Battle of the Coral Sea

• 1. Introduction

  ›

  The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought from the 4th to the 8th of May 1942, stands apart from every naval engagement that preceded it. The opposing fleets never sighted each other. Neither side fired a gun directly at the other. All the fighting was done by aircraft launched from carriers, attacking targets far over the horizon. It was the first time in history that two navies battled each other entirely through carrier-based air power.

  At stake was Port Moresby, a harbor town on the southern coast of New Guinea. If Japan captured it, the entire northern coast of Australia would come within range of Japanese land-based bombers. The Americans knew the attack was coming. Their codebreakers had broken enough of Japan's naval cipher to know the target, the plan, and the approximate date.

  What no one could predict was how those five days would unfold. The commanders on both sides would find themselves operating with incomplete information, at ranges no naval officer had ever had to manage before. By the time the two fleets disengaged, the Pacific War had shifted in ways neither commander yet fully understood.

• 2. The Japanese Plan

  ›

  In April 1942, Japan's army and navy finalized Operation MO, a plan to invade Port Moresby from the sea. The target date for the landing was the 10th of May. A preliminary assault on Tulagi, in the southeastern Solomon Islands, was set for the 2nd and the 3rd of May. There the navy would establish a seaplane base for reconnaissance throughout the South Pacific.

  Rear Admiral Kōsō Abe commanded the invasion fleet, which comprised 11 transport ships. They carried about 5,000 soldiers from the South Seas Detachment and about 500 troops from the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force. The fleet departed Rabaul on the 4th of May for the 840 nautical mile trip to Port Moresby. Proceeding at 8 knots, the ships planned to pass through the Jomard Channel in the Louisiades. Escorting them was Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka's attack force, built around one light cruiser and six destroyers.

  The fleet carriers Zuikaku and Shōkaku sortied from Truk on the 1st of May. Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi commanded the carrier strike force, with his flag aboard a cruiser rather than a carrier. Tactical control of the carrier air forces rested with Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara, stationed aboard Zuikaku. Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue directed the entire MO operation from a cruiser at Rabaul, having arrived there from Truk on the 4th of May. With the battle scene hundreds of miles to the south, Inoue would struggle to give timely orders during the fighting.

  Even before MO was complete, Japan was planning further steps. Operation RY, targeting Nauru and Ocean Island for their phosphate deposits, was scheduled to begin on the 15th of May. Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia were to follow in Operation FS.

• 3. The Intelligence Advantage

  ›

  By March 1942, U.S. Navy codebreakers had penetrated up to 15% of Japan's main naval cipher, which the Americans designated JN-25B. By the end of April, they were reading up to 85% of signals transmitted in that code. On the 5th of April, an intercepted message directed a Japanese carrier and other large warships toward Inoue's operational area. On the 13th of April, British codebreakers deciphered a message revealing that Japan's Fifth Carrier Division was already en route from Formosa via Truk, with Port Moresby as the likely target.

  Admiral Chester W. Nimitz decided to send all four of the Pacific Fleet's available carriers to the Coral Sea. Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher commanded Task Force 17 and was already in the South Pacific, having departed Tongatabu on the 27th of April. Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch led Task Force 11, positioned between Fiji and New Caledonia. Task Force 44, a joint Australia-U.S. warship force, was en route from Sydney and Nouméa under Australian Rear Admiral John Crace. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey's Task Force 16 had just returned from the Doolittle Raid and departed Pearl Harbor immediately, but it would not arrive in time to fight.

  The Japanese, meanwhile, had drawn false confidence from American radio signals. Un-encrypted traffic from TF 16 as it returned to Pearl Harbor led Tokyo to conclude that almost all U.S. carriers were in the central Pacific. The Japanese did not know where the remaining carrier was. They did not expect any carrier response to Operation MO until the operation was already well underway.

  On the 4th of May, Fletcher sent 60 aircraft against Japanese forces at Tulagi in three strikes, sinking a destroyer and three minesweepers. Word reached Takagi, who was refueling 350 nautical miles north of Tulagi. He turned southeast to hunt the American carriers and sent scouts to search east of the Solomons. Fletcher's ships were not there. The two fleets moved toward each other, neither knowing exactly where the other was.

• 4. The Confusion of 7 May

  ›

  In 1972, Vice Admiral H. S. Duckworth reviewed Japanese records of the battle. He called the 7th of May 1942 in the Coral Sea "the most confused battle area in world history." Both fleets launched massive airstrikes that morning and both sides attacked the wrong targets.

  From Shōkaku, a scout plane at 07:22 reported enemy ships 163 nautical miles away: one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers. Rear Admiral Hara, convinced he had located the U.S. carriers, ordered all available aircraft to launch. Seventy-eight planes took off by 08:15: 18 Zero fighters, 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers, and 24 torpedo aircraft. Lieutenant Commander Kakuichi Takahashi led the overall strike; Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki commanded the torpedo bombers. The planes' actual targets were not carriers. They were the oiler Neosho and the destroyer Sims.

  Thirty-six Japanese dive bombers found and attacked the two ships. Sims took three bomb hits, broke in half, and sank immediately, killing all but 14 of her 192-man crew. Neosho absorbed seven bomb hits plus a crashing dive bomber and was left drifting without power. Takahashi's strike had wasted Japan's entire morning air effort on a fuel ship and an escort.

  The American side made a comparable error. At 08:15, a Yorktown SBD piloted by John L. Nielsen sighted Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō's cruisers screening the invasion convoy. Nielsen made a coding error, describing the sighting as "two carriers and four heavy cruisers." Fletcher launched 93 aircraft: 18 Grumman F4F Wildcats, 53 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers, and 22 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers. The American pilots found the light carrier Shōhō, not Japan's main carrier force.

  Shōhō had only four Zeros and two older A5M fighters flying combat air patrol when the Americans arrived. Her remaining aircraft were being readied below decks. Lexington's air group, led by Commander William B. Ault, struck first with two 1,000 lb bombs and five torpedoes. Yorktown's group added up to 11 more 1,000 lb bombs and at least two torpedoes. Shōhō sank at 11:35, with only 203 of her 834-man crew recovered. Lexington SBD pilot Robert E. Dixon radioed back: "Scratch one flat top! Signed Bob."

  Rear Admiral Hara later spoke with Admiral Matome Ugaki, Yamamoto's chief of staff. He confided that the "poor luck" of that day had made him want to quit the navy.

• 5. The Carrier Duel

  ›

  At 06:35 on the 8th of May, TF 17 launched 18 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers to search in a full 360-degree arc out to 200 nautical miles. The skies over the U.S. carriers were mostly clear, with 17 nautical miles of visibility. Over the Japanese carriers, a warm front had moved in overnight, limiting visibility to between 2 and 15 nautical miles.

  At 08:20, a Lexington SBD piloted by Joseph G. Smith spotted the Japanese carriers through a gap in the clouds. Two minutes later, a Shōkaku search plane commanded by Kenzō Kanno found TF 17. The two forces were about 210 nautical miles apart. Both sides raced to put every available aircraft in the air.

  At 09:15, the Japanese carriers launched a combined strike: 18 fighters, 33 dive bombers, and 18 torpedo planes, all under Takahashi's command. Yorktown's strike group of 6 fighters, 24 dive bombers, and 9 torpedo planes was airborne by 09:15. Lexington's group of 9 fighters, 15 dive bombers, and 12 torpedo planes launched at 09:25.

  Yorktown's dive bombers, led by William O. Burch, reached the Japanese carriers at 10:32. Shōkaku and Zuikaku were about 10,000 yards apart, with Zuikaku hidden under a rain squall. Sixteen CAP Zero fighters protected both carriers. Attacking Shōkaku at 10:57, the Yorktown bombers scored two 1,000 lb bomb hits, tearing open her forecastle and wrecking her flight deck. Lexington's aircraft arrived at 11:30 and added one more 1,000 lb bomb to Shōkaku's damage. Shōkaku had 223 of her crew killed or wounded. Her gasoline storage tanks had exploded and her engine repair workshop was destroyed. Her captain, Takatsugu Jōjima, asked Takagi for permission to leave the battle. At 12:10, Shōkaku retired to the northeast with two destroyers.

  Lieutenant Commander Shimazaki sent 14 of his torpedo planes against Lexington and 4 against Yorktown. The attack began at 11:13. The four planes targeting Yorktown all missed. Shimazaki's remaining planes used a pincer attack on Lexington, whose wide turning radius made her hard to maneuver. At 11:20, two Type 91 torpedoes struck the carrier. One buckled her port aviation gasoline tanks, letting undetected fumes spread through surrounding compartments. The other ruptured her port water main, forcing three forward firerooms offline. The ship could still make 24 knots.

  At 11:27, a single 250 kg semi-armour-piercing bomb struck Yorktown in the center of her flight deck. The bomb penetrated four decks before exploding, killing or seriously wounding 66 men. Damage control parties had Lexington's fires apparently contained by 12:33. Then, at 12:47, sparks from unattended electric motors ignited the gasoline fumes that had spread through the ship. The resulting explosion killed 25 men and started a large fire. Two more explosions followed, at around 14:42 and again at 15:25. By 15:38, the fires were uncontrollable. Lexington's crew began abandoning ship at 17:07. Admiral Fitch and the ship's captain, Frederick C. Sherman, were among those rescued. At 19:15, the destroyer Phelps fired five torpedoes into the burning carrier. Lexington sank in 2,400 fathoms at 19:52. Of her 2,951-man crew, 216 went down with the ship.

  During the return flight, both Kenzō Kanno and Kakuichi Takahashi were shot down and killed.

• 6. Tactical Win, Strategic Loss

  ›

  The Americans lost about 41,826 long tons of shipping to Japanese attacks. The Japanese lost about 19,000 long tons. Japan had sunk a U.S. fleet carrier, a destroyer, and an oiler. The Americans had sunk only a Japanese light carrier and a destroyer. Lexington alone represented 25% of U.S. carrier strength in the Pacific at that time.

  Port Moresby remained in Allied hands. The invasion fleet turned back without achieving its objective. This was the first time since the start of the Pacific War that a major Japanese advance had been halted before reaching its goal. The morale lift for the Allies, who had absorbed loss after loss since the 7th of December 1941, was real.

  Both sides told distorted accounts to their publics. American press releases claimed Japan had lost between 18 and 37 ships. Japan announced a great victory. The American overstatement had an unintended consequence: the press grew skeptical of U.S. Navy battle reporting. When Midway came, coverage of U.S. Navy claims was treated with more caution.

  Japan could no longer reach Port Moresby by sea. Beginning on the 21st of July, Japanese troops set out along the Kokoda Track from Buna and Gona. Allied reinforcements, starting with the Australian 14th Brigade that embarked at Townsville on the 15th of May, slowed and then halted the Japanese advance. By September 1942, the offensive had been turned back.

  In July, the Allies learned Japan had begun building an airfield on Guadalcanal. On the 7th of August 1942-11,000 United States Marines landed on Guadalcanal. Another 3,000 landed on Tulagi and nearby islands the same day.

• 7. The Road to Midway

  ›

  Shōkaku reached the port of Kure, Japan, on the 17th of May, nearly capsizing in a storm because of her battle damage. Japan's Naval General Staff estimated repairing her would take two to three months. Zuikaku arrived at Kure on the 21st of May. Neither carrier would be ready for Yamamoto's planned engagement near Midway Atoll.

  Zuikaku was undamaged, but she had lost a large number of aircraft in the battle. The Japanese apparently did not consider combining surviving Shōkaku aircrews with Zuikaku's depleted air group. No effort was made to rush replacement aircraft to her before Midway. She was simply left out of the operation.

  Nimitz gave the Pearl Harbor shipyard exactly three days to prepare Yorktown for battle. The repair had been estimated to take 90 days. Only the most critical work was completed. Yorktown left Pearl Harbor with three of her boilers inoperative and a top speed of 27 knots. To replace her aircraft losses from the Coral Sea, the U.S. placed Saratoga's torpedo, dive bomber, and fighter squadrons aboard her. Yorktown went into Midway with a mixed air group from two different carriers.

  At Midway, Yorktown's aircraft played crucial roles in the Allied victory. Her planes helped Enterprise's aircraft sink Hiryū. She absorbed both Japanese aerial counterattacks at Midway, sparing Enterprise and Hornet from further damage. Japan lost four fleet carriers at Midway. Because of U.S. industrial strength, Japan could never regain numerical superiority in carriers after that defeat.

  Historians H. P. Willmott, Jonathan Parshall, and Anthony Tully argued that Yamamoto made a critical error in committing fleet carriers to Operation MO. If Midway was to be the decisive battle, no important assets should have been diverted to a secondary operation. The Coral Sea also gave Yamamoto two warnings he failed to heed. The first: that the U.S. had somehow anticipated Japanese plans with remarkable precision. The second: that American carrier aircrews could inflict serious damage on Japanese forces. Both warnings repeated themselves at Midway.

  Parshall and Tully offered a final assessment. In their words, the Coral Sea "had provided the first hints that the Japanese high-water mark had been reached." Midway, they wrote, "put up the sign for all to see."