Morocco 2026 FIFA World Cup bid

• 1. Introduction

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  The Morocco 2026 FIFA World Cup bid came down to a scorecard. FIFA's evaluation committee gave Morocco's proposal 275 points out of a possible 500. It gave the rival bid, a joint effort from Canada, Mexico, and the United States called United 2026, 402 points. Morocco lost, and the 2026 tournament went to North America instead. What made that gap so wide? Was it the stadiums, the roads meant to connect them, or the hotel rooms promised for visitors? Or was it something else entirely that worried FIFA's inspectors? And once this bid collapsed, what came next for a country that wanted so badly to host the World Cup?

• 2. A Fifth Attempt

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  In 1994, 1998, 2006, and 2010, Morocco entered the race to host the World Cup and lost each time. It fell first to the United States, then France, then Germany, then South Africa. A win in 2026 would have made Morocco only the second African country to host the tournament, following South Africa's turn in 2010.

  The 2015 FIFA corruption case, and the resignation of president Sepp Blatter that followed, delayed the entire process before Morocco could even begin its campaign. The process did not restart until the FIFA Council met on the 10th of May 2016. That meeting laid out four phases. A strategy and consultation phase ran to May 2017. An enhanced preparation phase followed to December 2017. Evaluation ran from March to June 2018, ending in a final decision that same month.

  By April 2017, no rival bid had emerged, so the three CONCACAF federations asked FIFA to skip the rest of the process. They wanted the tournament awarded directly at the June 2018 Congress in Moscow. FIFA's Council refused on the 8th of May 2017, insisting on a full bidding procedure instead. To keep hosting duties rotating between confederations, only members of CAF, CONCACAF, CONMEBOL, and the OFC could enter. None of those four confederations had hosted either of the previous two tournaments. FIFA set the 11th of August 2017 as the deadline to declare interest. The Royal Moroccan Football Federation used that exact day to announce its bid.

  With that declaration filed, Morocco had less than a year to convince FIFA it could deliver stadiums, roads, and hotels that did not yet exist.

• 3. Building For 2026

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  Morocco hosted the Africa Cup of Nations back in 1988, long before its 2026 ambitions took shape. The country went on to host the African Youth Championship in 1997, and the CAF Under-23 Championship in 2011. It added the African Under-17 Championship in 2013 and the African Nations Championship in 2018. The FIFA Club World Cup came to Morocco three times, in 2013, 2014, and 2022.

  On the 10th of January 2018, King Mohammed VI named Moulay Hafid Elalamy chairman of the bid committee. Two days later, the bid brought in VERO Communications, a London-based agency, to run its communications and strategy.

  In March 2018, the bid committee said it would spend $16 billion preparing the country to host, spread across four areas. Transportation was to gain new rail connections, roads, highways, and airport terminals. Healthcare was to add about 21 new hospitals. Tourism was to gain a wave of new hotels and leisure facilities. Sport was to see roughly 130 stadiums built or renovated, up from the 38 stadiums Morocco already had with room for 10,000 or more spectators.

  Turning those four categories into finished stadiums meant choosing exactly which cities would host, and how big each new ground needed to be.

• 4. Twelve Cities One Cup

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  On the 22nd of August 2017, Morocco published its official list of candidate stadiums, each held to strict FIFA benchmarks. Every venue needed room for a 1900 square meter hospitality village within 150 meters of the stadium. Capacity requirements ranged from 40,000 for group and second-round matches, to 60,000 for the semi-finals, and 80,000 for the opening match and the final.

  Casablanca and Marrakesh, grouped together in the venue plan, were set to hold four grounds. A planned Grand Stade de Casablanca was designed for 93,000 fans. A second planned stadium in the cluster held 46,000. Marrakesh Stadium, slated for renovation, was to expand from 45,250 seats to 69,565 for tournament matches. A planned Stade Mohammed V rounded out the group at 46,000.

  Rabat's Prince Moulay Abdellah Stadium, already holding 52,000, was slated for renovation down to a tournament capacity of 46,500. Agadir's Adrar Stadium, holding 45,480, was to grow slightly to 46,048 for the World Cup. Tangier's Ibn Batouta Stadium would expand the most, from 45,000 to 65,000. Fez Stadium, with a current capacity of 45,000, was to reach 46,092 after renovation.

  Tétouan's planned Stade de Tétouan, which would have held 55,000, was later cancelled. Stade d'Oujda, with capacity for 45,600, only reached the stage of construction starting. Four more cities, Meknes, Nador, El Jadida, and Ouarzazate, were each pencilled in for a new modular stadium holding 46,000.

  Every one of the proposed host cities already ran its own taxi fleet and bus network. Trams were running or expanding in Rabat-Salé and Casablanca, with new lines planned for Tangier, Marrakesh, Fez, and Agadir. Casablanca had also floated a metro system, though those plans were shelved. A regional express rail network was already operating and growing in Rabat-Salé and Casablanca. A separate national highway network already linked most of the country's large cities.

  Long-distance rail already reached every proposed host city except Tétouan, Ouarzazate, and Agadir. Organizers had plans to link Agadir to the high-speed TGV network through Marrakesh, and to connect Tétouan to the conventional line through Tangier. Every selected city had its own airport except El Jadida and Meknes. Mohamed V International Airport in Casablanca served as the bid's main gateway for international travelers.

  That single hub in Casablanca would later become one of the reasons FIFA's own inspectors grew uneasy about the bid.

• 5. The Case For Morocco

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  The Confederation of African Football backed Morocco's bid from within CAF. Formal support also came from a long list of FIFA member federations. They included Algeria, Angola, Belgium, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo DR, Egypt, France, and Gambia. Also supporting were Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Luxembourg, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Palestine. Qatar, Russia, Seychelles, Senegal, Serbia, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia rounded out the list.

  A survey commissioned by the bid committee found 97% of Moroccans in favour of hosting, with 81% describing their support as strong. The same survey found 93% expecting a positive impact on the economy and jobs. It found 91% expecting benefits for sports participation, and 95% saying they were interested in playing football themselves.

  In January 2018, the Moroccan government declared its full backing for the bid. The bid's logo, unveiled on the 23rd of January 2018, took its five-pointed star from the pentagram on the Moroccan flag. Seven red leaves wrapped around it, framing a kicking footballer. Its slogan, 'Together for One Goal,' followed on the 17th of March 2018.

  That polished public face masked a bid book that FIFA's own evaluators were about to tear apart.

• 6. A High-Risk Bid

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  Transportation scored 2.1 out of 5, the lowest mark of any section in Morocco's bid. FIFA rated the overall bid high risk, its rival low risk, singling out stadiums, accommodation, and transportation as the three weakest categories. Evaluators pointed to the country's dependence on one main airport for international arrivals, along with gaps in transport links between cities and stadiums.

  That spending pledge amounted to some 16% of the country's entire economic output, a $100 billion economy, compared with just 6% earmarked for public health. Rising hosting costs paired with cuts to social spending had already fueled protests during the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. Morocco's plan also included no legacy strategy for its newly built stadiums once the tournament ended. The rival bid, by contrast, relied entirely on existing venues and required no new government debt.

  When Morocco's football federation announced its bid in August 2017, the announcement itself ran to just two sentences. FIFA later found the bid book so lacking that it made a second, unscheduled visit to the country. Officials said they were not satisfied with what had been submitted. Morocco's bid leader acknowledged it had to improve the quality of the submission made to FIFA in March 2018 because inadequacies were identified. Committee chairman Moulay Hafid Elalamy said plainly that organizers needed to 'improve the quality of our bid book.'

  FIFA's evaluators also raised doubts about the stadiums themselves, noting what they called 'deviations from the initial planned program.' They also flagged concerns about the quality of proposed training grounds, saying Morocco's venues needed extensive modernization to match the rival bid's standard. FIFA further criticized the bid for including potential 'white elephants,' expensive stadiums whose maintenance costs would outweigh their future use. The rival bid, unlike Morocco's, needed no new tournament-specific construction, relying only on venues already used by professional teams. FIFA explained its scoring system was built to avoid unsustainable bids, judging 'how meaningful and sustainable is the infrastructure presented.' Morocco's own bid committee conceded it could not have hosted the tournament immediately, unlike its rival. Morocco's revenue projections added to the case against it: organizers forecast $785 million, less than half of the rival's projected $1.8 billion. FIFA president Gianni Infantino later cited that gap as the main reason he favored the rival bid.

  Money and stadium quality were only part of FIFA's worry list. Its evaluators also had to weigh whether Morocco's cities, and the region around them, were safe enough to fill with fans.

• 7. Integrity Security And Rights

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  Investigators found that in two of Morocco's earlier bids, the country's own stakeholders had tried to bribe voting officials. FIFA issued a formal integrity warning to the Moroccan bid in January 2018. FIFA secretary general Fatma Samoura also wrote to voters directly. She warned them to 'not accept any technical or development support which may unduly affect the integrity of the bidding procedure.' Bid officials had at one point discussed a formal arrangement with the Confederation of African Football. It would have funded training camps and other development programs across the continent. Samoura herself was later referred to FIFA's ethics committee. Officials found she had family ties to El Hadji Diouf, one of the bid's ambassadors. That connection prompted a complaint alleging a conflict of interest.

  Morocco sits in a North African region that had already suffered political instability and terrorist attacks in neighbouring Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. In 2011, a bombing in Marrakesh, one of the bid's proposed host cities, killed 17 people at Jemaa el-Fnaa Square. That same square had been earmarked as the bid's planned fan site.

  FIFA rated the bid a medium risk for human rights and labour standards. Inspectors visiting the country found stray dogs killed by gunshot during their visit. Morocco's bid book never mentioned that homosexuality is illegal there, nor did it lay out any plan to protect LGBT athletes or fans. FIFA's own guidelines require host countries to guarantee freedom from discrimination of any kind. Ahmed El Haij, president of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights, told the Associated Press that LGBT visitors 'will face a lot of discrimination.' He added that neither the state nor society would prevent it.

  Morocco's own bid book acknowledged a problem with 'ultra' fan groups, known for violent behaviour. In February 2018, that risk became visible: 65 people were arrested and a stadium in Marrakesh was vandalised. Hotel capacity worried FIFA too. Morocco would need to invest $3.2 billion and add roughly 30,000 rooms to accommodate visitors. Its accommodation plans were rated high risk, versus a low-risk rating for the rival bid.

  South Africa withheld its support for Morocco's bid, citing relations strained since 2004 by the Western Sahara conflict. Namibia ruled out backing Morocco too, declaring it 'will never support nor align itself with a coloniser.'

  FIFA's decision would arrive within months. Losing this bid, though, would not be the last chapter in Morocco's push to host a World Cup.

• 8. Aftermath

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  Morocco did not stop trying after 2026. It returned with a new bid for the 2030 World Cup, this time alongside Portugal and Spain instead of bidding alone. In December 2024, FIFA unanimously awarded that joint bid to the three countries, finally making Morocco a World Cup host nation. The 2030 tournament will also include centenary games held in Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, a South American postscript to the tournament Morocco will now co-host.