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Mexican drug war

Ch. 1 of 8
— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

Contents

Mexican drug war

8 sections
  • The Mexican drug war produced a city with the highest homicide rate in the world. Between 2009 and 2011, Ciudad Juárez in the state of Chihuahua recorded more than 200 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. The Mexican drug war is an ongoing, asymmetric armed conflict between the Mexican government and a shifting set of drug trafficking syndicates. Soldiers, police, cartel gunmen, vigilantes and politicians have all been pulled into it. This documentary asks how a smuggling trade with deep roots became a conflict on this scale. It asks why capturing and killing cartel leaders so often made the violence worse. It asks who has paid the price, from mayors and reporters to migrants crossing the country. And it asks why four presidents, each with a different slogan, have kept relying on the armed forces.

  • Prohibition ended in the United States in 1933, and that is when the illegal drug trade between Mexico and its northern neighbor began. Until then, Mexican bootleggers had been supplying alcohol to American gangsters. Mexico's position made it a natural staging point for narcotics and contraband moving between Latin America and American markets.

    In 1940, President Lázaro Cárdenas tried something radical. Encouraged by the psychiatrist Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, he legalized all drugs. The hope was to stop illegal trafficking organizations before they could form. The law lasted about five months. Mexico then repealed it, allegedly under growing economic and political pressure from the United States.

    World War II created a legal opium business near Culiacán. After the Pacific War cut off Asian opium, the United States ran short of medical morphine. Mexican authorities, working with American officials, expanded regulated poppy cultivation in the northwest, including rural land around Culiacán in the state of Sinaloa. Farmers in the Sierra Madre Occidental grew opium that was refined into morphine for Allied forces. The program ended after 1945. The farming knowledge, smuggling routes and local middlemen stayed behind. Historians and criminologists see those networks as an early foundation for later trafficking groups in Sinaloa.

    From the late 1960s into the early 1970s, a surge in recreational drug use in the United States sent Mexican marijuana production up exponentially. Criminals began smuggling on a major scale. Operation Intercept and Operation Condor followed, both backed by the United States. Their stated target was opium poppies and marijuana in the so-called Golden Triangle, which covers parts of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua. Mexico deployed about 10,000 soldiers and police. The result was mass arrests, torture and imprisonment of peasants who were often accused of helping leftist insurgents. No major traffickers were captured. Contemporary assessments called the campaigns a failure, citing unchecked production, military corruption and abuses in rural areas.

    The next shift came from Florida. Crackdowns there and in the Caribbean, during what became known as the Miami drug war, forced Colombian traffickers to find new routes into the United States. Mexico stood ready to supply one.

  • In 1980, a former agent of the Judicial Federal Police named Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo founded the Guadalajara Cartel. People called him El Padrino. He began by smuggling marijuana and opium into the United States. He then became the first Mexican drug chief to link up with Colombia's cocaine cartels, including the Medellín Cartel run by Pablo Escobar. His marijuana trafficking infrastructure was already built and ready to serve the Colombians. No other cartels existed in Mexico at that time.

    By the mid-1980s, the Guadalajara Cartel had a reputation as a reliable transporter. Payment at first came in cash. By the late 1980s it had shifted to payment in kind. Félix Gallardo ran operations with his associates and with politicians who sold him protection. According to Peter Dale Scott, the cartel also prospered because the Dirección Federal de Seguridad, led by Miguel Nazar Haro, shielded it.

    Security analysts trace the origins of cartel power to something larger. For decades, an implicit arrangement existed between traffickers and the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, known as the PRI. In the 1980s the PRI began losing its grip on power, and that arrangement started to unravel.

    In 1985 the cartel took a major blow. Its co-founder Rafael Caro Quintero was captured, and later convicted, for the murder of DEA agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena. Félix Gallardo kept a low profile, and in 1987 he moved with his family to Guadalajara.

    He was arrested on the 8th of April 1989. Rather than let his empire fall in a single raid, he divided it. He sent his lawyer to gather the nation's top traffickers at a house in Acapulco, where territories called plazas were assigned. The Tijuana route went to his nephews, the Arellano Felix brothers. The Ciudad Juárez route went to the Carrillo Fuentes family. Miguel Caro Quintero would run the Sonora corridor. Joaquín Guzmán Loera and Ismael Zambada García took over Pacific coast operations and became the Sinaloa Cartel, bringing the veteran Héctor Luis Palma Salazar back into the fold. Matamoros, Tamaulipas, stayed with Juan García Ábrego, founder of what became the Gulf Cartel, who had not joined the pact.

