Kargil War
The Kargil War, fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999, began with a warning from a local shepherd. In the Batalik sector, an Indian patrol led by Captain Saurabh Kalia acted on that tip-off. The patrol was ambushed, and the ambush exposed an intrusion that Indian commanders had not detected. India's army chief, General V. P. Malik, was visiting Poland at the time and followed events through reports. On the 12th of May, the estimate passed to him spoke of "some militants". By the 15th of May it had grown to 250-300. By the 21st of May it exceeded 1000. Who were these intruders, and what did their commanders hope to gain? How do armies fight on mountain ridges when the enemy sits above them? Why did the world, in the end, line up against Pakistan? The answers begin with one road through the mountains.
National Highway 1 runs from Srinagar to Leh and passes through the town of Kargil, which lies 205 km from Srinagar and faces the Northern Areas across the Line of Control. Above the road, military outposts sat on ridges generally around 5000 m high, and a few reached 5485 m. Anyone holding those ridges could watch the traffic below. Pakistani fire on one stretch of the highway threatened to cut off Leh, though a longer route existed through Himachal Pradesh, the Leh-Manali Highway. Narrow roads and rough terrain slowed every convoy, and the altitude limited what aircraft could carry. Control of the highway therefore became India's first priority.
Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was a tehsil of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region of isolated valleys divided by some of the world's highest mountains. Its people belonged to diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948 ended with the Line of Control cutting Ladakh in two, and the Skardu tehsil went to Pakistan. After Pakistan's defeat in the war of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement. In it they promised not to fight over that boundary.
Winters in Kargil are long and chilly, with temperatures often falling to -48 C. Summers are cool, but the nights stay frigid. Mountain warfare favours whoever holds the high ground. An attacker needs a far higher ratio of men to defenders to dislodge them, and altitude and freezing cold make the task worse. Tactically vital features and well-prepared posts atop the peaks gave defenders advantages like those of a fortress. Kargil was also chosen partly because several military positions there stood unoccupied and open to preemptive seizure.
Pakistan held one more advantage. Skardu, a Pakistani-controlled town just 173 km from Kargil, could provide logistical and artillery support. A road between the two towns exists, but it was closed in 1949.
Through the winter of 1998-1999, parts of the Pakistani armed forces quietly trained troops and sent them across the Line of Control under the codename Operation Badr. Its aims were to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh and to push India out of the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan hoped that either result would force India to negotiate a settlement of the wider Kashmir dispute. Tension in the region might also internationalise the Kashmir issue. A further goal may have been to lift the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Jammu and Kashmir. This all came in February 1999, the month both countries signed the Lahore Declaration promising a peaceful, bilateral solution.
The story that the intruders were Kashmiri militants did not survive scrutiny. Lieutenant General Shahid Aziz, who headed an analysis wing of the ISI, wrote in The Nation in January 2013: "There were no Mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition".
Who approved the plan remains disputed. According to General Malik and many scholars, the groundwork was laid long before 1999. The army had put similar infiltration proposals to Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto, but both were shelved for fear of all-out war. Some analysts believe the blueprint was revived soon after Pervez Musharraf became army chief in October 1998. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif later claimed he knew nothing and learned of the crisis from a phone call by India's Atal Bihari Vajpayee. He blamed Musharraf and "just two or three of his cronies". Musharraf insisted that Sharif had been briefed 15 days before Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on the 20th of February. Some writers also suggest the operation was revenge for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984, which seized much of the Siachen Glacier.
The occupation itself began in February 1999. Troops of the elite Special Services Group, along with four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry, set up bases on 132 vantage points on the Indian side. The Northern Light Infantry was then a paramilitary regiment, not part of the regular Pakistani army. According to General Malik, the bulk of the infiltration came in April. The intrusions ranged across the lower Mushkoh Valley, the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, Kaksar, Batalik, the Chorbat La sector and Turtuk. India missed many of them because patrols were never sent into some of these areas, and heavy Pakistani artillery fire covered the intruders elsewhere.
On the 18th of May, a high-level security meeting in Delhi finally grasped the real scale of the intrusion. Heavy mobilisation began, and division-level movement was ordered. Several divisions were told to stop counterinsurgency work and take up positions against the infiltrators. The seized area is generally put at between 130 and 200 square kilometres. The intruders carried small arms and grenade launchers, along with mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. India later said it recovered more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines.
