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— CH. 1 · ORIGINS AND TERMINOLOGY —

Putinism

~4 min read · Ch. 1 of 6
6 sections
  • The phrase Putinism first appeared in print on the 11th of January 2000. Andrei Piontkovsky published an article titled Putinism in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya and posted it to the Yabloko website that same day. He defined the term as the highest stage of bandit capitalism in Russia. Piontkovsky argued that this system discards democratic freedoms and human rights while consolidating power through hatred against specific ethnic groups. The article described a war for national consolidation built on brainwashing and isolation from the outside world. This initial characterization framed the political landscape not as democracy but as a form of organized theft disguised as statecraft.

  • A sociological investigation conducted by Olga Kryshtanovskaya in 2004 revealed the extent of security service dominance within the Russian elite. Her data showed that siloviks comprised 25 percent of the entire political elite at that time. Within Vladimir Putin's inner circle of roughly twenty people, the proportion rose sharply to 58 percent. These individuals came from twenty-two governmental enforcement agencies including the Federal Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The process of their ascent allegedly began during Boris Yeltsin's second term in 1996 when the elite sought to restore order. By 2004, estimates suggested that 77 percent of those holding power had worked in structures affiliated with the former KGB or its successor agency. This concentration created an intelligence state where one FSB officer existed for every 297 citizens compared to one per 428 citizens in the Soviet era.

  • Following a referendum, Vladimir Putin signed an executive order on the 3rd of July 2020 to insert amendments into the Russian Constitution. These changes took effect officially on the 4th of July 2020. Political scientists like Vladimir Pastukhov argued these amendments transformed Russia toward totalitarianism by seizing control over public and private life. The legal framework removed term limits for the presidency and criminalized opposition activities through incremental steps. Alexander Podrabinek described this as a steady process of de facto criminalizing any dissent within the country. The amendments allowed the president to run for two additional terms after resetting his tenure clock. This shift centralized authority while weakening the separation of powers between branches of government.

  • State ideology under Putin fused nationalist imperialism with conservative Orthodoxy and authoritarian elements reminiscent of Stalinism. Politologist Irina Pavlova noted that Chekists held political objectives to transform Moscow into the Third Rome. In February 2021, Putin linked his personal thought to Lev Gumilyov's theory of passionarity which describes the rise and fall of societies. He claimed Russia had not yet attained its highest point due to an infinite genetic code. The regime promoted Orthodox Christianity against liberal cosmopolitanism while supporting anti-liberal hard right authoritarians abroad. This ideological blend included Eurasianism which posits that Russian civilization belongs to neither Europe nor Asia but stands alone. Anti-American sentiment became the basis for official patriotism following the Russo-Georgian War in 2008.

  • Vladimir Putin has frequently used historical narratives to justify current policies regarding national identity and territorial integrity. In November 2023 he stated that the Mongol-Tatar yoke was better for the Russian people than Western domination. He argued that Alexander Nevsky received permission from Tatar khans to resist invasion of the West effectively. On the 9th of June 2022, marking the 350th anniversary of Peter the Great's birth, Putin described conquered lands as being returned to Russia. He blamed Mikhail Gorbachev and Vladimir Lenin for the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 calling it a major geopolitical disaster. In his 2022 address concerning Ukraine he referred to modern Ukraine as entirely created by Bolshevik Communist Russia. These statements framed the collapse of the USSR as a tragedy rather than liberation for former republics.

  • Putinism has garnered support from far-right movements across Europe and America while forming alliances with anti-Western regimes. Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini maintained links with the Kremlin before some populists distanced themselves after the invasion of Ukraine. The regime established diplomatic relationships with China and Iran based on shared anti-American sentiments. Richard Shorten noted that Putin appealed to mainstream western reactionaries attracted by unapologetic social conservatism. Jason Stanley argued that Putin viewed himself as the global leader of Christian nationalism. However, figures like Sahra Wagenknecht later reversed their stance following the large-scale invasion launched on the 24th of February 2022. The Slovak political party Smer continued to express Russophilic stances despite international sanctions.

Common questions

When did the phrase Putinism first appear in print?

The phrase Putinism first appeared in print on the 11th of January 2000. Andrei Piontkovsky published an article titled Putinism in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya and posted it to the Yabloko website that same day.

What percentage of Vladimir Putin's inner circle were siloviks according to Olga Kryshtanovskaya's 2004 investigation?

Siloviks comprised 58 percent of Vladimir Putin's inner circle of roughly twenty people during the 2004 sociological investigation by Olga Kryshtanovskaya. These individuals came from twenty-two governmental enforcement agencies including the Federal Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

On what date did Vladimir Putin sign the executive order inserting amendments into the Russian Constitution?

Vladimir Putin signed an executive order on the 3rd of July 2020 to insert amendments into the Russian Constitution. These changes took effect officially on the 4th of July 2020 after a referendum.

Which theory did Vladimir Putin link his personal thought to in February 2021?

In February 2021, Vladimir Putin linked his personal thought to Lev Gumilyov's theory of passionarity which describes the rise and fall of societies. He claimed Russia had not yet attained its highest point due to an infinite genetic code.

When did Vladimir Putin state that the Mongol-Tatar yoke was better for the Russian people than Western domination?

Vladimir Putin stated that the Mongol-Tatar yoke was better for the Russian people than Western domination in November 2023. This statement justified current policies regarding national identity and territorial integrity.

All sources

168 references cited across the entry

  1. 4webRegression in RussiaArnold Beichman — 14 February 2007
  2. 10webBlood and Iron: How Nationalist Imperialism Became Russia's State IdeologyAndrei Kolesnikov — Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center — December 2023
  3. 11bookВыборы на фоне Крыма: электоральный цикл 2016-2018 гг. и перспективы политического транзитаValeriy Fedorov et al. — ВЦИОМ — 2018
  4. 12magazineПутинизм как высшая и заключительная стадия бандитского капитализма в РоссииAndrey Piontkovsky — 11 January 2000
  5. 23newsThe Making of Vladimir PutinCohen, Roger — 26 March 2022
  6. 30bookAryan Unconscious: Archetype of Discrimination, History & PoliticsLukasz Andrzej Glinka — Cambridge International Science Publishing — 2014
  7. 32newsCountering Russian Aggression Debate, House of CommonsDavid Lammy — 23 February 2022
  8. 34webДесять признаков путинизмаБорис Лазаревич Вишневский — 6 January 2017
  9. 37webPutinismLeon Aron — American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research — 8 May 2008
  10. 40newsThe Hard-Line Russian Advisers Who Have Putin's EarAnton Troianovski — 30 January 2022
  11. 56webPutin: The Rule of the Family Masha GessenMasha Gessen — 14 March 2016
  12. 57newsPutin's fight against corruption resembles matryoshka dollPavel K. Baev — The Jamestown Foundation — 22 May 2006
  13. 58newsPutin Isn't Just an Autocrat. He's Something WorseAlexander Motyl — 14 March 2022
  14. 59journalThe End of the Russian IdeaAndrei Kolesnikov — August 2023
  15. 65newsPutin's Thousand-Year War12 March 2022
  16. 76webPutin's PhilosophyThe American Conservative — 28 March 2012
  17. 77webIvan Ilyin, Putin's Philosopher of Russian FascismThe New York Review of Books — 5 April 2018
  18. 84newsIn Russia, nationalists turn on PutinThomas Grove — 1 December 2011
  19. 86newsPutin Says West Aiming to Tear Apart RussiaVoice of America — 25 December 2022
  20. 98webPutin's Anti-Bolshevik Fantasies Could Be His DownfallMario Kessler — 26 February 2022
  21. 99newsBack to the USSRAmelia Gentleman — 29 May 2000
  22. 100webRegression in Russia10 February 2009
  23. 104bookRussia—Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin LegaciesLilia Shevtsova — Carnegie Endowment — 2007
  24. 106newsThe Russians Love Their Children, TooPamela Druckerman — 8 May 2014
  25. 108newsRussian Deputies Restore Soviet National Anthem (Published 2000)Patrick E. Tyler — 9 December 2000
  26. 118newsAdam Zivo: The sad truth about socialist 'anti-imperialists' who defend PutinAdam Zivo — National Post — 17 September 2023
  27. 121bookLa France russe: enquête sur les réseaux de PoutineNicolas Hénin — Fayard — 2016
  28. 128webMélenchon: "Je deviens central"Le JDD — 16 October 2016
  29. 157journalNationalism and legitimation for authoritarianism: A comparison of Nicholas I and Vladimir PutinSean Cannady et al. — 1 January 2014
  30. 164webBlame It on Lenin: What Putin Gets Wrong About UkraineMark N. Katz — 24 February 2022