    Fighting between rival cartels began in earnest after the arrest and escalated through the 1990s. Cartel power also grew after the Cali and Medellín cartels collapsed in that decade. Félix Gallardo hoped to keep overseeing national operations from behind the scenes. In 1993 he was moved to a high-security prison, and whatever control he still held over the other leaders ended.

  • In 2000, Vicente Fox of the National Action Party became the first president since 1929 who was not from the PRI. The party he replaced had ruled for over 70 years, and anti-drug work in that era mostly meant seizing marijuana and opium crops in remote regions. Fox's term brought broad public optimism and, through 2007, falling homicide rates.

    Underneath, new violence was building in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. In the summer of 2003, Los Zetas, then the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel, used gruesome, military-style tactics against the Sinaloa Cartel. They also terrorized journalists and civilians. The Mexican media did not widely report it at the time. The tactics set a precedent that other cartels later copied. An estimated 110 people died in Nuevo Laredo in the first eight months of 2005. That same year, La Familia Michoacana split from its allies, the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas, and violence surged in Michoacán.

    Felipe Calderón took office after the contested 2006 presidential election. He launched Operation Michoacán, a militarized campaign that analysts say was meant to consolidate his authority and rally public support. It eventually involved about 45,000 troops, together with state and federal police. His government pioneered a "kingpin strategy" that used the Army and the Federal Police to capture or kill cartel leaders. Genaro García Luna, Eduardo Medina Mora and Guillermo Galván Galván directed the effort. Operations in Baja California, Sinaloa and Chihuahua followed.

    Early results looked encouraging. Forces detained or killed senior figures including Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, Arturo Beltrán Leyva, Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, Antonio Cárdenas Guillén and Vicente Carrillo Leyva. Calderón said the cartels wanted "to replace the government" and "are trying to impose a monopoly by force of arms, and are even trying to impose their own laws". Critics argue that the strategy made the conflict worse. Removing leaders created vacuums that set off internal power struggles. When one group weakened, others rose. The breakup of La Familia Michoacana, for example, produced the Knights Templar. Splinter groups fought over overlapping routes and territories. Some leaked intelligence to Mexican authorities or to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, using what they knew about their old organizations to turn police against rivals.

    The murder rate climbed dramatically during Calderón's term. His administration's own statistics counted 50,000 drug-related homicides over six years. Outside sources claimed more than 120,000 murders in the same period. Carlos Pascual, the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico, was among the analysts who blamed the increase directly on the military measures.

    In 2008, Calderón signed the Mérida Initiative with the United States. It provided funding, training and intelligence, and allowed American personnel to work in Mexico in advisory roles. In March 2009, he sent 5,000 more Army troops to Ciudad Juárez. By 2011, the armed forces had captured 11,544 people believed to be tied to organized crime. The year before, 28,000 people had been arrested on drug-related charges.

  • In 1999, Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas Guillén recruited 37 former elite soldiers from Mexico's special forces to serve as his private army. They became Los Zetas. After Cárdenas Guillén was arrested and extradited in 2007, the group broke away under Heriberto Lazcano and built independent networks in drug, arms and human trafficking. By 2008 they had allied with the Beltrán Leyva brothers against their former partners. In 2010 the split became open war, and several border towns in Tamaulipas turned into "ghost towns".

    In October 2012, Mexican Navy forces killed Lazcano in a shootout in Sabinas, Coahuila, after gunmen attacked their patrol. The operation came hours after the capture of another senior Zeta, Salvador Alfonso Martínez Escobedo. It raised the Navy's standing and let Miguel Treviño Morales take control of Los Zetas. It also ultimately benefited Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, whose Sinaloa Cartel wanted the Nuevo Laredo smuggling routes. The Navy arrested Treviño Morales in July 2013. By the late 2010s, the group had fractured into rival factions, including Sangre Nueva Zeta and Zetas Vieja Escuela.

    Michoacán followed the same pattern. La Familia Michoacana was the first cartel targeted by Calderón's strategy. After its founder Nazario Moreno González, called "El Más Loco", was reported dead, the group split. One faction was led by José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, known as "El Chango". The other became the Knights Templar Cartel, formed in 2011 under Enrique Plancarte Solís and Servando Gómez Martínez, called "La Tuta". The Knights Templar reportedly promoted a religious doctrine as part of its identity. Méndez Vargas was arrested in 2011, and authorities declared La Familia dismantled. The Navy killed Plancarte Solís in 2014. Gómez Martínez was arrested in 2015, and the cartel is believed to have disbanded in 2017.

    In 2006, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán formalized "the Federation", an alliance of criminal groups in Sinaloa. He became Mexico's most-wanted trafficker, with an estimated net worth of US$1 billion. The Federation fought the Juárez Cartel for control of routes in and around Ciudad Juárez, and the Juárez Cartel lost. Estimates of the dead range between 5,000 and 12,000. Both sides fought through street gangs. Los Mexicles, the Artistas Asesinos and Gente Nueva worked for Sinaloa, while La Línea and Barrio Azteca fought for Juárez. After Guzmán's conviction in 2019, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada emerged as the senior figure. Zambada was arrested in 2024 and extradited to the United States in 2025. Rival factions inside the Sinaloa Cartel have since fought each other.

    Cartels are sometimes portrayed as centralized hierarchies. Often they work more like loose networks of cells and affiliates that can shift loyalties or rebrand. That makes them resilient, but it also feeds infighting and fragmentation.

    The Jalisco New Generation Cartel, or CJNG, grew out of a split in the Milenio Cartel. It defeated a rival offshoot, La Resistencia, and took over Milenio's smuggling networks. It spread from coast to coast in only six months. By 2018 it was claimed to be the most powerful cartel in Mexico, although Insight Crime said the Sinaloa Cartel still held that place. Its leader, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as "El Mencho", was killed by the Mexican Army in the 2026 Jalisco operation on the 22nd of February. His death triggered widespread retaliatory violence and travel disruptions.

  • Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI took office in 2012 promising a different kind of war. He opposed armed American agents operating in Mexico and wanted only to train Mexican forces in counter-insurgency tactics. He pledged to lower criminal violence rather than hunt cartel leaders and intercept shipments. Even so, 23,640 people died in the conflict in his first 14 months, between December 2012 and January 2014. His security policy was shaped by Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong, Jesús Murillo Karam and Salvador Cienfuegos.

    In 2012 and 2013, rural communities began arming themselves. Vigilante groups called grupos de autodefensa comunitaria took up weapons against criminals trying to dominate their towns. Óscar Naranjo, one of Peña Nieto's security advisors, encouraged the approach. It crumbled as the groups fell into internal struggles and disputes with the government, and as organized crime infiltrated and co-opted them.

    The Iguala mass kidnapping of 2014 became a flashpoint. Forty-three students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College disappeared after local police detained them and allegedly handed them to a criminal group. International forensic experts later discredited the government's investigation. The case drew national and international condemnation and exposed how entangled authorities and organized crime had become.

    In 2015, El Chapo Guzmán escaped from the maximum-security Altiplano prison through a mile-long tunnel. It had lighting, ventilation and a rail-mounted motorcycle. After six months on the run, he was recaptured in Los Mochis, Sinaloa, following a military raid. He was extradited to the United States in 2017 and sentenced to life imprisonment. Guzmán claimed he had paid bribes to both Peña Nieto and Calderón. Both men denied it. Also in 2017, the legislature passed the Law of Internal Security to formalize the military's role in civilian policing. The Supreme Court struck it down a year later.

    Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the left-wing Morena party took office in 2018. He promised amnesty for poor farmers, coerced laborers and young people jailed for drug possession, but not for cartel members. His approach was summed up as "Abrazos, no balazos", or "hugs, not bullets". It stressed welfare spending, scholarships and youth employment. In January 2019, he declared "the end of the Mexican war on drugs" and said he would focus on oil theft rings called huachicoleros, which targeted the state company Pemex. Critics objected to the declaration because security policy still leaned on the armed forces.

    The National Guard was created in May 2019 by merging units of the Federal Police, military police, Navy and other agencies. It was first envisioned as a civilian-led force. It ended up under the Secretariat of National Defense, known as SEDENA. In October 2019, a Guard operation in Culiacán tried to capture Ovidio Guzmán López, one of El Chapo's sons, in response to a U.S. extradition request. About 700 cartel enforcers took hostages, including in a housing unit where military families live, and forced his release. López Obrador said the decision prevented further loss of life. Ovidio Guzmán López was captured in a 2023 operation and extradited to the United States. The arrest in January 2023 set off a wave of violence in Sinaloa.

    Despite the campaign promises, troop levels were 76% higher and defense spending 87% higher between 2012 and 2022. Under U.S. pressure, the National Guard was increasingly used to slow migrant flows from Central America. Claudia Sheinbaum took office in 2024 pledging continuity. She named Omar García Harfuch to head the Secretariat of Security and Civilian Protection, and her government expanded that office's powers and turned more heavily to surveillance technology.

  • In December 2005, Mexico's Attorney General reported that nearly 1,500 of the 7,000 agents in the Federal Investigations Agency were under investigation for suspected crimes. Another 457 faced charges. Agents of the agency were believed to work as enforcers for various cartels, and it was disbanded in 2009.

    In June 2007, Calderón purged 284 federal police commanders from all 31 states and the Federal District. In April 2008, General Sergio Aponte Polito, who ran the anti-drug campaign in Baja California, made public accusations about police corruption. He said the state's anti-kidnapping squad was really a kidnapping team working with organized crime. He also said bribed police units served as bodyguards for traffickers. More than 50 accused officials, many of whom quit or fled. Four months later Aponte was relieved of his command.

    In May 2010, an NPR report gathered allegations from dozens of sources that the Sinaloa Cartel had infiltrated the federal government and the military. Mexican officials denied it. Mexico has thousands of municipal police forces with uneven training, resources and oversight. Federal law enforcement has been reorganized at least five times since 1982, and at least four elite special forces units have been created. Impunity rates for violent crime are estimated at between 90 and 95%.

    The weapons are a separate story. Cartels favor assault rifles such as the AR-15, M16, M4, AK-47 and Type 56, which cannot be bought on the civilian market. Some use counterfeit M16s built from aftermarket parts. They also use body armor, improvised explosive devices, narco-submarines and unmanned aerial vehicles. Grenades and rocket launchers are often smuggled across the Guatemalan border as leftovers from the Salvadoran Civil War and the Nicaraguan Revolution.

    In 2011, a gunwalking scandal known as Operation Fast and Furious erupted. Critics said the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives had allowed straw purchases and let guns travel to Mexico. The agency's own Project Gunrunner was meant to stop that flow. Later, the Mexican Navy seized a weapon from Guzmán's gunmen during the Black Swan operation that captured him, and the ATF confirmed it was one of the guns lost under the project. U.S. Department of Homeland Security officials said the common claim about American origin is misleading. Of about 30,000 weapons seized in Mexico between 2004 and 2008, they said 3,480 were traced to the United States, which is 87 percent of those that could be traced.

    Poverty supplies the workforce. Between 2006 and 2010, the share of Mexicans living in extreme or moderate poverty rose from 35% to 46%, or 52 million people. The bottom ten percent of earners held 1.36% of the country's resources, while the top ten percent held almost 36%. In 2012, cartels were estimated to employ over 450,000 people directly, and another 3.2 million depended on the drug trade. In Ciudad Juárez, up to 60% of the economy rested on illegal income. In the 1960s, only 5.6% of Mexicans had more than six years of schooling.

    Supply shifts mattered too. A 2018 study estimated that between 2006 and 2009, the decline in cocaine supply from Colombia could explain 10-14% of the rise in Mexico's violence.

  • By the end of Calderón's term in 2012, the official death toll was at least 60,000. Estimates passed 120,000 by 2013, not counting 27,000 people who were missing. Counting is difficult because it is often unclear which deaths belong to the war and which are ordinary homicides. Yearly tallies of organized-crime homicides show the swings. They record 2,774 killings in 2007, a peak of 12,658 in 2010, a drop to 7,993 in 2014, and 12,224 in 2016. One estimate puts the total at about 115,000 for 2007-2018. In 2009, the attorney general's office claimed that 9 of 10 victims belonged to organized crime groups, though other sources questioned that. Military and police deaths are estimated at 7% of the total.

    Cartels have also used violence as a message. The 2008 Morelia grenade attacks killed eight and injured more than 100 civilians celebrating Independence Day. In 2011, Los Zetas set fire to the Casino Royale in Monterrey and killed 52 civilians. At least a dozen norteño musicians have been murdered, most of them performers of narcocorridos, folk songs about the drug trade.

    Between 2000 and 2012, several dozen journalists were murdered for covering the war, including Miguel Ángel López Velasco, Luis Carlos Santiago and Valentín Valdés Espinosa. The offices of Televisa and local newspapers were bombed. As traditional outlets were silenced, anonymous blogs such as Blog del Narco took over reporting, and cartels then targeted bloggers. In May 2012, Regina Martinez of Proceso was murdered in Xalapa. A few days later, three Veracruz photojournalists were tortured and killed.

    Politicians are targets as well. María Santos Gorrostieta Salazar, a former mayor of Tiquicheo, Michoacán, had survived three assassination attempts and the murder of her husband. She was abducted and beaten to death in November 2012. The 2018 general elections were the deadliest on record, with more than 130 candidates and politicians killed. Mayors usually appoint local police chiefs, which makes them valuable to cartels seeking control.

    Migrants crossing Mexico have been kidnapped, held for ransom and forced to work for cartels. In 2010, the bodies of 72 migrants were found in San Fernando, Tamaulipas. A year later, 177 bodies were found in a mass grave in the same area. Mexico's National Human Rights Commission said 11,000 migrants were kidnapped in six months in 2010.

    The commission also received nearly 5,800 complaints of military abuse between 2007 and 2012 and issued around 90 detailed reports on violations against civilians. Finance Minister Agustín Carstens said the worsening security situation alone was reducing Mexico's gross domestic product by 1% a year.

    Groups of women known as madres buscadoras, or searching mothers, have organized searches for their disappeared relatives. Their work has uncovered unmarked mass graves.

Updated

Common questions

What is the Mexican drug war?

The Mexican drug war is an ongoing, asymmetric armed conflict between the Mexican government and various drug trafficking syndicates. The military intervened in 2006 with the aim of reducing drug-related violence.

When did the Mexican drug war begin and who started it?

The Mexican drug war formally began in 2006 when President Felipe Calderón launched Operation Michoacán. The campaign eventually involved about 45,000 troops together with state and federal police.

How many people have died in the Mexican drug war?

The official death toll of the Mexican drug war was at least 60,000 by the end of Calderón's term in 2012. Estimates passed 120,000 by 2013, not counting 27,000 missing, and sources differ on which deaths belong to the war.

Why did the kingpin strategy make the Mexican drug war more violent?

Capturing or killing cartel leaders created leadership vacuums that sparked internal power struggles and greater competition. Cartels splintered into smaller, more violent factions, such as the Knights Templar after the breakup of La Familia Michoacana.

How did the Mexican drug cartels begin?

Most Mexican cartels trace back to Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, who founded the Guadalajara Cartel in 1980. After his arrest on the 8th of April 1989, he divided his territories among regional leaders, and groups such as the Sinaloa Cartel emerged.

What did Andrés Manuel López Obrador change in the Mexican drug war?

López Obrador pledged to address the social roots of crime and summed up his policy as "Abrazos, no balazos", or "hugs, not bullets". He declared the war over in January 2019, but security policy continued to rely on the National Guard.

What happened to El Chapo during the Mexican drug war?

Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán led the Sinaloa Cartel's Federation, escaped from Altiplano prison in 2015 through a mile-long tunnel, and was recaptured in Los Mochis. He was extradited to the United States in 2017 and sentenced to life imprisonment.

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  85. 241JournalEffects of police confiscation of illicit drugs and syringes among injection drug users in VancouverDaniel Werb et al. — August 2008
  86. 242JournalDrug Users: A Potentially Important Bridge Population in the Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, Including AIDS, in ChinaHongjie Liu et al. — February 2006
  87. 243JournalSyringe Confiscation as an HIV Risk Factor: The Public Health Implications of Arbitrary Policing in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.Leo Beletsky et al. — July 18, 2012
  88. 244JournalSocial and Structural Factors Associated with HIV Infection among Female Sex Workers Who Inject Drugs in the Mexico-US Border Region.Landon Myer et al. — April 25, 2011
  89. 245JournalThe Effect of Exposures to Policing on Syringe Sharing Among People Who Inject Drugs in Bangkok, Thailand.Kanna Hayashi et al. — June 25, 2013
  90. 250NewsMayors Are New Targets In Mexico's Deadly Drug WarJason Beaubien — NPR — October 11, 2010
  91. 253NewsMexican journalist Lydia Cacho: 'I don't scare easily'Emine Saner — August 31, 2012
  92. 254NewsGuatemala police chief arrested over 'cocaine link'Julian Miglierini — March 2, 2010
  93. 255NewsLatin American drug cartels find home in West AfricaArthur Brice — CNN — September 21, 2009
  94. 257BookChallenges and implications for the future Joint ForceThe Joint Operating Environment — December 2008
  95. 259Dever says nothing new in investigationDerek Jordan — Sierra Vista Herald — May 4, 2010
  96. 263NewsCalderon proposes steps against money launderingKen Ellingwood — August 26, 2010
  97. 264DEA – Money LaunderingThe U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration — 2010
  98. 273NewsGuerra al narco asfixia penalesJosé Luis Ruiz — January 10, 2011
  99. 274U.S. Special Forces Trained Mexican Troops in ColoradoGeoffrey Ramsey — August 11, 2011
  100. 276Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking OrganizationsJune S. Beittel — Congressional Research Service — July 22, 2015
  101. 279BookMexico and the 112th CongressClare Ribando Seelke — Congressional Research Service — January 29, 2013
  102. 280Longmire, Sylvia. Cartel: The Coming Invasion Of Mexico's Drug Wars. 2011. 'Revamping Mexico's Police Forces' p. 120. Palgrave Macmillan
  103. 281NewsThe Mexico drug war: Bodies for billionsAshley Fantz — CNN News — January 20, 2012
  104. 283NewsCounting Mexico's drug victims is a murky businessClaire Schaeffer-Duffy — March 1, 2014
  105. 284BookDEA HistoryUS DEA
  106. 285NewsDrug lords rose to power when Mexicans ousted old governmentJana Bussey — September 15, 2008
  107. 287NewsGang wars plague Mexican drugs hubClaire Marshall — August 14, 2005
  108. 288NewsUrge sanear sistema de justicia: gobiernoJorge Ramos et al. — November 27, 2008
  109. 295Heineman, Matthew. Cartel Land. Netflix video. Directed by Matthew Heineman. 2015. A&E Indie Films
  110. 306NewsRestart neededVirginia Mercado — November 20, 2018
  111. 309AMLO advierte 'pobreza franciscana' en el gobierno si se requiereIsrael López Linares — February 1, 2019
  112. 310NewsMexico explosion: scores dead after burst pipeline ignitesDavid Agren — January 19, 2019
  113. 318NewsUS anti-drug campaign 'failing'August 6, 2004
  114. 319NewsA Look at Major Drug-Producing CountriesNewsvine — February 29, 2008
  115. 321Longmire, Sylvia. Cartel: The Coming Invasion Of Mexico's Drug Wars. 2011. 'Mexican Cartels Infiltrating US Parks And Forests' p. 162. Palgrave Macmillan
  116. 326Informe de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social en MexicoMaría del Rosario Cárdenas Elizalde — 2013-10-21
  117. 328BookMurder City: Ciudad Juárez and the Global Economy's New Killing FieldsC Bowden — First Nation Books. — 2011
  118. 329BookThe Mexico Competitiveness Report 2009Ricardo Hausmann et al. — World Economic Forum — 2009
  119. 330Police Reform in Mexico Advances and Persisytyent ObstaclesDaniel Sabet — WilsoN center Research Organization — April 26, 2014
  120. 333"Police Reform in Mexico: Informal Politics and the Challenge of Institutional Change". By Daniel Sabet. Stanford University Press, May 2, 2012 – Political Science – 296 pages. .
  121. 334"The Politics of Drug Violence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia and Mexico". By Angelica Duran-Martinez. Oxford University Press, December 13, 2017 – Political Science – 320 pages.
  122. 339NewsMexican drug lord Joaquin 'El Chapo' Guzman escapesCatherine E. Shoichet et al. — CNN — July 12, 2015
  123. 340NewsMexican Drug Lord 'El Chapo' Guzmán Escapes From PrisonAnthony Harrup et al. — July 12, 2015
  124. 342NewsMexico and the Drug CartelsGeorge W. Grayson — Foreign Policy Research Institute — August 2007
  125. 346NewsMexican Authorities Arrest 46 Suspected Drug Gang MembersKelly Heffernan-Tabor — WFMY News 2 — May 29, 2011
  126. 348InSide: Who Controls Tijuana?Insightcrime.org — May 3, 2011
  127. 352Smugglingwickenburg-az.com
  128. 353Free Article for Non-MembersStratfor — May 17, 2010
  129. 354Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO)Insight Crime — August 2, 2013
  130. 355NewsPresident Bush Designates Beltran Leyva and his Organization Under Kingpin ActAntonio O. Garza — Embassy of the U.S. in Mexico — May 30, 2008
  131. 357A Touch of Luck and AwarenessUS Embassy Diplomatic Cables from WikiLeaks
  132. 359NewsDEA: Bribes taint late Mexican drug czar StoryDane Schiller — May 13, 2009
  133. 360NewsMexican top cops linked to cartelMark Stevenson — January 25, 2009
  134. 361NewsMexican Army Slammed for Drug War TortureNewser — July 9, 2009
  135. 371JournalInvestigación documental sobre la narcocultura como objeto de estudio en MéxicoAmérica Tonantzin Becerra Romero — 2018
  136. 377NewsATF officials admit mistakes in Operation Fast and Furious gun programMike M. Ahlers — CNN — July 26, 2011
  137. 381NewsMexican cartels move beyond drugs, seek dominationNBC News News — August 4, 2010
  138. 3824 De Diciembre De 2011 – Lomas De Sotelo, D.F.SEDENA Mexican National Defense Department
  139. 383Release of Mexico Murder Stats Reveals Shifting LandscapePatrick Corcoran — InSight — October 24, 2011
  140. 384The Mexican drug war (2006–Present)Roger Lee — The History Guy
  141. 385BookWorld Report 2012: MexicoHuman Rights Watch — January 22, 2012
  142. 386NewsAnti-drug general oustedRichard Marosi — August 9, 2008
  143. 392NewsMexico drug wars have killed 35,000 people in four yearsHaroon Siddique — January 13, 2011
  144. 395NewsMexico: Body of Zetas drug cartel leader Lazcano stolenWill Grant — October 9, 2012
  145. 396NewsDeath of Zetas Leader Confirmed, But Body Now MissingRandy Kreider — October 9, 2012
  146. 397NewsBriefing: How Mexico is waging war on drug cartelsSara Miller Llana — August 16, 2009
  147. 398NewsThe Drug War's Invisible VictimsLaura Carlesen — February 10, 2012
  148. 399NewsMexico Plan Adds Police To Take On Drug CartelsManuel Roig-Franzia — July 11, 2008
  149. 404NewsMexican Drug Cartels Leave a Bloody Trail on YouTubeManuel Roig-Franzia — April 9, 2007
  150. 405NewsMacabre drug cartel messages in MexicoKen Ellingwood — June 11, 2008
  151. 406NewsGrenade Attack in Mexico Breaks From Deadly ScriptMark Lacey — September 24, 2008
  152. 407NewsMexico: Trouble in CuliacánPulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting — 2009
  153. 408NewsMexico's Drug War Veers Toward Terrorism Amid Anger Over U.SJens E. Gould — Bloomberg — October 20, 2008
  154. 409Education Is Latest Casualty In Mexico's Drug WarJason Beaubien — September 28, 2011
  155. 410NewsIn Mexico, Sorting Out Good Guys From BadMarc Lacey — November 1, 2008
  156. 411NewsThe Making of a Narco StateGuy Lawson — March 4, 2009
  157. 414NewsOrdenan arrestar a ex mandos de InterpolMaría de la Luz González — January 16, 2009
  158. 419NewsImpunity in Mexico: 93% of Crimes Go UnreportedEna Aguilar Peláez — April 5, 2023
  159. 420U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Mexico," Country Reports on Human rights Practices-2002, March 31, 2003.
  160. 421Larie Freeman, Troubling Patterns: The Mexican Military and the War on Drugs (Washington, D.C.: Latin America Working Group, September 2002).
  161. 422Human Rights Watch, Military Injustice: Mexico's Failure to Punish Army Abuses (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 2001).
  162. 423Reuters, "Peasants in Rural Mexico Claim Army Brutality," November 17, 2003.
  163. 424Luis Astorga, Drug Trafficking in Mexico: A First General Assessment, Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Discussion Paper 36 (Paris: UNESCO, 1999).
  164. 425Government of Mexico, Recomendación 12/2002 a la Procuraduría General de la República sobre el caso del homicidio del señor Guillermo Velez Mendoza (Mexico City: National Human Rights Commission, May
  165. 426"Crime-torn Mexican 'FBI' Investigates 1,500 Agents," Reuters, December 4, 2005; Tim Gaynor and Monica Medel, "Drug Gangs Corrupt Mexico's Elite 'FBI,'" Reuters, December 6, 2005; and, Laurie Freeman,
  166. 427Surge la Policía Federal Ministerial (May 30, 2009)Eluniversal.com.mx — May 30, 2009
  167. 428Government of Mexico, Estadísticas judiciales en Materia Penal, Cuaderno No. 10 (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 2003), Chart 2.6.2, p. 478.
  168. 433News"Narcos" atacan estación de TelevisaBBC Mundo — January 7, 2009
  169. 436NewsViolence in Mexico Takes Rising Toll on PressJosé de Córdoba et al. — August 20, 2010
  170. 444NewsKilling Escalates Mexico Drug WarDavid Luhnow et al. — June 29, 2010
  171. 445NewsBody count from mass graves in Mexico rises to 145Tracy Wilkinson — April 15, 2011
  172. 446NewsMexico Drug War Fast FactsCNN — September 2, 2013
  173. 448NewsMexican cartels move into human traffickingAnne-Marie O'Connor — July 27, 2011
  174. 449Trafficking in Persons Report 2010United States Department of State
  175. 450NewsCrece en España mafia mexicanaAna Anabitarte — December 30, 2010
  176. 452NewsMexican drug gang menace spreads in GuatemalaUk.reuters.com — February 18, 2009
  177. 453NewsMexican cartel threatens Guatemala PresidentJeremy McDermott — Telegraph.co.uk — March 2, 2009
  178. 454News'Guatemalastan': How to Prevent a Failed State in our MidstKevin Casas-Zamora — Brookings Institution
  179. 455NewsGuatemala on the brink?Phil Leggiere — Homeland Security Insight nd Analysis — May 25, 2009
  180. 466American Death tollAmericanchronicle.com
  181. 467NewsMexican Drug Violence Spills Over Into USHuffingtonpost.com — February 9, 2009
  182. 469BookTerrorism & Homeland SecurityJonathan R. White — Cengage Learning — 2011
  183. 470BookSense and Nonsense about Crime, Drugs, and CommunitiesSamuel Walker — Cengage Learning — 2010
  184. 471BookMexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?George W. Grayson — Transaction Publishers — 2010
  185. 472BookTo Die in Mexico: Dispatches from Inside the Drug WarJohn Gibler — City Lights Books — 2011
  186. 477Is Arizona suffering "increased crime and drugs" because of the border?Adam Isacson — Washington Office on Latin America
  187. 478New Study Separates Rhetoric from Reality on U.S.-Mexico BorderWashington Office on Latin America — April 18, 2012
  188. 480NewsLatin American Panel Calls U.S. Drug War a FailureJose De Cordoba — February 12, 2009
  189. 481NewsCardoso, Gaviria, Zedillo Urge Obama to Decriminalize MarijuanaJoshua Goodman — Bloomberg.com — February 11, 2009
  190. 482Time to Debate a Change in Washington's Failed Latin American Drug PoliciesLarry Birns et al. — The Council on Hemispheric Affairs — April 1, 2009
  191. 483NewsLos dilemas con el narcotráficoSamuel González — October 26, 2010
  192. 485NewsBanks Financing Mexico Gangs Admitted in Wells Fargo DealMichael Smith — June 29, 2010
  193. 488NewsHSBC Exposed U.S. Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist Financing Risks (press release)United States Senate, The Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations — July 16, 2012
  194. 489NewsHSBC Executive Resigns at Senate Money Laundering HearingJesse Hamilton et al. — July 17, 2012
  195. 491NewsA Regional Strategy for Drug Wars in the AmericasStephanie Miller — Center for American Progress — April 7, 2009
  196. 492A Regional Strategy for Drug Wars in the AmericasCenter for American Progress — March 2010
  197. 493BookEl Narco: The Bloody Rise of Mexican Drug CartelsIoan Grillo — Bloomsbury Publishing — 2012
  198. 494BookAmexica: War Along the BorderlineEd Vulliamy — Bodley Head — 2010
  199. 496BookNarconomics: How to Run a Drug CartelTom Wainwright — PublicAffairs — 23 February 2016
  200. 497BookMexico: Democracy InterruptedJo Tuckman — Yale University Press — 3 July 2012

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