Kokoda Track campaign
In early 1942, the Australian government and many citizens feared a Japanese invasion of their mainland. The entire 8th Division had been lost or rendered ineffective in Malaya, Ambon, Timor, and Rabaul following rapid Japanese advances. The Royal Australian Air Force lacked modern aircraft while the Royal Australian Navy was too small to counter the Imperial Japanese Navy. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill attempted to divert two brigades of the 6th Division to Burma but Australian Prime Minister John Curtin refused to authorize this movement. Instead, these brigades formed part of the garrison at Ceylon before returning to Australia in August 1942. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters considered invading Australia in early 1942 but decided against it in February that year as it was judged beyond Japanese capabilities. No planning or preparations were undertaken for such an invasion. In March 1942 the Japanese military adopted a strategy of isolating Australia from the United States by capturing Port Moresby, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. An attempt to capture Port Moresby by amphibious assault known as Operation Mo was thwarted by the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. A month later most of the Japanese carrier fleet was destroyed in the Battle of Midway further reducing the possibility of major amphibious operations in the South Pacific. Following these events the Japanese began to consider an overland advance on Port Moresby.
In 1942 Papua was a territory of Australia with little development and largely devoid of infrastructure beyond that around Port Moresby. There were no roads beyond the vicinity of Port Moresby and travel north was largely undertaken by air or sea. The Kokoda Track is a foot track running roughly southwest from Kokoda through the Owen Stanley Range towards Port Moresby. It reaches a height of 6,000 feet as it passes around the peak of Mount Bellamy. The terrain rises and falls regularly up to 3,000 feet up and down over the full length of the track. Vegetation is dense jungle while the climate is mostly hot and humid with high rainfall though higher parts are cold particularly at night. Operations in New Guinea were impacted by tropical diseases such as malaria dengue fever scrub typhus tropical ulcers dysentery and fungal infections. Walker observes that the Kokoda Track starts and ends with malaria. Malarial vectors were substantially absent from cooler higher elevations along the track where most cases observed were relapses rather than primary infections. Significant rates of disease were observed in troops mainly militia sent to New Guinea for defense of the port leading up to the campaign. The risk from malaria was particularly high for troops operating in coastal areas around the southern end of the track and when Australian forces had been forced back to Imita Ridge.
In the early evening of the 21st of July 1942 Japanese troops landed close to Gona. An infantry company was immediately dispatched towards Kokoda reaching the Kumusi River at Wairopi in the afternoon of the 23rd of July. B Company of the 39th Battalion assembled a force including what remained of the Papuan Infantry Battalion to make a stand near Oivi on the 26th of July. One platoon remained at Kokoda but threatened with encirclement the force withdrew south to Deniki. Having lost contact the platoon at Kokoda also withdrew to Deniki on the 27th of July. With the force reassembled it reoccupied the village unopposed on the 28th of July. The first battle at Kokoda was fought over 28, the 29th of July causing repeated determined attacks that led Australians to withdraw to Deniki. Owen commanding officer of the 39th Battalion was mortally wounded in the fighting. Remaining companies of the 39th Battalion arrived overland while Major Allan Cameron Brigade Major of the 30th Brigade assumed command of the force. He planned an attack for the 8th of August towards Kokoda with three companies advancing on different lines. Two of the companies were held up and forced to retire while A Company occupied Kokoda but isolated and under attack it withdrew during the night of the 9th of August. Companies of the 39th Battalion had withdrawn to Deniki by the 12th of August and were attacked the following morning. With threat of envelopment the battalion commenced withdrawal towards Isurava on the morning of the 14th of August.
Morris said to Lieutenant General Sydney Rowell on handing over command of New Guinea Force that mountains would beat the Japanese if they did not beat them themselves. Substantially devoid of infrastructure Morris set about expanding harbor and airfield facilities at Port Moresby. Opened in early October a T-shaped wharf constructed on Tatana Island more than doubled port capacity. Roads were virtually non-existent so Lieutenant Bert Kienzle was ordered to construct an overland road for resupply. Just over 50 miles of road was completed by end of September 1942 from McDonald's to Owers' Corner. A porter could carry load equivalent to 13 days rations yet if he carried rations for soldier between them they consumed load in 6½ days. This made no allowance for ammunition other necessary equipment or porter return trek to Kokoda which took 8 days. Operations could not be sustained without large scale air drops occurring. Aerial resupply commenced with drop sites at Kagi and Efogi but neither site was particularly suitable. Significant quantities fell outside drop zone and could not be recovered due to unreliable maps or poor visibility. Recognizing better drop zone needed Kienzle set out on the 1st of August to find large open area he recalled seeing from air. On the 3rd of August he identified smaller of two dry lake beds near crest of range which he called Myola.
Bullard reports that munitions of the 144th Regiment included eighteen medium machine guns three battalion infantry guns two rapid-fire guns and two regimental artillery guns. The mountain artillery battalion deployed with three companies servicing a gun each while leaving one gun in reserve at Buna. The 44th Regiment deployed with thirteen medium machine guns three battalion guns one regimental gun and one rapid-fire gun. Anderson indicates regimental and mountain artillery battalion guns were 75 mm Type 41 while infantry guns were 70 mm Type 92. Australian brigade structure included regiment of artillery consisting of two batteries each equipped with twelve Ordnance QF 25-pounder guns. These had range of 11,000 yards but weighed 2,600 pounds and were not intended broken down into pack loads. As Japanese advance threatened Imita Ridge 14th Field Regiment less one battery deployed to near head of track to defend against break-out by Japanese into more open country. Two guns hauled to Owers' Corner by caterpillar tractor. On the 20th of September they shelled Japanese positions at Ioribaiwa from range of 3,000 yards. Third gun stripped down and manhandled forward taking 50 men five days to move it just through mountainous jungle terrain.
MacArthur arrived in Australia on the 17th of March 1942 appointed Supreme Commander Allied Forces South West Pacific Area. Blamey recalled from Middle East arriving Australia on the 23rd of March 1942 subsequently appointed commander-in-chief Australian Army and simultaneously held position commander allied land forces SWPA. Papua and New Guinea formed Australian 8th Military District under command of Morris promoted major general on the 9th of April 1942. Rowell arrived from Australia with HQ I Corps taking command force on the 12th of August 1942. Both Blamey's Allied Land Headquarters and MacArthur's General Headquarters increasingly alarmed by situation on track with Australian forces suffering series reversals and by Japanese landings at Milne Bay fought the 25th of August to the 7th of September 1942. Vasey then Blamey deputy chief general staff wrote privately to Rowell on the 1st of September that GHQ like bloody barometer cyclone up and down every two minutes. MacArthur also had poor opinion Australian troops no real appreciation conditions under which fighting New Guinea conducted. On the 6th of September MacArthur wrote to General George Marshall stating Australians proven unable match enemy jungle fighting aggressive leadership lacking. Jones observes attitude Australians poor fighters pervaded thinking at MacArthur headquarters.
The Australian advance commenced with attack the 28th of September against abandoned Japanese positions on Ioribaiwa Ridge. The 16th Brigade commenced advancing forward on the 3rd of October. Allen advanced his headquarters to Menari by the 11th of October while 25th Brigade advanced on two tracks from Efogi toward Templeton's Crossing. He mindful need keep troops fresh enough fight supply problems imposed operations over track. There already difficulties air drops meeting division needs expressed Herring on the 7th of October including need create reserve over above daily needs. As consequence supply program intensified. On the 5th of October Blamey wrote MacArthur hard terms logistical difficulties faced NGF specifically Allen. Despite this Blamey and MacArthur pressured Allen increase rate advance forcing issue only arranging supplies dropped Myola effectively forcing Allen advance meet point supply. Anderson discusses identifies extremely risky strategy. Blamey and Herring wanted Allen maintain pressure retreating Japanese push home advantage. Dropping supplies forward maintains momentum advance but quickly breaks down if advance stalled limited reserves. Position Blamey premised proposition Japanese enemy retreat. In fact they made clean break Ioriabiawa established defenses blocking Allen progress. By the 16th of November two brigades Australian 7th Division crossed Kumusi River Wairopi advanced Japanese beachheads joint Australian United States operation. Japanese forces Buna, Gona held out until the 22nd of January 1943.
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Common questions
When did the Japanese troops land near Gona during the Kokoda Track campaign?
Japanese troops landed close to Gona in the early evening of the 21st of July 1942. This landing initiated the ground advance that led to the subsequent battles along the Kokoda Track.
What was the purpose of Operation Mo in the Pacific War of World War II?
Operation Mo was an attempt by Japan to capture Port Moresby through amphibious assault. The operation failed after being thwarted by the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942.
How many days did it take to move a single artillery gun forward through the mountainous jungle terrain of the Owen Stanley Range?
It took five days for fifty men to manhandle a single artillery gun forward through the dense jungle and mountainous terrain. This difficult movement occurred as part of the defense efforts against the Japanese advance on Imita Ridge.
Who commanded the Australian forces at Kokoda when Major Allan Cameron assumed command of the force?
Owen served as the commanding officer of the 39th Battalion until he was mortally wounded during the fighting. Major Allan Cameron then assumed command of the force after Owen's death.
When did the Japanese hold out at Buna and Gona before falling to Allied forces?
Japanese forces holding Buna and Gona held out until the 22nd of January 1943. This resistance ended following a joint Australian United States operation that crossed the Kumusi River by the 16th of November 1942.