Operation Pedestal

• 1. Introduction

  ›

  Operation Pedestal began with sealed envelopes, handed to the masters of fourteen merchant ships and marked 'Not to be opened until 08:00 hours August 10.' Inside each was a message from First Lord of the Admiralty Albert Alexander, wishing the captains 'God Speed.' By August 1942, the fortnightly ration on Malta had fallen to 14 ounces of sugar and 7 ounces of fats per person. Bread was rationed at 10.5 ounces and corned beef at 14 ounces. Adult male workers were surviving on 1,690 calories a day; women and children received 1,500. Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, the local air commander since July, warned that only a few weeks' supply of aviation fuel remained on the island. If fuel, food, and ammunition did not arrive before September, Malta would surrender. Churchill and First Sea Lord Dudley Pound agreed that losing the island would be 'a disaster of the first magnitude to the British Empire.' They also believed its loss would prove fatal to the defence of the Nile Valley. Britain's answer was the largest convoy escort yet assembled: two battleships, three aircraft carriers, seven cruisers, and thirty-two destroyers to protect fourteen merchant ships. The Axis had positioned 701 aircraft, multiple lines of submarines, torpedo boats, and minefields across every approach to the island. Whether anything would reach Grand Harbour was a question only the next two weeks would answer.

• 2. The Island's Strategic Weight

  ›

  From June to October 1941, Malta-based British forces sank about 220,000 long tons of Axis shipping on the supply routes to North Africa. Aircraft were responsible for 115,000 of those long tons; the Royal Navy took 94,000 long tons more. Malta-based squadrons accounted for roughly 75 per cent of all Axis ships destroyed from the air during that period. The island was not simply a defensive garrison. It was a base that threatened to cut the supply lines keeping Axis armies in the desert alive. The Axis launched successive air campaigns against Malta to suppress it, beginning in 1941. By late July 1942-80 fighters remained operational on the island, wearing down at 17 aircraft per week. Aviation fuel was barely sufficient for those fighters alone. Bombers and torpedo aircraft had been stood down from offensive operations. In August, a mass slaughter of livestock began on the island to reduce the need for fodder imports and to convert grazing land for crops. The meat was distributed through communal Victory Kitchens.

  From January 1941 to August 1942-46 ships had delivered 320,000 long tons of cargo to Malta. Twenty-five ships had been sunk in the attempt. Thirty-one submarine supply runs had also been conducted at great cost and for limited cargo. Nineteen carrier operations, known informally as Club Runs, had delivered 670 Hurricanes and Spitfires to the island between August 1940 and August 1942. Operation Julius in June 1942 had tried to run convoys simultaneously from Gibraltar and Alexandria. Only two ships from the Gibraltar convoy reached Malta; the Alexandria convoy was forced to turn back. The sole tanker in the Gibraltar group was sunk. On the 5th of August, Abwehr reports had convinced Kesselring that a major Allied operation to resupply Malta was already underway.

• 3. A Fractured Command

  ›

  Benito Mussolini had held the offices of Minister of War, Minister of the Navy, and Minister of the Air Force since 1933. He had concentrated authority over all three Italian armed services in himself alone. Below him, the command structure fractured. Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring of the Luftwaffe commanded German forces in the theatre as Commander-in-Chief South. He had no authority over Axis operations in North Africa or over the organisation of Axis convoys. Supermarina, the Italian Naval High Command, resisted all German attempts to integrate its operations. Ships in different Italian squadrons never trained together, and Supermarina routinely overruled its own subordinate commanders. German inter-service rivalries added another layer of friction; there was little unity of effort between German and Italian forces.

  The Regia Marina received only 12,000 long tons of fuel in June 1942, equivalent to 20 per cent of what its convoy routes consumed. Most Italian capital ships were non-operational because of this shortage. Mussolini suggested to Hitler that the convoy should be resisted by submarines and aircraft alone. The Luftwaffe lacked fighters to escort its bombers, torpedo aircraft, and surface ships simultaneously. Kesselring refused an Italian request for air cover for the fleet. He doubted that the Italian heavy cruisers could succeed even with such cover. By the morning of the 12th of August, Kesselring confirmed to Comando Supremo that the Luftwaffe was fully committed to bomber escort. It could not spare fighters to protect Italian surface ships. The 3rd and 7th Cruiser divisions, which had sailed to intercept the convoy, were denied the air protection they had demanded.

  By the 10th of August, 220 Luftwaffe aircraft had assembled in Sicily. Another 300 Regia Aeronautica aircraft stood ready on the island, and 150 more had gathered in Sardinia.

• 4. Fire from Above

  ›

  At 13:15 on the 11th of August, four torpedoes struck HMS Eagle from a range of 400 yards. The carrier sank in eight minutes, 70 nautical miles south of Cape Salinas. Destroyers and the tug Jaunty rescued 929 men of the complement of 1,160. Two hundred and thirty-one men were lost, along with all but four of Eagle's Sea Hurricanes. Those four aircraft happened to be airborne at the moment of the sinking. The loss stripped the convoy of roughly 20 per cent of its fighter cover in a single strike.

  Axis air attacks built toward a noon assault on the 12th of August involving 117 Italian and 58 German sorties. The volume of anti-aircraft fire from the convoy forced many Axis crews to release their weapons early. One weapon never reached the convoy at all. A radio-controlled SM.79, loaded with a 1,000 kilogram bomb, was directed toward a carrier from a Cant Z.1007b flown by Generale di brigata Ferdinando Raffaelli. The radio failed. The SM.79 flew straight ahead and struck Mount Khenchela in Algeria. Two aircraft from the Sezione Speciale arrived with anti-personnel bombs; the armour-piercing bombs intended for the mission had not been made ready. Both struck Victorious, killing six sailors and wounding two.

  Around 18:35 on the 12th of August, clouds parted over the convoy as Ju 87 dive-bombers arrived with torpedo aircraft in a well-timed attack. One wave of Stukas near-missed Rodney. A second wave attacked Indomitable from out of the sun at 9,000 feet. Two 1,000 kilogram bombs hit the flight deck and three more near-missed. Fifty men were killed and 59 were wounded. Indomitable caught fire and slowed to 17 knots. Victorious was now the only operational carrier. Aircraft that could not land on her were thrown overboard.

  Syfret ordered Force Z to turn west at 18:55, earlier than planned, to move Indomitable out of danger. Eagle's loss had removed 16 aircraft; Indomitable's damage had taken 47 more out of action. Force X pressed on with eight Sea Hurricanes, three Martlets, and ten Fulmars as total fighter cover for the convoy.

• 5. Night in the Narrows

  ›

  At 19:38 on the 12th of August, an Italian submarine fired four torpedoes at a freighter from 2,000 yards and heard three explosions. The detonations came not from the target but from HMS Nigeria and the tanker Ohio. Nigeria's torpedo killed 52 men. Ohio's blast tore a hole 23 feet by 26 feet in its side and started a fire. The crew put the fire out and held 7 knots. Both Nigeria and HMS Cairo had been fitted as Fighter Direction ships, and both were struck within minutes of each other. Force X lost its commander, the leaders of both convoy columns, and nearly half its escort in moments.

  At 00:40, four German S-boats and thirteen Italian torpedo boats launched fifteen attacks on the convoy as it passed through the Skerki Channel. The lighthouse at Cap Bon had exposed the convoy's position about 10 nautical miles from shore. The long, thinly-escorted line of merchant ships was an easy target in darkness.

  At 01:02, near Ras Mustafa south of Kelibia, two MS torpedo boats struck Manchester. Each scored one hit, flooding boilers, fuel tanks, and magazines and wrecking three of Manchester's four propeller shafts. The ship listed 12 degrees. Power was later restored and 156 men were taken aboard Pathfinder. At 05:00, the captain ordered Manchester scuttled and the remaining crew to make for the Tunisian coast.

  Between 03:15 and 04:30, roughly 15 nautical miles off Kelibia, torpedo boats sank Wairangi, Almeria Lykes, and Glenorchy. Kenya's captain described the state of the convoy as 'chaotic.' Brisbane Star, damaged but still moving, lurked near the Tunisian coast by dawn, waiting to make a run for Malta after dark.

• 6. Ohio

  ›

  Ohio arrived at Grand Harbour at 09:30 on the 15th of August 1942. The tanker was lashed between the destroyers Ledbury and Penn, with a minesweeper steadying the stern. Cheering crowds and a band playing Rule Britannia greeted the ship as it entered port. Men removed their hats, women crossed themselves, and a bugle sounded Still. Ohio settled on the bottom just as the last of its fuel was emptied.

  On the morning of the 13th of August, ten Ju 88s near-missed Ohio and hit Waimarama, which disintegrated. Waimarama had been carrying aviation fuel on deck; the blast destroyed one of the attacking bombers. Melbourne Star passed through the burning wreckage, rescuing 27 survivors from a crew of 107. Shortly after, a Stuka shot down during a second wave of attacks crashed onto Ohio's deck and caught fire.

  HMS Unbroken had been waiting 2 nautical miles north of the Capo Milazzo lighthouse since the 10th of August. At 07:25, the Italian cruisers appeared through the periscope, heading north between the islands of Filicudi and Panarea. The ships were making 20 knots with eight destroyer escorts. Unbroken's commander raised the periscope only briefly to avoid detection, manoeuvring carefully into position. At 08:05, the cruisers slowed to 18 knots for Gorizia to fly off a seaplane; a destroyer machine-gunned a periscope seen at 450 yards. Unbroken fired four torpedoes after the destroyers had passed. Bolzano was struck while beginning to turn away. Muzio Attendolo, alerted too late by Bolzano's fate, was hit forward; 82 feet of its bow was blown open, though the ship suffered no fatalities. The destroyers detected Unbroken at 08:45 and dropped 105 depth charges in the next 45 minutes, but at too shallow a depth. Unbroken remained submerged for ten hours and was eventually recalled to Malta. Bolzano burned until the following day; after a month of repairs it was towed to Naples.

  Penn first tried to tow Ohio, but the listing hull kept snapping the tow line. Twenty bombers attacked the towing formation, destroying Ohio's rudder and holing the stern. A bomb struck the same spot as the earlier torpedo hit and broke the tanker's keel. American volunteers from Santa Eliza manned Ohio's anti-aircraft guns throughout the tow. Ledbury and Penn were eventually lashed one on each side of the hull, with a minesweeper steadying the stern. Bramham replaced Ledbury for the final stretch.

  The tanker's oil was discharged into two waiting vessels while water was simultaneously pumped into Ohio to reduce the chance of structural failure. About 3,000 soldiers unloaded the surviving ships. Some supplies were looted by police officers, watchmen, British soldiers, and Maltese civilians. The surviving convoy delivered roughly 32,000 short tons of general cargo, along with petrol, oil fuel, kerosene, and diesel. The Siege of Malta broke in November 1942, after the Second Battle of El Alamein ended on the 11th of November. Operation Torch in the western Mediterranean that same month enabled land-based aircraft to escort merchant convoys to the island.