPS means organized crime community. Prosecutors and investigators use both to classify and charge criminal organizations. Writers sometimes swap in the English abbreviation OCG.

  Many groups carry the name of their home turf. The Solntsevskaya Bratva comes from the Solntsevo District of Moscow, the Tambovskaya Bratva from Tambov Oblast, and the Izmaylovskaya gang from the Izmaylovo District. Depending on their economic interests, such groups may work alone, form alliances or compete.

  Beyond Russia itself, the Georgian mafia is regarded as one of the most powerful criminal networks in Europe. It has produced more thieves in law than any other group across the former USSR. The Chechen mafia ranks among the largest ethnic organized crime groups in the former Soviet Union. In the 1990s, a paramilitary group called the Mkhedrioni, led by the thief in law Jaba Ioseliani, mixed armed force with organized crime in Georgia.

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• 3. Thieves and Their Code

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  Stenka Razin and Yemelyan Pugachev, peasant chieftains of the 17th and 18th centuries, show what organized crime looked like in Russia for hundreds of years. It was political banditry. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the same pattern appeared in revolutionary and counter-revolutionary groups, including the Bolsheviks and Socialist Revolutionary gangs. The authorities always tried to suppress such groups completely, sometimes by brutal methods.

  By the early 1930s, harsh repression had ended the era of politically organized gangs. The curtailment of the NEP policy also wiped out economic criminals, who were treated as equivalent to criminals against the state. Out of that gap grew a new underworld, united by non-political defiance of authority. Its elite called themselves the Thieves in Law, guardians of the criminal traditions of pre-revolutionary Russia.

  This subculture built its own language, known as fenya or blatnaya muzyka, along with customs and a code of conduct. The code rejected social norms entirely, including family life. A thief in law was to have no permanent relationships with women. He was also forbidden from joining public events held by state bodies or helping judges and investigators solve crimes.

  The Great Patriotic War of the 1940s broke that world apart. Many criminals accepted an offer to join the Red Army and defend the homeland against the Nazi threat. When the war ended, they returned to the camps, where the so-called Bitch Wars began against thieves in law who had held to tradition. Both sides suffered extremely significant losses.

  Post-war hardship fed more banditry, and the underworld filled with fresh recruits. These new prisoners saw no need to honor the old rules. They wrote their own codes, which allowed mutually beneficial cooperation with the state. The Soviet economy itself, increasingly strained by the 1950s and 1960s, would soon pull criminals and officials closer still.

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• 4. Shortages and Reform

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  Blat, the practice of obtaining goods and services through personal connections, became a way of life in the Soviet economy of the 1950s and 1960s. The planned economy could not meet its targets within legal limits. Managers turned to eyewash, meaning deliberate deception, and to pushers, specialists who concluded favorable contracts and knocked out scarce goods, raw materials and equipment. Shortages, speculation and nesuny, a nearly universal petty theft, became everyday features.

  The mid-1960s brought the first signs of organized crime as a social phenomenon. Weaker economic oversight let individuals called Tsekhoviks gather large sums of money and invest it in illegal production. Traditional professional criminals began to parasitize these shadow entrepreneurs. Later they helped them in return for a share of the income, forming a symbiotic structure.

  A similar bargain linked the political elite to the underworld. Officials obtained goods and services unavailable by legal means, and in exchange they offered patronage and protection from law enforcement. Yuri Andropov's anti-corruption campaign, launched after his election as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, partly exposed this arrangement. It was only the tip of the iceberg.

  Mikhail Gorbachev's rise coincided with a fresh crisis in the Soviet economy. A campaign against alcohol consumption, meant to raise labor productivity, instead sparked rapid growth in illegal alcohol production and sales. That trade handed a large number of unofficial entrepreneurs plenty of money.

  During perestroika in the late 1980s, new laws on state enterprises and cooperatives made it possible to legalize and protect criminal capital. Groups could also use the media and public structures to defend their interests. Law enforcement grew less effective amid the constant reforms, and a significant portion of citizens turned to shadow sources of income.

  In the early 1990s, opened borders allowed illegal trade and the export of capital abroad, and criminals developed methods of corrupting state structures. Racketeering remained the main support of organized crime, alongside the hotel business, gambling, prostitution and the export of raw materials. Even so, crime had not yet subjugated political and social institutions and stayed vulnerable before state bodies. Reformers had meanwhile adopted a thesis that shadow capital should be converted and legalized to serve as a main source of resources for the reform itself.

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• 5. Crime Meets Politics

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  In March 1998, a State Duma resolution on overcoming the crisis in the Russian economy reached a startling estimate. It noted that criminal groups controlled up to 40% of privately owned enterprises, 60% of state enterprises and up to 85% of banks. Legitimate and criminal capital had merged.

  Some groups held entire sectors. The Tambovskaya had a grip on the energy market of Saint Petersburg, while the Solntsevskaya dominated casinos and transportation hubs in Moscow. Leaders such as Semion Mogilevich, Sergei "Sylvester" Timofeev and Alexander Khabarov forged ties with politicians, police and even intelligence agencies. These organizations were known for extreme violence and internal power struggles.

  The Uralmash gang of Yekaterinburg went further and openly backed political candidates. It also formed a public movement to gain legitimacy. During the 1999 legislative election, investigators identified several hundred cases in which criminal groups nominated their own candidates and gave financial and organizational support to parties and movements. Where they could not place their people directly, they corrupted officials, sometimes by paying them regular salaries without naming the services expected in return.

  By the start of the 21st century, organized crime was being built on what the source calls an oligarchic model, aiming for the greatest possible legalization. Armed units of criminal organizations registered as detective and security agencies. Funds sat in banks controlled by criminal organizations, and their source became enterprises protected by a "roof."

  Mark Galeotti, an expert in modern Russia, describes how the relationship with the state has changed. In his view the Russian government has used criminal networking as a geopolitical tool, drawing on the capabilities of these groups for state interests. He stresses that this is pragmatism rather than direct control. The state sets boundaries for the groups and occasionally enlists their services, a long way from the 1990s, when the political elite and organized crime were more intertwined.

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• 6. Crossing Borders

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  Afghan heroin was among the first goods Russian criminals moved abroad. Galeotti explains that after the Soviet collapse, they expected political instability and economic collapse at home and went looking for a place on the international stage. They carried heroin across Europe and sold it to local gangs rather than on the street. Over the years, many became skilled intermediaries who worked beside other major criminal organizations and provided services instead of trying to control whole territories.

  Taking advantage of open borders and globalizing markets, groups set up strongholds in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Hungary, Israel and the Czech Republic. Local political and economic elites, front companies and infiltration of legitimate markets helped them hide. A United Nations report in 1995 put the number of people involved in organized crime in Russia at 3 million, employed in about 5,700 gangs.

  In 1992, Vyacheslav "Yaponchik" Ivankov was sent to Brighton Beach in the United States. The stated reasons were that he was allegedly killing too many people in Russia and that he could take control of Russian organized crime in North America. Within a year he had built an international operation covering narcotics, money laundering and prostitution. He made ties with the American Mafia and Colombian drug cartels, and his reach extended to Miami, Los Angeles and Boston.

  He arrived in the middle of a feud. Monya Elson, leader of Monya's Brigada, was fighting Boris Nayfeld, and bodies dropped on both sides. Ivankov's arrival virtually ended the fighting, though Elson later challenged him too. Nayfeld was arrested in January 1994 and released in 1998, while Elson was arrested in Italy in 1995.

  Ivankov also dealt harshly with rivals. He allegedly tried to buy out the drug importation business of the Georgian boss Valeri "Globus" Glugech. After Glugech refused, he and his top associates were shot dead. A summit in Vienna in May 1994 awarded Ivankov what remained of that business. Two months later he quarreled with Sergei "Sylvester" Timofeyev, head of the Orekhovskaya gang, who was murdered a month afterward.

  Ivankov's reign ended in June 1995. He attempted a $3.5 million extortion of two Russian businessmen, Alexander Volkov and Vladimir Voloshin, and the FBI arrested him. The result was a ten-year sentence in maximum security prison.

  Other alliances crossed continents. According to FBI reports, Mogilevich had ties to the Camorra through Salvatore DeFalco, a lower-echelon member of the Giuliano clan, and the two reportedly met in Prague in 1993. In 1995, the Camorra and the Russian mafia ran a scheme in which US$1 bills were bleached and reprinted as $100s. The notes went to the Russians for distribution in 29 post-Eastern Bloc countries and former Soviet republics. In payment, the Russian mafia gave the Camorra property, including a Russian bank, and firearms smuggled into Eastern Europe and Italy.

  The global extent of Russian organized crime was not fully realized until Ludwig "Tarzan" Fainberg was arrested in January 1997, mainly over arms dealing. In 1990 he had moved from Brighton Beach to Miami and opened a strip club called Porky's, which became a hangout for underworld figures. He grew close to Juan Almeida, a Colombian cocaine dealer, and acted as a go-between with the corrupt Russian military. In 1993 he helped Almeida obtain six Russian military helicopters, and the next year he helped arrange a submarine purchase for cocaine smuggling. Federal agents had watched him for months, and an undercover DEA agent, Alexander Yasevich, was sent to verify the dealing. Facing possible life imprisonment, Fainberg agreed to testify against Almeida and received a sentence of 33 months.

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• 7. Ranks and Roles

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  The title Pakhan marks the supreme boss of a bratva. He rarely involves himself in daily activity and prefers to stay behind the scenes to avoid police attention. The organization around him is not strictly hierarchical. Power spreads across regional groups and leaders, and influence is earned through reputation, loyalty and connections rather than fixed titles.

  The Obshchak is the treasurer. He manages the communal fund, which pays for criminal activities, bribes to officials, legal defense, and support for the families of imprisoned or dead members.

  Below the leadership, operational units called brigades do the work. Each is led by an Avtoritet, who reports to the Pakhan or to an intermediary. The Avtoritet manages a team of Boeviks, the fighters who carry out drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal gambling. Boeviks swear loyalty to their Brigadier, and through him to the Pakhan.

  The lowest tier is the Shestyorka, or "sixes." These junior associates run errands, deliver messages and gather intelligence. Many are on probation, not yet full members, and must prove their loyalty and usefulness.

  Loyalty, silence and refusing to cooperate with law enforcement are the essential principles of the code, especially among upper ranks. Because the structure is decentralized, it can adapt quickly and survive even when cells or leaders are taken down. This flexibility makes the bratva harder for police to dismantle.

  The Vor v zakone stands apart from this ladder. Not every member is a Vor, but those who are carry moral and strategic authority, settle serious disputes, and wield influence beyond any single brigade. A man cannot name himself one. The title must be granted by other vors.

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• 8. Arrests and Aftermath

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  Marat Balagula and Vyacheslav Ivankov were both released from prison in 2004. Ivankov was extradited to Russia and jailed again over the alleged murders of two Turks in a Moscow restaurant in 1992. He was cleared of all charges and freed in 2005. Four years later he was assassinated by a sniper's shot to the stomach. Monya Elson and Leonid Roytman were arrested in March 2006 over an unsuccessful plot to murder two Kyiv-based businessmen.

  In 2009, FBI agents in Moscow targeted two suspected mafia leaders and two corrupt businessmen. One leader was Yevgeny Dvoskin, who had shared a prison with Ivankov in 1995 and was deported in 2001 for breaking immigration regulations. The other was Konstantin "Gizya" Ginzburg, reportedly the "big boss" of Russian organized crime in America, who was reportedly assassinated that year.

  That same year, Mogilevich was placed on the FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list. The charge was a complex scheme that defrauded investors in his company YBM Magnex International of $150 million. He was indicted in 2003 and arrested in 2008 in Russia on tax fraud charges. Because the United States has no extradition treaty with Russia, he was released on bail. Back in 1998, Monya Elson had called him the most powerful mobster in the world.

  In 2010, Russian organized crime was reported to have a strong grip on the French Riviera and Spain, and the WikiLeaks cables branded Russia a virtual "mafia state." In 2011, the Obama administration named the Brothers' Circle, headed by Temuri Mirzoyev, one of four transnational organized crime groups posing the greatest threat to US national security. Officials sanctioned certain key members and froze their assets.

  On the 7th of June 2017-33 affiliates were arrested and charged by the FBI, US Customs and Border Protection and the NYPD. The charges included extortion, racketeering, illegal gambling, narcotics trafficking, wire fraud and murder-for-hire conspiracy. Prosecutors described underground gambling dens in Brighton Beach, violence against people who owed gambling debts, and the trafficking of over 10,000 pounds of stolen chocolate confectionery taken from shipping containers. It is believed that 27 of those arrested belonged to the Shulaya clan, largely based in New York.

  On the 26th of September 2017, after a four-year investigation, 100 Spanish Civil Guard officers carried out 18 searches around Málaga in a large-scale money laundering case. Eleven members and associates of the Solntsevskaya and Izmailovskaya clans were arrested, among them Alexander Grinberg, owner of Marbella FC. Money, firearms and 23 high-end vehicles were seized. On the 19th of February 2018-18 defendants were accused of laundering over $62 million through real estate, with help from Vladislav Reznik, former chairman of the Russian insurer Rosgosstrakh. The Tambov and Malyshev organizations were involved, and the accused stood trial in Spain.

  In September 2025, Russian authorities seized over 1.5 metric tons of cocaine hidden in banana crates from Ecuador, a record. Ecuador is now the world's largest cocaine exporter, and Russia is the largest single-country importer of Ecuadorian bananas. Reports from the World Customs Organization and others describe a sharp rise in cocaine trafficking to Russia as traffickers adapt to stricter controls in Western Europe.

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