Operation Sonnenblume
In September 1940, the Italian 10th Army advanced about 65 miles into Egypt to seize Sidi Barrani. Marshal Rodolfo Graziani halted his forces there to build fortified camps while waiting for engineers to extend supply lines. The British Western Desert Force attacked these positions in December 1940 with a force of roughly 30,000 men. Within five days, the British captured Bardia and Tobruk before pursuing the retreating Italians to El Agheila. Combe Force intercepted the last organized units at the Battle of Beda Fomm. The British took over 130,000 prisoners and hundreds of tanks while suffering only 600 casualties.
Adolf Hitler issued Directive 22 on the 11th of January 1941 ordering the dispatch of a blocking detachment to North Africa. General Erwin Rommel arrived in Libya on the 12th of February 1941 with orders to defend Tripoli using aggressive tactics. Advanced units of the 5th Light Afrika Division reached Tripoli on the 14th of February and moved immediately to the front line east of Sirte. A second panzer division was approved by Hitler on the 3rd of February to join the initial force. The first German troops reached Sirte on the 15th of February and advanced to Nofilia on the 18th of February. On the 24th of March, Axis forces captured El Agheila and attacked Mersa Brega three days later.
The Western Desert stretched about 400 miles wide from Mersa Matruh to Gazala along the single paved road known as Via Balbia. Scorpions, vipers, and flies populated the region inhabited by a small number of Bedouin nomads. Days were miserably hot while nights turned very cold for soldiers stationed there. The Sirocco wind blew clouds of fine sand that reduced visibility to a few yards and coated machinery and food. Motor vehicles needed special oil filters just to operate in such conditions. Tank engine life fell from 60 hours to 20 hours due to the harsh environment. Italian tanks often broke down within days of moving across the open terrain.
On the 24th of March Rommel advanced with new units toward positions held by the British 3rd Armoured Brigade south-east of Mersa Brega. Two columns moved along the coast road while another made an outflanking move through the desert to the south. The British withdrew from Mersa Brega followed up by German forces advancing from Tripoli. On the 1st of April Rommel sent Panzer Regiment 5 and Machine-Gun Battalion 8 to capture Mersa Brega. Reconnaissance Unit 3 reconnoitered towards Soluch and Ghemines before being ordered on to Benghazi. By late on the 4th of April Group Schwerin was out of fuel and stranded near Ben Gania. Axis columns met at Mechili where they captured a considerable British force.
General Archibald Wavell underestimated the ability of Germans to mount an offensive despite copious intelligence reports from Ultra decryption. He believed the Germans could not be ready until May when his own armored divisions would have been overhauled. Wavell wrote in 1949 that he had certainly not budgeted for Rommel after his experience fighting the Italians. Maps found to be inaccurate caused confusion when commanders arrived to see the terrain themselves. Many experienced British units were transferred to Greece in Operation Lustre leaving Cyrenaica weak. Lieutenant-General Philip Neame predicted tanks would break down as soon as they moved but received little support from Cairo.
Axis forces failed to capture Tobruk in their first rush forcing Rommel to divide troops between the port and the frontier wire. On the 10th of April Rommel made the Suez Canal the objective of the DAK while ordering a breakout from Tobruk prevented. The port was invested by 5th Light Division on the east side and Brescia Division to the west. A composite force sent on to Sollum was stopped by the British Mobile Force conducting a delaying action around Capuzzo. German tanks proved superior to British counterparts but supply lines remained too long to maintain further advances. By the 2nd of May Rommel accepted the Axis force was insufficient to capture Tobruk and prepared to repel a counter-attack from Egypt.
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Common questions
When did Adolf Hitler issue Directive 22 ordering the dispatch of German troops to North Africa?
Adolf Hitler issued Directive 22 on the 11th of January 1941. This directive ordered the dispatch of a blocking detachment to North Africa.
Who was the first German general to arrive in Libya during Operation Sonnenblume?
General Erwin Rommel arrived in Libya on the 12th of February 1941. He received orders to defend Tripoli using aggressive tactics.
What specific environmental challenges affected tank engine life in the Western Desert?
Tank engine life fell from 60 hours to 20 hours due to the harsh environment. The Sirocco wind blew clouds of fine sand that coated machinery and food while motor vehicles needed special oil filters just to operate.
Why did General Archibald Wavell underestimate the ability of Germans to mount an offensive?
General Archibald Wavell underestimated the ability of Germans to mount an offensive despite copious intelligence reports from Ultra decryption. He believed the Germans could not be ready until May when his own armored divisions would have been overhauled.
When did Rommel accept the Axis force was insufficient to capture Tobruk?
By the 2nd of May Rommel accepted the Axis force was insufficient to capture Tobruk. He prepared to repel a counter-attack from Egypt after failing to take the port in their first rush.