Madhyamaka
The Indian Buddhist monk Nāgārjuna established the Madhyamaka tradition sometime in the first three centuries CE. Scholars cannot pinpoint his exact birth date or place of residence, though Joseph Walser suggests he lived in Amarāvatī within the east Deccan region. His core philosophical work remains the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, known as Root Verses on the Middle Way. This text serves as the foundational document for the entire school. Nāgārjuna drew heavily from earlier Buddhist sources to construct his arguments. He explicitly cites the Advice to Kātyāyana sutra in chapter 15 of his major work. That ancient scripture states that both existence and nonexistence are criticized by the Blessed One who opposed being and non-being. Other scholars note allusions to the Mahahatthipadopama sutta and the Kevaddha sutta within his writings. Some researchers argue that themes found in the Aśtakavagga and Pārāyanavagga texts represent a Proto-Mādhyamika teaching. The Dazhidulun, a text attributed to him in Chinese tradition, also references the Arthavargīya sūtra regarding ultimate truth. While some scholars like Paul Fuller and Alexander Wynne reject claims that these early texts constitute Madhyamaka, others see clear connections. Nāgārjuna's primary goal involved refuting the essentialism of certain Abhidharma schools such as Vaibhasika. These schools posited theories of svabhava or intrinsic nature. He also targeted Hindu Nyāya and Vaiśeśika schools which claimed ontological substances called dravyatas. His method relied on reductio ad absurdum arguments known as prasanga to demonstrate that any theory of substance was unsustainable.
Central to Madhyamaka philosophy is śūnyatā, commonly translated as emptiness. This concept refers to the idea that dharmas are empty of svabhava, meaning they lack intrinsic nature or inherent existence. Richard P. Hayes notes that svabhava can be interpreted as either identity or causal independence. Candrakīrti defines it further as something that does not depend on anything else. A common structure used by Madhyamaka thinkers to negate this concept is the catuśkoți, or four corners tetralemma. This logical tool presents four alternatives: a proposition is true; false; both true and false; or neither true nor false. The denial of svabhava does not mean a nihilistic rejection of all things. In conventional everyday sense, Madhyamaka accepts that one can speak of things even if ultimately they are empty of inherent existence. Emptiness itself is also empty, having no independent existence or reference to a transcendental reality beyond phenomenal reality. Nāgārjuna equates the emptiness of dharmas with their dependent origination. He writes in chapter 24 of his Root Verses that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path. Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. This view steers clear of metaphysical extremes like annihilationism and eternalism. Annihilationism suggests nothing exists after death or that actions have no effects. Eternalism claims things inherently exist and are efficacious objects of craving. Madhyamaka argues these two views are equally untenable. The cognitive aspect of svabhava acts as a superimposition beings make when perceiving things. Candrakirti compares this error to someone suffering from vitreous floaters causing an illusion of hairs appearing in their visual field. Understanding how an optical illusion works does not stop it from functioning. A cognitive shift termed realization is required to end the suffering caused by reification of the world.
Rāhulabhadra was an early madhyamika sometimes described as either a teacher of Nāgārjuna or his contemporary follower. He composed verses in praise of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Chinese sources maintain he also wrote a commentary on the MMK translated later by Paramartha. Nāgārjuna's pupil Aryadeva lived during the third century CE and authored various works including the famous 400 Verses. His writings serve as a supplement to Nāgārjuna's own texts. Aryadeva also produced refutations against non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools. Two commentaries on the MMK may be attributed to him, one called Akutobhaya which some consider an auto-commentary by Nagarjuna. Another commentary survives only in Chinese as part of the Chung-Lun Middle treatise. Buddhapālita lived between 470 and 550 CE and developed the prāsañgika approach within Madhyamaka thought. His work Madhyamakavritti exists now only in Tibetan translation. He critiqued essentialism mainly through reductio ad absurdum arguments known as prasanga. Bhāvaviveka argued differently in his Lamp of Wisdom text. He advocated for using logical arguments based on epistemology from logicians like Dignāga. This created a source of future debate regarding proper argumentation styles. Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita for not putting Madhyamaka arguments into autonomous syllogisms. He held that madhyamikas must positively prove their position using sources of knowledge agreeable to all parties. Candrakīrti lived approximately between 600 and 650 CE and sought to defend Buddhapālita while critiquing Bhāvaviveka's position. He wrote the Prasannapadā Clear Words commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. His works remain central to understanding Madhyamaka in Tibetan Buddhism. Śāntideva lived at the end of the seventh century and first half of the eighth century. He composed the philosophical poem Bodhicaryāvatāra discussing the bodhisattva path and six paramitas. Later commentators included Prajñakaramati who wrote on the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Jayananda who commented on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra.
