Battle of Taranto
The Mediterranean Sea became a deadly choke point in 1940. British convoys traveling from Gibraltar to Egypt faced constant threats from Italian naval forces. Italy had entered the war that year, cutting off direct routes for supplies to British troops in North Africa. Ships now had to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of miles to their journey. This detour stretched supply lines and delayed reinforcements for the Western Desert Campaign. The Regia Marina kept most of its capital ships anchored at Taranto. They refused to engage the Royal Navy directly on open water. Losing a battleship meant losing it forever since shipyards could not replace them quickly. Six battleships sat idle in the harbor while British forces struggled to maintain control of the sea lanes. Admiral Andrew Cunningham commanded the British Mediterranean Fleet during this tense standoff. He needed a way to neutralize the Italian threat without risking his own fleet in a head-on battle.
Admiral Sir Dudley Pound ordered staff to re-examine plans for attacking Taranto during the Munich Crisis of 1938. Lumley Lyster suggested using Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers for night attacks. These aircraft were considered obsolete but possessed unique capabilities for low-level operations. Security measures remained so tight that no written records existed about the training program. Just one month before the war began, Pound advised his replacement to consider the possibility. Operation Judgment originally targeted Trafalgar Day on the 21st of October 1940. A fire in an auxiliary fuel tank destroyed two Swordfish aircraft and caused delays. The carrier Eagle suffered a breakdown in her fuel system and was removed from the operation. Illustrious became the primary carrier for the strike force. Rear Admiral Lyster led the complete force consisting of Illustrious, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers. Twenty-four attack Swordfish came from four different Naval Air Squadrons. Half carried torpedoes while others dropped bombs or flares as diversions. Intelligence officers spotted unexpected barrage balloons protecting the harbor after reconnaissance flights confirmed Italian fleet positions.
Twelve aircraft left Illustrious just before 21:00 hours on the 11th of November 1940. Nine more followed approximately ninety minutes later. One aircraft turned back when its auxiliary fuel tank detached mid-flight. Another launched twenty minutes late after emergency repairs fixed damage from a minor taxiing accident. Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Williamson led the first wave through thin clouds. Sixteen flares illuminated the harbor east of Mar Grande at 22:58. Williamson's plane struck the battleship Conte di Cavour with a torpedo that blasted a hole below the waterline. His aircraft was immediately shot down by anti-aircraft fire. Two remaining aircraft pressed home an unsuccessful attack on Andrea Doria despite heavy fire. Three other bombers attacked from a northerly direction hitting Duilio with two torpedoes. Captain O. Patch RM led a bomber force that hit two cruisers moored at Mar Piccolo. The second wave approached from the north shortly before midnight. Eight aircraft participated in this assault with five carrying torpedoes and two dropping flares. Lieutenant G. Bayley RN flew an aircraft that hit Littorio but was shot down by antiaircraft fire from the heavy cruiser Pola. Only one aircraft landed safely at 02:39 after making an unsuccessful dive-bombing attack on an Italian cruiser.
Taranto harbor had a depth of only about twelve meters yet British torpedoes managed to strike effectively. A drum attached beneath the nose of each aircraft pulled up the torpedo nose during drop. This belly-flop technique prevented weapons from diving too deep into shallow waters. The Italian fleet lost half its capital ships in a single night. Conte di Cavour developed a large hole in her hull and touched bottom at greater depth than intended. Twenty-seven crew members died while over one hundred more sustained injuries. Her superstructure and main armament remained above water while the rest sank below the surface. Duilio suffered slightly smaller damage but survived by running aground. Littorio experienced considerable flooding caused by three torpedo hits despite underwater protection systems. Machinery remained intact though the ship's bows became totally submerged by morning. Thirty-two crewmen died during the attack on Littorio. Anti-aircraft defenses fired 13,489 shells from land batteries plus several thousand from ships themselves. Only twenty percent of required anti-torpedo nets were fielded due to scheduled gunnery exercises. Eighty-seven barrage balloons existed but strong winds blew away sixty before the attack began.
The Regia Marina transferred undamaged ships from Taranto to Naples within hours of the attack. They waited until defensive measures improved before returning vessels to their original base. Repairs took four months for Littorio and seven months for Duilio. Conte di Cavour never returned to full service since Italy surrendered in 1943. Admiral Andrew Cunningham wrote that the attack freed up British hands considerably. He believed remaining Italian battleships would not face them directly. The balance of power shifted toward the British Mediterranean Fleet allowing split operations into two battlegroups. Each group contained one aircraft carrier and two battleships instead of operating as a single unit. Five days after Taranto Admiral Inigo Campioni sortied with two battleships and six cruisers. This force successfully disrupted a mission delivering aircraft to Malta. Follow-up operations led to the Battle of Cape Spartivento on the 27th of November 1940. Control of the Mediterranean continued swinging back and forth until the Italian armistice in 1943. Italian shipping to Libya increased between October 1940 and January 1941 averaging 49,435 tons per month. British naval authorities failed to deliver the true knockout blow expected by strategic planners.
Imperial Japanese Navy staff carefully studied the Taranto raid during planning for attacks on Pearl Harbor. Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito flew to Taranto to investigate the attack firsthand. He subsequently had lengthy conversations with Commander Mitsuo Fuchida about his observations in October 1941. A group of IJN officers visited Taranto in May 1941 discussing tactics with their Italian counterparts. The Japanese had been working on shallow-water solutions since early 1939 using various ports as notional targets. Type 91 aerial torpedoes entered service in the early 1930s with breakaway wooden noses to soften water impact. By 1936 they perfected breakaway wooden fins for added aerial stability. All six Imperial Japanese fleet carriers participated in the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Seven American battleships were sunk or disabled while several other warships were destroyed or damaged. The U.S. Navy thereafter designed Pacific Ocean operations around carriers instead of battleships. Older ships proved too slow to escort carriers and became chiefly used as fire support for amphibious operations. Battleships found less useful in expansive waters than confined Mediterranean harbors.
Modern historical perspectives evaluate strategic success versus operational failure of the battle differently. Christopher Caravaggio argued British naval authorities failed to deliver the true knockout blow expected by planners. Italian shipping increased significantly between late 1940 and early 1941 despite heavy losses. The attack disrupted Axis convoys to Africa very little compared to expectations. Aerial torpedo experts previously believed attacks required water at least twelve meters deep. Taranto harbor depth was only about twelve meters yet British methods overcame this limitation. Cunningham's estimate that Italians would not risk remaining heavy units quickly proved wrong. Campioni sortied just five days after the raid with two battleships and six cruisers. The Battle of Cape Spartivento followed shortly after proving Italian willingness to engage. Control of the Mediterranean continued swinging back and forth until the Italian armistice in 1943. The Taranto show freed up British hands considerably according to Admiral Andrew Cunningham's post-attack writings. Yet measured against primary tasks of disrupting Axis supply lines the results remained limited. Naval War College Review published analysis questioning whether tactical victory translated into strategic advantage for Britain.
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Common questions
What happened during the Battle of Taranto on the 11th of November 1940?
British aircraft launched from the carrier Illustrious attacked Italian battleships in Taranto harbor. The strike damaged three capital ships including Conte di Cavour, Duilio, and Littorio while sinking one permanently out of service.
How did British forces overcome shallow water at Taranto to hit Italian ships?
A drum attached beneath each torpedo prevented weapons from diving too deep into waters only twelve meters deep. This belly-flop technique allowed effective strikes despite the harbor depth being insufficient for standard torpedoes.
Who commanded the British Mediterranean Fleet during the attack on Taranto?
Admiral Andrew Cunningham led the British Mediterranean Fleet against the Italian Regia Marina. He authorized Operation Judgment which utilized Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers for night attacks.
Did the Battle of Taranto prevent future Italian naval operations in the Mediterranean?
Italian shipping increased significantly between October 1940 and January 1941 averaging 49,435 tons per month after the raid. Admiral Inigo Campioni sortied with two battleships and six cruisers just five days later to disrupt Axis supply lines.
How did the Japanese Imperial Navy use lessons from the Battle of Taranto?
Imperial Japanese Navy staff studied the raid including Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito who visited Taranto in May 1941. They applied shallow-water solutions developed since early 1939 to their December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor.