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Military tactics: the story on HearLore | HearLore
Common questions
What are the four core functions of military tactics?
The four core functions of military tactics are kinetic force, movement, protection, and the psychological shock of the charge. These elements have remained constant throughout history even as technology changed the weapons used to deliver them.
When did infantry-delivered missile firepower begin to rise significantly in military history?
Infantry-delivered missile firepower began to rise significantly in the mid 19th century. The introduction of the rifled musket during the Crimean War and the American Civil War marked a turning point that offered flatter trajectories and improved accuracy at greater ranges.
Which historical period saw the shock cycle dominate military tactics according to J. F. C. Fuller?
The shock cycle dominated military tactics between 650 and 1450 according to J. F. C. Fuller. This period was followed by a shock and projectile cycle from 1450 to 1850 and a projectile cycle from 1850 to the present.
What event ended the first unarmored period in Tom Wintringham's chronological periods of World War II?
The Battle of Plataea in 479 BC ended the first unarmored period in Tom Wintringham's chronological periods. The first armored period concluded with the Battle of Adrianople in 378.
Why did personal armor get largely discarded by the 18th and 19th centuries?
Personal armor was largely discarded by the 18th and 19th centuries because its weight and bulk reduced soldier mobility and endurance. It was re-introduced during World War I in response to the firepower of artillery.
Military tactics
The first word of war is not a shout, but a calculation. Before the first sword swings or the first arrow flies, military tactics exist as a silent science of organizing human bodies into instruments of destruction. This discipline, distinct from the grand strategies that decide nations or the logistics that feed armies, operates on the immediate, bloody reality of the battlefield. It is the lowest of three levels of war, yet it is the level where life and death are decided in seconds. For most of human history, the balance of this science shifted not by philosophy, but by the relentless march of technology. A spear is a different weapon than a rifle, and a horse is a different weapon than a tank, but the core functions of tactics have remained constant: kinetic force, movement, protection, and the psychological shock of the charge. These four elements have danced a complex waltz through the ages, with one function dominating the era while the others recede into the background, only to rise again when the technology of the time demands it.
The Kinetic Shift
The history of firepower is a history of distance and precision. For millennia, the kinetic function of tactics relied on the physical strength of the soldier to deliver a blow with a club, a spear, or a sword. The Romans introduced artillery to change this equation, but for centuries, the result of a battle was rarely decided by the missile fire of infantry alone. It was not until the mid 19th century that the value of infantry-delivered missile firepower began to rise significantly. The introduction of the rifled musket during the Crimean War and the American Civil War marked a turning point, offering flatter trajectories and improved accuracy at greater ranges. This technological leap meant that flanking maneuvers without artillery support became increasingly difficult, and the cost of an infantry attack rose dramatically. The machine gun, appearing at the turn of the 20th century, and the mobile firepower of tanks and aircraft that followed, cemented the dominance of kinetic effects. Today, guided weapons and self-propelled artillery provide the primary means of destruction, rendering the close-range melee of ancient history a distant memory.
The Speed of War
For most of human history, the speed of war was limited to the pace of a human foot. An army could rarely travel more than a few miles in a day, unless they traveled along rivers, and only small elements like cavalry or light troops could exceed this limit. This restriction on tactical mobility remained unbroken until the latter years of World War I, when the advent of the tank improved mobility sufficiently to allow decisive tactical maneuver. Despite this advance, full tactical mobility was not achieved until World War II, when armored and motorized formations achieved remarkable successes. However, even in that global conflict, large elements of the armies remained reliant on horse-drawn transport, which limited tactical mobility within the overall force. The development of field obstacles by military engineers further constrained movement, proving that speed is not just about engines, but about the ability to clear the path forward. The balance between mobility and firepower has dictated the rise and fall of fighting arms, from the chariots of antiquity to the air cavalry troopers of the modern era.
What defines the gray zone in modern military tactics?
The gray zone in modern military tactics is defined by the ambiguity between defense versus offense and peace-keeping versus war effort. These tactics include strong-arm diplomacy, economic coercion, media manipulation, and cyberattacks.
Personal armor has been worn since the classical period to provide a measure of individual protection, yet its limitations have always been weight and bulk. The heavier the armor, the less mobile the soldier, and the less endurance the human body possesses. By the 18th and 19th centuries, personal armor had been largely discarded, only to be re-introduced during World War I in response to the firepower of artillery. The re-emergence of helmets and the proliferation of armored fighting vehicles during World War II marked a return to the protection of the individual and the collective. Fortifications, used since ancient times, provide collective protection through entrenchments, roadblocks, barbed wire, and minefields. These defenses, often created by military engineers, serve as a counter to the kinetic function of the enemy. The paradox of protection lies in its ability to slow the enemy while simultaneously slowing the defender, creating a stalemate that defines much of modern warfare. The return of body armor for infantry in Western armies after World War II highlights the enduring need for protection in an age of high-velocity projectiles.
The Psychology of Shock
Shock action is as much a psychological function of tactics as a physical one, and it can be significantly enhanced by the use of surprise. It has been provided by charging infantry, chariots, war elephants, cavalry, and armored vehicles, all of which provide momentum to an assault. The drenching flights of arrows from English longbowmen at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 caused the horses of the French knights to panic, demonstrating that shock can be delivered from a distance. During early modern warfare, the use of tactical formations of columns and lines had a greater effect than the firepower of the formations alone. In the early stages of World War II, the combined effects of German machine gun and tank gun firepower, enhanced by accurate indirect fire and air attack, often broke up Allied units before their assault commenced. The cumulative psychological shock effect on the enemy was often greater than the actual casualties incurred, proving that the mind is as vulnerable as the body on the battlefield.
The Cycles of Dominance
The development of tactics has involved a shifting balance between the four tactical functions since ancient times, and changes in firepower and mobility have been fundamental to these changes. J. F. C. Fuller proposed three tactical cycles in each of the classical and Christian eras, with the shock cycle dominating between 650 and 1450, followed by a shock and projectile cycle from 1450 to 1850, and a projectile cycle from 1850 to the present. Tom Wintringham proposed six chronological periods during World War II, which alternate the dominance between unarmored and armored forces. The first unarmored period ended with the Battle of Plataea in 479 BC, while the first armored period concluded with the Battle of Adrianople in 378. The second unarmored period ended with Charlemagne's victory at Pavia in 774, and the second armored period concluded with the battles of Morgarten in 1315, Crécy in 1346, and Ravenna in 1512. The third unarmored period ended with the Battle of Cambrai in 1917, and the third armored period continues to the present. These cycles reflect the dominance of individual fighting arms, from the phalanx and Roman legion to the heavy cavalry and the modern armored forces.
The Synchronization of Arms
The synchronization of the various fighting arms to achieve the tactical mission is known as combined arms tactics. One method of measuring tactical effectiveness is the extent to which the arms, including military aviation, are integrated on the battlefield. A key principle of effective combined arms tactics is that for maximum potential to be achieved, all elements of combined arms teams need the same level of mobility, and sufficient firepower and protection. The history of the development of combined arms tactics has been dogged by costly and painful lessons. While German commanders in World War II clearly understood from the outset the key principle of combined arms tactics, British commanders were late to this realization. Successful combined arms tactics require the fighting arms to train alongside each other and to be familiar with each other's capabilities. The integration of air power, ground forces, and infantry has become the standard, yet the failure to synchronize these elements has led to disasters such as Operation Market Garden in September 1944 and the challenges faced during the Vietnam War.
The Gray Zone of War
Military tactics answer the questions of how best to deploy and employ forces on a small scale, but the nature of war has evolved to include the gray zone. These tactics include everything from strong-arm diplomacy and economic coercion to media manipulation and cyberattacks, to the use of paramilitaries and proxy forces. The title gray zone comes from the ambiguity between defense versus offense, as well as the ambiguity between peace-keeping versus war effort. Before the nineteenth century, many military tactics were confined to battlefield concerns, but now, specialized tactics exist for many situations, such as securing a room in a building. Technological changes can render existing tactics obsolete, and sociological changes can shift the goals and methods of warfare, requiring new tactics. The first World War forced great changes in tactics as advances in technology rendered prior tactics useless, and the gray zone represents the next evolution of this constant adaptation. The history of tactics is not just a history of weapons, but a history of the human mind's ability to adapt to the changing nature of conflict.