The early transmission of Buddhism to Tibet involved influential figures such as Śāntarakśita who lived from 725 to 788 CE. His students Haribhadra and Kamalashila (740, 795) played key roles in spreading these ideas. The Kadampa figures Atisha (982, 1054) and his pupil Dromtön (1005, 1064) taught Madhyamaka using works by Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. Early transmission saw two main strands of philosophical views debating each other. One camp defended Yogacara-Madhyamaka interpretation centered on scholars of Sangphu monastery founded by Ngog Loden Sherab (1059, 1109). This group also included Chapa Chokyi Senge (1109, 1169). The second camp championed work of Candrakirti over Yogacara-Madhyamaka interpretation. Patsab Nyima Drag born in 1055 and Jayananda active in the twelfth century belonged to this group. It was the Madhyamaka interpretation and works of Candrakirti which became dominant over time in Tibet. Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü died in 1185 and wrote an important commentary on Nagarjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. He studied under both Dharmakirtian Chapa and Candrakirti scholar Patsab. His work attempted to steer a middle course between their differing views. Mabja affirmed conventional usefulness of Buddhist pramāna while accepting Candrakirti's prasangika views. His scholarship influenced later Tibetan Madhyamikas including Longchenpa, Tsongkhapa, Gorampa, and Mikyö Dorje. Śāntarakśita and his student Kamalaśīla were influential in initial spread of Madhyamaka Buddhism to Tibet. Haribhadra wrote an influential commentary on Abhisamayalamkara text.
Tibetan Buddhist scholars began distinguishing between Autonomist Svātantrika and Consequentialist Prāsañgika approaches to reasoning. This distinction originated with Tibetans rather than classical Indian madhyamikas. The terms refer to logical procedures used by Bhavaviveka who argued for autonomous syllogisms and Buddhapalita who held one should only use reductio ad absurdum. Svātantrika states that conventional phenomena have conventional essential existence without ultimately existing essence. They believe they can make positive assertions using syllogistic logic because proponent and opponent share same valid cognition. Name comes from ability to use autonomous arguments in debate. Central technique avowed by Prāsañgika is showing by reductio ad absurdum that any positive assertion regarding phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional. It holds not necessary for proponent and opponent to use same kind of valid cognition to establish common subject. Possible to change view of opponent through reductio argument. Major difference may lie between two styles of reasoning while division itself remains exclusively Tibetan. No conclusive evidence shows existence of Indian antecedent. Longchen Rabjam noted fourteenth century that Candrakirti favored approach when specifically discussing analysis for ultimacy. Otherwise he made positive assertions describing paths of Buddhist practice in his Madhyamakavatāra. Even Prāsañgikas stick to using reductios specifically when analyzing for ultimate truth.
Further Tibetan philosophical developments began responding to works of scholar Dölpopa Shérap Gyeltsen (1292, 1361). This led to two distinctly opposed views on nature of ultimate reality within Tibet. Dolpopa founded Jonang school and viewed Buddha Nature as truly real unconditioned replete with eternal changeless virtues. In Jonang school ultimate reality is only empty of what is impermanent and conditioned not of its own self which is ultimate Buddhahood. Ultimate reality acts as ground or substratum uncreated indestructible noncomposite beyond chain of dependent origination. Basing himself on Indian Tathāgatagarbha sūtras main sources, Dolpopa described Buddha Nature as great emptiness far from annihilatory emptiness. This great emptiness said filled with eternal powers and virtues. Position came known as emptiness of other because held ultimate truth was positive reality not empty of own nature. Only empty of what it was other than itself. Dolpopa considered view form of Madhyamaka calling system Great Madhyamaka. He opposed rangtong self-empty view that ultimate reality empty of everything including itself. It thus not transcendental ground metaphysical absolute including all eternal Buddha qualities. Rangtong shentong distinction became central issue contention among Tibetan Buddhist philosophers. Alternative interpretations taught outside Jonang include Kagyu figures like Jamgon Kongtrul (1813, 1899) and Sakya philosopher Shakya Chokden (1428, 1507). Gelug school founded beginning fifteenth century by Je Tsongkhapa (1357, 1419). Tsongkhapa argued only interpretation of Nagarjuna by prāsañgika Indian thinkers ultimately correct. He maintained ultimate truth or emptiness absolute negation meaning nothing exempt from being empty including emptiness itself.
Madhyamaka philosophy obtained central position in all main Tibetan Buddhist schools who consider themselves madhyamikas. Sakya scholars such as Rendawa Zhönnu Lodrö (1349, 1412) and Rongtön Sheyja Künrig (1367, 1450) were early critics of other empty view Gorampa Sonam Senge (1429, 1489) defended orthodox Sakya Madhyamaka position critiquing both Dolpopa and Tsongkhapa interpretations. He widely studied not only in Sakya but also Nyingma and Kagyü institutions. Gorampa called version middle way qua free from extremes claiming ultimate truth ineffable beyond predication concept. For Gorampa emptiness absence four extremes existence nonexistence both neither without further qualification. Conventional truths object negation because found entirely nonexistent when subjected to ultimate rational analysis. All conventional realities fabrications since awakening requires transcending fabrication. Ultimate freedom from conceptual fabrication reached by negating reality appearances. Mikyö Dorje eighth Karmapa Lama lived 1507, 1554 and argued language other emptiness does not appear sutras treatises Indian masters. He attacked view of Dolpopa against sutras ultimate meaning stating phenomena emptiness. Jamyang Sheba Changkya Rölpé Dorjé Gendun Chopel fourteenth Dalai Lama influential modern figures Gelug Madhyamaka. Contemporary scholars agree hardly any details concerning Nāgārjuna yet his influence persists globally. His ideas continue shaping discussions on consciousness ethics metaphysics across disciplines today.
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Common questions
When did Nāgārjuna establish the Madhyamaka tradition?
Nāgārjuna established the Madhyamaka tradition sometime in the first three centuries CE. Scholars cannot pinpoint his exact birth date or place of residence, though Joseph Walser suggests he lived in Amarāvatī within the east Deccan region.
What is the core philosophical work written by Nāgārjuna for Madhyamaka?
His core philosophical work remains the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, known as Root Verses on the Middle Way. This text serves as the foundational document for the entire school and explicitly cites the Advice to Kātyāyana sutra in chapter 15.
How does Madhyamaka philosophy define the concept of śūnyatā or emptiness?
This concept refers to the idea that dharmas are empty of svabhava, meaning they lack intrinsic nature or inherent existence. Emptiness itself is also empty, having no independent existence or reference to a transcendental reality beyond phenomenal reality.
Who were the key figures responsible for transmitting Madhyamaka Buddhism to Tibet?
The early transmission involved influential figures such as Śāntarakśita who lived from 725 to 788 CE and his students Haribhadra and Kamalashila. The Kadampa figures Atisha and Dromtön later taught Madhyamaka using works by Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti.
What is the difference between Svātantrika and Prāsañgika approaches in Tibetan Madhyamaka?
Svātantrika states that conventional phenomena have conventional essential existence without ultimately existing essence and uses autonomous syllogisms. Prāsañgika holds not necessary for proponent and opponent to use same kind of valid cognition and shows by reductio ad absurdum that any positive assertion regarding phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional.