Italian invasion of Egypt
In June 1940, Italy declared war on France and Britain from the coast of Libya. The Italian 10th Army stood ready to cross into neutral Egypt. Marshal Rodolfo Graziani received orders to attack by August 8. His goal was to seize the Suez Canal. This waterway remained vital for British communications with India and the Far East. Mussolini demanded a rapid advance along the Egyptian coast. He hoped to defeat any British forces in the area quickly. The Italian strategy relied on massed infantry divisions moving down the Via Balbia road. Only one paved road existed across the desert between Mersa Matruh and Gazala. The plan assumed that speed would compensate for equipment shortages. Yet the army lacked sufficient trucks to move all its units. Non-motorized divisions had to march long distances on foot. The British garrison in Egypt numbered about 36,000 men. They guarded the canal while facing Italian forces in Cyrenaica. French divisions in Tunisia held the western Libyan border until June 22. After the fall of France, Wavell commanded Middle East Command over both Mediterranean and Middle East theatres. He ordered his troops to dominate no-man's land through aggressive patrolling. Small mobile columns known as jock columns harassed Italian convoys. These raids aimed to delay any invasion rather than stop it outright.
The Western Desert stretched about 400 miles from Mersa Matruh westward to Gazala. A hot desert wind called the sirocco blew clouds of fine sand across the landscape. Visibility dropped to a few yards during these storms. Sand coated eyes, lungs, machinery, food and equipment alike. Motor vehicles required special oil and air filters just to function. Water and military stores had to be transported from outside the region. Bedouin tracks linked wells but offered little protection against the elements. In September 1940, the Maletti Group got lost leaving Sidi Omar. Reconnaissance aircraft had to find them after they disappeared into the desert. The group lacked experience with desert conditions and proper navigation tools. Italian staff failed to provide maps for their assembly points. The non-motorized infantry divisions marched up to 50 kilometers each day. They could not keep pace with motorized units without transport. Supplies accumulated slowly along the coast road. Engineers began building the Via della Vittoria extension of the Libyan highway. This project would take months to complete. Graziani believed massed attacks could overcome logistical limits. He ignored warnings that his army lacked enough lorries or trucks. Only five divisions advanced down the coast road due to shortages. The remaining units stayed behind at Tobruk or Bardia. Transport aircraft were insufficient to move troops quickly. Fuel shortages hampered naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Ten submarines had been lost since Italy declared war. The fleet remained too important to risk further losses. British control of the Eastern Mediterranean allowed them to bombard coastal positions freely.
On the 9th of September 1940, the Royal Italian Air Force increased its activity over Cyrenaica. Bombers from 55 Squadron, 113 Squadron and 211 Squadron RAF retaliated against Italian airfields. They attacked transport, supply dumps and conducted a raid on Tobruk. Later that day, fighters made sweeps over Buq Buq. British reconnaissance revealed ground movement at Bardia, Sidi Azeiz and Gabr Saleh. The forward move showed limits of Italian mobility when the Maletti Group got lost again. On the 13th of September, the 1st CC.NN. Division retook Fort Capuzzo. Artillery fire fell on Musaid just over the Egyptian border. Sollum barracks became empty targets for bombing raids. Dust clouds rose as Italian forces advanced along the coast road. Two divisions led the attack behind screens of motorcyclists and tanks. The formation made easy targets for artillery and aircraft. By nightfall on the 16th of September, the 1st CC.NN. Division occupied Sidi Barrani. Above the escarpment, British covering forces fell back parallel to those on the coast road. No flank attack occurred despite expectations. Italians dug in on an arc stretching south and southwest. Camps formed at Maktila, Tummar east, Tummar west, Nibeiwa and Sofafi. Divisions further back occupied Buq Buq, Sidi Omar and Halfaya Pass. Casualties remained under 200 men during the entire advance. The army halted about 50 miles inside Egypt. Engineers began construction of fortified camps while waiting for supplies.
The 7th Support Group harassed Italians between the border and Matruh. It retained capacity to engage main Italian forces if needed. At Matruh, infantry awaited attacks while the bulk of the 7th Armoured Division prepared counter-attacks from the desert flank. Covering forces exaggerated their size to confuse enemy planners. The 3rd Coldstream Guards, a company of King's Royal Rifle Corps and Free French Motor Marines fell back in stages. They demolished the road as they retired to delay pursuit. By mid-July, Mediterranean Fleet controlled Eastern Mediterranean waters. Destroyers bombarded Italian coastal positions and transported supplies along the coast to Matruh. RAF Blenheims destroyed three aircraft on ground at Benina. Captured Italians spoke of damage, casualties and loss of morale after naval bombardments. Small British columns worked with armored car patrols moving close to Italian camps. They gleaned information and dominated hinterland areas near Sollum. On the 17th of September, Mediterranean Fleet mined Benghazi harbor. A destroyer hit a mine there and sank. Fires and explosions were seen during continued bombardments. Camps and depots moved inland to avoid destruction. Wavell ordered O'Connor to drive back Italians from frontier posts. Instructions emphasized dominating hinterland if war began. The 6th Infantry Division headquarters took command in June 1940. It lacked complete units but still functioned effectively. Four Hawker Hurricane fighters arrived by July though only one could be spared for Western Desert Force operations.
On the 8th of December 1940, the Western Desert Force launched Operation Compass. This five-day raid targeted fortified Italian camps outside Sidi Barrani. Berti remained on sick leave while Gariboldi temporarily commanded the 10th Army. The raid succeeded quickly against unprepared defenses. Few units survived destruction within Egypt. Survivors faced hurried retreat along the coast road. By the 11th of December, British forces began counter-offensive actions. The rest of the 10th Army was swiftly defeated across Cyrenaica. Pursuit extended to Sollum, Bardia, Tobruk, Derna, Mechili, Beda Fomm and El Agheila near Gulf of Sirte. British losses totaled around 2,000 killed or wounded during Compass. They captured over 130,000 prisoners including Libyans and Italians. Over 400 aircraft were destroyed or captured alongside many tanks. Broken-down vehicles prevented continuation beyond El Agheila. Best-equipped units diverted to Greek Campaign instead. Casualty figures varied among historians but all agreed on massive Italian losses. Kenneth Macksey noted fewer than 50 British deaths versus thousands of Italian casualties. Harold Raugh estimated about 130,000 Italian losses against less than fifty British. Giorgio Bocca recorded forty men killed plus ten tanks and eleven armored cars destroyed. Howard Christie documented 19,000 killed and 38,000 wounded for the 10th Army between September and December.
The 10th Army advanced roughly one kilometer per day to keep non-motorized units together. No bold mechanized strokes occurred despite available resources. Armored units guarded infantry rather than executing flanking movements. The Maletti Group failed to operate according to Italian armoured warfare theory. Lack of preparation training and organization led to blunders in assembling forces. Over-caution paralyzed tank battalions attached to other divisions. Rushing motorization of the 1st CC.NN. Division disorganized driver-infantry relationships. Sixty-eight Fiat M.11/39 tanks remained out of seventy-two sent to Libya by late September. Nine serviceable and twenty-three unserviceable tanks stayed with the 1st Medium Tank Battalion. Twenty-eight operational and eight non-operational tanks belonged to the 2nd Medium Tank Battalion. Deliveries of new Fiat M13/40 models began arriving in October. Thirty-seven M13/40 tanks reached Libya on the 12th of October followed by another thirty-seven on the 12th of December. Mussolini wrote on the 26th of October expressing frustration over delays. Two days later, Italy invaded Greece beginning Greco-Italian War. Graziani allowed planning at leisurely pace while advancing toward Matruh scheduled for mid-December. Equipment losses for both sides had not been accurately tabulated until later studies. Poor morale plagued Italian ranks throughout campaign duration. Navy lacked experience despite fast well-built ships funded under Fascist regime. Air force stagnated after being ready for war since 1936. British dominance of terrain combined with inferior Italian technology sealed defeat.
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Common questions
When did the Italian invasion of Egypt begin in 1940?
The Italian invasion of Egypt began on the 8th of August 1940 when Marshal Rodolfo Graziani received orders to attack. The advance started shortly after Italy declared war on France and Britain from Libya in June 1940.
Who commanded the Italian forces during the invasion of Egypt?
Marshal Rodolfo Graziani commanded the Italian 10th Army during the invasion of Egypt. He received direct orders from Benito Mussolini to seize the Suez Canal and defeat British forces quickly.
What was the outcome of Operation Compass launched by the Western Desert Force?
Operation Compass launched on the 8th of December 1940 resulted in the swift defeat of the Italian 10th Army across Cyrenaica. British forces captured over 130,000 prisoners including Libyans and Italians while destroying or capturing more than 400 aircraft.
How many miles into Egypt did the Italian army advance before halting?
The Italian army halted about 50 miles inside Egypt after advancing along the Via Balbia road. They dug in on an arc stretching south and southwest with camps at Maktila Tummar east Tummar west Nibeiwa and Sofafi.
Why did the Italian 10th Army fail to maintain its advance into Egypt?
The Italian 10th Army failed to maintain its advance due to severe logistical shortages including insufficient trucks lorries and fuel. Non-motorized divisions had to march long distances on foot while equipment failures paralyzed tank battalions attached to other units.