German–Polish declaration of non-aggression
The Locarno Treaties of 1925 reshaped European security in ways that left Poland exposed. France agreed never to send forces into Germany outside its own occupation zone in the Rhineland. Britain and Italy guaranteed only the Franco-German border against changes from either side. The United Kingdom and Italy refused to make similar guarantees for Germany's eastern border with Poland. Under the terms of the Franco-Polish alliance of 1921, France was supposed to launch an offensive from the Rhineland if Germany invaded Poland. The Locarno Treaties effectively gutted these provisions of the alliance. British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain pushed for the treaties as a way for Germany to peacefully revise the Treaty of Versailles in Eastern Europe. Chamberlain believed that as long as Poland had France as an ally, it would never hand over areas like the Polish Corridor. Improved Franco-German relations were intended to weaken the Franco-Polish alliance and force the Poles to yield to German power. From the early 1920s onward, British foreign policy aimed to revise aspects of the Treaty of Versailles in favor of the Reich.
Józef Piłsudski sought a non-aggression declaration due to concerns over France's Maginot Line construction. Until 1929, French plans called for an offensive into the North German Plain alongside offensives from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The construction of the Maginot Line began in 1929 and indicated the French Army's preference for a strictly defensive stance. This shift left eastern allies like Poland on their own without guaranteed support. From Piłsudski's viewpoint, a non-aggression declaration with Germany became the best choice given France's new military plans. Some historians speculate that Piłsudski may have sounded out France on joint military action after Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933. The French refusal might have been one reason Poland signed the non-aggression declaration. However, there is no evidence in French or Polish diplomatic archives that such a proposal was ever advanced. Historians noted that when rumors of a Polish preventive-war proposal were reported in Paris in late October 1933, the source was the Polish embassy itself. It has been argued that Piłsudski had the embassy start these rumors to pressure Germans who demanded an end to the 1921 Franco-Polish alliance.
A détente between Poland and Germany began in early 1933 through secret talks led by Józef Beck. Hans-Adolf von Moltke interpreted a veiled proposal for direct contact made by Beck in April 1933 as a key step. Hitler encouraged this by stating on the 2nd of May 1933, that he did not share the view that questions Poland's right to exist. On the 17th of May 1933, Hitler gave a speech to the Reichstag saying it was impossible to make Germans out of Poles. Talks were held in September between Beck and German officials Konstantin von Neurath and Joseph Goebbels during a disarmament conference in Geneva. The rapprochement was temporarily interrupted by Germany's withdrawal from Geneva talks in October 1933. By November 1933, the Polish ambassador asked Hitler if security losses could be compensated by direct relations. Hitler responded by calling Poland an outpost against Asia and proposed excluding war between the two countries. A draft declaration was accepted in principle by the Polish government within a month. Talks on the text concluded quickly in January 1934 before the final signing.
The agreement angered political elites in Czechoslovakia just four days after discussions between Józef Beck and Edvard Beneš. Beneš told British ambassador Joseph Addison that the deal showed Poland was a useless country deserving another partition. French public opinion turned negative as critics believed Poland might become an unreliable ally. The French government claimed they had not been fully advised during later stages of negotiations despite being informed earlier. American public opinion saw the agreement as signaling Polish support for Germany even though the administration previously advocated such a pact. Concerns arose in the Soviet Union with commentary in Izvestia questioning whether the agreement represented a concession or a German maneuver. To allay fears of war, Poland renewed the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact on the 5th of May 1934. This renewal extended until the 31st of December 1945 despite repeated suggestions from Hitler to form an alliance against the Soviets. A report by Soviet ambassador Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko noted the agreement contained no secret terms.
German policy changed drastically in late 1938 after the annexation of Sudetenland sealed Czechoslovakia's fate. In October 1938, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop offered to renew the agreement if Poland allowed Danzig's annexation and extraterritorial motorway construction through the Corridor. Beck communicated unofficial refusal at Berchtesgaden on the 4th of January 1939, and formal rejection occurred on the 8th of January 1939. Hitler denounced the declaration unilaterally on the 28th of April 1939 during an address before the Reichstag. He renewed territorial claims in Poland citing the Anglo-Polish alliance as justification for denunciation. The signing prompted Hitler to seek rapprochement with Moscow which was positively received by the Soviet Union. After months of rising tension, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact containing a secret protocol to divide Poland. Germany invaded Poland on the 1st of September 1939 initiating World War II while Soviets invaded on the 17th of September 1939.
The historical significance of the 1934 declaration has remained controversial among scholars for decades. British historian Hugh Seton-Watson wrote in 1945 that the pact marked the beginning of active German-Polish cooperation in Eastern Europe. A.J.P. Taylor considered in his 1961 book The Origins of the Second World War that the agreement removed Polish support for France and freed Hitler to take further actions. Later historians have been less critical of the agreement than earlier critics. Anna Cienciala wrote in 1975 that the pact formed part of a policy of equilibrium seeking to preserve independence by balancing relations with both Germany and the Soviet Union. Piotr S. Wandycz criticized Taylor in 1986 for giving insufficient weight to assurances regarding Poland's alliance with France. Russian conspiracy theories emerged when the SVR declassified documents on the 1st of September 2009 claiming Poland secretly conspired against the Soviet Union between 1935 and 1945. Polish historians stated there was no evidence such protocols existed despite claims from former KGB officer sources.
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Common questions
What was the purpose of the German, Polish declaration of non-aggression signed in 1934?
The agreement aimed to establish a period of peace between Poland and Germany by excluding war between the two countries. Józef Piłsudski sought this declaration due to concerns over France's Maginot Line construction which left eastern allies like Poland on their own without guaranteed support.
When did Hitler denounce the German, Polish declaration of non-aggression unilaterally?
Hitler denounced the declaration unilaterally on the 28th of April 1939 during an address before the Reichstag. He renewed territorial claims in Poland citing the Anglo-Polish alliance as justification for the denunciation.
Who led the secret talks that began the détente between Poland and Germany in early 1933?
A détente between Poland and Germany began in early 1933 through secret talks led by Józef Beck. Hans-Adolf von Moltke interpreted a veiled proposal for direct contact made by Beck in April 1933 as a key step toward rapprochement.
Why did Poland renew the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact on the 5th of May 1934?
To allay fears of war, Poland renewed the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact on the 5th of May 1934. This renewal extended until the 31st of December 1945 despite repeated suggestions from Hitler to form an alliance against the Soviets.
What historical significance does Anna Cienciala attribute to the German, Polish declaration of non-aggression in 1975?
Anna Cienciala wrote in 1975 that the pact formed part of a policy of equilibrium seeking to preserve independence by balancing relations with both Germany and the Soviet Union. Later historians have been less critical of the agreement than earlier critics like A.J.P. Taylor.