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Ion Antonescu

Ch. 1 of 8
— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

Contents

Ion Antonescu

8 sections
  • Ion Antonescu was executed by a military firing squad on the 1st of June 1946, at a site outside Jilava called Valea Piersicilor, the Valley of the Peach Trees. He refused a blindfold. When the order came, he raised his hat in salute. His final written words were a letter to his wife, urging her to enter a convent, and accusing Romanians of ingratitude while expressing his conviction that posterity would vindicate him.

    The man who died that day had served as Prime Minister and Conducator of Romania through most of World War II. He had led his country into a military alliance with Nazi Germany, ordered his troops across the Prut River into Soviet territory, and presided over policies responsible for the deaths of as many as 400,000 people, most of them Jews and Romani Romanians. He had also, at certain moments, refused to hand Romanian Jews over to the German machinery of extermination. He was, in the assessment of historians, an atypical figure among Holocaust perpetrators.

    How does a career officer who earned praise from King Carol I for handling a peasants' revolt become one of the architects of mass murder in eastern Europe? What drove Antonescu's obsessive hatreds, and what constrained them? And why did the country he called ungrateful come, in some quarters, to treat him as a national hero long after his death?

  • Antonescu was born in Pitești, a town north-west of Bucharest, into an upper-middle class Romanian Orthodox family with military roots. His father was an army officer who sent him to the Infantry and Cavalry School in Craiova. The divorce of his parents, which led his father to marry a Jewish convert to Orthodoxy, was a traumatic rupture that Antonescu never stopped referencing. He consistently depicted his stepmother as a femme fatale who had destroyed what he regarded as a happy family.

    By one account, Antonescu briefly attended school alongside Wilhelm Filderman, who would later become a prominent Romanian Jewish community activist. Their paths would cross again decades later under far grimmer circumstances. After graduating in 1904 with the rank of Second Lieutenant, Antonescu spent two more years at the Special Cavalry Section in Targoviste. Reportedly impatient with slow promotions, he compensated for his short stature through sheer toughness. His reddish hair and his reputation as a hard and unsparing commander earned him the nickname Cainele Rosu, or The Red Dog.

    His handling of the 1907 peasants' revolt, where he commanded a cavalry unit in Covurlui County, drew mixed judgments. Some historians consider him an unusually violent participant; others see his role as no different from that of any officer carrying out orders. Crown Prince Ferdinand was nonetheless sent to congratulate him in front of the whole garrison on behalf of King Carol I. Antonescu was promoted to Lieutenant the following year, attended the Advanced War School between 1911 and 1913, and served as a staff officer during the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria.

  • After Romania entered World War I on the Allied side in 1916, Antonescu became chief of staff under General Constantin Prezan. When enemy forces crossed into Wallachia, he was tasked with designing a defence plan for Bucharest. The royal court, army, and government were pushed back into Moldavia, and Antonescu rose with them. As Prezan was elevated to Chief of the General Staff that December, Antonescu, by then a major, was named head of operations.

    His influence on Prezan became so pervasive that General Alexandru Averescu, in his memoirs, adopted the formula "Prezan (Antonescu)" to denote Prezan's plans and decisions. A contemporary described Antonescu as "a talented if prickly individual." He contributed to the tactics used at the Battle of Marasesti between July and August 1917, when Romanian forces under General Eremia Grigorescu stopped the advance of German forces commanded by Field Marshal August von Mackensen.

    Two events during this period left lasting marks on Antonescu's character. First, when Russia left the war and Romania was forced to make a separate peace with the Central Powers, he advocated for what he called "the most rational solution." Second, in 1918, Crown Prince Carol abandoned his army posting to marry a commoner. Antonescu was outraged. The contempt he developed for the future King Carol II proved enduring, personal, and politically consequential. After the war, politician Ion G. Duca recorded that Antonescu's intelligence and activity had brought credit on himself and invaluable service to the country.

  • Antonescu's interwar career combined nationalist advocacy with diplomatic posting. He participated in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference campaign for recognition of Romania's gains in Transylvania, publishing an essay whose title translated as "The Romanians. Their Origin, Their Past, Their Sacrifices and Their Rights." The booklet advocated Romanian rule beyond the current borders of Greater Romania, including the annexation of all Banat areas and the Timok Valley, even at the risk of war with the emerging Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

    In 1922, he became military attache in Paris, where he negotiated 100 million French francs in credit to purchase French weaponry. Working alongside diplomat Nicolae Titulescu, the two became personal friends. Through the conservative writer Marthe Bibesco, Antonescu was introduced to the ideas of Gustave Le Bon, a researcher of crowd psychology whose work had influenced fascism. Bibesco herself compared Antonescu to 19th-century French nationalist Georges Boulanger and introduced him as such to Le Bon.

    The Israeli historian Jean Ancel noted that Antonescu's famously erratic moods, which could swing from rage to calm and back within minutes, were linked to syphilis he had contracted as a young man. A German diplomatic report written years later would confirm this to Berlin, noting that the condition produced severe attacks every several months. In 1923, back in Paris, Antonescu made the acquaintance of lawyer Mihai Antonescu, who would become his closest political associate, legal representative, and eventual co-defendant at the war crimes tribunal that ended both their lives.

  • During his tenure as Deputy Chief and then Chief of the General Staff in the early 1930s, Antonescu first grew interested in the Iron Guard, a fascist and antisemitic movement led by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. He ordered the Army's intelligence unit to compile a report on the group, but also established a connection to Codreanu that would deepen into something resembling friendship. When defence minister Paul Angelescu questioned his weapons modernization projects, and when a report Antonescu submitted on embezzlement of Army funds indirectly implicated King Carol II, the king ordered him out of office. The Interior Ministry placed him under surveillance. Carol's intelligence service kept him closely monitored.

    The conflict between Antonescu and Carol intensified through the late 1930s. When Carol appointed Octavian Goga as Prime Minister over a far-right cabinet in late 1937, Antonescu became Defence Minister. His mandate coincided with Romania's agonizing choice between its traditional alliance with France and Britain on one side, and alignment with Nazi Germany on the other. When Carol then proclaimed his own authoritarian regime and had Codreanu arrested, Antonescu resigned in protest. He served as a celebrity defence witness at both of Codreanu's trials, at the second of which he vouched for his friend's honesty by shaking his hand in front of the jury. Codreanu was convicted of treason nonetheless, and later killed by gendarmes acting on Carol's orders in November 1938.

    By 1940, Romania faced territorial catastrophe. Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were lost to Soviet occupation. Hungary received Northern Transylvania. Southern Dobruja went to Bulgaria. Carol's popularity collapsed. When Antonescu sent the king a note of protest, he was arrested and interned at Bistrita Monastery, from which he commissioned Mihai Antonescu to open contacts with German officials, offering to advance German economic interests, particularly in Romania's oil industry, in exchange for German endorsement. Hitler's minister in Romania, Wilhelm Fabricius, wrote to Berlin: "I am not convinced that he is a safe man." On the 5th of September 1940, Carol transferred most of his dictatorial powers to Antonescu, and abdicated shortly after.

  • The regime formally proclaimed on the 14th of September 1940 was called the National Legionary State. The Iron Guard became the only legally permitted party in Romania, and Antonescu was named its honorary commander while Horia Sima became his Deputy Premier. Antonescu also signed Romania into the Tripartite Pact in Berlin on the 23rd of November, and two days later the country adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact. German troops entered Romania to defend the oil industry and train Romanian forces in Blitzkrieg tactics.

    From the start, the partnership between Antonescu and Sima was brittle. Antonescu was concerned with reviving an economy stripped by Carol's departure, during which Carol had taken most of the national treasury with him into exile. Sima favored populist economic measures Antonescu considered unaffordable. Tensions peaked in late November 1940, when the Iron Guard, after uncovering the circumstances of Codreanu's death, carried out the Jilava Massacre, assassinated historian Nicolae Iorga and economist Virgil Madgearu, and committed other acts of violence. Antonescu's public condemnation of the killings was limited and discreet. That same month, he joined Sima at a burial ceremony for Codreanu's newly discovered remains.

    The conflict within the Axis's leadership in Berlin mirrored the conflict in Bucharest. Heinrich Himmler, Baldur von Schirach, and Joseph Goebbels supported the Legionaries. Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Wehrmacht backed Antonescu, worried that internal disorder would threaten Romania's oil production, which was vital to the German war effort. The January 1941 Legionary Rebellion, during which Guardists killed approximately 120 Bucharest Jews over two days of violence, forced a decision. Antonescu sent in the Army under General Constantin Sanatescu. With German assistance operating on Hitler's orders, Antonescu suppressed the Iron Guard and eliminated Sima as a political force inside Romania.

  • On the 12th of June 1941, at a summit with Hitler, Antonescu was briefed on the ideological character of the coming war against the Soviet Union. Hitler described it as a war to annihilate "Judeo-Bolshevism" and showed Antonescu the guidelines he had issued to his troops about the "special treatment" of Soviet Jews. Antonescu embraced this framing entirely, telling Hitler that Romania as a Latin people had an inborn hatred of Slavs and Jews and could serve as an anti-Slavic buffer for Germany. On the 18th of June 1941, he issued orders to his generals about "cleansing the ground" of Jews as Romanian forces entered Bessarabia and Bukovina.

    A large-scale pogrom was carried out in Iasi with Antonescu's agreement, killing thousands of Jews. Romanian forces, formally organized as a General Antonescu Army Group under German general Eugen Ritter von Schobert, entered the war without a formal declaration. The conquest of Bessarabia was popular among Romanians who remembered the Soviet occupation of 1940, but Antonescu's decision to push beyond the Dniester into territory that had never been part of Romania was more controversial. On the 30th of August 1941, Romania occupied a region it designated Transnistria, formerly part of the Ukrainian SSR. This area became the site of the main component of the Holocaust in Romania: mass deportations of Bessarabian and Ukrainian Jews, later joined by transports of Romani Romanians and Jews from Moldavia.

    The fall of Odessa in October 1941 was celebrated with a parade through Bucharest's Arcul de Triumf. But it came at enormous cost: the ill-equipped 4th Army had suffered losses of roughly 100,000 men during a two-month siege Antonescu had insisted on conducting without German assistance. The Odessa massacre that followed, ordered by Antonescu as retaliation for a bombing that killed Romanian officers including General Ioan Glogojeanu, became one of the defining atrocities of the Romanian occupation. When Wilhelm Filderman, Antonescu's one-time schoolmate, wrote to protest the killing of Jews in Odessa, Antonescu wrote back blaming Jewish commissars for Romanian casualties and holding the entire Romanian Jewish community morally responsible for the losses at Odessa.

    The system Antonescu built was characterized by what historians have noted as singular inconsistencies. His regime combined pogroms and mass murder with selective leniency toward most Jews in the Old Kingdom. He ultimately refused to adopt the Final Solution as Germany defined it. Romania, as a junior partner that was never occupied by the Wehrmacht, retained a degree of political autonomy that made this partial resistance possible. Antonescu was able to enforce policies independently responsible for the deaths of as many as 400,000 people while simultaneously declining to hand the remaining Jewish population of the Old Kingdom to German extermination camps. Killinger, the German ambassador, told Antonescu to deport Old Kingdom Jews to the death camps in Poland rather than to Transnistria, and threatened reduced arms supplies if Antonescu proceeded otherwise. Antonescu, dependent on German weapons, had little choice but to comply with Killinger's direction.

  • The Battle of Stalingrad, fought between June 1942 and February 1943, cost Romania some 150,000 men dead, wounded, or captured. More than half of Romania's divisions were wiped out. By 1943, the combination of heavy losses, German contempt for Romanian troops, and declining living standards had made the war deeply unpopular inside Romania. The American historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that broken German promises, disregard for warnings about Soviet offensive preparations, and a pattern of blaming allies for German miscalculations all combined to produce a genuine crisis in German-Romanian relations.

    Antonescu authorized his Deputy Premier and new Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu to begin peace contacts with the Allies. Romanian diplomats approached British and American counterparts in Portugal and Switzerland. The answer they received was consistent: no armistice was possible that did not include the Soviet Union, a condition Antonescu refused. In March 1944, the Soviet Red Army broke through on the Southern Bug and Dniester fronts. British Supreme Allied Commander Field Marshal Henry Maitland Wilson presented Antonescu with an ultimatum. After visiting Hitler one more time in Germany, Antonescu chose to keep fighting, persuaded by Hitler's promise that Northern Transylvania would go to Romania if the Axis prevailed.

    On the 5th of August 1944, Antonescu met Hitler for the last time at Ketrzyn. On the 23rd of August, King Michael I summoned him to the Royal Palace, presented him with a demand to take Romania out of its Axis alliance, and had him arrested when he refused. General Constantin Sanatescu, who had commanded the forces that suppressed the Legionary Rebellion in 1941, replaced him as Premier. Romania declared war on Nazi Germany two days later. Antonescu was placed in the custody of Romanian Communist Party militants, then handed to Soviet forces, who transported him to Moscow alongside Mihai Antonescu, Governor of Transnistria Gheorghe Alexianu, defence minister Constantin Pantazi, Gendarmerie commander Constantin Vasiliu, and Bucharest Police chief Mircea Elefterescu. After Germany's surrender, the group was moved to Lubyanka prison. SMERSH operatives, among them Viktor Abakumov, interrogated Antonescu there, but the transcripts were never returned to Romania.

    At the May 1946 People's Tribunal in Bucharest, Antonescu was tried on charges of war crimes, crimes against the peace, and treason. The procedures were drafted by coup participant Lucrețiu Patrascanu of the Romanian Communist Party. PNT leader Iuliu Maniu, appearing as a witness, pushed back against the accusatory atmosphere: "We were political adversaries, not cannibals," he said, then walked to Antonescu and shook his hand. Antonescu was found guilty. Appeals were rejected within six days. King Michael, under pressure from the Soviet-backed Petru Groza government, signed the execution decree. Antonescu was shot at the Valley of the Peach Trees on the 1st of June 1946 alongside Mihai Antonescu, Alexianu, and Vasiliu. His involvement in the Holocaust was officially reasserted and condemned following the 2003 Wiesel Commission report.

Updated

Common questions

Who was Ion Antonescu and what role did he play in World War II?

Ion Antonescu was a Romanian military officer and marshal who served as Prime Minister and Conducator of Romania during most of World War II. He led Romania into an alliance with Nazi Germany, joining the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, and his regime was responsible for policies that caused the deaths of as many as 400,000 people, most of them Bessarabian, Ukrainian, and Romanian Jews as well as Romanian Romani.

What was the National Legionary State created by Ion Antonescu?

The National Legionary State was a regime formally proclaimed on the 14th of September 1940, created as a coalition between Antonescu's military dictatorship and the Iron Guard, a fascist and antisemitic movement led by Horia Sima. The Iron Guard became the only legally permitted political party in Romania under this arrangement. The partnership was short-lived; Antonescu suppressed the Iron Guard following the Legionary Rebellion of January 1941.

How did the Holocaust unfold under Antonescu's regime in Romania?

Antonescu's regime combined pogroms, mass murder, and ethnic cleansing with deportations to occupied Transnistria, a territory Romania occupied from August 1941 onward. Large-scale atrocities included the Iasi pogrom and the Odessa massacre, ordered by Antonescu as retaliation for a bombing that killed Romanian officers. The regime showed leniency toward most Jews in the Old Kingdom and ultimately refused to adopt Germany's Final Solution, while independently causing the deaths of as many as 400,000 people.

How was Ion Antonescu overthrown and what happened to him after the war?

On the 23rd of August 1944, King Michael I summoned Antonescu to the Royal Palace, demanded Romania exit the Axis alliance, and had him arrested when he refused. Antonescu was handed to Soviet forces, interrogated at Lubyanka prison by SMERSH operatives including Viktor Abakumov, then returned to Romania in spring 1946. He was convicted of war crimes, crimes against the peace, and treason at a People's Tribunal and executed by firing squad on the 1st of June 1946 at a site outside Jilava known as the Valley of the Peach Trees.

What was Ion Antonescu's relationship with Adolf Hitler?

Antonescu met Hitler on at least nine occasions between June 1941 and August 1944. Hitler reportedly came to regard Antonescu as the only trustworthy person in Romania and the only foreigner he consulted on military matters. American historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that Hitler was more consistently favorable toward Antonescu than toward any other leader he met except Mussolini. The two communicated through Hitler's interpreter Paul Schmidt, since Antonescu spoke French and Hitler spoke only German.

Why did Antonescu refuse to fully implement the Final Solution despite being a German ally?

Romania, as a junior Axis partner that was never occupied by the Wehrmacht, retained a degree of political autonomy that allowed Antonescu to make independent decisions. His regime prioritized plunder over systematic killing and showed leniency toward most Jews in the Old Kingdom. Germany's Ambassador Killinger pressured Antonescu to deport Old Kingdom Jews to Polish death camps instead of Transnistria, threatening to reduce arms supplies, which constrained but did not fully determine Antonescu's choices.

All sources

357 references cited across the entry

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  127. 130Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 334–335.
  128. 131Deletant, p. 166; Trașcă, p. 384
  129. 132Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 334.
  130. 133Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 335.
  131. 134Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 459–460.
  132. 135Ancel, Jean The History of the Holocaust in Romania, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, p. 304.
  133. 136Deletant, pp. 77–78, 83, 94–96
  134. 137Trașcă, pp. 385–389
  135. 138Deletant, pp. 87–88; Trașcă, pp. 385–387
  136. 139Final Report, pp. 150–157, 245, 321, 323; Ancel (2005 a), p. 291; Deletant, pp. 171–177, 248–253, 261, 276–277, 328–329; Trașcă, p. 389sqq
  137. 140Deletant, pp. 167–168; Gella, p. 171
  138. 141Nicholls, p. 6; White, p. 175
  139. 142Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 p. 521.
  140. 143Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945, by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 73
  141. 145Deletant, p. 2
  142. 146Nicholls, p. 6
  143. 147Deletant, pp. 90–92
  144. 148Deletant, p. 92
  145. 149Deletant, pp. 96–97, 99; Gella, p. 171; Penkower, p. 161
  146. 150Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 pp. 460–461.
  147. 151Deletant, pp. 209–210, 335
  148. 152Traudl Junge, Melissa Müller, Até o fim: Os últimos dias de Hitler contados por sua secretária, Ediouro Publicações, Rio de Janeiro, 2005, pp. 106–107, 191.
  149. 153Deletant, pp. 98–99
  150. 154Final Report, pp. 63, 117, 168; Deletant, pp. 26–27, 75; Harvey, p. 545
  151. 155Harvey, p. 545
  152. 156Deletant, p. 26; Harvey, pp. 544–545
  153. 157Deletant, pp. 26–27
  154. 158Chant, p. 75; Deletant, p. 27; Gella, p. 171
  155. 159Gella, p. 173; Weber, p. 164
  156. 160Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945, by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 228
  157. 161Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945, by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeş and Cristian Crăciunoiu, p. 229
  158. 162Steven J. Zaloga, Tanks of Hitler’s Eastern Allies 1941–45, p. 31
  159. 163Final Report, p. 252; Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 230–240, 341–344; Penkower, pp. 153, 161
  160. 164Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 p. 461.
  161. 165Deletant, pp. 75, 231–240, 341–344; Roper, pp. 8, 14
  162. 166Deletant, pp. 231, 233–234, 236–239, 342–345
  163. 167Deletant, pp. 234–236
  164. 168Deletant, pp. 237–240, 343–344; Roper, p. 14
  165. 169Deletant, pp. 236, 337
  166. 170Chant, p. 124; Deletant, pp. 234–235, 342
  167. 171Deletant, p. 231; White, p. 158
  168. 172Deletant, pp. 233–234, 238–239; Kelso, p. 129
  169. 173Cioroianu, pp. 51–52; Deletant, pp. 237–240, 343–344; Gella, p. 172; Roper, pp. 8–9, 13–14
  170. 174Deletant, pp. 238–240, 343–344
  171. 175Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 238–239, 344; Roper, p. 14; Weber, p. 156
  172. 176Deletant, pp. 240, 344; Kelso, p. 129; Nicholls, p. 6
  173. 177Chant, pp. 84, 303
  174. 178Deletant, pp. 239–240
  175. 179Chant, p. 124; Deletant, p. 237
  176. 180Ancel (2005 a), p. 321; Bucur (2004), pp. 173–176; Chant, pp. 84–85, 124–125, 303; Cioroianu, pp. 50–55; Deletant, pp. 3–4, 241–246, 265–266, 343–346; Gella, p. 172; Guran & Ștefan, p. 112; Ioanid, pp
  177. 181Deletant, pp. 241–242; Roper, p. 14
  178. 182Cioroianu, p. 55; Deletant, pp. 242–243; Roper, p. 14
  179. 183Chant, pp. 84–85, 124–125, 303; Gella, p. 172; Kelso, p. 129
  180. 184Chant, p. 122
  181. 185Final Report, p. 316; Cioroianu, p. 51; Deletant, pp. 247–248; Kelso, p. 130; Nicholls, pp. 167, 225
  182. 186Harvey, p. 498; Morgan, p. 188; Veiga, pp. 302–303, 313–314
  183. 187Deletant, pp. 243–244, 345–346
  184. 188Deletant, p. 244
  185. 189Cioroianu, p. 296; Deletant, pp. 244, 246
  186. 190Deletant, pp. 246, 346
  187. 191Deletant, p. 249
  188. 192Final Report, pp. 317–331; Cioroianu, pp. 295–296; Deletant, pp. 245–261, 346–350; Frankowski, pp. 218–219
  189. 193Final Report, pp. 316, 319–320, 331; Deletant, pp. 247–248, 261
  190. 194Final Report, pp. 316–317; Frankowski, p. 219; Ioanid, p. 235
  191. 195Final Report, pp. 313–331; Cioroianu, pp. 295–296; Deletant, pp. 245–261; Frankowski, pp. 218–219
  192. 196Deletant, pp. 248, 255
  193. 197Final Report, p. 314; Deletant, pp. 172, 248–249, 328
  194. 198Deletant, p. 251
  195. 199Final Report, pp. 313, 322; Deletant, pp. 250–251
  196. 200Final Report, pp. 320–321; Deletant, p. 248
  197. 201Final Report, p. 321
  198. 202Final Report, pp. 240–241, 252, 321–322; Achim, p. 168; Deletant, pp. 73, 252–255, 261, 276–277; Kelso, p. 97
  199. 203Final Report, p. 245; Deletant, pp. 173–174, 252–253, 261, 276–277, 329
  200. 204Deletant, pp. 255–256, 348
  201. 205Deletant, pp. 248, 261
  202. 206Deletant, pp. 255–257, 349–350
  203. 207Deletant, pp. 256–259, 349–350
  204. 208Deletant, pp. 259, 350
  205. 209Deletant, pp. 5, 259
  206. 210Deletant, p. 259
  207. 211Cioroianu, p. 296; Deletant, p. 259
  208. 212Deletant, p. 260
  209. 213Final Report, pp. 68–69, 117–118, 168–172, 243, 249, 383, 385–386; Ancel, p. 231; Boia, pp. 260–261; Deletant, pp. 2, 4, 114–115, 205–229, 235, 334; Ioanid, pp. 232, 233, 235; Oldson, pp. 4–11, 161–16
  210. 214Deletant, pp. 216–219, 225–229, 337–339; Oldson, pp. 7–8; Penkower, p. 148sqq
  211. 215Final Report, p. 324; Cioroianu, pp. 44–45, 55, 126–132, 151–154; Deletant, pp. 238–239, 344; Gella, p. 172. In addition to the PCR, these included the Ploughmen's Front and the Socialist Peasants' Pa
  212. 216Final Report, pp. 65, 243; Browning, p. 276
  213. 217Final Report, pp. 104–105, 143; Cioroianu, pp. 42–52, 132–134; Deletant, pp. 116, 123, 196–198, 219, 225, 238–239, 254, 303, 311, 332–333, 335–336, 340, 343–344
  214. 218Final Report, p. 143; Ioanid, p. 233
  215. 219Deletant, pp. 72, 303, 332
  216. 220Frankowski, p. 217. According to Deletant (p. 72), 72 communists believed to be Soviet agents or partisans were executed in 1940–1944, from a total of 313 PCR members sentenced to death. The rest had
  217. 221Final Report, p. 105; Deletant, p. 225
  218. 222Deletant, p. 72
  219. 223Final Report, pp. 62–63; Achim, p. 169; Deletant, pp. 71–72, 302–303, 311; Griffin (1993), p. 127; Laqueur, p. 205; Ornea, pp. 219, 346; Veiga, pp. 299, 313. Antonescu notably ordered the execution of
  220. 224Griffin (1993), p. 127.
  221. 225They included the Iron Guardist Haig Acterian (Ornea, p. 219) and, possibly, the communist Ion Gheorghe Maurer (Cioroianu, p. 134).
  222. 226Cioroianu, pp. 43–46, 48–52; Deletant, pp. 332, 344; Roper, pp. 14–16
  223. 227Cioroianu, pp. 46, 48–49, 62, 134
  224. 228Deletant, pp. 343–344; Gella, p. 172; Roper, pp. 13–16
  225. 229Cioroianu, pp. 128, 134–135, 140, 171, 265; Gella, p. 172; Roper, pp. 14–15
  226. 230Guran & Ștefan, p. 113
  227. 231Neubauer et al., pp. 148, 150
  228. 232Neubauer et al., p. 148
  229. 233Boia, p. 259
  230. 234Final Report, pp. 238–239
  231. 235Final Report, pp. 290–292, 295
  232. 236Final Report, pp. 300–301; Deletant, pp. 206–207
  233. 237Deletant, p. 237
  234. 238Bucur (2006), pp. 184–186
  235. 239Deletant, pp. 58, 297, 302
  236. 240Earl A. Pope, "Protestantism in Romania", in Pedro Ramet, Sabrina P. Ramet (eds.), Christianity under Stress. Vol. III: Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia: The Communist and Postc
  237. 242Deletant, pp. 73, 254
  238. 243Final Report, pp. 313–331; Cioroianu, pp. 130–131, 265–268, 295–297; Deletant, pp. 264, 347, 349; Gella, p. 173; Ioanid, pp. 235–237; Weber, pp. 158–159
  239. 244Final Report, pp. 315–316, 324; Deletant, pp. 249–250, 349; Ioanid, p. 235
  240. 245Richard Wagner, "Ethnic Germans in Romania", in Stefan Wolff (ed.), German Minorities in Europe: Ethnic Identity and Cultural Belonging, Berghahn Books, Providence, 2000, p. 136.
  241. 246Cioroianu, pp. 266–267
  242. 247Ancel (2005 b), pp. 235–236, 241; Gella, p. 173
  243. 248Kent, pp. 109–110
  244. 249Kent, p. 224.
  245. 250Ioanid, pp. 235–236
  246. 251Final Report, pp. 316, 339; Ancel (2005 b), pp. 235–256; Weber, pp. 152–159, 164–167. Ancel discusses in particular the influx of Zionists fleeing Soviet rule in the late 1940s, the renewed antisemiti
  247. 252Deletant, pp. 313, 350
  248. 253Deletant, p. 350
  249. 254Final Report, pp. 281, 315, 317–318
  250. 255Final Report, pp. 337–338; Ioanid, pp. 233, 244; Weber, p. 161
  251. 256Final Report, pp. 321–331, 335–339, 347, 385; Deletant, pp. 3–4, 262–263; Weber, pp. 157, 159, 166–167
  252. 257Ioanid, p. 236; Weber, pp. 161–163
  253. 258Ancel (2005 a), pp. 17–18, 427–428; Deletant, p. 273; Ioanid, p. 236; Weber, pp. 160–161
  254. 259Final Report, pp. 240–241; Achim, pp. 170–171, 189
  255. 260Boia, p. 119; Bucur (2004), pp. 173–176; Deletant, pp. 243, 265–266, 269, 344; Roper, pp. 13–14, 41–42
  256. 261Deletant, pp. 243, 265–266, 343–344; Roper, pp. 13–15, 41–42
  257. 262Final Report, pp. 280–281, 283–284, 335–339, 347, 385; Deletant, pp. 264–265; Ioanid, pp. 236–237; Weber, pp. 158–159, 166–167
  258. 263Deletant, pp. 4, 264–265
  259. 264Final Report, pp. 283–284, 340–348; Ancel (2005 a), p. 423; Boia, pp. 118–119, 336, 340; Deletant, pp. 4–5, 265–269; Geran Pilon, pp. 59–66; Ioanid, pp. 236–245; Oldson, pp. 3–4
  260. 265Final Report, pp. 339–340; Boia, pp. 119, 340; Deletant, pp. 4–5, 266–269; Ioanid, pp. 239–240
  261. 266Boia, p. 336; Cioroianu, pp. 416–420, 490–492
  262. 267Ioanid, pp. 239–240, 245
  263. 268Final Report, p. 348; Boia, pp. 160–161, 259, 340; Deletant, p. 269; Geran Pilon, pp. 67, 116; Ioanid, pp. 246, 251; Laqueur, p. 205; Shafir, p. 215
  264. 269Boia, pp. 339–341
  265. 270Boia, p. 339
  266. 271Ioanid, p. 240
  267. 272Final Report, pp. 283–284, 302, 345–346; Ancel (2005 a), p. 424; Bucur (2004), pp. 174–175; Ioanid, p. 240
  268. 273BookHitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonsecu and his Regime, Romania, 1940–1944Dennis Deletant — Springer — 12 April 2006
  269. 274Ancel (2005 a), pp. 12–13, 17, 414; Ioanid, p. 236
  270. 275Ioanid, pp. 240–241
  271. 276Ancel (2005 a), pp. 428–425; Ioanid, pp. 240–241
  272. 277Final Report, p. 345; Ioanid, p. 241
  273. 278Final Report, pp. 284, 302, 340–348; Ancel (2005 a), pp. 414, 418; Deletant, pp. 264, 269; Ioanid, pp. 241–245; Oldson, p. 3; Weber, pp. 164–165
  274. 279Boia, pp. 28–29, 340, 344; Shafir, p. 230
  275. 280Boia, pp. 28–29
  276. 281Final Report, pp. 319, 322, 330–331; Boia, pp. 340–341; Bucur (2004), p. 178; Deletant, pp. 270–271
  277. 282Boia, p. 259; Deletant, pp. 270–271
  278. 283Tony Judt, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Post-war Europe", in Jan-Werner Müller (ed.), Memory and Power in Post-war Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 175.
  279. 284Deletant, p. 4
  280. 285Final Report, pp. 349, 352–353, 360–361; Boia, pp. 340–341; Bucur (2004), p. 178sqq; Deletant, pp. 269–271, 312; Ioanid, p. 246sqq; Kenney, p. 93; Laqueur, pp. 205–206
  281. 286Ramet, pp. 172–173
  282. 287Laqueur, p. 205. Both factions have also been known to endorse integral denial (Final Report, pp. 365–367).
  283. 288Final Report, pp. 349, 350, 351, 353–354, 359, 373–374; Boia, pp. 340–341; Bucur (2004), p. 178; Deletant, pp. 6, 269–271; Geran Pilon, pp. 67–71; Ioanid, pp. 246, 250–252; Laqueur, pp. 203–205; Shafi
  284. 289Final Report, pp. 349, 350, 373; Boia, p. 340; Bucur (2004), p. 178; Deletant, pp. 6, 269, 281–282
  285. 290Deletant, pp. 281–282; Shafir, p. 231
  286. 291Boia, p. 340
  287. 292Final Report, pp. 350, 353; Ioanid, pp. 246, 251; Laqueur, pp. 205–206
  288. 293Final Report, pp. 350–352, 362–363; Ioanid, p. 246
  289. 294Final Report, p. 350; Shafir, p. 215
  290. 295Deletant, pp. 271, 352. Theodoru stands out for his complete form of Holocaust denial (Final Report, pp. 350–352, 354, 362, 373).
  291. 296Final Report, pp. 356, 357–358, 372, 375–376, 378
  292. 297Among those cited are Expres Magazin (Ioanid, pp. 129, 250) and Dosarele Historia (Deletant, p. 350) Evenimentul Zilei did the same in the early 1990s. (Weber, p. 150).
  293. 298Final Report, pp. 349, 354, 356, 375
  294. 299Ioanid, pp. 247, 248
  295. 300Boia, pp. 340–341; Deletant, pp. 269–270; Ioanid, pp. 247–250, 251–252; Kenney, p. 93; Laqueur, p. 205
  296. 301Boia, pp. 340–341; Deletant, pp. 269, 270; Kenney, p. 93
  297. 302BookCollaboration with the Nazis: public discourse after the HolocaustRoutledge — 2010
  298. 303Deletant, p. 270; Ioanid, p. 247
  299. 304Final Report, pp. 360–362; Boia, p. 29; Ioanid, pp. 249–250, 252; Kenney, p. 93
  300. 305Final Report, pp. 374–375; Deletant, pp. 271–272
  301. 306Final Report, p. 349
  302. 307Bucur (2004), p. 158
  303. 308Deletant, pp. 2, 3, 5
  304. 309Régine Robin, "Une juste mémoire, est-ce possible?", in Thomas Ferenczi (ed.), Devoir de mémoire, droit à l'oubli?, Éditions Complexe, Paris, 2002, p. 109. ; Bucur (2004), pp. 158, 178–179; Deletant,
  305. 310Bucur (2004), p. 178; Ioanid, p. 245. According to Ioanid, these Romanian-sourced interpretations affected historiographic accounts at an international level, when they were republished by the Yad Vas
  306. 311Final Report, pp. 348, 350, 355–356, 357–359, 361, 367; Bucur (2004), p. 178; Deletant, pp. 7, 270–271, 352–353
  307. 312Final Report, p. 348
  308. 313Final Report, p. 353; Deletant, p. 273
  309. 314Final Report, pp. 348, 362; Deletant, pp. 273–274
  310. 315Final Report, pp. 179, 341, 379; Deletant, p. 272; Ioanid, p. 249
  311. 316Final Report, p. 379; Deletant, pp. 281, 253, 352
  312. 317Deletant, p. 272
  313. 318Final Report, pp. 361, 374; Deletant, pp. 270–273
  314. 319Final Report, pp. 9–13, 17–18, 361–362, 386–393; Deletant, pp. 6–7
  315. 327Bucur (2004), p. 172
  316. 328Bucur (2004), pp. 172–173
  317. 330Deletant, pp. 98, 118, 231
  318. 331Deletant, p. 305
  319. 332Richard Stites, "Frontline Entertainment", in Richard Stites (ed.), Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia, Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, pp. 135–136.
  320. 333Roy Douglas, The World War, 1939–1945. The Cartoonists' Vision, Routledge, London, pp. 94, 96.
  321. 334Neubauer et al., p. 174
  322. 335Deletant, pp. 267–268; Ioanid, p. 239
  323. 336Deletant, p. 268; Ioanid, p. 239
  324. 337Deletant, p. 267
  325. 338Final Report, pp. 359–361; Bucur (2004), pp. 158, 178; Ioanid, pp. 251–252; Kenney, p. 93; Ramet, p. 173
  326. 339Final Report, p. 360; Ioanid, p. 251; Shafir, p. 215
  327. 340Final Report, p. 360; Shafir, p. 215
  328. 341Ioanid, p. 251
  329. 342Bucur (2004), p. 178
  330. 343Ioanid, p. 252
  331. 344Final Report, pp. 359–361
  332. 348BookRomanian civilization, Volume 4Centrul de Istorie și Civilizație Europeană (Academia Română) — Romanian Cultural Foundation; Original: Indiana University Press — 1995
  333. 349BookManuscriptum, Volume 29Muzeul Literaturii Române (Romania) — Muzeul Literaturii Române; Original: University of Michigan Press — 1998
  334. 350BookThe Romanian Army of World War IIMark Axworthy — Osprey Publishing — 1992
  335. 351JournalThe Marshals as Key Symbols of the Romanian – Finnish Cooperation during World War IISilviu Miloiu — Valahia University Press — 2008
  336. 352BookWorld War II German Battle InsigniaGordon Williamson — Bloomsbury Publishing — 20 March 2012
  337. 353BookThunder at Prokhorovka: A Combat History of Operation Citadel, Kursk, July 1943David Schranck — Helion and Company — 19 January 2014
  338. 354Paul Carell, Scorched earth; Hitler's war on Russia, G. G. Harrap, 1970, p. 19
  339. 355Adolf Hitler, Max Domarus, Speeches and proclamations, 1932-1945, Bolchazy-Carducci, 2004, p. 2799
  340. 356Christopher Ailsby, Combat medals of the Third Reich, P. Stephens, 1987, p. 98
  341. 357BookKunnian ruletti: Korkeimmat ulkomaalaisille 1941-1944 annetut suomalaiset kunniamerkitAntti Matikkala — Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura — 2017

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