Skip to content

Gulf Cartel

Ch. 1 of 8
— CH. 1 · INTRODUCTION —

Contents

Gulf Cartel

8 sections
  • The Gulf Cartel once moved tons of cocaine into the United States aboard government buses. A captured trafficker named Juan Antonio Ortiz described the scheme. Between 1986 and 1990, he said, the buses belonged to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. They made ideal transport because border officers never stopped them.

    The Gulf Cartel is a Mexican criminal syndicate based in Matamoros, in the state of Tamaulipas. Matamoros sits directly across the border from Brownsville, Texas. Perhaps no organized crime group in Mexico is older. The United States has designated it a terrorist organization, and it is believed to deal with crime groups in Europe, West Africa, Asia, Central America and South America.

    How does a family smuggling business grow into something like this? Who protected it, and who paid for that protection? And what happened when the soldiers it hired for itself turned against it in the streets of Tamaulipas?

  • In the 1930s, a man named Juan Nepomuceno Guerra founded the group that would become the Gulf Cartel. Its first name was the Matamoros Cartel. It began by smuggling alcohol and other illegal goods across the border into the United States. Guerra is also said to have smuggled heroin for more than forty years.

    When Prohibition ended, the organization did not disappear. It simply found other trades. It controlled gambling houses, prostitution rings and a car theft network, along with other kinds of illegal smuggling.

    The group grew significantly in the 1970s under Juan García Ábrego. By the 1980s he was adding cocaine to the business and taking the upper hand. The shift toward cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana happened under his command and that of Guerra.

    His most important move was a negotiation with the Cali Cartel of Colombia. The Gulf organization had been earning 1,500 dollars per kilogram for delivering Cali's cocaine. García Ábrego demanded 50 percent of each shipment instead.

    The new terms came with a burden. He now had to guarantee that the product reached its destination. So he built warehouses along Mexico's northern border, large enough to hold hundreds of tons of cocaine. The warehouses gave him a new distribution network and more political influence. He also shipped cash north to be laundered, in the millions.

    By around 1994, the Gulf Cartel was estimated to handle as much as one-third of all cocaine shipments from Cali suppliers into the United States. During the 1990s, the Mexican attorney general's office put the organization's worth at over 10 billion dollars.

  • In 1986, an FBI agent named Claude de la O stated in testimony that he had taken over 100,000 dollars in bribes from García Ábrego. He had also leaked information that could have endangered an FBI informant and several Mexican journalists. Claude was removed from the case in 1989 and retired a year later.

    The cartel's protection did not stop at one agent. The source describes a special deal with members of the Texas National Guard, who trucked cocaine and marijuana from South Texas to Houston. In Mexico, the deputy attorney general in charge of the federal Judicial Police was found to have accumulated more than 9 million dollars for protecting García Ábrego. Former associates claimed that a deputy attorney general under Carlos Salinas de Gortari received more than 1.5 million dollars a month.

    In 1995, the FBI put García Ábrego on its Ten Most Wanted list. He was the first drug trafficker ever named there. On the 14th of January 1996, he was arrested outside a ranch in Monterrey, Nuevo León.

    The arrest itself drew suspicion. Some believed the Mexican government had always known where he was and held back because of what he knew about government corruption. The arresting commander of the Federal Judicial Police allegedly received an armored Mercury Grand Marquis and 500,000 dollars from a rival cartel. Another theory notes that a United States vote on Mexico's trade certification was due on the 1st of March. Mexico received that certification shortly after the arrest.

    He was flown to Mexico City and then to Houston, wearing slacks and a striped shirt. An FBI agent interviewed him, and he confessed to ordering people murdered and tortured. His prosecutors tried him as an American citizen, because he held an American birth certificate. Mexican authorities called that document fraudulent, and he also held an official Mexican one.

    The trial began eight months after his arrest. According to The Brownsville Herald, he entered the courtroom grinning and chatting with his lawyers. Over four weeks, 84 witnesses testified, from law enforcement officers to convicted smugglers. Jurors convicted him on 22 counts and ordered 350 million dollars of his assets seized, 75 million more than first planned. He received eleven life sentences and is held in a maximum security prison in Colorado.

    Prosecutors also tied him to two massacres in Matamoros. In 1984, six people were killed at La Clínica Raya, a hospital where rival drug members were being treated. In 1991, eighteen prisoners were slain at the Cereso prison.

    His brother Humberto then tried to take command. He lacked the leadership skills, and he lacked the backing of the Colombian suppliers.

  • In July 1999, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén took control of the cartel by assassinating Salvador Gómez Herrera, known as El Chava. The two men were close friends and co-leaders. The murder earned Cárdenas the nickname Mata Amigos, meaning Friend Killer.

    Cárdenas wanted protection from rivals and from the Mexican military. He turned to the army itself. His first contact was an army lieutenant named Arturo Guzmán Decena, whom he reportedly asked to find the best men possible. Guzmán Decena deserted and brought more than 30 deserters from the elite special forces unit known as GAFE. Salaries far above army pay drew them in.

    Among the original defectors were Jaime González Durán, Jesús Enrique Rejón Aguilar and Heriberto Lazcano. Lazcano would later lead Los Zetas as an independent cartel. Los Zetas began as the hired private army of the Gulf Cartel.

    From 2001 to 2008, the two organizations were known together as La Compañía, meaning The Company. One of the first missions of Los Zetas came in 2003. They destroyed Los Chachos, a group that served the Milenio Cartel and disputed Tamaulipas drug corridors. Its boss, known as El Chacho, had betrayed the Gulf Cartel for the Tijuana Cartel. Los Zetas killed him.

    As Cárdenas consolidated power, the Zetas took on more work. They ran kidnappings, collected taxes and debts, and operated protection rackets. They also secured trafficking routes called plazas, and executed enemies, often with grotesque savagery. The Sinaloa Cartel answered with its own enforcer group, Los Negros. It had less complexity and less success.

    Some experts date the Mexican drug war not to 2006 but to 2004. They point to Nuevo Laredo, where the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas fought Sinaloa and Los Negros.

    Cárdenas himself nearly became untouchable by threatening the wrong people. On the 9th of November 1999, he and about 15 gunmen confronted two American agents in Matamoros, one from the DEA and one from the FBI. The agents had come with an informant to gather intelligence. Cárdenas ordered them out of their vehicle, and they refused. They warned that killing federal agents would bring a massive manhunt. He let them go with a threat never to return.

    Until then he had been seen as a minor player. After the standoff, he landed on the FBI Ten Most Wanted list, with a 2 million dollar bounty.

    On the 14th of March 2003, he was captured in Matamoros during a shootout between the Mexican military and his gunmen. The operation had been planned in secret over six months. Only President Vicente Fox, the defense secretary Ricardo Clemente Vega García and the attorney general Rafael Macedo de la Concha were told.

    Behind the walls of La Palma prison, he still gave orders through his lawyers, his guards and handwritten notes. He approved executions and signed forms to buy police forces. He also allied with Benjamín Arellano Félix of the Tijuana Cartel. After a dispute, Cárdenas ordered Arellano beaten, and the alliance ended.

    He was extradited to the United States in 2007. In 2010, he was sentenced to 25 years in a courtroom locked to the public in Brownsville. Nearly 30 million dollars of his assets went to Texas law enforcement agencies. Two helicopters bought with drug proceeds went to two Canadian financing companies.

  • On the 24th of February 2010, hundreds of trucks marked C.D.G, XXX and M3 rolled through northern Tamaulipas. The initials were insignia of the Gulf Cartel. Rumors of a broken alliance with Los Zetas had circulated on blogs and mass emails since September 2009, but this was no longer a rumor.

    The fighting began in Reynosa, then spread to Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros. It eventually reached 11 municipalities in Tamaulipas, nine of them on the Texas border. Violence spilled into neighboring Nuevo León and Veracruz. On the 5th of October 2010, the Gulf Cartel killed two Zeta members in Brownsville, Texas.

    Local authorities and the media tried to claim that nothing was happening. Witnesses described entire cities paralyzed in daylight, and businesses and homes burned to ruins. Thousands died, though most shootings and body counts went unreported.

    Why did the alliance break? The source says it is unclear who started it, and it offers many competing accounts. Banners hung in Matamoros and Reynosa claimed that Los Zetas had moved into extortion, kidnapping and theft on their own. Los Zetas answered with banners of their own. They said they had carried out executions and kidnappings on Gulf orders, and that the Gulf Cartel blamed them for civilian deaths.

    Other accounts point to Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, brother of Osiel. He was said to be addicted to gambling, sex and drugs, and Los Zetas saw him as a threat. Another version blames a succession quarrel after Osiel's extradition. The Gulf candidates were Antonio Cárdenas and Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, while the Zetas wanted Lazcano.

    Still others say the Gulf Cartel sought a truce with Sinaloa and Los Zetas refused to honor it. One account says Los Zetas left to ally with the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel. A final version concerns a Reynosa drug corridor. Samuel Flores Borrego, a Gulf lieutenant known as El Metro 3, killed Sergio Peña Mendoza, a Zeta lieutenant known as El Concorde 3. Los Zetas demanded the killer, the Gulf Cartel refused, and observers believe that started the war.

    The Gulf Cartel then joined its old rivals, the Sinaloa Cartel and La Familia Michoacana, who shared a profound hatred of Los Zetas, according to Stratfor. Los Zetas allied with the Juárez, Beltrán-Leyva and Tijuana cartels.

    By the source's account, the major cartels have been sorted into two blocs since February 2010. The Gulf, Sinaloa, La Familia and Knights Templar cartels stood on one side. The Juárez, Tijuana, Beltrán-Leyva and Zeta organizations stood on the other.

  • A shooting began around 10 in the morning on the 5th of November 2010 in Matamoros, and it lasted until about 6 in the evening. Mexican forces had been pursuing Antonio Cárdenas Guillén, known as Tony Tormenta, after more than six months of intelligence work. Authorities had tried twice before. Each time his gunmen distracted the troops and let him escape in an armored vehicle.

    This time more than 660 marines, 17 vehicles and three helicopters took part. Gunmen met them with grenades and heavy-caliber fire. La Jornada reported over 80 SUVs of gunmen defending him and more than 300 grenades fired. Cartel members hijacked public transport units and built dozens of roadblocks to hold the soldiers back. The roadblocks continued after Cárdenas was killed.

    Three international bridges closed. So did the University of Texas at Brownsville, just across the border. Schools and public transportation in Matamoros stopped. Residents warned each other on Twitter and Facebook, and bystanders recorded the gunfire on video.

    The death toll depends on whom you ask. Government sources counted eight dead, including three marines, a soldier and four gunmen. The Brownsville Herald and The Monitor reported around 50 killed. Other sources and one anonymous officer said more than 100.

    The violence did not stay in Matamoros. Reynosa saw a spiral of killing days later. In Ciudad Mier, a turf war with Los Zetas drove out more than 95 percent of the population. Banners from Los Zetas celebrating the death appeared across Mexico. President Barack Obama phoned President Felipe Calderón to congratulate him.

    The bodyguards at his side were known as Los Escorpiones. The Mexican government said Antonio created them and that they numbered over 60 civilians, ex-police and ex-soldiers. Narcocorridos on YouTube praised them. Members killed that day were known by numbers, such as Escorpión 1, Escorpión 18, Escorpión 26 and Escorpión 42. Two wounded members, Escorpión 37 and Escorpión 43, were arrested. Their capture helped Mexican forces understand the group's structure.

    Two factions had formed within the Gulf Cartel by then. The Metros were headquartered in Matamoros and the Rojos in Reynosa. Osiel Cárdenas had set up similar groups in the late 1990s, identified by radio codes, and a third group, the Lobos, in Laredo. Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, a former policeman known as El Coss, led the Metros. Mario Cárdenas Guillén, brother of Osiel and Antonio, led the Rojos.

    The quarrel began in 2010. Juan Mejía González, called R-1, was passed over for regional boss of Reynosa and sent to the Frontera Chica. Samuel Flores Borrego got the post instead. Rafael Cárdenas Vela, nephew of Antonio, also blamed the Metros for helping the military find his uncle. Other sources say the Rojos were suspected of being too soft on Los Zetas.

    Flores Borrego was killed on the 2nd of September 2011. Firefights followed across Tamaulipas, though the Metros held the major cities from Matamoros to Miguel Alemán. Costilla was arrested in September 2012, and a leader named Mario Ramirez Trevino was captured on the 18th of August 2013.

    In June 2020, InSight Crime journalist Victoria Dittmar described the Gulf Cartel as fragmented. A group called Los Pelones emerged as an independent cartel from the breakup. Remnants of the old organization remain in Tamaulipas.

  • In April 2011, police in Reynosa found 68 kidnapped people from Mexico and Central America inside a Gulf Cartel safe house. Kidnapping became one of the group's defining crimes. The source says that the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas together are blamed for more than half of the kidnappings in Mexico.

    An intelligence agency listed three motives. The cartel kidnaps to replace members lost to death or arrest, to eliminate rival gang members, and to collect ransom. The recruits included unlikely figures. Omar Ortiz, a former soccer star of C.F. Monterrey, was arrested in January 2012 for working in a Gulf kidnapping ring. A lucha libre wrestler named Lázaro Gurrola, known as Estrella Dorada, was also arrested.

    The crimes reached into Texas, mainly around McAllen. Kidnappers reportedly trained with paintball equipment to rehearse the abductions. A man from Palmview, Texas, named Isaac Sanchez Gutierrez, faced an ultimatum when his brother was taken. He could pay 10 million dollars or smuggle 50 drug loads into the United States.

    Extortion was steadier work. The cartel taxed businesses across Tamaulipas for protection, with threats of death for those who refused. Critics argue that capturing kingpins pushed cartels toward more extortion, as they searched for other income.

    Oil provided another cushion. The cartel was reported to have stolen about 40 percent of oil products in northern Mexico in 2011, then sold them illegally. One captured leader said drug trafficking was the main business, but oil theft had become an important financial cushion. In 2008 in Michoacán, the cartel was reported to control counterfeit goods, with millions of fake CDs and movies.

    The Economist reported in 1997 that Gulf drug money in the Rio Grande Valley may have moved about 20 billion dollars. It said around 15 percent of retailers' gains there came from drug money.

    The rank structure is simple. Falcons, called halcones, act as street lookouts. Hitmen, called sicarios, carry out killings, kidnappings and extortion. Lieutenants supervise them and may order low-profile executions. At the top sit the capos, who appoint territorial leaders and plan high-profile killings.

    The network stretches far beyond Mexico. In Texas, the cartel relies on street and prison gangs, including the Texas Syndicate, the Latin Kings and the Mexican Mafia. In Europe, it was reported to use BlackBerry phones to talk with the 'Ndrangheta of Italy, because the texts are difficult to intercept. In 2009 the organization decided that European demand and a strong euro justified building a network there. West Africa, with its weak rule of law, became a staging ground for routes toward Europe.

  • On the 25th of March 2010-40 inmates escaped from a federal prison in Matamoros. On the 10th of September 2010-85 walked out of a prison in Reynosa. On the 17th of December 2010, about 141 left a federal prison in Nuevo Laredo. Earlier counts were a few higher in both of the last two cases, and the corrected figures came later.

    The Reynosa prison had already been attacked in April 2010, when a convoy of ten trucks carrying gunmen broke in and freed 13 inmates. In Zacatecas on the 16th of May 2009, an armed commando used ten trucks and a helicopter to free 53 Gulf Cartel members. On the 15th of July 2011, a fight inside a Nuevo Laredo prison left seven inmates dead and 59 escaped. The five guards on duty were never found. CNN reported that more than 400 inmates escaped from Tamaulipas prisons between January 2010 and March 2011.

    The police were an easier target. The newspaper Excélsior reported that Tamaulipas paid the worst police wages in Mexico, about 3,618 pesos a month, or roughly 260 dollars. In Aguascalientes, where violence is far lower, officers earn five times as much. On the 9th of May 2011, the federal government disarmed all police in the state, starting with Matamoros and Reynosa. On the 7th of November 2011, about 1,660 officers were dismissed for failing control tests or refusing to take them.

    The political story runs deeper. For 71 years the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the PRI, ruled Mexico, and many believed it kept a quiet arrangement with the cartels. When trafficking got out of line, the government would stage arrests and the drug lords would settle down. After the PRI lost the presidency in 2000, that arrangement and the pax mafiosa fell apart.

    Tamaulipas became a symbol of the breakdown. Investigators found the massacre of 72 migrants and clandestine mass graves holding more than 250 bodies in San Fernando. The candidate for governor, Rodolfo Torre Cantú, was assassinated in 2010. Specialists concluded that neither the regional nor the federal government controlled the territory.

    On the 30th of January 2012, the attorney general ordered the past three governors of Tamaulipas and their families to stay in the country. They were under investigation for possible cooperation with cartels. Newspapers reported that these governors had close ties to the Gulf Cartel.

    On the 5th of June 2016, Tamaulipas voters elected a governor from an opposition party for the first time in 87 years. Francisco Javier García Cabeza de Vaca of the National Action Party won on the slogan that winds of change were coming. Both he and his opponent still faced accusations of taking illicit money from the Gulf Cartel.

Updated

Common questions

Where is the Gulf Cartel based?

It is based in Matamoros, in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas. The city sits directly across the border from Brownsville, Texas.

Who founded the Gulf Cartel?

Juan Nepomuceno Guerra founded it in the 1930s. It was first known as the Matamoros Cartel and began by smuggling alcohol into the United States.

What was the relationship between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas?

Los Zetas began as the Gulf Cartel's hired private army, recruited from Mexican army special forces deserters under Osiel Cárdenas Guillén. They broke from the Gulf Cartel in early 2010 and the two groups went to war.

What are the Metros and the Rojos?

They are two factions within the Gulf Cartel. The Metros, centered in Matamoros, followed Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez. The Rojos, centered in Reynosa, were more loyal to the Cárdenas family.

What happened to Juan García Ábrego?

He was arrested on the 14th of January 1996 outside Monterrey and extradited to the United States. A jury convicted him on 22 counts, and he received eleven life sentences.

All sources

361 references cited across the entry

  1. 10BookDrug war zone: frontline dispatches from the streets of El Paso and JuárezHoward Campbell — University of Texas Press — 2009
  2. 11A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest BorderMICHAEL T. McCAUL — HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
  3. 12BookU.S. Border Security: A Reference HandbookJudith Warner — ABC-CLIO — 2010
  4. 13BookEl Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal InsurgencyIoan Grillo — Bloomsbury Publishing — 2011
  5. 14Narcotics Rewards ProgramUnited States Department of State
  6. 15NewsFalleció el fundador del cártel del GolfoCésar Peralta González — 12 July 2001
  7. 16NewsLa historia del cártel del GolfoCarmen Lira Saade — 15 March 2003
  8. 18NewsReputed drug lord's brother under arrestTony Vindell — 15 October 1994
  9. 19BookComing together?: Mexico-United States relationsPeter H. Smith — Brookings Institution Press — 1997
  10. 20BookDrug politics: dirty money and democraciesDavid C. Jordan — University of Oklahoma Press — 1999
  11. 21BookHomage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in MexicoBill Weinberg — Verso Publishers — 2000
  12. 23NewsMexican Drug Gang's Reign of BloodSam Dillon — 4 February 1996
  13. 27NewsMexican Drug Cartel Chief Convicted in U.S.Mark Fineman — 17 October 1996
  14. 29BookOrganized CrimeHoward Abadinsky — Cengage Learning — 2009
  15. 30BookOrganized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican BorderlandsJohn J Bailey — University of Pittsburgh Press — 2001
  16. 32NewsLegendary Juan Garcia Abrego in U.S. custodyDane Schiller — 16 January 1996
  17. 33NewsGarcia Abrego is U.S. citizen, officials insistDeborah Tedford — 2 July 1996
  18. 34NewsExpulsion may have broken the lawDane Schiller — 19 January 1996
  19. 35NewsLife in jail for drug lordTerri Langford — 1 February 1997
  20. 37UNITED STATES v. GARCIA ABREGOUnited States Court of Appeals: Fifth Circuit
  21. 38NewsJury: Abrego guiltyMarisa Taylor — 17 October 1996
  22. 39NewsGarcia Abrego was allowed to go freeMaro Robbins — 27 August 1995
  23. 41NewsMentes perversasJorge Pérez González — 22 February 2009
  24. 42NewsEl Profe welcomes Garcia Abrego's downfallTony Vindell — 24 January 1996
  25. 47NewsMexico Agrees To Extradite Drug Suspect To CaliforniaTim Weiner — 19 January 2001
  26. 48A Chronology: Murder, Money, & MexicoPeter Lupsha — University of New Mexico
  27. 49NewsMedina Garza en 'La Palma'Alejandro Medellín — 4 February 2011
  28. 51NewsCaen 21 miembros de cártel del GolfoJosé Luis Ruiz — 3 April 2001
  29. 53NewsLa disputa del narcopoderIgnacio Ramírez — 10 April 2000
  30. 57News¿Quienes son los Zetas?7 March 2010
  31. 58NewsCártel de 'Los Zetas'15 January 2011
  32. 59BookMexico: narco-violence and a failed state?George W. Grayson — Transaction Publishers — 2010
  33. 60NewsA cartel army's war withinHector Tobar — 20 May 2007
  34. 65NewsLos Zetas called Mexico's most dangerous drug cartelMichael Ware — 6 August 2009
  35. 66NewsTexas jury convicts alleged Mexican cartel hit manChris Sherman — 25 January 2012
  36. 73NewsMexico's Drug War: Soldiers versus Narco-SoldiersAlex Sánchez — 4 June 2007
  37. 76Drug Trafficking OrganizationsNational Drug Intelligence Center
  38. 79NewsDangers higher for federal agentsJson Buch — 28 February 2011
  39. 80NewsDEA agent breaks silence on standoff with cartelDane Schiller — 15 March 2010
  40. 82Osiel Cardenas-GuillenFederal Bureau of Investigation
  41. 83$2 Million Reward Offered Leading to the Arrest or Conviction of Drug TraffickersDrug Enforcement Administration — 14 December 2000
  42. 87NewsLíderes narcos pactan en La Palma trasriego de drogaDavid Aponte — 5 January 2005
  43. 100United States of America v. Cardenas-GuillenUnited States Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Texas
  44. 103NewsNew U.S. attorney no stranger to HoustonTerri Langford — 9 November 2011
  45. 104NewsCardenas Guillen awaits trialEmma Perez — 23 September 2008
  46. 105NewsMexican drug lords decry U.S. prison conditionsDane Schiller — 30 September 2011
  47. 107NewsTrafficking defendant: I was a DEA informerDane Schiller — 4 August 2011
  48. 109Law and Order in MexicoDana M. Grimes — 2010
  49. 116TCO 101: The Gulf CartelSylvia Longmire — Mexico's drug war
  50. 120NewsEU: alarma guerra "Zetas"-El GolfoJaime Hernández — 4 March 2010
  51. 131NewsTres militares, 'Tony Tormenta' y un periodistaJacobo G. García — 11 July 2010
  52. 145Balacera Matamoros: Convoy de MarinosYouTube — 5 November 2010
  53. 148NewsHead of Gulf Cartel killed5 November 2010
  54. 153Data on Mexican drug war violenceRobert Johnston — Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Unconventional Warfare
  55. 157NewsCartel WarsMichael Deibert — 16 May 2011
  56. 169News"Los Zetas" por dentroFrancisco Gomez — 31 December 2008
  57. 175NewsDeath of Gulf Cartel 'Finance Chief' Sign of Internal Strife?Elyssa Pachico — 11 October 2011
  58. 178JournalMexico: Cartels, Corruption and Cocaine: A Profile of the Gulf CartelStephanie Brophy — August 2008
  59. 180BookDrugs and the American Dream: An AnthologyPatricia A. Adler — Wiley-Blackwell — 2012
  60. 181Testimony of Thomas A. ShannonUnited States Senate
  61. 182DTOs Have Expanded Operations in the United StatesU.S. Government Accountability Office
  62. 184NewsCartels cooperate with prison gangsJason Buch — 1 January 2012
  63. 185NewsFBI: Trucking 'significant' in cartels' U.S. profitabilityCharlie Morasch — 6 December 2011
  64. 190NewsUndermining Mexico's Dangerous Drug CartelsTed Galen Carpenter — 15 November 2011
  65. 192Mexican Cartels Exploit North Africa TurmoilInsight Crime — April 2011
  66. 193NewsLatin American drug cartels find home in West AfricaArthur Brice — 21 September 2009
  67. 194Cocaine trafficking in Western AfricaUnited Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime
  68. 203NewsThe Missing in Tamaulipas26 April 2010
  69. 204NewsAll Tamaulipas, a War Zone22 April 2010
  70. 211NewsSin resolver origen de narcofosas en TamaulipasDaniel Sánchez López — 9 April 2011
  71. 213NewsTamaulipas: 'Failed state' in Mexico's war on drugsJulian Miglierini — 13 April 2011
  72. 214Mexico's PRI Names Presidential Candidate.Sylvia Longmire — Mexico's Drug War
  73. 215BookThe Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in MexicoPeter Andreas — Brown University — April 1998
