Battle of Buna–Gona
Japan's entry into World War II began with the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941. This coordinated assault included simultaneous strikes on Thailand, the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Japanese forces rapidly secured territory across South-East Asia, the East Indies, and the Central Pacific. Australia felt the shock of the speedy collapse of British Malaya and the fall of Singapore in early 1942. Nearly 15,000 Australian soldiers became prisoners of war along with the rest of a garrison numbering some 85,000 men. US President Franklin Roosevelt ordered General Douglas MacArthur to formulate a Pacific defence plan with Australia in March 1942. The Australian prime minister, John Curtin, agreed to place Australian forces under MacArthur's command as Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area. MacArthur moved his headquarters to Melbourne in March 1942. The Japanese assaulted Rabaul on the 23rd of January 1942, establishing it as the forward base for campaigns in mainland New Guinea. Japanese forces first landed on the mainland of New Guinea on the 8th of March 1942 when they invaded Lae and Salamaua. These actions were designed to secure bases for the important facility at Rabaul. The Japanese 17th Army under Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake was a corps-sized command involved in multiple campaigns including Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands. The Japanese 8th Area Army, under General Hitoshi Imamura, mobilised to take overall command from the 16th of November 1942. It was responsible for both the New Guinea and Solomon Islands campaigns while based at Rabaul. The Japanese 18th Army, under Lieutenant General Hatazō Adachi, was formed to take over responsibilities for operations on mainland New Guinea. This left the 17th Army responsible for the Solomon Islands campaign.
Rain turned the tracks into mud during the battle period. Temperatures ranged from high heat with humidity reaching 82 percent, creating oppressive conditions. In humid conditions, kunai grass trapped the heat and temperatures could reach extreme levels. The battle was conducted during the tropical wet season with average rainfall for December being heavy. Daily rainfall totals of several inches were not uncommon. Under these conditions, the few tracks quickly became boggy. The area was one of the most malarial regions in the world. While malaria was the greatest disease threat, other tropical diseases such as dengue fever, scrub typhus, tropical ulcers, dysentery, and fungal infections were common. Supplies of quinine, which was still the primary drug in use, were unreliable. Atebrin only became the official suppressive drug used by Australian forces in late December 1942. The need for a strict anti-malaria program was not fully understood by many officers. Many officers saw this as a medical rather than a disciplinary issue and did not compel their men to take their medicine. It was common for Australian soldiers to wear shorts and rolled sleeves in response to the oppressive heat. Mosquito nets and repellent were in short supply while the repellent that was supplied was considered ineffective. Brien reports that Japanese accounts of the prevalence of disease are similarly shocking. Bergerud states that 85, 95 percent of all Allied soldiers in the area carried malaria during the battle. There were 4.8 men hospitalised through sickness for one Allied battle casualty. Seventy-five percent of the cases were attributed to malaria. After he had relieved Harding, Eichelberger gave orders to take the temperature of an entire company near the front. Every member of that company was running a fever. By necessity, many men remained in the front lines with fevers up to high levels.
Approaching the beachheads, it was necessary for Allied forces to rely on air drops. There was a high rate of loss and breakage, up to 50 per cent. From almost the outset of the battle, the Allies faced critical shortages of ammunition and rations. Once the Allied forces had formed up on the Japanese positions, landing strips were quickly developed to support the engaging forces. This eliminated the losses associated with air-dropping but the supply situation was consistently compromised by poor weather over the air route and a lack of transport aircraft. A sea route was gradually surveyed to nearby Oro Bay which was to be developed as a port in support of Allied operations. The first large vessel to deliver supplies to Oro Bay arrived on the night of 11/the 12th of December. Following this, regular convoys under Operation Lilliput commenced. Lilliput greatly increased the tonnage of material supplied to the Allied forces but much of it was consumed by increases in the size of the force. The level of supply never reached the point where it ceased to be an extraordinarily difficult problem. The Japanese fighting along the Kokoda Track faced the same logistical problems as the Australians but lacked the benefit of air supply to any significant extent. Stocks of rice and other foodstuffs identified at Gona when it was captured on the 8th of December suggest that the garrison had been well provisioned at the start of the battle. The Japanese positions had been supplied by sea from Rabaul but attempts at the start of the battle to land troops and supplies from destroyers were only partly successful. Allied air power at Rabaul and over the beachheads curtailed the use of surface ships for supply. Some troops and equipment destined for Buna, Gona were landed near the mouth of the Mambare River. Reinforcements and supplies were barged to the beachheads from there. Some supplies were landed from submarines although size and travel time dictated that the quantities were necessarily small. On the night of the 25th of December, a Japanese submarine unloaded supplies and ammunition at Buna Government Station, the last time the Japanese received supplies. There was limited use of aerial resupply by the Japanese at Buna, Gona. The normal rice ration was 28 oz (800 g or approximately 600 mL). Rice formed the bulk of the Japanese ration. At the end of December, each man received around 360 mL of rice per day but this was reduced to 40, 80 mL in early January. There was no food for the period 8, the 12th of January. By the time that the battle was over on the 22nd of January, the garrison had been virtually starved into submission.
Before the Allied forces arrived on the Buna, Gona coast, Richard K. Sutherland, then major general and MacArthur's chief of staff, had glibly referred to the Japanese coastal fortifications as hasty field entrenchments. The strength and combat effectiveness of the Japanese defenders was severely underestimated. Maps of the area were inaccurate and lacked detail. Aerial photos were not generally available to commanders in the field. Allied command had failed to make effective provision for supply of artillery or tanks, believing quite mistakenly that air support could replace them. Allied commanders in the field were unable to provide fire support capable of suppressing Japanese positions sufficient for infantry to close with and overwhelm them. Logistical limitations constrained efforts to make good these deficiencies. Scanty and inaccurate intelligence led MacArthur to believe that Buna could be taken with relative ease. MacArthur never visited the front during the campaign. He had no understanding of the conditions faced by his commanders and troops yet he continued to interfere and pressure them to achieve unrealistic results. Terrain and persistent pressure for haste meant that there was little if any time given for reconnaissance. MacArthur's pressure has been described as lengthening the battle and increasing the number of casualties. The combat effectiveness of US forces, particularly the US 32nd Division, has been severely criticised. A lack of training is most often cited in defence of their performance. Several historians have also commented on the lack of training afforded Australian militia units engaged in the battle although some had the benefit of a stiffening of experienced junior officers posted to them from the Australian Imperial Force. During the opening stages of the offensive, the Allies faced a severe shortage of food and ammunition. This problem was never entirely resolved. The battle also exposed critical problems with the suitability and performance of Allied equipment.
The battle started on the 16th of November when the Australian 7th Division crossed the Kumusi River about 40 miles from the beachheads. On the eve of the 19th of November, the 25th Brigade was advancing toward Gona along the track from Jumbora while the 16th Brigade was advancing toward Sanananda on the track from Soputa. The American 126th Regiment was placed under command of the 7th Division to protect its eastern flank. Attacks were launched on the 19th of November using the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 128th Infantry Regiment. On the same day, the 25th Brigade approaching Gona made contact with defended positions placed along its line of advance. The 16th Brigade approaching Sanananda made contact the following day. Up to that point there had been only limited and light contact with the Japanese defenders as the Australians approached the beachheads. It had been the same for the 32nd Division. This situation quickly changed as the attacking forces met with stiff resistance. Despite repeated attacks over the next two weeks the Allies made little progress and were faced with mounting casualties. The conditions were likened to a tropical vignette of the trench warfare conditions of the earlier war. By the 26th of November artillery support for the division had increased from the two mountain howitzers to include six 25-pounders. Warren Force was to concentrate its efforts against the eastern end of the New Strip. On the 22nd the III/128th was moved to there leaving a company to guard the Simemi Track. The front was adjusted with III/128th taking the right seaward flank. I/126th remained in the centre with the 2/6th Independent Company to the left. Here the coast ran south to north toward Cape Endaiadere so that the axis of advance toward the cape was north. The attack was preceded with strafing by P-40s and Beaufighters while A-20s bombed to the rear. Some fifty aircraft participated. This was followed by half an hour of artillery bombardment. The massed fire failed to suppress the Japanese position and the attack was met with heavy fire. The advance of the I/126th was misdirected opening a gap in the left flank. The I/126th was recalled to seal the flank. The attack ended without significant gain as Japanese aircraft from Lae strafed the Americans.
On the morning of the 20th of November the 16th Brigade having advanced from Soputa on the Sanananda track was approaching the vicinity of two track junctions that left the main track for Cape Killerton. The 2/1st Battalion in the lead came under small arms and artillery fire and the battalion deployed to the flanks. Two companies under Captain Basil Catterns were tasked to make a broad left-flanking manoeuvre around the Japanese positions astride the road. The remainder of the brigade adjusted itself in support. Catterns' force skirted the Japanese forward positions and attacked the main Japanese position astride the road as evening approached after about 6:00 pm. Catterns' force fought a desperate action through the night and the day of the 21st of November while the rest of the battalion pressed forward against Japanese positions that were threatened by Catterns' manoeuvre. The defenders fell back through the night and into the morning. By 8:30 a.m. on the 21st of November the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalion moved through the forward companies of the 2/1st. Catterns' force had made a small salient in the main Japanese defences. The 2/3rd pressed forward to relieve Catterns by the early evening taking position immediately to Catterns' rear while his force vacated the position it had been holding. In Catterns' initial force of 91 all ranks 5 officers and 26 other ranks had been killed and 2 officers and 34 other ranks had been wounded. The gun the forward positions immediately delaying the brigade's advance and a further defensive position in between were secured by this action. The Japanese positions were now just north of the first track junction but denied the use of this track to Cape Killerton. To either flank was thick jungle and swamp dispersed through the area were relatively open patches of kunai grass. One patch was immediately forward of the Japanese positions encountered by the 2/1st Battalion on the 20th of November. After long fighting along the Kokoda Track the effective strength of the Brigade had been reduced to less than the equivalent of a battalion.
On the 19th of November the 25th Brigade approached Gona Village on the track from Jumbora. Just south of the village the passage of a patrol of the 2/33rd through a large patch of kunai was being disputed by some Japanese riflemen. The 2/31st pushed through the kunai and then came under small arms fire from the direction of the village and deployed to the flanks. The Japanese defence was tenacious and running short of ammunition the battalion broke contact just before midnight. Having received supplies at Wariopa on the 13th of November the brigade was on the last of its emergency rations and required ammunition. Supplies arrived on the 21st of November and an attack was planned for the following day where the 2/33rd Battalion was to advance on the village. Lieutenant Haddy's 2/16th Chaforce Company was now under command of the 2/31st Battalion having taken up a position just west of the village and Gona Creek. As the 2/33rd Battalion advanced and met strong resistance the 2/31st Battalion worked around to the east to the beach and attacked on a narrow front confined by beach and swamp on either flank. At the forward Japanese positions it was repulsed by heavy enfilade fire. The 2/25th Battalion was to push through the 2/31st Battalion on the 23rd of November to renew the attack from the east. The battalion made a small gain before being held and was forced to withdraw. The village was bombed on the 24th of November and the 3rd Battalion attacked on the afternoon of the 25th of November from the southwest with mortars and artillery in support. After a small advance the battalion was held up by a Japanese defensive position. The Japanese at Gona had been aggressive in their defence. In the evening of the 26th of November the 2/33rd astride the main track was counterattacked by the defenders. By these events the offensive capacity of the 25th Brigade was exhausted. The brigade had fought the Japanese the length of the Kokoda Track. It had been reinforced by the 3rd Battalion and the three Chaforce companies. The four battalions totalled just over the strength of a battalion and the Chaforce companies about one-third of a battalion.
Allied losses in the battle were at a rate higher than that experienced at Guadalcanal. For the first time the American public was confronted with the images of dead American troops. There was widespread evidence of the Japanese defenders cannibalising the dead. The resolve and tenacity of the Japanese in defence was unprecedented and had not previously been encountered. It was to mark the desperate nature of fighting that characterised battles for the remainder of the Pacific War. For the Allies there were a number of valuable but costly lessons in the conduct of jungle warfare. Operations in Papua and New Guinea were severely hampered by terrain vegetation climate disease and the lack of infrastructure. These imposed significant logistical limitations. During the Kokoda Track campaign these factors applied more-or-less equally to both belligerents but favoured the defender in attacks against well-fortified positions. The battlefield and logistical constraints limited the applicability of conventional Allied doctrine of manoeuvre and firepower. About 1,200 sick and wounded were evacuated by sea from 13 to the 20th of January. On the 20th of January Yamagata ordered an evacuation and on the night of the 21st of January large sections of the force still remaining in the area began to break away in accordance with their orders. About 1,000 to 1,900 escaped overland to the west of Gona. The remaining garrison fought to the death almost to the man.
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Common questions
When did the Battle of Buna, Gona start and end?
The battle started on the 16th of November 1942 when the Australian 7th Division crossed the Kumusi River. The battle concluded on the 22nd of January 1943 when the Japanese garrison was virtually starved into submission.
Who commanded the Japanese forces during the Battle of Buna, Gona?
Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake led the Japanese 17th Army which was responsible for the Solomon Islands campaign while Lieutenant General Hatazō Adachi commanded the 18th Army responsible for operations on mainland New Guinea. General Hitoshi Imamura mobilised to take overall command from the 16th of November 1942 as head of the 8th Area Army based at Rabaul.
What were the primary causes of death among Allied soldiers in the Battle of Buna, Gona?
Malaria was the greatest disease threat with 85 to 95 percent of all Allied soldiers carrying the infection during the battle. Other tropical diseases such as dengue fever, scrub typhus, tropical ulcers, dysentery, and fungal infections were also common due to the humid conditions and lack of effective medicine.
How did supply shortages affect the outcome of the Battle of Buna, Gona?
Allied forces faced critical shortages of ammunition and rations until landing strips were developed to support engaging forces. The Japanese garrison ran out of food by early January 1943 when their rice ration dropped to 40 or 80 mL per day leading to starvation before the battle ended on the 22nd of January.
Why was the terrain so difficult for troops fighting in the Battle of Buna, Gona?
Rain turned tracks into mud while temperatures reached extreme levels with humidity hitting 82 percent creating oppressive conditions. Kunai grass trapped heat and the area contained thick jungle and swamp dispersed through relatively open patches that hindered movement and visibility.