India answered with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 troops. The terrain made division and corps operations impossible, so most fighting happened at brigade or battalion level. In practice, two divisions totalling 20,000 men, plus several thousand paramilitary and air force personnel, were deployed. That brought the Indian force in the Kargil-Drass sector to close to 30,000. The infiltrators, including those giving logistical backup, numbered roughly 5,000 at the height of the conflict.
The first target was the ground nearest the highway. Tololing and Tiger Hill in Dras dominated the Srinagar-Leh route. By the 22nd of May, 18 Grenadiers, 1 Naga and Garhwal under Colonel Kushal Thakur had begun an assault on Tololing and were awaiting reinforcements. Troops from 2 Rajputana Rifles under Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Ravindranath and from 16 Grenadiers joined the fight through difficult terrain. Several senior officers died. India recaptured Point 4590 on Tololing in mid-June, and it cost the Indian Army more casualties than any other single battle of the war.
On the 20th of June, 13 JnK Rifles under Lieutenant Colonel Y. K. Joshi captured Point 5140 after an intense close-quarters battle. Lieutenant Vikram Batra's victory signal, "Yeh Dil mange More", became legendary. About 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear posts in the line of sight. The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, though it did less elsewhere because the ground offered little room to deploy it. On the 28th of June, 2 Rajputana Rifles attacked the Three Pimples after General Malik spoke personally with Ravindranath. The two-day battle ended with the position captured on the 29th of June.
By the last week of June, most of India's firepower was aimed at Tiger Hill, the highest peak around. The battle began on the 3rd of July and became the first in India to be telecast live. One battalion proved insufficient after two days, so 8 Sikh moved in from the west. By the 8th of July, 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh held the entire feature, and General Malik briefed the media. According to the official count, 75-80% of the intruded area and nearly all the high ground were back under Indian control.
Point 4875 came next. Lieutenant Colonel Joshi's battalion began the assault on the 4th of July, but fortified defences left two companies stuck in daylight. Vikram Batra, injured, volunteered to reinforce them as a platoon commander. General Malik noted: "The opposing troops were so close that, besides the staccato of small arms, verbal exchanges carried on throughout the night." When Captain Naveen Nagappa was injured, Batra led the final assault and rescued him. Batra died to sniper and RPG fire on the 7th of July, and his attack secured the victory.
In the Batalik sector, the fight for Point 5203 began on the 6th of June and ended with its capture on the 21st of June, when the Ladakh Scouts joined in. Jubar peak fell on the 7th of July. The last major action was Zulu Spur, which 3 Gurkha Rifles and 9 Para SF attacked from the 22nd of July under Brigadier M. P. S. Bajwa. The Pakistani forces retreated by the 25th of July, and the fighting ceased on the 26th.
India cleared only limited use of air power on the 25th of May, and it came with a firm order. No fighter jet was to cross the Line of Control under any circumstance. The government feared undesirable escalation. This became Operation Safed Sagar, the Indian Air Force's role beside the ground troops. It was reportedly the first air war fought at such altitudes, with targets between 6000 and 18000 ft above sea level.
Thin air changed how weapons behaved. The rarefied atmosphere affected the trajectories of rockets and of dumb and laser-guided bombs. The Pakistani Air Force offered no opposition, so aircrews had time to adjust their aiming and firing techniques. Poor weather and range limits still cut bomb loads and the number of usable airstrips. The Mirage 2000 fleet was the exception, and it began operations on the 30th of May.
The 27th of May brought losses. A MiG-27 flown by Flight Lieutenant K. Nachiketa went down, which the Indian Air Force attributed to engine failure. A MiG-21 flown by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja was shot down by the Pakistani army. Both aircraft fell over the Batalik sector. Pakistan first said both jets had crossed into its territory. Nachiketa was captured by a Pakistani patrol and given prisoner-of-war status, and he was released on the 3rd of June. Reports say Ahuja bailed out safely but was apparently killed by his captors, since his body came back riddled with bullet wounds. An Indian Mi-8 helicopter was also lost, to Stinger missiles.
The Mirage 2000H flew its first sortie on the 30th of May, dropping laser-guided bombs on well-entrenched Pakistani positions. Its bombing, by day and by night, showed results almost at once.
Out at sea, Operation Talwar prepared the Indian Navy to blockade Pakistani ports, chiefly Karachi. India's western and eastern fleets met in the North Arabian Sea and began aggressive patrols. The move targeted Pakistan's dependence on sea-based oil and trade. Nawaz Sharif later disclosed that Pakistan had just six days of fuel left to sustain itself if full-scale war had broken out.
Pakistan's first public line was that independent Kashmiri insurgents alone were fighting. Its diplomats described the intruders as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", an approach built on plausible deniability. Veteran analysts doubted it from the start. The battle was fought at heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped volunteers could hardly seize land and hold it. The army's own honours undercut the story. Two soldiers received the Nishan-e-Haider, Pakistan's highest military award, and another 90 received gallantry awards, most of them posthumously.
India pressed the point with evidence. On the 5th of June it released documents recovered from three Pakistani soldiers. On the 11th of June it released intercepted conversations between General Musharraf, who was visiting China, and a senior general in Rawalpindi. In the tape, the general is recorded saying "the scruff of the militants necks is in our hands". Pakistan dismissed the recording as a "total fabrication". Pakistan also made contradictory statements and at one point defended the incursions by saying the Line of Control itself was disputed.
The Kargil War was South Asia's first "live" war. Indian television and websites carried war footage and analysis at a time when electronic journalism there was growing explosively. One Pakistani shell even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil, and coverage carried on. The coverage also fed jingoistic feelings, and press briefings from both governments produced clashing claims. India placed a temporary embargo on information from Pakistan, banning the telecast of the state-run channel PTV and blocking online editions of the newspaper Dawn. It also ran advertisements in The Times and The Washington Post describing Pakistan's support for extremists in Kashmir.
At a seminar in Karachi, Pakistani journalists agreed that India's government had taken its press and people into its confidence while Pakistan's had not. Some analysts believe the larger and more credible Indian media acted as a force multiplier and a morale booster for the military operation.
Governments beyond the region were less forgiving. President Bill Clinton later wrote in his autobiography that "Sharif's moves were perplexing". He added that "by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the bilateral talks", and he applauded India for not crossing the line itself. The G8 nations condemned the violation of the Line of Control at the Cologne summit. The European Union and the ASEAN Regional Forum took India's side on the line's inviolability. Even China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted that forces return to their pre-conflict positions.
India conducted its first successful nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan had been developing its own capability in secret since around the same time, and it conducted its first known tests in 1998, just two weeks after a second series of Indian tests. The Kargil War therefore stands as one of only two instances of conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states, alongside the Sino-Soviet border conflict.
On the 31st of May, Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad warned that an escalation could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. The statement was read at once as a nuclear threat. The leader of Pakistan's senate added: "The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed". Some experts believe the 1998 tests emboldened the Pakistani military to increase coercion against India.
The alarm grew when US intelligence received reports of Pakistani warheads moving toward the border. Bruce Riedel, then an aide to President Clinton, reported that US intelligence had imaged Pakistani nuclear weapons moving to forward deployments. Clinton tried to talk Nawaz Sharif out of nuclear brinkmanship. A White House official said Sharif seemed genuinely surprised by the supposed missile movement and answered that India was probably planning the same. A security expert, Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, claimed in a 2000 article that India had readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Sharif later claimed in his official biography that Musharraf had moved warheads without telling him. Musharraf wrote in his memoirs that Pakistan's nuclear delivery system was not operational during the war.
The fear extended to other weapons. Pakistan accused India of using chemical weapons and napalm. India displayed a cache of gas masks as proof that Pakistan might be ready for unconventional weapons. US officials and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons found the Pakistani allegations unfounded.
By the 15th of June, India had massed much of its army near the international border, and commanders were ordered to be ready to cross it. Pakistan's director general of military operations, Tauqir Zia, told his Indian counterpart that Pakistan was uncomfortable with the escalation. Sharif flew to meet Clinton on the 4th of July. Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan removed all its forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control. After the Washington accord of that day, Sharif agreed to withdraw, and most of the fighting gradually halted. The United Jihad Council, an umbrella body of pro-Pakistani Kashmiri separatists, rejected the climb-down and decided to fight on. A ceasefire on the 12th of July failed when Pakistani forces did not withdraw. On the 27th of July, Pakistani forces asked for a flag meeting to collect their dead, and Major General Mohinder Puri agreed.
From the end of the war until February 2000, the Indian stock market rose by more than 30%. The next national budget raised military spending sharply. Patriotism surged, and many celebrities voiced support for the Kargil cause. In September-October 1999, the National Democratic Alliance government won re-election with 303 of 545 seats in the Lok Sabha. One month after the war, a Pakistan Navy plane was shot down by India in the Atlantique Incident, briefly reviving fears of conflict. India also decided to finish fencing the entire Line of Control, a project Pakistan had stalled. Relations with the United States improved. Relations with Israel, which had discreetly supplied ordnance, unmanned aerial vehicles, laser-guided bombs and satellite imagery, were also bolstered.
The Atal Bihari Vajpayee government set up the Kargil Review Committee, chaired by the strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam. Its report led to a large-scale restructuring of Indian intelligence and, unusually, was published openly. The government withheld some chapters and all annexures as classified. Critics said the report avoided assigning specific responsibility. It indicted Brigadier Surinder Singh for failing to report intrusions in time, but press reports claimed he had issued early warnings that senior commanders ignored. An internal armed forces assessment cited "a sense of complacency" and being "unprepared for a conventional war", and it pointed to a shortage of large-calibre guns like the Bofors.
In Pakistan, the reckoning was harsher. Many Pakistanis had expected victory based on official reports and were dismayed by the retreat. Benazir Bhutto called the war "Pakistan's greatest blunder". Retired Major General Abdul Majeed Malik called it a "total disaster" in 2012. In a national security meeting, Admiral Fasih Bokhari called for a court-martial against Musharraf. On the 12th of October 1999, Musharraf staged a bloodless coup and ousted Nawaz Sharif. The Northern Light Infantry, praised even by a retired Indian general, was folded into the regular army. Despite many calls, Pakistan never set up a public commission of inquiry.
The human cost is still argued over. India's official figures are 527 dead and 1,363 wounded. For Pakistan, Musharraf gave 357 killed, while the US Department of State made an early, partial estimate of close to 700. Indian estimates stand at 1,042, and Sharif said more than 4,000 died. Eight Pakistani personnel were captured and repatriated on the 13th of August 1999. India awarded four Param Vir Chakras and eleven Maha Vir Chakras.
The Kargil War Memorial stands in Dras, in the foothills of Tololing Hill. A poem by Makhanlal Chaturvedi, "Pushp Kii Abhilasha", is inscribed on its gateway, and the Memorial Wall bears the names of the fallen. A museum holds archives, recordings and captured Pakistani equipment. The war inspired films including Lakshya in 2004 and Shershaah in 2021, which follows the life of Vikram Batra. It even touched sport. The India-Pakistan match at the 1999 Cricket World Cup coincided with the Kargil timeline and became one of the most viewed games of that tournament.
Updated
Common questions
When was the Kargil War fought and where?
The Kargil War was fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999 in the Kargil district of Ladakh and along the Line of Control. The fighting ceased on the 26th of July 1999.
What was Operation Badr in the Kargil War?
Operation Badr was the codename of Pakistan's infiltration across the Line of Control. Its aims were to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh and push India out of the Siachen Glacier.
What were Operation Vijay and Operation Safed Sagar in the Kargil War?
Operation Vijay was the codename of India's military operation, a mobilisation of 200,000 troops. Operation Safed Sagar was the Indian Air Force's role beside the ground troops, with limited air power cleared on the 25th of May.
Why was the Kargil War so difficult to fight?
The Kargil War was fought on ridges generally around 5000 m high, with a few as high as 5485 m, and winter temperatures can drop to -48 C. Attackers need a far higher ratio of men to dislodge defenders on high ground.
Did nuclear weapons play a role in the Kargil War?
Both India and Pakistan had tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and the Kargil War is one of only two conventional wars between nuclear-armed states. On the 31st of May 1999, Pakistan's foreign secretary warned that Pakistan could use "any weapon" in its arsenal.
What were the casualties of the Kargil War?
India's official figures are 527 dead and 1,363 wounded. Pakistani figures vary widely, from 357 killed according to Musharraf to more than 4,000 according to Nawaz Sharif.
How did the Kargil War end?
After the Washington accord of the 4th of July 1999, Nawaz Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops under pressure from President Bill Clinton. Indian forces cleared the Drass subsector and fighting ceased on the 26th of July 1999.
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