  74. 219NewsNarcopolítica en Tamaulipas29 June 2010
  75. 220NewsTamaulipas; PRI y narcoRicardo Alemán — 12 January 2010
  76. 221NewsBlindaje contra narcopolíticos en TamaulipasAlejandro Salas — February 2010
  77. 222NewsTamaulipas: gobierno fallidoMartín Moreno — 10 April 2011
  78. 262Mexico's War on DrugsJason Ensinger — Shave Magazine
  79. 263JournalCRS Report for Congress: Mexico's Drug CartelsColleen W. Cook — October 2007
  80. 270NewsLatest Mexico drug arrest may cripple Gulf cartelTracy Wilkinson — 13 September 2012
  81. 271NewsOtro Cárdenas Guillén hereda la organizaciónAurora Vega — 6 November 2010
  82. 273BookThree United States-Mexico border warsTony Payan — Greenwood Publishing Group — 2006
  83. 275NewsEl sicario, un documental proscrito en México (1)Charles Bowden — 6 February 2011
  84. 276NewsEl sicario, un documental proscrito en México (2)Charles Bowden — 6 February 2011
  85. 285BookMafias on the move: how organized crime conquers new territoriesFederico Varese — Princeton University Press — 2011
  86. 286BookPrivate actors and security governanceAlan Bryden — LIT Verlag Münster — 2006
  87. 287BookHuman rights along the U.S.-Mexico border: gendered violence and insecurityTony Payan — University of Arizona Press — 2009
  88. 289NewsCárteles "cobran piso" en EU: DEADoris Gomora — 25 December 2011
  89. 297NewsSan Juan kidnapping ring suspects face judgeKatie Lopez — 18 November 2011
  90. 299NewsAlleged Gulf Cartel members charged with Hidalgo kidnappingRafael Caranza — 4 November 2011
  91. 301NewsGulf Cartel members charged in Hidalgo kidnappingIldelfonso Ortiz — 4 November 2011
  92. 304NewsPalmview chase suspect: Gulf Cartel forced me to smuggleJared Taylor — 21 December 2011
  93. 305BookClandestine crossings: migrants and coyotes on the Texas-Mexico borderDavid Spener — Cornell University Press — 2009
  94. 310BookSecurity disarmed: critical perspectives on gender, race, and militarizationBarbara Sutton — Rutgers University Press — 2008
  95. 315NewsDrug Lord's Web of Payoffs Spans U.S.-Mexico BorderMark Fineman — 4 September 1995
  96. 316NewsMexico Arrests A Top Suspect in Drug TradeSam Dillon — 16 January 1996
  97. 318NewsCartel bribery spreads to ValleyFernando Del Valle — 13 December 2010
  98. 325NewsDesintegró PFP peligrosa célula del Cartel del GolfoFrancisco Rendon — 9 November 2011
  99. 328BookTransnational criminal organizations, cybercrime, and money launderingJames R. Richards — CRC Press — 1999
  100. 333NewsShots near Weslaco lead cops to Gulf Cartel arms smugglingJared Taylor — 17 November 2011
  101. 335NewsOperación 'hormiga', en el tráfico de armasMaria De la Luz Gonzalez — 22 December 2008
  102. 341NewsEl cártel del Golfo controla la piratería en MichoacánGustavo Castillo García — 2 April 2008
  103. 342NewsMilitares piratas en México23 July 2010
  104. 345Texas Gang Threat Assessment 2010Texas Department of Public Safety
  105. 347Texas Drug Threat AssessmentNational Drug Intelligence Center
  106. 348South Texas Border and San Antonio Market Areas (2008)National Drug Intelligence Center
  107. 349South Texas Border and San Antonio Market Areas (2007)National Drug Intelligence Center
  108. 350NewsNogales drug tunnel found23 November 2011
  109. 351NewsDrug traffickers use submersibles to ferry narcoticsChris Kraul — 6 November 2007
  110. 352JournalSelf-Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS) – Fact SheetJoint Interagency Task Force South — 2008
  111. 353NewsDrug-Sub CultureDavid Kushner — 23 April 2009
  112. 354NewsU.S. launches drive against Mexican drug cartelGlenn Somerville — 20 July 2009
  113. 358NewsCae en Naucalpan 'El Betito', sobrino de Osiel CárdenasDavid Vicenteño — 30 June 2019
  114. 362BookLos Zetas Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil War in MexicoGuadalupe Correa-Cabrera — University of Texas Press — 2017

Queue